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Part I: 
 
Introduction 
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Chapter 1:  
Background, Aim and Focus 
 
The Bible and the Koran are canonical scriptures with great significance for many in 
contemporary Norway as religious texts and as cultural and historical documents. The two 
scriptures are understood differently, both by the religious traditions themselves (according to 
their different statuses in Christianity and Islam respectively) and by the general public. Hadith 
is also considered an authoritative source of revelation among most Muslims.1 
In two commentary articles in the largest Norwegian newspaper, VG, a journalist cited 
and gave his own interpretation of Sura 4:34 from the Koran (one of the texts in this study) to 
illustrate his opinion that, as a religion, Islam was totally unsuited to Norwegian society – 
because of its alleged view of women.2 It is impossible to imagine an op-ed article in a 
prominent newspaper in Norway doing the same with a biblical text, even though it is not 
difficult to find biblical texts that could lead one to see the Christian tradition as generally 
oppressive to women. There may be several reasons for this. The Bible is no longer regarded as 
having a significant impact on the public sphere in Norway. There is also a general awareness 
that the Bible is interpreted in different ways among Christian believers, with the result that one 
text or interpretation alone cannot represent the Christian message.  
The focus of this study is to analyze how Christian and Muslim women in Norway relate 
to and interpret texts from their canonical3 scriptures (the Bible, the Koran, and the hadith) when 
reading the texts together. The interpretative situation to be analyzed covers both the encounter 
between readers and texts on the one hand and the encounter between readers on the other. The 
starting question was: Do Muslim and Christian women differ in their interpretative strategies 
when reading their canonical scriptures or do their strategies have commonalities and 
overlapping features? 
 Right from the beginning, however, the aim of the study was more than simply a 
comparison of interpretative strategies between women from the two traditions. I also wanted to 
map the interaction between the readers in interpreting the texts. This entailed two new 
                                                 
1
Hadith: “Report of the words and deeds of Muhammad and other early Muslims; considered an authoritative source 
of revelation, second only to the Koran (sometimes referred to as sayings of the Prophet). Hadith … were collected, 
transmitted, and taught orally for two centuries after Muhammad’s death and then began to be collected in written 
form and codified.” (Esposito 2003: 101) The hadith text about Hajar in this study is taken from al-Bukhari, one of 
the sixth most authoritative collections for Sunni Muslims. 
2 Olav Versto, “Dette finner vi oss ikke i” (“We don’t accept this”) and “Hijab var et feilgrep” (“The hijab was a 
mistake”), commentary articles in VG 14.04.2007 and 21.02.2009. 
3 I will use the notion “canonical” instead of “sacred” or “holy” with respect to the Bible, the Koran, and the hadith 
in this study because it has a more descriptive sense, referring to texts that have a specific status as normative 
documents in a defined realm, such as a particular religion.  
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questions: What kind of interpretative strategies does a Christian or a Muslim woman use when 
reading texts from the other tradition? And how may an encounter between women from the two 
religions, with cultural background as a crossing variable, influence their interpretative 
strategies?  
Another question underlying this study was: What can create a possible shared agency in 
such an encounter, if the participants assume the task of changing women’s conditions in one 
way or another? On what basis would such an agency be constructed? What role do the texts and 
interpretative strategies play in the formation of an agency for change? 
 Reading and interpreting canonical scriptures may turn into reading processes that are not 
only directed toward the text but also toward the reading of the context(s).4 The positions of the 
texts and the positioning of the readers with respect to the texts are influencing factors in this 
respect. The term “readings” in the title of this study thus refer to both texts and context. 
 
 Frameworks and Outline 
I became aware of the term “Gender Justice” some years ago through a book written by 
Norwegian social scientists and feminists5 commenting on the distribution of power in the 
Norwegian society. I later discovered that the Muslim feminist scholar Ziba Mir-Hosseini used 
the same term to describe an important aim for Islamic legal rulings (Mir-Hosseini 2007). The 
term justice can be interpreted both subjectively and objectively, and the interplay between the 
subjective and objective provides space for individuality and difference while at the same time 
including the political aim of equality. The use of the notion “gender justice” instead of “gender 
equality,” however, makes it more apparent that the premises for the evaluation of equality are 
not fixed in advance. This means that the power of definition is not settled automatically in a 
hegemonic discourse but is open for negotiation. 
 Bringing the term “Gender Justice” into the contemporary Norwegian context provides 
an analytical background for taking a closer look at various discourses on women, gender 
equality, and religion. In the hegemonic discourse in Europe Islam is often targeted as a religion 
that discriminates against women, and this has implications for the general attitude toward 
Muslims and toward Muslim women in particular. At least in the Norwegian context (the 
situation may be different in other European countries), the Christian tradition is not targeted in 
the same way, and the general impression is that the Church of Norway has in fact 
“automatically” implemented Norwegian state feminism (Eriksen 2004).  
                                                 
4 When I use “context”, I will specify which context(s) I refer to in each case. In some cases, however, “context” 
will refer to “the contextual” as a general hermeneutical/theoretical term. 
5 The title of the book was Kjønnsrettferdighet (“Gender Justice”) (Holst 2002). 
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As a value, gender equality can be said to have become a significant part of Norwegian 
identity for many, and this is sometimes interpreted in a way that might contradict the 
individual’s rights to define her or his situation (cf. the subjective element in Gender Justice), as, 
for instance, in discussions about Muslim women wearing the hijab. The value of gender 
equality and the right to be religiously and culturally different from the majority, often collide in 
these discourses. The figuration in the dominating Norwegian discourse of the oppressed Muslim 
woman and the liberated Christian woman (which may imply a figuration of the oppressive 
Muslim man and the liberating Christian man) motivated me to seek out some Christian and 
Muslim women to see how they as subjects would articulate their interpretation of texts from 
their canonical scriptures regarding women’s roles and positions. To invite them to articulate this 
in a group process, as I have done in this project, is motivated by both theoretical and 
methodological considerations.6  
 Dialogue between Muslims and Christians in the Norwegian context has addressed issues 
connected to practicalities concerning the rights of practicing Islam in the country but has also 
led to joint statements about common challenges, such as violence against women in close 
relationships.7 Muslim-Christian dialogue in Norway has generally provided arguments for 
dialogical solutions to possible tense issues between religions, cultures, and secular society.8 But 
canonical texts from the two traditions have only occasionally been used as resources for more 
official dialogues. The political and social context, as well as sharing experiences, has been in 
focus in institutionalized dialogues. There are examples of more theologically oriented 
dialogues, but there are few organized dialogues oriented to reading the canonical scriptures.  
This modus of dialogue is explored more in other contexts. In the UK the book Scriptures 
in Dialogue (Ipgrave 2004) can be cited as an example of documenting and reflecting on a 
Christian-Muslim co-study of the Bible and the Koran among religious scholars. In this book, 
gender and women’s issues are part of the horizon.9 I was motivated as a Christian feminist to 
concentrate entirely on women as readers and interpreters of texts about women in the canonical 
scriptures because of the patriarchal heritage of both the Christian and the Muslim tradition. 
What this entails and the considerations leading to these choices are displayed in Chapter 2 and 
3. The practice of Scriptural Reasoning represents another model of religious encounter (Jewish, 
                                                 
6 See Chapter 2 and  3. 
7 See the homepage of the Contact Group between the Church of Norway and the Islamic Council Norway: 
http://folk.uio.no/leirvik/Kontaktgruppa.htm [accessed 23 June 2010]. 
8 Organized dialogue can be called either Christian-Muslim or Muslim-Christian. “Christian” is often put first in 
European settings. There are, however, noticeable exceptions to the habit of putting “Christian” first: Islamisk-
Kristent Studiecenter in Copenhagen, directed by Lissi Rasmussen, the journals Islam and Muslim-Christian Studies 
and Islamochristiana. In this study I will use Muslim-Christian dialogue. 
9 Cf. chapter 3 in Ipgrave 2004. 
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Christian and Muslim), also concentrating on the co-reading of canonical scriptures (Ford and 
Pecknold 2006). I will discuss this contribution in Chapter 2. 
From a Christian feminist theological perspective, the UK-based Mukti Barton has 
explored, in her book Scripture as Empowerment for Liberation and Justice: The Experience of 
Christian and Muslim Women in Bangladesh (Barton 1999), how Christian and Muslim women 
in Bangladesh experience part of their canonical scriptures as empowerment. Barton uses the 
narratives of Hagar/Hajar as an example of the empowering reading of related texts, and it was 
part of my inspiration to use these narratives in this study as well. The Danish Christian 
theologian Lissi Rasmussen has worked on co-readings of the Bible and the Koran in Denmark 
and Nigeria (Rasmussen 1997) and has provided a theoretical model of what may be called 
interreligious hermeneutics. Again, I will discuss this in Chapter 2.  
Interreligious (or transreligious, see Chapter 2 p.  28 ff.) hermeneutics is emerging as a 
field of its own within hermeneutical theory. This is marked by the publication of the ESITIS 
conference in 2009, where I found inspiration and valuable contributions to the theoretical 
framework of this study.11 A book published in 2009 in Sweden (Stenström 2009) represents 
another resource since it addresses biblical and koranic hermeneutics and thematizes feminist 
and postcolonial perspectives in the interpretation of the canonical scriptures. 
Thematically, the above-mentioned studies have commonalities with this study with 
regard to hermeneutical theory and other theoretical perspectives concerning feminism and 
Muslim-Christian dialogue. Methodologically, however, this study has a different approach. The 
above studies provide, in general, sparse information about the interpretative processes as they 
play out between the readers. Rather, the books I have mentioned present the interpretative 
results of co-readings or theorize about hermeneutics. So, after reading Barton’s study, I 
wondered how the women involved in her project had actually talked about the texts while 
discussing them. Did the Christian and Muslim women participating share the same reflections 
about their contexts? What was their method of interpreting text and context? And, in the case of 
Scriptures in Dialogue, I wanted to know more about the conversations behind the reflections 
presented: Did the participants argue with one another at some point, and did the conversations 
keep close to the topic all the time? How did the participants express themselves? Gaining more 
insight into these aspects of co-reading requires the use of qualitative research methods to 
document and analyze the hermeneutical process(es).  
To take part in organized activities of Muslim-Christian encounters is still a privilege for 
a few in today’s Europe. At the same time, everyday encounters between people of different 
                                                 
11 European Society for Intercultural Theology and Interreligious Studies (http://www.esitis.org).The 2009 ESITIS 
conference was held from 15 -18 April and organized by the Center for Intercultural Theology and Study of 
Religions at the University of Salzburg, Austria. The theme was “Interreligious Hermeneutics in Pluralistic Europe”. 
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religious and cultural backgrounds are increasing due to the European societies’ growing 
plurality. To make a Muslim-Christian encounter accessible in some more detail, as will be done 
in this study, could show that the complexity of communication may not be very different in 
these communicative processes from what people experience in their everyday lives when 
discussing issues related to religion and gender.   
The theoretical and methodological considerations will be addressed in Chapters 2 and 3. 
Theoretically, the study has three key terms that frame the study: Hermeneutics, Dialogue, and 
Feminisms. Methodologically, the study relies on qualitative research methods, and the empirical 
material is established from the discussions and conversations in a group of (originally) ten 
Christian and Muslim women living in Norway, with different cultural backgrounds crossing the 
religious boundaries. The participants12 met six times for three and a half hours. At four of these 
meetings texts from the Bible, the Koran, and the hadith were discussed. The texts were the 
Hagar/Hajar narratives (from the Old Testament and the hadith), Sura 4:34, and 1 Timothy 2:8-
15 (from the Koran and the New Testament respectively). A detailed presentation of the process 
of establishing the empirical material is given in Chapter 3.  
 Chapters 4, 5 and 6 present and analyze the empirical material. Selections from the 
transcribed discussions are presented and analyzed in detail, followed by a more general analysis 
at the end of each discussion. There are ten discussions presented altogether, differing greatly 
both thematically and in their communicative modes. The discussions are presented in 
chronological order, in accordance with the group process. In this way I have tried to grasp some 
of the possible developments in the communicative process throughout the project. 
 Chapter 7 is the concluding part, where I present the most significant findings of the 
analysis in light of the theoretical and methodological framework. In this chapter I will also 
make some suggestions about the possible consequences of the findings and relate them to the 
broader interpretative situation in Christian and Muslim faith communities and in society at 
large. 
 
 Delimitations  
A few important delimitations of the work should be spelled out right from the outset. This is a 
study aimed at interpreting readers and communicative processes, not texts. This means that I 
will not conduct any independent exegetical analysis of the texts in question. Using qualitative 
methodology, the study has also no intention of evaluating the statements and interpretations of 
the participants in the project in light of established academic or religious understandings of the 
texts (according to Christian and Islamic theology and jurisdiction).  
                                                 
12 I will consistently use the term “participants”, not “informants”, for the women taking part in this study.  
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Regarding the important and ongoing debates about secular societies, religious and 
cultural differences, and women’s rights, this study will relate to these debates occasionally but 
does not aim to give any comprehensive treatment of the rather large issues involved. 
 
A Dissertation in the Discipline of Interreligious Studies 
Although I apply methods of qualitative research and relate my analysis to the social sciences, 
this study is situated as part of Christian theology.13 More specifically, it is part of the field of 
interreligious studies. Still a field in the making, interreligious studies may be described as being 
concerned with the dynamic relation between religious traditions14 as represented by texts and 
people. The field can be approached both descriptively and normatively (such as in participatory 
studies of interreligious dialogues). At the University of Oslo interreligious studies are based in 
the Faculty of Theology, as is the case in many other universities offering similar studies.15  
With this study I hope to contribute to the field of interreligious studies in two ways: (1) 
through the establishment of a theoretical connection between hermeneutics, dialogue, and 
feminisms (Chapter 2), and (2) by offering qualitative research in the empirical field of Muslim-
Christian relations – in this case, focused on readings of selected texts from the Bible, the Koran, 
and the hadith as done by women in Norway. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
13 I use the term “Christian theology” for what is often just called “theology” in Western academia.  
14 Cf. the description of the field of interreligious studies at the Faculty of Theology, University of Oslo: 
http://www.tf.uio.no/forskning/omrader/interrel.html [accessed 23 June 2010]. 
15 Cf. the list of institutions related to the European Society for Intercultural Theology and Interreligious Studies 
(ESITIS): http://www.esitis.org/?page_id=17. 
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Part II: 
 
Theoretical, Contextual, and Methodological Perspectives 
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Chapter 2: 
Theoretical and Contextual Perspectives 
 
 
Theoretical, contextual, and methodological perspectives are viewed as closely related in this 
study. This position is based on the epistemological view that theory is always situated in a 
context. According to that same epistemological reasoning, method, and theory should be 
consistent. Some discussions relate to both method and theory, such as the discussion on 
representation, which will be done mainly in the next chapter.16  
 The theoretical perspectives and tools for analyzing the ensuing “thick” description of a 
communication process between Christian and Muslim women and canonical scriptures can be 
framed by the three terms hermeneutics, dialogue, and feminisms. Each of the three sections here 
starts with situating and discussing them with regard to this study more generally, before 
narrowing the scope toward establishing more direct analytical tools applied in the later analysis. 
It is significant to remember that the participants, as interpreting subjects, break new ground in 
their interpretations of text, context, and the actual encounter, reflecting as they speak. They use 
particular resources from their religious traditions, contemporary contextual discourses, 
references to time and space, as well as their own experiences and reflections, to create a web of 
different hermeneutical tools for use “on the ground.”17 This influences how the theoretical 
framework is constructed. 
 I have consulted Christian and Islamic theology, philosophy, pedagogy, sociology, social 
anthropology, culture theory and social theory as well as gender studies to construct the project’s 
meaning-making web in this chapter and the next. Although eclectic, this was necessary in order 
to create the new theoretical and methodological framework where the search for knowledge 
from the empirical material can be situated and analyzed adequately. This kind of eclectic 
approach is challenging but required when the aim is to produce knowledge that, although 
framed by established academic disciplines, does not have an immediate and readily established 
theoretical and methodological framework. 
  
 
 
                                                 
16 The line between theory and method is drawn differently by the various academic disciplines, and the reader will 
find that I follow the social sciences pattern because of the need to go into depth with establishing the empirical 
material in Chapter 3. 
17 The formulation “facts on the ground,” which inspired me to use this expression, is used in the Middle East to 
emphasize that, when there is a discrepancy between what one sees and hears and what the politicians say, what 
matters is the basic experience of reality, of the “facts on the ground.” 
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Hermeneutics, Dialogue, and Feminisms 
What happens when these three broad and disputed fields intersect in a theoretical framework? 
This is complicated, no matter how these intersections are portrayed.  
Feminisms, however defined, are ethical and moral projects of creating equality between 
men and women through transforming patterns of male dominance in religious and societal 
structures into patterns more consistent with gender equality. This may take different shapes. To 
reveal patterns of male dominance hermeneutics is needed to reach a situated understanding, 
representing a viewpoint of what is.  
Dialogue is both a philosophical and an everyday term. It can be used normatively with 
respect to how human communication processes ought to be, but it can also be used descriptively 
regarding organized activities (cultural dialogue, religious dialogue). Although I will return 
extensively to discuss the concept of dialogue, the correlation of hermeneutics and dialogue, 
since it is related through the aspects of communication and expression, needs to be stated. In 
this study the term dialogue will be used normatively unless another use is explicitly indicated. 
Like feminism, dialogue used normatively implies a notion of human equality. 
Feminism and dialogue thus represent normative determinations of hermeneutics in this 
project. The normativity should not be understood as being imposed on the participant’s 
interpretation efforts of text and context but as a compass by which to navigate in the research 
process: influencing my questions regarding the empirical material, my selection of theoretical 
discussion partners, and my aims in the analysis.  
 
Hermeneutics 
Hermeneutics is the theory of interpretation and interpretation processes.18 Although it still has a 
central position in philosophy, literary theory, and Christian theology, the term “hermeneutics” is 
no longer the property of the humane disciplines alone.19 The field of hermeneutics covers 
different interpretation theories with shifting emphases on text, author, reader(s), and historical 
as well as current contexts. I use the term in two ways: first, to designate a method for 
                                                 
18 The term is derived from the Greek word hermeneia, meaning “to articulate in language” (Møller and Gulddal 
1999). The Greek word was translated into Latin as interpretatio, but in the 16th century the Greek term, 
hermeneutics (ibid.), began to be employed again. Hermeneutics and interpretation thus have the same etymological 
roots in Latin and Greek respectively. 
19 Hermeneutics, originally a method of interpreting and understanding texts from antiquity (the pre-modern use), 
was extended to include the interpretation of texts in general through the works of the theologian Friedrich 
Schleiermacher (1768-1834) and the philosopher Wilhelm Dilthey (1833-1911) (Jeanrond 1994: 50; 53). Their 
argument was that, to understand a text, one needed to understand both the author and the author’s context, and a 
linguistic, “grammatical” work on the text itself was needed (Lægreid and Skorgen 2001: 27). Later developments in 
hermeneutics have focused more on the relation between text and reader, with less attention on the author, the 
author’s context and personality and the historical context of the text’s origin (ibid.: 25; (Jordheim 2001: 58-62). 
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interpreting texts when I refer to a specific hermeneutical tradition, but mostly I use the term 
within a broader perspective to theorize on the interpretation of human life and communication. 
The latter includes the interpretation of texts, contexts, and human self-reflection, expressed 
through action and agency, discourses, and dialogues. There are two interactive levels of 
interpretation in this work: the interpretation by the participants and the interpretation by the 
researcher. To start with the hermeneutical framing of the project, I will now turn to theorizing 
about hermeneutics in qualitative research. 
 
Hermeneutics in the Social Sciences 
The social sciences engaged with hermeneutical theory after the so-called linguistic turn. The 
sociologist Anthony Giddens suggested the term “double hermeneutics” (Giddens 1993: 170) to 
cover the research operations of social scientists. Giddens states that the researcher both 
interprets according to his own pre-knowledge and the research field and reinterprets the 
interpretation already existing in the field that is the object of research. The researcher thus 
interprets what is already interpreted as a meaningful universe among the informants in the field 
(Giddens 1993: 170). The term “double hermeneutics” is, however, somewhat unclear to a 
theologian trained in exegesis: Where, according to Giddens, is the “doubling”? Is it in the 
hermeneutical act? If the hermeneutical process is depicted as a circle, a spiral, or, as Ricoeur 
prefers to express it, as an arch (Ricoeur 2001: 76), and the researcher has a place in the 
hermeneutical process, does this mean that the circle, the spiral, or the arch are doubled, and 
there is actually two interpretation processes going on in the same research operation? The 
researcher is still not able to escape his/her place in the hermeneutical process and is not able to 
double (or split) himself/herself as an interpreter.  
The doubling could refer to the researcher’s two areas of resources in the interpretative 
research: the research discourse and the empirical field. But the interpretations in a research 
process are not conducted separately in the two areas, since the whole point in a hermeneutical 
process is the dynamics between the material and its interpreters. A possible interpretation of 
Giddens’ “double hermeneutics” may be that he simply wanted to clarify that a researcher in 
social sciences is neither the first nor the only interpreter of a social field, and there are already 
interpretations in the field to which he/she has to relate. The “double” of the hermeneutical 
operation is to interpret the interpretation of others. In the use of the term hermeneutics in the 
humanities, this distinction is often not made – there is an assumption that the text one is 
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interpreting, is already an interpretation and exists in an intertextual relation to other texts and 
interpreters (Jeanrond 1994: 103).20 
Giddens makes an important point when he emphasizes that concepts, theories, and 
interpretations do not exist in closed departments of “research” and “empirical field” but moves 
back and forth between them (Giddens 1993: 167). This study is an example of this. The 
interpreting participants possibly have access to theological and contextual interpretations of 
both texts and context done by researchers (such as Christian and Islamic theology and social 
scientists). The research – and the researcher – is a participating interpreter relating to the 
empirical field (the field of research), and should exercise self-reflection throughout the process.  
Qualitative method and other postpositivist contributions on interpretation in the social 
sciences share the concern of hermeneutics to reject a notion of “objective research” and of a 
neutral researcher as much as possible in these types of research (Holter 1996: 28-29). But to 
suggest that social actions could be interpreted in the same interpretative modes as textual 
hermeneutics also opens up a new theoretical position for the anthropologist or sociologist, i.e. to 
read social interaction and human behavior as text. The social anthropologist Clifford Geertz 
claims that the inclusion of hermeneutics in anthropology made it possible to avoid both a first-
person position (phenomenology) and a third-person position (observer, allegedly neutral) and 
assume instead a second-person position, which would mean establishing a dialogue with the 
research field and the informants. Here both the researcher and the informants are subjects 
(Geertz 1983).  
In this study I will be engaged in what Giddens would call “double hermeneutics” in the 
sense that I interpret the interpreters. At the same time I interpret texts from relevant research 
fields to make a broader interpretative framework.21 As stated above, I am not convinced that the 
innovative aspect of the term “double” is connected to hermeneutical work on empirical material, 
but the research operation done in this study is nevertheless consistent with Gidden’s intention 
behind the term “double hermeneutics.”  
 
                                                 
20 Jeanrond cites Mark C. Taylor (“Deconstruction: What’s the Difference”, in Soundings, 1983): “Since each text 
becomes itself in relation to other texts, no text is self-contained. … There can no more be a text-in-itself than there 
can be independent signifiers. Texts, like the signs which comprise them, ceaselessly cross and criss-cross in a 
perpetual process of interweaving. As a result of this oscillating interplay, texts are neither stable nor static, but are 
transitory”. 
21 As mentioned in my introduction to this dissertation, I will not conduct my own exegetical work on the canonical 
texts in this study. The empirical material related to the texts is limited to the established material from the group of 
participants.  
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Hermeneutics as Part of the Western Tradition of Knowledge
22
 
As a term, hermeneutics was embedded in the Western and Christian philosophical and 
theological tradition and has become, as stated above, part of the social sciences in the West as 
well. If the words hermeneutics and interpretation are used as full synonyms, the 
misunderstanding may arise that knowledge systems other than the Western (or other religious 
traditions than Western Christianity) do not have interpretative systems or theories. Recent years 
have seen a development where the term “hermeneutics” is being used within Islamic theological 
discourse to a greater extent, gradually challenging the monopoly Christian theology previously 
had on the use of the term in a religious way (Esack 1997: 61). The terms “interpretation” and 
“reinterpretation” are, however, the dominant terms in Islamic literature in English.23 
Historically, the word hermeneutics tends to be used in a retrospective manner in the 
Western tradition, a habit that might blur the understanding the temporal nature of the 
development of interpretative theory within these traditions. To use the term in the sense of 
“modern hermeneutics” regarding the Christian interpretation of the Bible in the early centuries 
is anachronistic. To resist the idea of any given unified universal notion of hermeneutics (this 
includes universal not only spatially also but temporally unified) is to take interpretative 
processes seriously, since they are always situated in a specific context and always done by 
persons. This is a view marked by my own comprehension of the term hermeneutics, where the 
context, the subject position, and the presuppositions of the interpretative subject is shaped by 
fluidity, although they often stand in relation to more fixed interpretative frameworks, such as 
religious traditions.  
To interpret canonical texts and social and cultural contexts in religiously and culturally 
pluralist societies requires theoretical reflection on the processes of interpretation where this 
plurality is taken into account. The culturally and religiously pluralist interpretative situation for 
the participants in the group where the empirical material is established creates a complex web of 
interpretations. To map some of the challenges this represents provides a good reason for taking 
a closer look at the newly emerged discipline of interreligious hermeneutics.  
 
                                                 
22 I am aware that “Western” and “the West” are constructed terms used to refer to a cultural and geographical area 
that can easily be seen to be much too diverse to be included in one category. When possible, I prefer to refer to 
“Norway,” “Europe,” and “USA” for the sake of accuracy even if these geographical areas themselves also have 
many different representations and contexts. 
23 In koranic exegesis the terms tafsir and ta´wil refer to interpretations of the Koran: tafsir refers to philological 
“outer” exegesis and ta´wil to an “inner”, mystical interpretation (Esack 1997: 61). The Islamic interpretative 
concepts such as qiyas (“analogical reasoning”) and ijtihad (“independent reasoning”) are also part of what may be 
called Islamic hermeneutics; see p. 38 and 49.  
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Interreligious Hermeneutics 
Traditional24 Christian and Islamic interpretations of their canonical scriptures and their 
traditional structures of interpretative authority often aim at confirming and continuing already 
existing interpretations of the Koran and the sunna, the Bible and the tradition. These 
hermeneutical structures are criticized from modern and postmodern as well as feminist and 
postcolonial perspectives for neglecting or limiting the autonomy of the individual interpreter 
and preserving existing power structures.  
One of the substantial criticisms of philosophical hermeneutics is related to the various 
presuppositions of the existence of a coherent meaning, like the expectation of the emergence of 
a common horizon (Gadamer), and the possibility of interpretative consistency (Alvesson and 
Sköldberg 2008: 274-278). Radical hermeneutics suggests that the aim of interpretation is not to 
find meaning but to discover and then learn to cope with the loss of meaning (Alvesson and 
Sköldberg 2008: 274-279).  
But between these two ways of engaging with hermeneutics – interpretation with a 
relatively fixed meaning and interpretation in the absence of meaning – there are many paths. 
Some of these are related to interpretations where more than one religious tradition is present, 
represented by the canonical texts or by the believers. This creates a new hermeneutical situation 
with more than one frame of reference, but the existence of several frames is not extraordinary in 
itself. The new element is that two relatively fixed frames of reference, represented by the 
religious traditions’ interpretative structures, are present at the same time. 
The term “interreligious hermeneutics” can relate to the interpretation of canonical 
scriptures or the interpretation of a cross-religious encounter (Frederiks 2005). The Christian 
theologian Oddbjørn Leirvik suggests that the latter comes close to comparative theology, which 
“engages the Self in a potentially transformative encounter with the religious Other” (Leirvik 
2011 (forthcoming))The interpretations, for instance, of the Koran and the Bible together for 
Christians and Muslims in a common place may, however, still be separate hermeneutical acts 
that do not relate to any shared interpretative process involving the scriptures. An act of common 
interpretation may still happen, but it will then primarily be an interpretation of modes of 
interpretation or interpretations of the contexts represented or a shared context.  
Frederiks’ two ways of viewing interreligious hermeneutics may thus be intertwined in 
actual encounters. Leirvik asks: “Can the Koran and the Bible talk to each other?” His answer is: 
                                                 
24 When I use the term “traditional” as in “Christian and Islamic tradition”, I use it in a broad sense, implying that it 
does not reflect the plurality within the traditions. When I refer to a specific tradition, this will be specified. In Islam, 
the term “tradition” is used to refer to both the hadith and to the traditions of the law schools. I will refer to the 
“hadith” when I specifically mean the tradition of hadith and will use “tradition” when referring to Islamic law 
schools and the entire sunna. 
  
25 
“Books do not talk to one another; only living people can have a conversation” (Leirvik 2006: 
123). There is, however, a level of intertextual relation between the Bible and the Koran, for 
instance. Leirvik modifies his rejection of a textual encounter outside a cross-religious human 
encounter when he points to the intertextual relation between the Christian and Islamic traditions. 
The New Testament comments on the Old Testament, creating an internal biblical discussion, 
and the Koran comments on the Jewish and Christian scriptures (Leirvik 2006: 124-125). 
 
The Need for Clarifications to Track Transpositions in the Encounter Between 
Different Sign Systems 
In exploring interpretation processes where different religious universes of meaning meet, 
Leirvik and the Christian theologian Lissi Rasmussen in her book Diapraksis og dialog mellem 
kristne og muslimer (Rasmussen 1997) refer to Julia Kristeva when explaining an intertextual 
process as a transposition of linguistic expressions from one specific system of signs to another 
where the linguistic expression(s) could have a different meaning (Leirvik 2006: 124). Leirvik 
makes a significant hermeneutical observation on the basis of Kristeva’s notion of the 
intertextual: the same word can carry different meanings and different connotations when used in 
different systems of meaning. Likewise, persons with the same name in the Bible and the Koran 
(and the hadith) can have different histories, positions, and functions (Leirvik 2006: 124). This 
means that in a conversation between people from the Christian and Islamic traditions substantial 
communication requires further clarification of the meaning of words – and named individual 
figures – that or who appear to be similar but refer to different universes of meanings and 
persons.  
Words, ideas, and persons are situated and interpreted differently within the traditions. 
The traditions themselves consist of different sign systems, for instance, in different confessional 
branches of the Christian and Islamic traditions and in the different cultures in which the 
religious traditions are situated.  
This means that in a Muslim-Christian encounter that includes more than one culture, 
there are more than two sign systems present as the framework for transpositioning. This 
indicates that the transpositioning of a term may happen more than once, and the complexity of 
sign systems present entails that one clarification may not be sufficient. To explain what one 
intends to articulate would be a constant process, and communicating would require particular 
effort. To make substantial communication happen across the different interpretive frameworks 
in a complex group, like the group in this study, requires a high communicative consciousness. 
This consciousness could be present from the beginning or develop gradually throughout the 
process as a result of the encounter. 
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An example of the need to clarify and situate the use of a shared Christian and Muslim 
name in the present study is the name of Hagar/Hajar. The person Hajar in the Islamic tradition 
has features in common with Hagar in the Christian tradition, but the stories and the portrayals of 
Hagar/Hajar also differ in significant ways in the two traditions. In this study I will use the 
combined reference “Hagar/Hajar” to express both the connection and the difference between the 
two when I refer to them or the narratives together. I use “Hagar” when I refer specifically to the 
figure as portrayed in the Christian tradition and “Hajar” when I refer only to the figure in the 
Islamic tradition. But the names sound alike, and many Muslims write “Hagar,” and not “Hajar” 
when referring to the Hagar/Hajar figure in the Islamic tradition.25 But if I use the same spelling 
for the two figures, it would be impossible to know which Hagar/Hajar I am referring to, and the 
meaning of what I want to communicate to the reader would be lost or blurred. 
 
Transcontextual Space 
In her search for theoretical framework of diapraxis between Christians and Muslims through 
readings of the Bible and the Koran together, Rasmussen finds that Kristeva’s use of the term 
intertextual (Kristeva 1984: 59) opens up a dynamic aspect on the interpretation of texts 
(Rasmussen 1997: 106).  
Rasmussen suggests an intertextual model based on Kristeva and the theories proposed 
by Mikhail Bakhtin, where she outlines four levels of intertextual relations between the Bible 
and the Koran. First is the Koran and Bible in their original contexts, where both relate to other 
texts and to their historical contexts. Second, there is the intertextual relation between the Koran 
and the Bible as incorporating parts of other texts, including mutual exchange, shared themes, 
and ideas, or one text relating to the other both in historical and contemporary perspective. 
Rasmussen suggests this as the starting point of an invitation to dialogue because of the 
emergence of the intertext. Third, there are the texts (Koran and Bible) and their present 
contexts as represented through participants in a social process emerging as a discourse. The 
fourth level is to establish a space that is transcontextual (Danish: transkontekstuel). This 
happens through a shared practice of the intertextual.  
The fourth stage of this process is where the actual reading of each other’s canonical texts 
as Christians and Muslims can produce a dialogue and a diapraxis when Christians and Muslims 
relate to both through textual, contextual, and social dimensions, interpreting the Koran and the 
Bible in their current, shared context and in their own separate contexts (Rasmussen 1997: 107-
108).  
                                                 
25 The various pronunciations and spellings of the name Hagar/Hajar in Islam reflect the different Arabic dialects. 
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Rasmussen qualifies the transcontextual, dialogical area of interpretation through 
Bakhtin’s notion of polyphony achieved through orchestration (Bakhtin and Holquist 1981: 430), 
requiring different voices, equally heard and equally valued (Rasmussen 1997: 107-109). Behind 
the emergence of the intertextual for Kristeva, in the sense of transpositioning sign(s) into 
another sign system, thus requiring the articulation of a new position, lie the Freudian processes 
of displacement and condensation in the work of the unconscious. For Kristeva, transposition 
implies the abandonment of one sign system for a new one, based on the articulated sign transfer, 
where the subject merges the old and new meanings (Kristeva 1984: 60).  
In Rasmussen’s model, the transcontextual space (level 4) is where new interpretations 
and new understanding emerge from the intertext between the Koran and the Bible, when the 
Christian and Muslim readers bring their own contexts and traditions into their interpretations. 
Some of the texts become intertext, and some of their contexts are/become shared, whereas other 
parts of texts and contexts remain separate. In the same movement of transposition the creativity 
and new understandings based on the combination of texts and contexts present in a dialogical 
encounter may be re-situated by the readers both in their shared context and in their separate 
religious contexts. Part of this process is that the religiously particular text is re-contextualized in 
the context of the other, opening a path to new insights on texts, contexts, and the process of 
making meaning itself. Rasmussen writes: 
The intertext model as a dialogical text model based on practice has both a hermeneutical and a 
methodological function, since it explains the relation between dialogue and diapraxis, and to 
interpret and describe the transcontextual process that is started through reading each other’s 
texts, something that is necessary and the basis for the diapraxis … and the authentic dialogue 
between Christian and Muslims .… Together, people develop common knowledge that can be 
used to contextualize modes of action. (Rasmussen 1997: 110)26  
 
Rasmussen’s model provides an understanding of how interreligious hermeneutics may 
be applied in practical life, exemplified by Christians and Muslims coming together and reading 
each other’s canonical texts. Rasmussen is concerned with the power aspects of such encounters, 
addressing the need to prevent the event from becoming a monologue of the strongest voice(s) in 
order to provide what she calls “authentic dialogue.” 
Linking hermeneutics, dialogue, and diapraxis together, Rasmussen provides a useful 
structuring of the process of interpretation in a cross-religious group, as represented in this study. 
Her most useful contributions are her situated use of Kristeva and Bahktin and connecting the 
creative process of communication across readers, texts, and context in the aims of common 
                                                 
26 My translation. 
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knowledge, through what she describes as authentic dialogue. The common knowledge is 
achieved through the process, including the knowledge of texts and contexts represented by the 
participants, being discussed, negotiated, and recontextualized to create a shared contribution to 
a broader context. Authentic dialogue allows all represented voices to be able to share 
knowledge about text and context on an equal level and to be capable of creating common 
efforts. Rasmussen does not aim at synthesizing either the texts or the religious traditions but to 
extend the space for contextualizing the texts and to suggest the emergence of shared 
understanding and action when texts and contexts meet through the encounter of the readers. 
The critical point of Rasmussen’s model, in my view, is that the complexity of the 
communicative situation may be understated. The diversity among represented sign systems 
creates a complicated web. The different cultural universes of meaning across the religious 
frameworks are not taken into account other than through the religions.  
 
Transreligious and Transcultural Hermeneutics? 
The German Christian theologian Andreas Nehring claims that cultural representation generally 
overrules religious representation when people of different religious and cultural background 
meet (Nehring 2011 (forthcoming)). He argues that culture should be perceived not as static, 
fixed, normative structures but as a “coded network of constructions and negotiations of 
meaning” (Nehring 2011(forthcoming)). Cultures are, according to Nehring, both people’s “first 
identification” (before religion) and a fluid, non-fixed system of meaning. How do these 
reflections challenge interreligious hermeneutics? 
Nehring uses his observations to criticize what he claims to be a general lack of 
awareness about power structures and the presence of hegemonic political and cultural 
discourses in interreligious encounters. He blames this partly on the traditional premises of 
(Western) hermeneutics, claiming that these lack sensitivity about the otherness of other cultures 
or regard other cultures as static entities. This becomes particularly problematic in a postcolonial 
perspective when a Western Christian encounters a Muslim (Western or non-Western) 
presupposing that Islam, and cultures connected to Islam, are static.27 Nehring claims that 
colonial hegemonic discourse conflicts with intercultural and interreligious relations (and 
interreligious hermeneutics) in ways not always recognized by hermeneutically oriented Western 
Christian theologians.  
                                                 
27 Orientalism as a concept was recast by Edward Said, in his book with the same title (Said 1978), where he 
presents orientalism as how Western scientists and researchers constructed an image of the Middle East and Islam 
that was static, repressive and viewed Islam and the Middle East as inferior. For Said, orientalism tells us nothing 
about “the Orient” but a great deal about Western misconceptions of the Middle East and Islam. 
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In order to avoid reproducing the image of (other) cultures as static, Nehring suggests the 
terms “transreligious” and “transcultural” to replace “interreligious” and “intercultural.” His 
reasoning behind this is that using the prefix “inter” usually implies a relation between two stable 
entities. If they are not stable in the sense of being completely fixed, they may still be 
identifiable as constructed patterns of meanings and codes. An interreligious/cultural 
hermeneutics has no third transcendent point where interpretation occurs, in his view, since the 
partakers are firmly situated in cultural and religious frames of reference. That these cultural and 
religious frames are fluid implies that encounters between people of different faiths and cultures 
are not encounters between representatives of stable, easily comparable constructions of meaning 
and symbols. The faiths and cultures are in themselves diverse, meaning that the encounters in 
transreligious/transcultural encounters are not only happening across religious and cultural 
representations but among different representations of allegedly the same religion or culture.  
If culture is regarded as fluid and there is no third outside point from which one can 
interpret, how can cointerpretation happen? Nehring suggests focusing on creating a common 
performative culture through the encounter that may transform “one’s own respective 
articulation of a situation” (Nehring 2011(forthcoming)). Performativity aims at changing and 
shaping reality through words as a “speech-act.”28 This may nuance Rasmussen’s distinction 
between “dialogue” and “diapraxis” where diapraxis is joint action in the world and the 
necessary step beyond dialogue, according to her. The distinction between “words” and “action” 
is difficult to make, and her distinction between dialogue and diapraxis may be related rather to 
the location of the speaking/acting, with dialogue referring to an internal activity in the group, 
and diapraxis referring to joint speaking/acting in broader society. Nehring is primarily 
concerned with theorizing on the interpretive situation within the transreligious, transcultural 
encounter itself, whereas Rasmussen includes broader society as an at least partially shared 
context in her theorizing.  
 
Common Interpretation Located at a “Third Place”? 
Nehring rejected the notion of there being a third, transcendent point of view in an encounter 
between two cultures (Nehring 2011 (forthcoming)). Because he refers to culture and religion as 
self-referential systems of meaning, he finds this to be the main obstacle in the attempt to 
identify a common hermeneutical ground, even if the traditions are regarded as fluid. 
Rasmussen’s intertext model may provide an answer to this, where there is no pure transcendent 
third point of view but only an immanent/transcendent one: the physical place of the 
                                                 
28 We find examples of performative speech in liturgical practices within the Christian and Islamic tradition, such as 
in the recitation of the Koran. 
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transcontextual encounter between readers of the Bible and the Koran. This is, however, not a 
stable ground but an unstable and shifting one. Leirvik used the spatial metaphor “the space 
between” for encounters between people of different faiths (Leirvik 2006: 113-119) (leaning on 
Buber and his “realm between” (Buber 2002: 117, 241-243)),29 and thus reflects along the same 
lines as Rasmussen.  
The “transcontextual encounter” and the “third place” Rasmussen and Leirvik suggest as 
possible locations for a common interpretation of texts and contexts can be described as a place 
where meaning is constantly negotiated and discussed. This implies that a “third place” is not a 
removed, outside place that provides a neutral, power-free zone to establish a universal 
intercultural, interreligious (or “Muslim-Christian”) hermeneutics as a theoretical position. It is 
rather a creative space where performative speech may happen, aiming at transforming the 
participants’ “articulation of the situation” (Nehring) and indicating possibilities for diapraxis 
(Rasmussen). The acknowledgement of fluidity in the interpretative reference systems (religious 
and cultural) is combined with a requirement for situating and contextualizing these frameworks 
as well as the encounter itself. This implies that an option for obtaining a common interpretation 
of the texts that is contextual and attempts to avoid cultural and religious dominance by the party 
representing a dominant discourse requires an unstable, complex situation/location where the 
canonical scriptures are interpreted.  
 
The “Second Gender” in the “Third Place” 
This project is concerned with the issue of gender, gendered hermeneutics, and feminisms in 
readings of Christian and Islamic canonical scriptures. Leirvik, Rasmussen, and Nehring do not 
address gender issues specifically. There are, however, elements in their hermeneutical 
reflections that can be implemented in a hermeneutics from a feminist perspective aiming at 
reflecting on gendered power structures in religious traditions and in encounters between them. 
First, there is the quest for criticism of power, and behind this is the requirement of situating 
texts and contexts culturally (Nehring). Second, all three argue that interpretations of canonical 
scriptures, of context, and of religious traditions and cultures are fluid and can thus change. In 
addition, they all emphasize the possibility of the individual participants and the groups formed 
in the “third place” to act. 
 
                                                 
29 The Indian postcolonial theorist Homi K. Bhabha uses the notion of “in-between” with respect to cultures and 
spaces in his works as well when he aims to destabilize binary oppositions in what he claims to be a Western 
metaphysical attempt to frame the world. Bhabha seeks to establish a different view of cultures and nations as 
performative, fluid, and hybrid in order to interrupt what he claims to be ongoing processes of colonization (Bhabha 
2005 (1996): 54). 
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Scriptural Reasoning as a Common Space of Interpretation for Jews, Christians, and 
Muslims 
The initiative of Scriptural Reasoning (SR) creates places for Jews, Christians, and Muslims to 
read and interpret their canonical scriptures together. Reflecting on this practice, which started 
originally in Jewish and postliberal theological circles in the USA and later included Muslims as 
well and then spread to the UK and elsewhere, resulted in the book The Promise of Scriptural 
Reasoning (Ford and Pecknold 2006) to which participants from the different religious traditions 
contributed.30  
 The aim of SR is defined as giving a public response from the three religions together to 
meet contextual needs (Kepnes 2006: 26, 35) . These needs are partly political, partly religious: 
to counteract a split between “Islam” and the “West” and to prevent religiously legitimated 
unrest and conflict by providing messages of peace and coexistence from representatives of three 
religions reasoning together on their scriptures. Stephen Kepnes also speaks about a “third 
space” as important in SR, but this does not refer to a point between the traditions or an unstable, 
dynamic space of interpretation. Instead he refers to the practice of SR as seeking a “third space” 
“between anti-modernist religious fundamentalism and modern liberalism” (Kepnes 2006: 25). 
SR does not aim at presenting a coherent theory of interpretation nor a consistent method but a 
diverse practice (Adams 2006: 43) between academia, faith communities, and contemporary 
society.  
The initiative of SR was taken up by postliberal Christian theologians who may be seen 
as being influenced by the Christian theological movement of Radical Orthodoxy. Radical 
Orthodoxy’s quest for establishing a discourse beyond secularism (Cheetham 2007: 29 ) is 
shared by SR. SR, according to Kepnes, seeks to “move beyond much modern scholarship of 
religion and much liberal interfaith dialogue” (Kepnes 2006: 28). The focus is on healing the 
world and healing the traditions. The practitioners of SR find that this can be done through 
returning to the canonical scriptures together as skilled Jewish, Christian, and Muslim readers 
(often academic scholars) and meeting in a place referred to as a “tent,” a temporary place 
created for discussion. This “tent” is located between academia (“the campus”) and the religious 
traditions (“houses”) (Ford 2006: 7-13).  
The Jewish theologian Ben Quash claims that SR is “committed to particularity” (Quash 
2006: 60), meaning that the participants should speak on the basis of their own particular 
traditions, and the shared quest consists rather of parallel quests to return to one’s own tradition. 
The encounter is not in interpreting the texts but in sharing the respective interpretations and 
                                                 
30 Ford shows the origins of the practice of Scriptural Reasoning in his contribution to The Promise of Scriptural 
Reasoning (Ford 2006: 2-4). 
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highlighting the religious traditions’ alleged ability to give the world what the West has lost: a 
divine grand narrative, however different in Judaism, Christianity and Islam, that is grounded in 
the belief in one God.31 
The insistence on particularity throughout the encounters around the texts entails 
criticism of interreligious encounters that allegedly blur the boundaries between the traditions, 
claiming that this is a reductionism of the richness in each tradition as well as of the integrity of 
the believers. But the focus on particularity may also be influenced by Radical Orthodoxy, whose 
goal is to have Christianity reclaim its place as the cultural and social narrative of reference it 
used to have prior to the current influence of secularization in the West. In SR the monotheistic 
religions of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam together seem to inhabit the same role of providing 
a shared, monotheistic, religious understanding of the world. 
 
The Hermeneutical Practice of Scriptural Reasoning 
The hermeneutical reasoning behind the practice of SR, then, apparently starts with contextual 
needs, but prior to this is the theological project of rescuing human dignity on the basis of the 
canonical scriptures in the so-called Abrahamic religions and the faith in one God. The 
hermeneutical application is based on a respect for the differences between the three traditions 
that must not be violated, but the most significant difference in SR is that between the three 
religions on the one hand and secularism on the other. This is regarded as a difference that 
should be met by advocating and implementing the reasoning of “Abrahamic” faiths in the 
secular sphere and strengthening religious reasoning of this kind at the expense of secularism. 
 Kepnes’ suggestion of a hermeneutical position for viewing the practice of SR is a 
“triadic semiotic”: “meaning arises out of the relationship between the sign, referent and 
community of interpreters that reads the text” (Kepnes 2006: 24). The production of meaning is 
by the interpreters who bring their academic skills, knowledge, and traditional interpretations as 
individuals. The co-reflection on the texts should emerge in joint commentaries and “rules,” 
including the reasoning of all three religions, and made public in order to fulfill the aim of 
“healing the world” (Kepnes 2006: 25). 
In a reflection on the hermeneutical practice of SR, one of the participants, Tim Winter, 
describes the practice as “… not a method, but rather a promiscuous openness to methods of a 
kind unfamiliar to Islamic conventions of reading” (Winter 2006: 109). By this he means that the 
                                                 
31 The practitioners of SR maintain that the exclusion of other religions from the practice of SR, such as Buddhism 
and Hinduism, has to do with the fact that these traditions are less concerned with canonical scriptures. It is not a 
valuation of the religions as such. At the same time, however, the value of monotheism is highlighted as a moral 
meaning that establishes a special opportunity for respecting humans as being “in his image and therefore of infinite 
worth”(Kepnes 2006: 34). The inclusion of Buddhist and Hindu scriptures are debated by some SR participants. 
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Islamic conventions of reading Islamic canonical scriptures are less shaped by the non-religious 
or secular modes of readings and modes of interpretation than the Jewish and Christian ways of 
reading their texts are. In the encounter, the different ways of interpretation and readings meet 
and may influence each other.  
SR wants to combine a revival of the religious traditions represented through a common 
space for interpretation, a self-critical reflection brought about by the encounter in this common 
space, and a distance to both relativism and any attempt to create universal principles as a 
substitute for the particular religious traditions (Kepnes 2006: 25). The above presented “triadic 
semiotic”, however simple it may seem, creates a complex hermeneutical situation when 
practiced. The encounter of different systems and theories of interpretation within the religious 
traditions are the actual object of this “triadic semiotics,” so one may say that this hermeneutics 
creates a transcontextual space (Rasmussen) or a space between (Leirvik). The difference 
between SR as presented in The Promise of Scriptural Reasoning (Ford and Pecknold 2006) and 
the two other positions on interreligious (or transreligious) hermeneutics is located in their 
respective views on the role of the interpreter and the interaction between religious and secular. 
In all its various representations SR seems to contain contradictory views of the interpreter (the 
reader, the “scriptural reasoner”) as a subject. Kepnes finds that the “triadic semiotic” empowers 
the reader in the hermeneutical process. At the same time the general aim of SR is to engage with 
the respective canonical scriptures as resources and  a general attempt to avoid a liberal 
approach is stated by some of the participants. This may imply that the subjectivity of the reader 
is limited from the beginning and that the empowerment of the reader should not lead to criticism 
of the scriptures or engage with views labeled as “liberal.” Winter writes: 
So Scriptural Reasoning, while admitting a certain postmodern reticence about final meaning, is 
by no means an intrinsically liberal method, and may turn out to be particularly hospitable to 
conservative thinkers who find that little is being communicated in academic or popular 
“dialogue” sessions driven by liberal presuppositions. (Ford and Pecknold 2006: 107) 
 
I will return to the relation between SR and other models of interreligious dialogue and show 
implications of their respective views on religious difference in the section about dialogue. But 
for hermeneutics, and the role of the interpreter/reader, it seems that SR’s ideal is to empower 
readers as subjects while at the same time to limit the possibility for the reader to exercise her/his 
subject position because of the ideological framing of the project.  
This position is not unknown. Even within the religious traditions themselves, the 
interpreter who wishes to remain inside may still balance between tradition and subjective 
interpretation of the scriptures. To transfer this position to an interreligious encounter can be 
seen to be just as problematic because it could deprive this new hermeneutical situation of some 
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of its possible dynamics that depend on the creation of an unstable ground. It may lead to a 
hermeneutical situation where overlapping discourses of power between the three monotheistic 
traditions are never addressed, such as gendered hierarchies of power. The interaction between 
the participants as described in Rasmussen’s transcontextual space and Nehring’s performative 
speech, creating new interpretations of text, context, and the interpreters themselves, may be 
limited by the focus in SR on upholding religious particularity as an ideal, constructing the 
secular as the significant other. The focus on religious particularity could lead to an interpretative 
situation where differences are emphasized at the cost of possible similarities. SR’s focus on an 
alleged dichotomy between religious and secular, where the monotheistic religions’ worldview is 
threatened by secular trends, may influence how the societal context is regarded and promote a 
strong advocacy for the religious traditions and their canonical scriptures, allowing them to 
escape intrareligious and interreligious critique. Culture is not really included in the SR as a 
decisive factor in interpretation, other than as an element that should be transformed by the ethics 
and ontology of the three religions. 
SR represents a positive contribution of reflected experience of interreligious relations 
based on reading one another’s scriptures among Jews, Muslims, and Christians. Behind the 
ideological framing people meet to discuss canonical scriptures in ways that cannot be pre-
programmed, and representatives of SR emphasize personal relations being initiated and nurtured 
across religious boundaries, as well as the importance of shared knowledge and understanding. 
The question is if important possibilities of critique and self-critique on issues such as gendered 
power structures in interpretation of canonical scriptures are missed. Helene Egnell raises the 
following question in responding to the practice of SR: If SR aims at addressing contextual 
problems through reinforcing the resources of the canonical scriptures, what if the canonical 
scriptures themselves represent a problem? This question may be a unwelcome and perhaps 
illegitimate one in SR, but the issue the question addresses is the heart of the problem from a 
religious feminist point of view, according to Egnell (Egnell 2009: 3).  
 Leirvik, Rasmussen, Nehring, and the participants in the Scriptural Reasoning initiative 
share a position rejecting a universal, common interreligious (or transreligious) synthesized 
theory of interpretation. This would be my own position as well when I demand that 
hermeneutics to be situated. But in order to establish an interpretative situation capable of 
providing tools for self-criticism within the religious traditions in the interpretation and re-
interpretation of canonical scriptures, I align myself more closely to the hermeneutical positions 
of Leirvik, Rasmussen, and Nehring, and the challenge from Egnell, which may be directed 
toward all attempts to facilitate a co-reading of canonical scriptures, and not only as done in SR. 
The attention toward power structures within hermeneutics, including gendered power structures, 
is part of the contextualization of interpretations. But it is also part of the act of interpretation 
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itself through the readers’ presuppositions and by present hegemonic discourses as represented 
by the interpreters.  
 When moving closer to theorizing on and situating the hermeneutical situations subject to 
analysis in this project, the notion of the “third place” as a required unstable place to create a 
transcontextual space, the replacement of “interreligious” by “transreligious” and the reasoning 
behind this, and the suggestions about the possible outcomes of a hermeneutical encounter 
(diapraxis, a transformed articulation of a situation) will continue to be part of the theoretical 
framework. The tension between protecting the particularity of the religious traditions in 
encounters, including the canonical scriptures, and the request for change represented by 
feminisms to challenge the same traditions through the encounters will be addressed in the 
sections on dialogue and feminisms. 
 
Transreligious Hermeneutics on the Ground 
As stated earlier, Giddens emphasizes that in social research it is not only the researcher who 
interprets the informants – the informants have already an interpretation of their own lives and 
contexts. In this project the interpretation at the participatory level is that of the texts and of the 
transreligious, transcultural encounter in the group. The above discussion of 
interreligious/transreligious hermeneutics painted a broader picture. Now it is necessary to take a 
closer look at how to frame the interpretative processes taking place among the participants in 
this study.  
 My preferred term for the interpretations taking place in the group of participants will not 
be hermeneutics but meaning making. Meaning making includes all elements in the complex 
interpretative situation in the group and its context: the canonical texts, the discussions about the 
texts, the context(s) represented in the group, and the discussions about how to define and 
address this context. Part of making meaning is a process of situating oneself as an interpreting 
subject (as the “meaning maker”), and finding the roles that the canonical scriptures should play 
in meaning making. 
 By using the term “meaning making,” I am trying both to avoid too close an automatic 
connection with the Western interpretative tradition and to make it obvious that the interpretation 
going on in the group is broader than textual interpretation, even if the texts are an integral part 
of the process. 
The following section will concentrate on displaying a framework for some of the 
hermeneutical strategies used throughout the interpretation process. The selected elements 
elaborated on are thus derived from the empirical material by tracing the patterns of 
interpretation by the participants. Since the empirical material is established in a hermeneutical 
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process marked by religious and cultural complexity, the strategies and patterns of interpretations 
are shaped by this complexity. 
 
Mapping the Hermeneutical Complexity  
The group of interpreters in this study consists of Christians and Muslims, with an intrareligious 
variation: Lutheran and Roman Catholic Christians, Sunni and Shia Muslims. Regarding cultural 
background, three of the participants were Norwegians “without hyphens,” whereas the other 
seven had Moroccan, Pakistani, East African, Iranian, and Middle Eastern backgrounds in 
addition to their Norwegian background.32  
The complexity in the group is manifested in crossing relations between texts and the 
readers and between the readers. To read a canonical text from one’s own tradition is different 
from reading a text from another tradition. If someone from the other tradition is present while 
one reads the texts of the other, this entails that one relates not only to a text from another 
religious tradition but also to a person who may have a kind of ownership of the text. In the same 
way, the presence of people from a different religious tradition may have an impact on one’s 
reading and interpretation of one’s own texts and create a different interpretative situation than if 
one was alone or only among one’s fellow believers.  
But it is not only religious differences that influence the interpretative situation for this 
study’s participants. Cultural background and identity are important variables in textual 
interpretations. In the group, the religious and cultural identifications of the participants are 
crossing variables. A connection between cultural background and the interpretation of religious 
canonical scriptures, however, is not always recognized within religious emic discourses that 
emphasize religion as a phenomenon separate from culture and give the religious tradition an 
epistemological preference as an interpretative framework – allegedly separate from culture (this 
seems for instance to be the case in the practice of SR). The relation between cultural and 
religious traditions when interpreting the canonical texts does become a theme in the group’s 
discussions, not only in trying to make meaning of the texts but particularly when trying to 
articulate this meaning to the participants of other religious and cultural backgrounds. The 
culturally diverse background of the participants are, however, most visible when they are 
negotiating about context and how to define a significant context for their making of meaning. 
The participants’ relations to and individual stances toward religious, cultural, and 
political discourses play a significant role in the interpretative process as what hermeneutics 
would call presuppositions or pre-knowledge. They are all situated in their ordinary lives in 
                                                 
32 See a full presentation of the participants in Chapter 3. This chapter also includes a discussion on the composition 
of the group, and on the question of representativity. 
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different environments in between the interpretative sessions (the group meetings), and this links 
the discussions in the group to discourses of which the participants continue to be a part outside 
the organized group.33  
 
Meaning Making within the Frameworks of Islam and Christian Traditions 
When it comes to the participants’ relations to their religious tradition, the relations between the 
traditions and the individual believer as a Christian/Muslim cannot be described by one general 
standard. Some believers are devoted members of a faith community, whereas others are more 
individualized believers.  
How individual believers in Western Europe and in Norway relate to religious authorities 
and how they apply their own reading and interpretation of canonical texts and religious 
practices in relation to the established or authoritative interpretations can vary. The extremes 
would be not to relate to texts or to religious authorities at all and still have an identity as a 
Christian or a Muslim or to submit to a specific tradition and share this tradition’s view on text, 
interpretation, and religious practice. In between these extremes are different positions and 
different strategies for the making of meaning of texts and tradition. How the various positions 
are distributed between Christians and Muslims in Norway in general is not discussed in this 
study. This project will only show examples of various possible positions. 
 
 Islamic Interpretative Discourses  
In Islam most established discourses of interpretation of canonical scriptures may be called 
cumulative. This means that traditional ways of interpreting are still in use in contemporary 
efforts at making meaning, where “traditional way” is understood as an allegedly unbroken chain 
of transferred knowledge of interpretation from Islam’s origin to the present. In recent reformist 
Islamic movements, however, there is a tendency to claim that access to the sources of the Koran 
and the hadith should be more direct, bypassing the accumulated decades of interpretation 
between contemporary and early Islam. Both the cumulative and modernist discourses of the 
interpretation of the Koran and the sunna are marked by plurality, and the practices of 
interpretations are diverse both historically and in contemporary representations of Islam. 
In the Islamic tradition there has been, beyond the interpretative plurality, a general 
agreement that the Koran as text is God’s revelation and literally the word of God. Muhammad is 
considered to be a prophet (nabi or rasul) or mediator of direct revelation. The view of the Koran 
as a literary divine textual revelation is currently being debated within Islam through 
                                                 
33 One incident in the group’s process shows this connection very clearly when Inger (Norwegian Lutheran) brought 
up the issue in the group of the Muhammad cartoons that was intensely debated in the Norwegian context at the time 
of this meeting. 
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highlighting principles of interpretation at the cost of literal interpretation (Tariq Ramadan may 
be seen as representative of this development).34  
Trying to grasp the meaning of the Koran is motivated by a search for God-given rules of 
life, to be able to live a life according to God’s will. The theological interpretation theories of 
how to interpret the Koran are shaped by this aim, and the majority of the interpretative theories 
in the Islamic tradition are concerned with matters of law. Islamic law is a field that includes 
regulations concerning human relations, muamalat, and the relations between human beings and 
God, ibadat (Roald 2004: 73). There is an important distinction within the Islamic tradition 
between sharia (literally: the road to the waterhole) as a notion of God’s eternal will and fiqh as 
an expression of the actual human-made rules and regulations based on sharia. The source for 
seeking God’s will in the Islamic tradition is not only the Koran but also the sunna (the example 
of Muhammad, as reflected in the hadith) and ijma, the consensus of the Muslim interpretive 
scholars at a particular time (Esposito 2003: 329).  
The tradition of usul-al-fiqh (“roots of law,” legal theory) means, according to the Islamic 
reformist scholar Tariq Ramadan, “a methodology of linguistic, religious and juridical 
interpretation of the sources and … a large frame … of global rulings … to direct the application 
of ijtihad …” (Ramadan 1999: 55). Ijtihad can be explained as “independent reasoning” and is 
an important concept for Islamic reformists (Esposito 2003: 134). The reason is that ijtihad can  
open for new interpretations of the Koran and the sunna so as to facilitate a contextual 
interpretation for new situations and challenges for Muslims under changed circumstances. 
The possibility of using ijtihad in contemporary times is disputed among Muslim 
scholars. Some regard the “gates of ijtihad” to have been closed since the ninth or tenth century, 
grounded in a belief that by that time the Muslim scholars had achieved the necessary level of 
interpretation of the sources and its application to human life and no further interpretation was 
needed (Roald 2001: 99). But for many Muslims and Muslim scholars today, ijtihad is seen as 
the possibility for the Islamic tradition to play a contextual role, both for Muslim believers and 
for Islam as a religion. To perform ijtihad, however, requires knowledge of the tradition, of the 
Arabic language, and the high personal morality of the mujtahid, the traditional name of the 
ijtihad performer (Ramadan 1999: 86-88). One of the Muslim participants in this study explains 
and uses the concept of ijtihad in her argumentation for the need of reinterpreting Sura 4:34, for 
instance. 
                                                 
34 The Swedish (Muslim) historian of ideas Mohammad Fazlhashemi claims that recent discussions within the 
Islamic tradition represented by the scholars Nasr Hamid Abu Zeid (Egyptian Sunni scholar) and Seyyed 
Mohammad Ali Ayazi (Iranian Shiite scholar) come close to developing an Islamic historical-critical hermeneutics 
(Fazlhashemi 2009: 49-51). 
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So, in their meaning making in this project, the Muslim participants relate to some of the 
classical hermeneutical tools in Islam such as ijtihad (“independent reasoning”). They also use 
the sunna as a resource for interpretation. 
 
Christian Interpretative Discourses 
The Christian tradition as a whole contains a variety of doctrinal differences on biblical 
interpretation and the role other canonical scriptures and traditions play in interpretation. But all 
Christian traditions share the view that the divine is located to the person of Jesus, and only 
indirectly to the Bible as a text or a book. This implies that the work a devoted Muslim needs to 
do while searching for the divine will in the koranic revelation is different from that done by a 
Christian with regard to the Bible. Biblical interpretation is crucial because the Bible represents 
the access to knowledge about the person of Jesus and God’s acts in human history. Pivotal to 
the Christian faith are the Biblical narratives of the birth, life, death, and resurrection of Jesus 
and their theological implications. 
The split in the Western church at the time of the Reformation was largely based on 
divergent views on the interpretation of the Bible, with Luther launching the principle of sola 
scriptura as a protest against the interpretational practice in the Roman Catholic Church of the 
time where the interpretation of the biblical scriptures was guided by the tradition. Luther’s 
protest was directed primarily against the clergy’s interpretative hierarchies. He did relate 
selectively to resources from the earlier tradition, negotiating continuity and discontinuity. 
Luther upheld the importance of the Church fathers (Augustine in particular) and the apostles 
whose authority for Luther was connected to their task of passing on God’s message, not to their 
personal status as such (Ulstein 2006: 98).  
Luther, unlike the Roman Catholic interpretative tradition, was not open to other sources 
of reasoning, such as philosophy, when interpreting what he claimed to be the Bible’s essential 
message of divine justification as crystallized in the Gospel. Whereas the traditional Islamic and 
Roman Catholic paradigms of knowledge aim at merging knowledge about the divine and 
knowledge about the world, the classical Lutheran position is to claim these as different areas of 
knowledge that ought to be kept separate (Ulstein 2006: 97).  
The status of the Bible as a source for Christian ethics is a complicated question in itself. 
Luther’s principle of sola scriptura, further qualified as solus Christus (Christ alone) and sola 
fide (by faith alone), was originally formulated with a view to salvation and soteriology. In the 
Lutheran interpretative tradition, ethical guidelines and the message of salvation (the Gospel) are 
thus separated – as reflected in the distinction between “Law” and “Gospel” as interpretative 
keys for biblical texts (Ulstein 2006: 114-116).  
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Luther’s interpretative principles have also been activated in recent discussions in the 
Church of Norway on gender equality and homosexual relationships as a resource for fresh 
ethical reasoning beyond the established positions and practices in the Lutheran tradition. 
Regarding the question of homosexual partnership, Church of Norway theologians have referred 
to the principle of “Christ as the centre of the Scripture,” together with the overriding ethical 
principle of neighborly love, to legitimize a more accepting attitude toward homosexual partners 
(Kirkerådet 2006: 43, 49-51).  
The position of the Bible in contemporary Christian communities generally is another 
question. Gerd Theissen states in his book The Bible and Contemporary Culture (Theissen 2007) 
that, among non-conservative Christians (liberal, progressive, radical), there is a tendency to 
view the Bible as nothing more than part of their cultural background, and that currently “even 
Protestants often look to other sources to provide the resources for faith” (Theissen 2007: ix-x). 
He claims that one of the reasons may be that conservative Christians (according to him) have 
monopolized the Bible to serve their particular views, since a wave of fundamentalist approaches 
to the Bible have hit the West from the late 1970s on. Together with a greater religious 
pluralization and secularization, Theissen is concerned with the lack of interest in the Bible 
among the general public that seems to be the result of these developments (Theissen 2007: xii-
xiii).  
For the Lutheran Christian participants in this study, the biblical texts presented to the 
group are not granted an immediate authority on the basis of their biblical status. In line with 
Theissen’s impression of Western Protestants mentioned above, at least one of the Norwegian 
Lutheran Christians in the study states that she prefers the biblical texts to be communicated to 
her through sermons in the worship services or to read literature about the Bible instead of 
reading the biblical texts herself.35 The reason she gave is that she finds the biblical texts hard to 
convert into a spiritual source for nurturing her Christian belief. 
The difference between the roles of the Koran for the Muslim participants in this study 
and the role of the Bible for the Christian participants creates challenges in the communication 
about the texts, as will be shown in Parts III and IV. 
 
The Question of Interpretative Authority in Christian and Islamic Discourses  
When exploring the interpretative situation in the Christian and Islamic traditions, the question of 
interpretative authority regarding canonical scriptures is a significant part of the field. 
Interpretative authority is closely connected to the act of textual interpretation: the structuring of 
this authority determines what is to be regarded as the legitimate interpretations of the canonical 
                                                 
35 This was Inger, at the first group meeting with self-presentations. 
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scriptures, which religious positions possess the authority to state this, and who is qualified to 
inhabit these positions. The issue of interpretative authority includes what is regarded as 
legitimate methods of interpretation.  
In the interpretative traditions of Christianity and Islam the question of interpretative 
authority is not merely a question of direct execution of power by stating legitimate ways to 
understand a text. It is also a question of how this power influences the individual interpreters 
and the faith communities in their textual interpretations. There is a dynamic relation between 
hermeneutics, religious practice, and power structures here.  
In both the Christian and Islamic traditions hermeneutics or interpretative structures are 
integrated into a larger doctrinal system. Changes in the interpretation of texts, new 
interpretations of the status of texts and new views about how the interpretative authority should 
be allocated are not only relevant to the area of textual understanding. Views of divinity, 
humanity, and the world are intimately connected to modes of interpretation of canonical 
scriptures. This is why discussions and disputes about hermeneutical/interpretative matters are 
often seen as striking at the heart of the believers and the core of the traditions. 
The interpretation of canonical scriptures within religious communities is both a matter of 
how a tradition is transferred and how the tradition develops. The representation of the past and 
the shaping of representations in the future are at stake. Structures of interpretative authority may 
serve to safeguard the dogmas and practices of the religious traditions. This could imply that the 
more emphasis a religious tradition puts on its canonical texts, the more crucial the question of 
interpretative authority becomes. However, stating this needs further clarification to see if this 
chain of reasoning is really valid: it may depend on how the focus on scripture is expressed in the 
tradition.  
In the Christian Lutheran tradition, there is a strong emphasis on the Bible. Access to the 
Bible for every Christian believer is seen as crucial. Lutheranism gives every believer the 
authority to interpret the biblical text for herself, based on the belief that the Bible defends its 
own authority (Ulstein 2006: 109). This particular weakened the hierarchical structure of 
interpretative authority in Lutheranism. The Lutheran Churches nevertheless operate with a 
hierarchy, since church leaders, ministers, and doctrinal committees have a mandate to guide 
believers as to which interpretations are valid for the church as a community. If interpretations 
are meant to be valid for the religious community, they must be tested. The testing is seen as a 
mutual process between the minister and the congregation, between the religious leadership and 
scholars and laypeople.36 In Roman Catholic tradition, the question concerns not only the 
                                                 
36 The doctrinal commission of the Church of Norway includes both laypeople, theological scholars and 
representatives of the Church leadership, all elected by the Church synod: 
http://www.kirken.no/?event=doLink&famID=240 [accessed 23 June 2010]. 
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authority to interpret the Bible but how to interpret the tradition, viewed as ongoing revelation.37 
In Islam the question of interpretative authority is not generally reduced to a question about (who 
is entitled to) the interpretation of the Koran but also includes the use of the hadith and sunna in 
the rulings of fiqh (“legal interpretation”).38 
 The Christian and Islamic history of interpretation and their respective management of 
structures of interpretation authority share some concerns. One is to balance the relationship 
between the individual believer and the religious community, where the community is generally 
decisive, at least at an official level. Another shared concern is the struggle to maintain a 
tradition and at the same time make its message relevant.  
Christian and Islamic communities share the fact that the overwhelming majority of 
interpreters in the communities are men. This observation is of special importance in this study. 
Both Christian and Muslim feminist theologians have addressed this as a crucial and problematic 
part of their interpretative traditions. Their common view is that this allowed patriarchy to shape 
the interpretative traditions. They all claim to various degrees that the male interpreters have 
overlooked parts of the tradition where women are represented (“gender blindness”), that they 
interpreted the texts and the traditions to women’s disadvantage in order to execute power over 
women, and that God’s message has been distorted in order to discriminate against women 
because it supported men’s own interests. I will elaborate more on this in the last section of this 
chapter, under the section on feminisms. 
In this project women discuss canonical texts, and to a certain degree they also address 
their own traditions’ history of interpretative authority. The extensiveness of the authority the 
participants claim for themselves to interpret the texts from their traditions is a question that 
concerns both the participants’ identity as interpreting believers and their attitudes toward their 
tradition.  
 
                                                 
37 See the document Dei Verbum from the Holy See: 
http://www.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/documents/vat-ii_const_19651118_dei-
verbum_en.html [accessed 23 June 2010]. 
38 The hadith literature generally have a strong position in Islam as an authoritative source. The different parts of the 
hadith, however, are separated into “stronger” and “weaker” hadiths. The strong hadiths are considered more 
reliable and thus more authoritative than the weaker ones in their reference to the words, deeds, and advice of 
Muhammad. Whether a hadith is judged to be strong or weak has to do with the codification process of hadiths, 
where both the content and, particularly important, the trading process (isnad) were evaluated. Hadiths must be 
traded back to Muhammad by reliable transmitters (Roald 2004: 70). This makes a hadith strong. Originally, only 
strong hadiths were supposed to influence the jurisdiction and the interpretation of the Koran, but in reality, hadiths 
with a weak isnad have also been used (Roald 2004: 72). 
  
43 
Everyday Hermeneutics and the Use of Time and Space to Make Meaning 
There is more to the interpretation of canonical texts than is found in public versions of the 
Christian and Islamic traditions respectively. The texts can be read and interpreted as narratives, 
as moral guidelines, or as inspiration to carry on struggling with life’s various challenges. The 
person who picks up her Bible to read, simply to feel that she is not alone in her struggles, or the 
one who meditates on a koranic verse while trying to get a good night’s sleep may be examples 
of everyday use of the canonical scriptures. 
The hermeneutical challenge for the participants in this study is to make meaning of texts 
in a shared, transreligious, and transcultural space. They use tools from their own tradition to 
interpret the texts, but, due to the encounter of different sign systems and self-referring systems, 
the meaning making had to transgress the boundaries of these systems in order to communicate 
across them. This is a demanding interpretative situation, impossible to prepare for or to control. 
Reflections are still in the making at the time of speaking, and the discussions often change 
directions. In this situation the development of useful interpretative and communicative tools 
was required. 
Two interpretative tools that became significant in the interpretative situation between the 
participants, the texts, and the contexts were the concepts of time and space. Making meaning 
implies situating a text, issue, experience, or feeling for the reader. To situate a canonical text is 
to place it in time and space, and this includes, directly or indirectly, situating oneself as a reader. 
It often also includes contextualizing the text to find out how the text can relate to a present that 
is known to the reader but obviously not to the text.  
To identify and situate one’s position as an interpreter may not be done once and for all 
in an interpretative process and, in a transreligious interpretative situation, the positions may 
vary according to whether the texts are from one’s own tradition or another’s. 
 
Space and Place, Text and Context 
Spatial hermeneutical tools in making meaning of the texts are linked to images of the text’s 
contexts, historically and in the present, and to the interpretative context itself. In an interpreting 
group, this question is also about positioning within the group: the space that is given, taken, or 
negotiated. The negotiation of space could mean inclusion or exclusion in a shared interpretation. 
Identification of contextual space concerns the relation between the defined interpretative space 
and the surrounding world. One of the questions that emerged in the group process was if 
making meaning of canonical texts taking place in Norway should apply beyond a Norwegian 
context, and also how the “Norwegian context” itself was to be defined. Many of the participants 
in the project have backgrounds from cultures and spaces outside Norway. These spaces and 
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experiences became important resources in the meaning-making process in negotiating and 
defining the significant context.  
 
Gendered Space 
Taking a step back from the actual interpretation process to reflect on the interpretative space, 
the term of gendered space becomes relevant to this project. All of the participants are women. 
This was a deliberate methodological and theoretical decision by me, derived from the 
postcolonial theorist Gayatri Spivak’s concept of strategic essentialism.40 The interpretative 
place in this study is perceived as gendered space and commented upon by the participants. But 
what does this imply and how does it influence interpretation of text, context, and interpreters? 
Strategic essentialism as a concept makes it possible (at least theoretically) to establish gender-
segregated space temporarily in order to reach a further specified aim and at the same time work 
to avoid an ontological confirmation of men and women as binary oppositions.  
The traditional position of most interpreters of the canonical scriptures within the 
Christian and Islamic traditions is, however, gendered space as well: It is predominantly a male 
space. A question would be if the participants construct the gender-segregated place of 
interpretation as being in opposition to the traditional male space of interpretation or as a 
response to it. They may not have only one but many views on this. 
 
Texts and Readers, Readers and Text: Situating the Interpretative Position 
Does being a reader automatically imply becoming an interpreter of a text? This was the theme 
in one of the discussions of the group.41 Eva, who has a Lutheran Christian Norwegian 
background,42 claimed that readings of a canonical text must imply interpretation. Shirin, who 
has a Shia Muslim Iranian-Norwegian background, argues that, for some, it could be possible to 
look at oneself as a reader without being an interpreter. For some, the term “interpretation” may 
imply compromising the content of the Koran (or the Bible, when this position is found among 
Christians) as a believer.  
The question is if it is possible to place oneself as a reader outside the interpretative 
process and seek for a “pure” or “original” meaning of the text. It is possible to claim a reading 
position outside interpretation, but this is still an interpretative position from a hermeneutical 
point of view. This answer could seem to be sufficient in theory, but in reality discussions 
between positions acknowledging versus disclaiming interpretation as a given fact are difficult, 
                                                 
40 I elaborate on this in Chapter 3, p. 106-109. 
41 This discussion is shown on p. 285-286. 
42 The participants are presented on p. 89-91. 
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since the parties might not acknowledge each other mutually as having legitimate positions. In 
this project, however, none of the participants disclaim interpretation as a valid way of relating to 
the texts. Interpretation and the allocation of interpretative authority take different shapes, but 
they are acknowledged as important. 
Another position in making meaning of canonical texts that represents a particular 
challenge in an interpretative discussion is the position of abandoning the text(s). If the text is 
abandoned, this could imply that there is nothing left to discuss. The abandonment may, 
however, take different interpretative forms. It may imply dismissing the text(s) as authoritative 
and placing the sole authority in the interpretative situation in the reader/interpreter. A more 
radical approach is to dismiss the text(s) as irrelevant and claim that interpretation of the text(s) 
is also irrelevant. The interesting hermeneutical investigation in this case would be to explore the 
reasoning behind the rejection of the texts and its implications. The perspectives from radical 
hermeneutics may be used to address this situation: How is one to deal with the loss of text or the 
loss of meaning in the text (Alvesson and Sköldberg 2008: 279)? To abandon the text may still 
be a way of relating to the text, as a hermeneutical position – just as the claim not to engage in 
interpretation may be seen as a hermeneutical position. The position of abandonment in various 
ways is present in the empirical material, mostly among the Christian participants. 
The reading position from which the participants most often distance themselves is that 
commonly referred to as “fundamentalist.” No one identified with this position, and in the 
discussions on the texts in 1 Timothy 2:8-15 and Sura 4:34 all warned strongly against this 
position. This is a position where there is no acknowledged distance between reader and text, and 
thus the reader withdraws from any responsibility as a subject. 
 
Text, Context, and Interpreter in Interchanging Positions  
How the texts are positioned in relation to the readers is a spatial hermeneutical question that 
concerns the placing of the text as close to or far from oneself as a reader. The participants relate 
to texts from their own tradition and to texts from a different tradition. It is possible to relate to 
both kinds of texts as texts and/or as context. To relate to a text as text implies taking the position 
of a reader and, from a hermeneutical/interpretative view, the role of interpreter in relation to a 
written (or oral) text.  
To relate to the text as context implies being concerned with the text’s historical and 
current interpretation and impact but comprehending the text only indirectly through other 
sources and not directly as a reader in direct dialogue with the text. This position implies a 
greater degree of distance to the text. If, on the other hand, one relates to the texts only as written 
texts without a context, the interpretation history and the contemporary context could shift to the 
background. Paul Ricoeur claims that understanding and interpreting a text are two different 
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reading positions. The former keeps the reader within the universe of the text, without regarding 
its context. The second position entails recreating the text as communication and bringing the 
text in contact with the reader’s context (Ricoeur 2001: 67).  
The Christian Korean feminist theologian Chung Hyun Kyung problematizes the relation 
between the Bible as text and readers as part of the context. This problematization is based on 
Asian (Christian) women’s reclaiming of their own history as authoritative after living through 
what Chung describes as decades of Western and patriarchal dominance of biblical interpretative 
authority. She suggests the theological slogan “We are the text” (Chung 1991: 111) for the future 
development of Asian women’s theology. This means not only that the readers become the 
privileged subjects in the interpretation of biblical texts but also that the texts are primarily part 
of the context, and that the primary object of interpretation within the Christian communities 
should be people (women) and their stories and experience. The Bible can become a spiritual 
source, according to Chung, only if a connection is established between the time of the texts 
(then) and the time of the readers (now) so that the stories (and bodily experiences) of divine 
liberation placed in the “then” and the “now” are equally acknowledged as significant texts about 
God’s revelation (Chung 1991: 111). Chung’s reasoning is framed within the Christian tradition, 
although she also actively relates to other religious traditions in her works. But would her slogan 
“we are the text” work for a Muslim reader of the Koran? 
The Islamic tradition strongly encourages learning the Koran by heart and being able to 
recite the whole text. In this way, the text of the Koran is embodied in the reciter, reciting the 
texts with her/his own voice. Even if this is not what Chung originally had in mind, this way of 
relating to the Koran makes the text as recited closely connected to the believer’s body. The 
distance between the divine revelation and the believer is still maintained, however, by the 
conviction that they are separated and that human experience cannot replace the divine 
revelation.  
The positioning of the reader toward the text is significant in order to investigate the 
process of interpretation. Is the position of the reader to understand, evaluate, or judge the text? 
Or, is the reader to position herself as the text and the text as context? These questions situate the 
reader as subject in different ways. But there is also the question of the placing of the subject: Is 
the reader or the text the defining subject? This way of posing this question may suggest that the 
position of text and reader is stable throughout the process of interpretation. I suggest that the 
location of the subject moves between text, reader, and context but to different degrees, 
depending on the interpreters’ view of the text.  
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Kwok Pui-Lan: “Diasporic Imagination”  
The Christian feminist and postcolonialist theologian Kwok Pui-Lan, of Chinese origin and 
currently based in the USA, shows how the concept of place can be critically investigated in 
hermeneutics. Her main project is to create a “postcolonial theology of religious difference” and 
to move beyond religious pluralism, which she states is constructed with Christianity as its norm 
and, as a construction, fixes the religious traditions in favor of the people having authority and to 
the disadvantage of all others (Egnell 2006: 259-261). Kwok uses the term diasporic imagination 
(Kwok 2005: 47) for a female diasporic subject’s multi-located consciousness negotiating 
between past and present, here and there, as an interpreting subject who as a result of her life 
narrative, always is doubly located (Kwok 2005: 46). Without going into the debates about the 
use of the term “diaspora,” I find Kwok’s term useful. Kwok states that the diasporic imagination 
is a skill that makes a subject able to mediate between tradition and modernity and between the 
past and the future. She claims that because the female diasporic subject has to reinvent her 
identity, as an individual, or as part of a collective, she has to struggle to find ways of expressing 
herself and may be able to formulate alternative views and agencies for change (critical 
discourses) because she negotiates with multiple others (imagined or present). In her postcolonial 
critique of Christianity, Kwok states that diasporic imagination can deconstruct universalism 
based on Western “common sense” and thus be open for other cultures and places to define 
Christian faith in their own context (Kwok 2005: 48-49).  
Kwok is basically concerned with transcultural negotiations of the representation of 
Christianity from a feminist perspective. But to return to what she calls “the episteme of 
nineteen-century European religious discourse,” she finds that anti-Semitism, colonialism, and 
women’s subordination are three connected elements in this discourse (Kwok 2005: 49). By this 
means Kwok brings feminism, postcolonial criticism, and the discourse about the religious other 
together. I would add that Jews were not the only representatives of the religious other in this 
nineteenth-century discourse; Muslims also figured as the religious other through what Edward 
Said called orientalism (Said 1978). In addition, Muslims represented the cultural other and the 
colonized, allegedly (according to Said) in need of being controlled and defined by Western 
colonizers. 
 Kwok’s term “diasporic imagination” is relevant to this project in at least two ways: First, 
the backgrounds of some of the participants are more than simply Norwegian (the Middle East, 
Iran, Africa, and Pakistan), and this creates a negotiation about which contextual perspectives to 
include when the texts are being contextualized. Second, the current hegemonic discourses in 
Norway and in the West on Muslims, Islam, and Muslim women also influences the participants’ 
interpretation of text, context, and each other. Islam as the other religion and Muslims as the 
religious other – using here the term “other” in an orientalist way – are part of these discourses. 
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Analogical Reasoning and Moral Enrichment/Moral Critique 
Analogical reasoning in making meaning of canonical texts is a way of juxtaposing the space and 
experience of the reader and the space and context of the text. The interpreted message of the 
text is tested on the reader’s perception of reality and her/his own experiences: Could I 
understand the text if I imagined myself in one of the positions of the textual figures or imagined 
myself as the author or historical listener of the text? The information this produces in the reader 
– thoughts, understandings, reactions, and feelings – is then woven into the meaning making of 
the text.  
In the encounter with narrative texts an analogical way of relating could also be to 
articulate a new narrative based on one’s own experiences and reflections. This new narrative 
could be harmonious with the textual narrative or it could be disharmonious as a kind of counter-
narrative. Another way to relate to a narrative is performative: to include oneself in the textual 
narrative through identification with one of the figures, reactivating the original narrative in 
one’s own life without creating a new narrative. Rituals within the traditions may provide space 
for this.43 
If the text read is a non-narrative, prescriptive text from a canonical scripture conveying 
ethical or ideological standpoints and reasoning, the analogical response and interpretation might 
be shaped more by reflections on ethics and ideology.44 But prescriptive texts are also likely to 
activate readers’ experiences, which may be articulated as narratives or statements. And 
narratives may also activate ideological and ethical reflections and interpretations of the reader.45 
In the group’s discussions on the Hagar/Hajar narrative, the second discussion starts with an 
ethical criticism of Hagar/Hajar’s action in the narratives, when she leaves her son Ishmael in the 
desert (Chapter 5, p. 162 ff). Hagar/Hajar’s act in the narratives might be seen as a criticism from 
a modern ideological/ethical point of view but could also be expressing the reader’s own 
experience. Other participants defend Hagar/Hajar’s action and thus relate closer to the 
exchanged interpretation of the narratives. Both parties, however, use analogical reasoning in the 
discussion to evaluate Hagar/Hajar’s action, and one of the sources of this is their experience.  
                                                 
43 The narrative about Hajar is, for instance, the frame for the ritual of sa`y in Islam. The Eucharist in the Christian 
tradition comes close to this aspect. 
44 The connotations of the concepts ethics versus ideology are different in interpretative theory, where “ideological 
reading” might be seen as a reductionist interpretation of a text, whereas ethical reading is more legitimate. Feminist 
readings are sometimes criticized for being ideological and thus reductionist, but their reading may be called ethical 
by feminists themselves. 
45 On the ideological criticism of narratives from other times (and other cultures), see Mieke Bal Narratology (Bal 
1997: 181-182), where she suggests that the suspension of reality in narratology is the only way to dissolve an 
ethnocentric interpretation (othering) of such narratives because it can reveal the structures of the narratives and 
through this show that “the nature of the otherness is sameness” (Bal 1997: 182). This makes it, according to Bal, 
possible to engage with narratives without being trapped in the ideologies of the present as a pre-understanding. 
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It seems relevant to connect the general hermeneutical tool of analogical reasoning to 
religious traditions of interpretation. In traditional Islamic interpretation, the principles of qiyas 
(analogical reasoning) and urf (custom) are used within the Islamic law schools. Analogical 
reasoning is part of ijtihad, although not as an independent act of an individual believer if she 
stays within the frameworks of the Islamic tradition. 
The spatial impact of qiyas in the positioning of the reader versus the canonical texts 
(from the Koran or the sunna) is that the interpreter is granted a role in interpreting the context 
and mediating between text and context. Ijtihad can be seen not only as mediating between 
canonical text and context but also as a moral enrichment of the text. The Muslim academic 
Abou el Fadl explains the concept of moral enrichment in the following way:  
[T]he text will morally enrich the reader, but only if the reader will morally enrich the text. The 
meaning of the religious text is not fixed simply by the literal meaning of its words, but depends, 
too, on the moral construction given to it by the reader. (Abou El Fadl, Cohen, and Lague 2002: 
15) 
 
He claims that the Muslim reader of the Koran has an ethical obligation to obtain a certain level 
of moral consciousness the Koran itself assumes its readers will contribute (Abou El Fadl, 
Cohen, and Lague 2002: 15). On this basis Fadl criticizes authoritarian structures and gender 
inequality in Islam, as a criticism of the Koran’s readers, not of the Koran itself. The position of 
the reader is thus to evaluate the text, but mostly to interpret the text in a way that morally 
enriches it. This places a strong obligation on the reader and at the same time gives authority to 
the reader as the interpreter of the text. 
 In Christian theology, the concept of ethical or moral critique of canonical scriptures 
themselves has been addressed by critical theologians such as feminist ones but also by 
Palestinian Christian theologians struggling with the biblical concept of “chosen people” and 
theologians working for the acceptance of homosexuality. Criticism of biblical interpretation is 
not enough for advocates of the ethical critique of the scriptures. The texts themselves must be 
ethically evaluated by the readers (Leirvik 2011 (forthcoming)).  
 In the section on feminisms later in this chapter, I will elaborate on what could be 
designated moral enrichment and moral critique by Christian and Islamic feminist theology on 
texts from the Koran, the sunna, and the Bible. It seems that moral enrichment and moral/ethical 
critique of the canonical scriptures aim at empowering the reader as well as making her 
responsible for her engagement with the texts. The question is what the difference between them 
may be in theory and practice, due to the different status of the Koran and the Bible in their 
respective traditions. The participants in this study all engage in moral evaluation of either the 
texts themselves, or existing interpretation of texts. Sometimes this is marked by self-criticism 
  
50 
on behalf of their traditions. The analysis will show if Christians and Muslims do this differently 
because of their respective backgrounds, and this sheds more light on similarities and differences 
between these ways of engaging with the texts as represented in this study. But there is one 
important question that has not yet been raised: What about morally enriching/criticizing 
canonical texts from a different tradition? I will return to this in the later section on dialogue.  
Analogical reasoning in the meaning-making process thus has two main aspects that are 
not contradictory: it may function as an existentially motivated strategy of interpretation – and 
this may or may not lead to ethical and moral evaluation of the canonical scriptures themselves – 
or the interpretation of these. Before it can be used to make meaning, however, analogical 
reasoning must in some way or another find a way to resolve what is perhaps the most classical 
hermeneutical challenge – at least regarding religious canonical scriptures in Christianity and 
Islam: How is one to relate to the time gap between context of the reader and the context of the 
text’s origin? 
 
Time and Temporality in Making Meaning 
Both spatial and temporal expressions can be seen as fundamental to human interpretation of the 
world. They not only appear as concrete references to time and space/place through articulation 
of narratives but are also used metaphorically when describing and interpreting human relations, 
texts, and discourses. To situate text, context, and interpreters also implies situating them in time. 
One of the challenges when religious canonical scriptures are read and interpreted in a 
different time is the almost unavoidable use of anachronisms. Anachronisms, in the sense of 
mixing past and present with the result that notions, terms, and figures belonging to the present 
are applied to the past without reflecting on the time gap, represents a challenge for making 
meaning in relation to ancient texts. The cultural theorist Mieke Bal discusses the use of 
anachronisms in understanding the past (Bal 2008: 47-49) She argues that a deliberate use of 
anachronisms could actually entail taking the past seriously as human existence in a different 
time and that not to use anachronisms understood as contemporary concepts and ideas on 
historical material could also be anachronistic.  
Her position seems to be that anachronisms are unavoidable. As long as we engage in the 
past we are doomed to produce anachronisms in one way or another, according to Bal. It would 
be better then, in her view, to do it consciously and deliberately so that our own paths through 
the interpretation process are traceable. Bal suggests the use of anachronisms as “temporal 
metaphor[s]” (Bal 2008: 48) to understand a phenomenon both in its “own” historical terms and 
in contemporary terms (Bal 2008: 48). For Bal, knowledge of the present and the past is an 
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important criterion for using anachronisms in a way that may become open to a substantial 
analysis.46  
Bal’s main warning is thus not against the use of anachronisms but against regarding 
other cultures, different in time and space from our own, as homogeneous entities. To make 
simplistic images of foreign or past cultures can lead us to believe that we have grasped them 
and thus give us the idea that we have a real chance at avoiding the temptation to confuse times. 
According to Bal, we should acknowledge the fluidity and accept our own position as limited 
with respect to our possibility of having access to other times. It is we, in our present time, who 
are the constructors of the past, and the past should not be “othered” and shaped into an entity 
that we are able to grasp in full.  
Bal suggests that we “boldly endorse anachronistic terms” (Bal 2008: 48) in analyzing 
phenomena to achieve understanding – both of the past and of the present. She underlines, 
however, that one should always situate oneself when doing this and do it consciously and in an 
informed manner.  
The participants in this study are not engaged as professional interpreters, even if many 
of them have the relevant education for interpreting their religious texts. The knowledge they 
show in their making of meaning is often more contemporary and contextual than historical and 
academic, even if the latter is also represented. The use of anachronisms in their making of 
meaning may be a way to relate morally to the texts as contemporary readers, engaging in moral 
enrichment or moral critique. In the analysis this is connected to how the participants position 
themselves as interpreters. One of the questions may be if the participants are found “guilty” of 
othering the texts or othering other cultures. The task would not be to frame the participants and 
accuse them of conveying stereotypical images of other times or other cultures but to investigate 
the interpretational circumstances: What is at stake for the participants when this happens? Could 
it be that they, when and if they use stereotypical images, are caught in a defensive position and 
feel othered themselves by the texts or by other cultures?  
 
Temporal Categorization as Discourses of Power 
If analyzed critically, the use of temporal and spatial categories in interpretation processes may 
yield valuable information for detecting present discourses of power. The social anthropologist 
Johannes Fabian made a critical study at the beginning of the 1980s on how social anthropology 
as a discipline has used/uses the concept of time (Fabian 1983). He claims that his own discipline 
                                                 
46 In her book Travelling Concepts in the Humanities: A Rough Guide (Bal 2002) Bal discusses the relation between 
human memory and anachronisms in her chapter on performance and performativity. She states: “For memory is 
doomed to anachronism. But its fundamental anachronistic nature is not a consequence of a failure to produce ‘the 
truth’ of the elements of the past.… Memory can’t transport its time frame” (Bal 2002: 190). 
  
52 
has rested on a tradition of constructing an oppressive distance between the anthropologist and 
his/her research object by placing the research objects in a different time than the researcher. 
Fabian claims this to be a legacy of anthropology’s colonial past. He discovered what he calls a 
habit of denying coevalness between researcher and informants. Denial of the coevalness of 
cultures (e.g. the researchers’ own culture, and the culture of the informants), which is often 
done only implicitly, is based on a temporal categorization that rests on a discourse of historical 
evolutionism (Fabian 1983:39).  
Following Fabian’s line of thought, the placing of another culture in “another time” 
creates a distance loaded with (negative) meaning. Even if Fabian’s work is mainly about 
exercising self-criticism on behalf of his own academic discipline and he basically focuses his 
criticism on the relation researchers have constructed with their informants, some of his 
discussions are theoretically and methodologically relevant for the analysis of the empirical 
material in this project. Obviously, it is a critical reminder of how I as a researcher situate and 
interpret the empirical material and the participating informants. His reflections on the use of 
temporal categories to commit symbolical violence against the other may, however, also be 
useful when analyzing discourses occurring in the empirical material. To place texts, cultural or 
religious practices, such as views on gender relations, in a different “time zone,” even though 
being contemporary, may be to deny a coeval relation. This, in line with Fabian would imply a 
construction of distance and of hierarchies of meaning. 
To deny coevalness may also be to refrain from establishing a moral enrichment or moral 
critique of a religious and cultural text or practice because these acts imply engagement, not 
distance. Just as Bal requires knowledge of past and present in using anachronisms in a 
responsible way, the notion of coevalness requires knowledge about the involved parties, the self 
and the other. 
Fabian claims that created and acknowledged coevalness is a condition for 
communication because the acknowledged shared time is necessary to create a space of 
intersubjective time in which communication is possible (Fabian 1983: 30-31). Without 
acknowledged coevalness, communication will not happen because one of the subjects (or both) 
has distanced herself from the other through temporal categorization.  
In the discourse of “Islam and the West” in Europe, there is a position that denies 
coevalness between the West and the Muslim majority countries, based on a view that Islam is 
allegedly behind Christianity in its historical development. The argument rests on historical 
evolutionism,47 claiming, for instance, that Islam has “not yet” gone through a period equivalent 
                                                 
47 This is based on an understanding of history where cultures, religions, and “civilizations” are bound to develop in 
the same way through universal laws of history, and thus take a certain amount of time to pass from one “historical 
stage” to a next.  
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to the European period of Enlightenment and represents a “medieval worldview.”48 The denial of 
coevalness can also be found as a position in Muslim majority country discourses, resting on the 
view that Christianity (along with Judaism) was only a preliminary phase before the final divine 
revelation represented by Islam. In both cases, the positions denying coevalness may block the 
creation of intersubjective time, hindering communication now with its main reference to present, 
shared challenges. 
Does Fabian’s notion of coevalness then include shared space as well as shared time? It is 
appropriate to ask if it is possible to split time and space in this respect. Intersubjective 
communication does not necessarily require the communicating subjects to be in the same place. 
But if one is focusing on the spatiality of interpretation, understood, for instance, as the act of 
interpretation situated within a specific context or as a contextual act, a mutual understanding 
between the interpreting subjects on what to acknowledge as the significant context could be a 
criterion for coevalness. This could include agreeing (perhaps after negotiation) on where to 
draw the spatial lines for the significant context(s) or who to include in it, collectively or 
individually.  
Fabian’s aim of creating intersubjective time, which was formulated in the beginning of 
the 1980s, could be viewed from a Western perspective as outdated in an age of worldwide web 
and globalization where knowledge and human contact across the world is regarded as having 
increased the understanding of other cultures (and religions). From an ethical perspective, 
however, the possibility of making the other an object rather than an equal human being is hardly 
outdated. The examples above show that othering through temporal categorizations in discourses 
are not outdated. Fabian himself underlined that the intersubjective time needs to be created; it 
does not simply occur (Fabian 1983: 31). This implies self-reflexivity, not only on the part of 
oneself, but also on the part of what one may be seen to represent. 
 
Defining Space and Time as Strategies of Meaning Making  
In the groups’ conversations, temporal and spatial tools in the interpretations can be traced by 
looking for the terms “here” and “there” and “then” and “now.” “There” and “then” express 
distance and may be used for the possible exclusion of a text, story, or argument from a 
discussion. “Here” and “now,” on the other hand, may be used as terms signaling closeness, 
                                                 
48 Examples of this view in the Norwegian contemporary context are found in public debates, and among some 
journalists. See for instance Halvor Tjønn in Aftenposten 02.28.2010: “Islam. Hvorfor så mye konflikt?” (“Islam. 
Why So Much Conflict?”). Academic discussions on Islam, modernity and secularization sometimes echo this view 
more implicitly, if modernity is linked to the concept of secularization. Against this view, José Casanova argues that 
this is only one (mostly Christian-European) way of viewing the relation between religion, secularity and modernity, 
and that “theories of secularization and modernization should be open to the possibility that other religions may also 
play a role in institutionalizing their own particular patterns of secularization” (Casanova 1994: 234). 
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relevance, and presence. But the temporal and spatial organization of texts, contexts, and the 
participants themselves are not necessarily loaded with significance at all times. A closer 
analysis is necessary to study how the cues “then” and “there” and “here” and “now” can 
function as an invitation to or closing up of communication and community. Space and time may 
function in a combined way in evaluating texts and context on basis of expressed ideals, such as 
gender equality. But expressions of hope and agency about text and context in the future may 
also be expressed through temporal and spatial categories. Notions of ideal situations, expressing 
hope and yearning, may be spatially and temporally defined. 
The canonical texts discussed in the study call for the participants’ temporal and spatial 
interpretative tools. They are placed differently in time, as well as in space through 
contextualization, to be close or distant and evaluated as relevant or outdated. “Old” and 
“ancient” may signal distance to a text but not necessarily. “New” and “relevant” could be used 
as equivalents but not necessarily to construct a distance to the “old” or “ancient.” 
Returning to Fabian’s notion of coevalness as an expression of equality and a valid 
expression of intersubjectivity, an articulation of a shared “here and now” in a group could 
express a mutually experienced coevalness. The ability and power to be present “here and now” 
as a subject, and not as an object vulnerable to others’ projections, is part of the actual 
experience of coevalness. A mutual recognition of the participants in the group as subjects 
sharing a “here and now” may make it possible to construct a space for a shared agency. Going 
back to Rasmussen’s transcontextual position and Nehring’s performative speech (enabling a 
transformed articulation of one’s position), experienced coevalness may be the premise for this. 
An important question linked to analyzing a process, stable or more shifting, toward an 
acknowledged experience of a common “here and now” is to ask what it takes for an interpreting 
group to reach this point, and how to recognize it. In a critical perspective, one may ask 
what/who may be excluded and defined as out of place, out of context, or outside the horizon. 
The creation of common “we’s” within the group of meaning makers can be seen as an 
expression of an emerging coevalness, an acknowledgement of a shared “here and now.” The 
common “we” might be unstable and shifting, and consist of different persons at different 
times.49 It is, however, reasonable to ask if the meaning-making process in this study gradually 
creates a more inclusively stable “we” between the participants throughout the process. The 
canonical scriptures in this project meet in their common readers; a transcontextual space, a 
shared “we,” or a “third space” may occur and be more or less stable. 
 
                                                 
49 The emergence of an “interpretative we” connects the notion of coevalness with the content of Stanley Fish´s 
term interpretative communities discussed later in this chapter. 
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Dialogue and Hermeneutics 
Dialogue can be explored from different positions: descriptively, i.e. describing various kinds of 
human communication, or as a more qualified, normative concept. The discussions above on 
transreligious hermeneutics displayed critical perspectives of power and the view of the other 
related to human relations in transreligious hermeneutical efforts.  
Both hermeneutics and dialogue refer to human relations and communication. 
Hermeneutics is involved in the interpretation of the personified other, not only of texts (cf. 
Giddens).50 There is always more than one presence in a hermeneutical situation of text and 
reader: the reader and the text. Some descriptions of interpretation and hermeneutics are 
transferable to a discussion on dialogue. But where hermeneutics is primarily concerned with the 
struggle to interpret (which may involve dialogue), dialogue is concerned with the struggle to 
communicate relationally and may address this normatively.  
When there is more than one reader present, a relation is established between the readers, 
as in this project. The ethical and conceptual framing and dynamics of this relation is the focus in 
this discussion on dialogue.  
 
Dialogue in this Project 
The term dialogue will be used in this study in both a normative and a descriptive way. When I 
refer to organized activities of transreligious/interreligious encounters that are called dialogue or 
encounter, I will be using the term descriptively. When analyzing the study’s empirical material, 
and generally in all other cases than describing activities that are called dialogue, I will use it 
normatively. This means that rather than calling the interpretative group a dialogue group,51 I 
will examine the empirical material for qualified dialogical events and processes and specify 
further what these may express, particularly regarding how cultural and religious differences are 
related. To look for dialogical events and processes in the group, it is necessary to clarify criteria 
for evaluating communication as dialogue and dialogical.52  
                                                 
50 Rasmussen, Nehring, and Leirvik connect hermeneutics and dialogue in different ways. The participants of 
Scriptural Reasoning (SR) did not call their Jewish-Muslim-Christian shared readings dialogue, thus hinting that  in 
their context the term “dialogue” for cross-religious encounters is contested because its alleged connection to 
religious liberalism. Other criticisms of the term for cross-religious and cross-cultural encounters are that a dialogue 
would always be dominated by hegemonic discourses and thus be more of a monologue in real life, that the term is 
overused and thus emptied for any significant meaning, and finally, that dialogue may cover controversies between 
different religious and cultural groups and hence create false harmony. 
51 See the Chapter 3 for a further discussion on the naming of the group and on dialogue and qualitative research. 
52 A further clarification: the evaluation of the empirical material by the criterion of dialogue is not done to evaluate 
the participants individually or to establish an ideal the group ought to obtain. Rather, I believe that the use of the 
term itself needs to be discussed and evaluated, that it is useful to distinguish between different forms of dialogue, 
and that the empirical material in this study may be used for this purpose. 
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In the following I will explore dialogue as a normative term first by discussing the 
philosophers Martin Buber and Emmanuel Levinas. I will then turn to Paolo Freire’s pedagogical 
approach. A short comment on their thinking on human equality versus gender equality will 
conclude this philosophical/pedagogical introduction. I will then suggest two different models 
represented in the reflections of transreligious/interreligious encounters/dialogues I refer to in the 
theoretical framework that differ in their evaluation and signification of differences. The models 
will be established via social theory using the concepts of multiculturalism and cultural 
complexity respectively. Finally, in this section on dialogue, I will suggest some more concrete 
tools for identifying dialogical processes and events in the empirical material. 
  
Buber, Levinas, Freire 
The word dialogue, just like the word hermeneutics, is of Greek orgin. The Greek words dia and 
logos mean “through” and “word” respectively. Plato used the term for the processes of 
education between teacher and pupil and for discussions open to everyone as a way of seeking 
knowledge and self-reflection (Svare 2008: 258-270). The Jewish philosophers Martin Buber and 
Emmanuel Levinas use the term to describe an ideal relation between Self and Other. The Latin 
American pedagogue Paolo Freire applies it to the sphere of social action in his book Pedagogy 
of the Oppressed (Freire 2000). 
Buber is concerned with relational communication, insisting that a true dialogue must 
take place between two subjects to establish an “I-Thou” relationship. Only through such a 
dialogue, according to Buber, does a human being become a person and not simply an individual 
(Buber 2002: 24). The process of dialogue requires the participants to reveal their uniqueness. 
Thus, playing out the differences between the partners is a sign of a genuine dialogue (Rundquist 
1998: 210).  
Levinas claims that the otherness of the Other must be fully respected in a dialogue. To 
violate the otherness of the Other is the most serious violation of the Other that can take place. 
For Levinas, Buber’s concept of reciprocity is not sufficient as an ideal. He claims that the 
relation between the “I” and the “You” is asymmetrical, since the ethical claim of the “I” to 
respond to the “You” is the basis of all human duty as being infinitely responsible for the Other 
(Levinas 1999: 101-102). In a dialogue, Levinas states, “the I as I is the servant of the You” 
(Levinas 1998: 150). Levinas claims that the reciprocity of which Buber speaks turns into an 
exchange of good behavior because it presupposes that the generosity shown by the “I” will be 
responded to by a similar generosity toward the “I” from the “You.” Levinas insists that the 
ethical responsibility rests solely on the “I.”  
  Buber and Levinas are both addressing ideal human relations in general in their 
philosophy of dialogue. Applying their thought to the development of values for transreligious 
  
57 
and transcultural dialogue would mean implementing general norms of dialogue (as suggested by 
them) into a particular setting. It may nevertheless be useful to contextualize their reflections on 
a communicative situation of religious and/or cultural plurality. Buber’s point that one is not to 
make one’s dialogue partner an object of knowledge but grants her/him full subjectivity and 
cherishes differences in a mutual process presupposes absolute equality between partners in the 
dialogue. Levinas’ claim of the total responsibility of the “I” means that initiatives for dialogue 
and the maintenance of dialogue would always be the duty of the “I,” no matter what the other 
party’s intention or reaction might be.  
  Speaking from a pedagogical and action-oriented point of view, Freire draws attention to 
two dimensions of dialogue: reflection and action. According to him, the word dialogue is an 
empty term without the dimension of action (Freire 2000: 87). Freire calls that the act of 
dialogue naming the world. This naming is a process of transformation where those taking part 
obtain significance as human beings. Freire claims that humility, faith in humankind, hope, love 
– and critical thinking – all are necessary qualities in a dialogue. For him, dialogue should aim at 
transforming reality as a social and not an individual effort. The aim of the transformation is to 
restore humanity to the marginalized. The transformation is not separate from the process of 
dialogue but takes place through the “naming of the world” that leads to re-creation. According 
to Freire, then, a dialogue should have a transforming aim, not only for those participating in the 
dialogue at an individual level but also for society at large. 
Freire applies the concept of dialogue to the social and political sphere. He includes the 
criticism of power and a political analysis of the social context as necessary ingredients of 
dialogue. His reflections are highly relevant for transreligious dialogue, not least those 
concerning dialogues taking place in contexts where there is an overwhelming majority and 
small minorities of religious communities – as in most European countries. Dialogue in such 
contexts requires an analysis of power relations between the majority and minorities, and 
considerations of how both the religious majority and minorities are affected by their respective 
status. Freire’s description of the aim, namely to work toward a re-humanization of the 
dehumanized, does not discriminate between different kinds of dehumanization. His reference is 
“the people,” i.e. the unprivileged masses and, leaning as he does on a Marxist-materialist 
perspective, there is clearly an economic and political dimension in the foreground. These 
aspects of marginalization are relevant matters in interreligious dialogue, but Freire’s main 
contribution is how he explains dialogue as a pedagogical process, a process where the 
participants should both teach and learn as subjects. According to Freire, words cannot be 
separated from praxis but must be integrated in action. Transreligious dialogue could then have 
the aim of naming the world together, across religious boundaries. Through a shared reclaiming 
of the power to name the world, which should be based on equal rights to do the naming among 
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the dialogue partners, transreligious dialogue would contribute to the world being “transformed 
and humanized” (Freire 2000: 89).  
In practice, this may entail exploring a common, shared context, be it the global context 
or the contexts of the faith communities represented in the dialogue, and to examine these to 
disclose where and why transformation is needed. This would make it possible to work out a 
common, open agenda for the dialogue, aimed at exploring what this “transformation and 
humanization” could actually imply in a given context.  
 
The Battle over “Naming the World” 
Each of the world religions, including Christianity and Islam, has a worldview and thus their 
own traditions of “naming the world.” The traditions, including the canonical scriptures, 
represented by the believers as interpreters and performers, are constantly defining the world and 
also defining their own power of definition. Francois Burgat, who researches political Islam, 
believes that the main conflict between the West and Muslim majority countries in the 
contemporary world concerns the symbolic power of defining the world. He claims that Muslim 
majority countries feel humiliated and oppressed by an increased domination of the West that has 
gradually obtained global hegemony of power of definition.53 This means that the dominant 
political and social discourse about political and social goals and what is “good” and “bad” refers 
increasingly to hegemonic discourses of Western ideals and political aims. For Muslims living in 
the West, this could mean being caught in between discourses. Conversely, the experience of 
Christians living in predominantly Muslim societies could be that hegemonic discourses in their 
societies marginalize them. Christian tradition and the West are not concurrent entities. In a 
situated dialogue, sharing the power of definition may begin with a conscious analytical 
reflection on power structures influencing the encounter in order to obtain space for creating 
intersubjective communication. 
 The act of “naming the world” in Christianity and Islam may be seen to include an act of 
“gendering the world” in the two traditions. In recent decades in both Christianity and Islam 
feminist criticism has been raised regarding the traditional definitions of gender and the 
constructions of gender models. One may ask if a representation of two religious traditions 
deeply shaped by patriarchy in a transreligious dialogue (as would be the case in a Christian-
Muslim dialogue) would double or confirm further the effect of the traditional “gendering of the 
world” in the religious traditions respectively through a cumulated power of definition supported 
by two religious traditions instead of one. If this is plausible, what would happen to the content 
                                                 
53 In his books Face to face with political Islam (Burgat 2003) and Islamism in the shadow of al-Qaeda (Burgat 
2008), Burgat discusses the impact of this symbolic struggle in some Muslim majority countries and how the 
representation of Islam in the West influence on internal struggles about the representation of Islam among Muslims. 
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of Freire’s hope for transformation and humanization of the world concerning gender models and 
gender roles? The aim of Christian and Muslim feminist theology is to transform the traditions to 
be less oppressive against women, and their analyses may be used to gender Freire’s aim for 
dialogue as “transforming and humanizing the world.” In the name of human equality, women 
should take part in the act of naming and transforming the world. 
The dialogue philosophies of Buber and Levinas and Freire’s dialogue pedagogy all insist 
on values that must be part of a communicative relationship called dialogue. These include 
criticism of power structures that marginalize humans (Freire), respect and care for personal 
integrity (Levinas), and what may be called relational justice and equality (all three). None of 
them, however, explicitly use a gender perspective or reflect on what these values might mean or 
entail if they were applied to gendermixed human relationships or gender mixed societies. This 
could be understood as self evident, when interpreting their contributions in a different time. 
However, considering that experience tells us that when questions of gender and power 
structures are not addressed openly and are thus not dealt with in an explicit way, this becomes a 
problem of gender justice. Does Freire’s transformation include a transformation of gendered 
power structures, so that women may take part in the naming of the world at the same level as 
men? Freire may easily be interpreted as supporting such a position, but he does not explicitly 
articulate this. The question is if these values posed by Freire, Levinas, and Buber may lack 
credibility if they do not explicitly include a gender perspective. If dialogue means the 
implementation of equality and justice, must this not include equality between women and men, 
and gender justice?  
In an attempt to grasp the meaning of dialogue, I have elsewhere suggested a definition of 
the term, qualifying dialogue to be:  
… a mutual encounter between equal parties, without hidden agendas, not aiming at transforming 
the other but at taking part in a mutual transformation that may happen through the encounter. 
(Grung 2005: 88)  
 
This is a normative definition, and it qualifies the process of transformation. It speaks of 
dialogue in ideal terms, as a created space that should be free from power imbalances and where 
the whole process should be totally transparent for all participants. In the following I will suggest 
two models of transreligious dialogues that provide views for qualifying transformation 
(although differently) but also situate the dialogue closer to organizational and theological 
realities. 
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Two Models of Transreligious/Interreligious Dialogue
54
 
The various initiatives of transreligious/interreligious dialogue on the global scene are situated in 
different contexts. They have emerged out of various contextual needs, and cover a large scale of 
diverse content and activities. There may be only one common feature between them: they 
include persons from at least two different religious traditions. Without qualifying the act and 
aim of transreligious encounter/dialogue, it is clear that religious difference55 is anticipated, 
expected, and needed in order to call an activity interreligious dialogue, interfaith dialogue, or – 
the term preferred in this study – transreligious dialogue. It follows that the differences between 
the participants with regard to religious identity, belonging, and background are most commonly 
indicated to be the most important differences. Cultural, social, ethnic, and gender differences are 
often not signified in the same way. This does not mean that they do not exist in transreligious 
dialogues. Nor does it imply that these other differences are not crucial in meaning-making 
processes and the construction of agencies within transreligious dialogues. Some claim that these 
other differences actually play a larger role than religious identity and representation in the 
transreligious dialogues.56  
The growing cultural and religious plurality in Western societies has produced social 
theories suggesting how society should be organized to facilitate the different needs emerging 
out of a more heterogeneous population. There are two main positions to start from in reflecting 
on this heterogeneity, and they differ in their views of what might keep a society sufficiently 
together across differences. One position views community as being established through the 
shared values of the individuals, and thus society should provide them possibilities for being 
organized in various groups with others thought to share the same values, and society as a whole 
is preserved as a patchwork consisting of different groups. The other position views 
communication to be the crucial activity for sustaining and creating a community. To put it very 
briefly: The former has been labeled the multicultural view, the latter could be called the 
“travelling concept”57 of cultural complexity (Eriksen 2009).  
                                                 
54 I use the term transreligious in accordance with the conclusions of my discussion on pages 28-30. The inclusion 
of the term “interreligious” is because it is still the most common term. The term “dialogue” is used, although some 
of the participants of Scriptural Reasoning do not wish to be associated with the term “dialogue” on an 
organizational level because they consider it to be a term co-opted by liberals. 
55 The use of the terms “difference” and “diversity” are debated: “difference” seems to be used to signify awareness 
of power structures and the need to acknowledge these. “Difference” thus expresses dissimilarity in a more 
significant way than “diversity” does, which may have more of a connotation of harmony. 
56 Cf. Nehring, who claims that the cultural representation is the first identification people make (Nehring 2011 
(forthcoming)), and the Christian feminist theologian Jeannine Hill Fletcher who claims that some feminists want 
feminism as their first identification (Fletcher in Egnell 2009). 
57 To frame a concept as a “travelling concept” is to acknowledge a certain degree of fluidity in its use and content. 
Mieke Bal states that concepts “on the road” travel between disciplines, historical periods, and different social and 
geographical areas, making them “travelling concepts.” Bal acknowledges that this may create a situation of 
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To emphasize difference as a starting point may be a useful place to begin when 
reflecting on transreligious dialogue. An organized dialogue implies communication that may 
potentially create partnership, community, and friendship. This requires reflection on the 
significance of difference and how it should be handled in practice and theorized.58  
 
Two Proposed Models: Difference as Constitutive, Difference as Challenge 
In recent decades, what is usually called interreligious dialogue, including Muslim-Christian 
dialogue, has become a social field of its own in Bourdieu’s sense of the term “field”: a defined 
area where there are different positions negotiating and struggling over the power of definition, 
with, for instance, regard to naming and qualifying the dialogue itself (Bourdieu 1975: 19).  
 I propose two models of transreligious dialogue, diverging with respect to the role of 
religious differences and how they relate to these differences in the encounters. The possible 
implications of this for the aims of dialogues and the inclusion of gender perspectives and 
women’s issues will be discussed after the presentation. It is, however, important to emphasize 
that, like all models, they simplify and do not do justice to the diversity existing “on the 
ground.”The boundaries between the two models are porous rather than watertight. 
 
Difference as Constitutive 
The first model is represented by the practitioners of Scriptural Reasoning (SR), and could be 
placed under the label “Difference as constitutive of the dialogue.” SR is a practice for 
interreligious encounter, focusing on reading canonical scriptures in Judaism, Christianity, and 
Islam. Religions are considered to be stable entities, not primarily in the sense that they are not 
dynamic or capable of adjusting but in the sense that the boundaries between them are stable and 
should be safeguarded in the encounter. Interaction between the participants may lead to 
friendship and strong personal relationships across religious boundaries. This is strongly 
encouraged, but the place of the encounter rests on constant stable relations between the 
traditions represented. This means that the method/practice of SR does not encourage entering 
into a profoundly challenging position to the authority of the scriptures or self-criticism in the 
traditions connected to the scriptures. The shared aim is rather to strengthen the visibility of the 
                                                                                                                                                             
“muddled multidisciplinarity” (Bal 2002: 25), but she also states that the traveling make the concepts flexible and 
useful when situated in new surroundings and can create a “productive interdisciplinarity” (ibid.). The latter requires 
an open and transparent use of the concepts, a constant redefining and articulation of how a concept is used in 
specific situations. 
58 In the empirical material, the challenge that arises through the presence of difference is handled and reflected on 
in various ways, and both models can be referred to in analyzing the group’s process in this study, but at different 
times. 
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religions in societies regarded as secular and to defend the religious traditions represented in SR 
as representing crucial resources for society.  
This implies that the respect for the religious other is (ideally) safeguarded, and the 
religious other is regarded a representative of a whole tradition. The establishment of SR is 
clearly defined as a response to contextual needs, basically emerging from outside of the 
religious traditions themselves. These are needs the religions can meet from a SR perspective. 
SR conveys a positive view of religions and corresponding skepticism toward secularity. 
Religious practitioners in the so-called Abrahamic religions need to learn to know one another 
and one another’s traditions through their canonical scriptures, to find the resources to “repair the 
world” (Kepnes 2006: 34). In this model religious differences seem to be signified as the only 
significant difference, and the differences between the religions are constitutive for the practice 
because what SR participants call liberal attempts to blur these differences would mean forcing 
participants to compromise their religious beliefs. The religious tradition as collective is the 
focus here, rather than individual believers. 
The social theories behind multiculturalism and the way they view cultural differences 
may help in evaluating this method. Multiculturalism is marked by its organization of cultural 
differences per group to secure that society grants people of different cultural, ethnic, and 
religious backgrounds rights based on their group membership.59 The aim is to provide space for 
and legitimization of difference, within the same nation-state or social community. In its 
“strong” form (Roald 2009: 32-33) as a political and social system for governing cultural and 
religious differences, multiculturalism focuses on group rights and group identity, and has been 
criticized for neglecting the individual rights of people within the groups. Multiculturalism has 
also been accused of creating and legitimizing parallel societies within a society and to providing 
a static view of cultures as unchangeable.60  
                                                 
59 The debate on multiculturalism is marked by diversity. Roald states one may speak of “strong” or a “weak” 
multiculturalism, with the latter trying to balance group and individual rights (Roald 2009: 32-33). What I mainly 
have in mind when suggesting this model of dialogue is a “strong” version of multiculturalism with a normative aim. 
Roald claims that this “strong” multiculturalism has generally been less implemented in practical politics than the 
“weak” (Roald 2009: 32). 
60 The definition of “culture” is central in this debate: Is culture a description of past and existing traditions, a fixed 
frame of reference for the individuals or is it something that happens through a constant flux of new references, 
ideas, and interpretations of the world where the past and the existing reference frames together create a dynamic 
movement in how both groups and individuals identify themselves? The Norwegian social anthropologist Thomas 
Hylland Eriksen suggests culture to be “something that happens, not something that merely exists; it unfolds through 
social processes and therefore also inherently changes” (Eriksen 2009: 13). In one of his earlier works, Kulturelle 
veikryss – Essays om kreolisering  (Cultural Crossroads – Essays on Creolization) (Eriksen 1994), Eriksen argues 
that there are two basic ways to view the constitution of culture. The first is to view it like a coral reef where the 
culture is based on continuity with the past and the culture is built up gradually, layer by layer, where only the coral 
on the surface is alive – but that rests on the traditions located in the specific space of the coral reef, clearly 
separated from other coral reefs (cultures). One may also view culture as a complex electrical field, with no defined 
spatial boundaries and the constitution of the field is based on the electrical voltage – a metaphor for human activity 
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I suggest that the practice of SR follows a multiculturalist-like pattern of theorizing about 
difference through viewing religious difference as the only significant difference and at the same 
time emphasizing the stability of the religious traditions. The collective view of the 
representation of religious traditions and the declared particularism in the interpretational 
processes of the encounter is consistent with a multicultural view. The constructed opposition 
between the religious and the secular in SR may be seen as a transposition of the view of 
religious differences when constructing a dichotomy between monotheistic religiosity in 
Judaism, Christianity, and Islam on the one hand and secularism in society as a whole on the 
other.  
Given SR’s closeness to the principles of multiculturalism, a similar criticism directed 
toward multiculturalism may also be made of SR: it might strengthen and legitimize religious 
boundaries as significant and overlook intrareligious differences and dynamics, through this 
confirming a certain pattern of parallel societies along religious lines as well as between the 
religious and the secular. A result may be that the space of individuals for acting within the 
traditions could be limited, with religion and secularism being seen as contradictory. Lastly, 
there is the problem of representation: Does the participant represent her-/himself or an entire 
tradition?  
 
Difference as Challenge 
I propose calling the second model of transreligious dialogue represented by Rasmussen and 
Leirvik “difference as challenge.” Although conceptualizing transreligious dialogue in different 
ways, they share a view of interreligious dialogue as entailing a possibility for change. They do 
not see religion as a stable entity. Both claim that religion needs to be interpreted and 
reinterpreted by its followers and believers, and that the space of transreligious dialogue is 
necessary for doing this in a pluralistic cultural and religious context. Rasmussen highlights the 
need for common Muslim-Christian action based on dialogue, emerging from the transcontextual 
place ideally created in a dialogue.61 The aim of the dialogue is thus not to safeguard the 
                                                                                                                                                             
as human thought, verbalization, and action (Eriksen 1994: 23). The coral reef metaphor implies that culture is based 
on a group of people sharing something that is regarded as stable or at least semi-stable, like values and traditions. 
The metaphor of an electrical field implies that culture is about making communication between humans possible. 
The boundaries between different cultures do not constitute the cultures themselves, nor does a metaphysical 
existence of the culture. Culture is fluid and linked to human activity in a way that makes it difficult to talk about 
cultures as distinctively different and separate (ibid.). In this understanding, culture is more detached from its spatial 
dimension. Eriksen links multiculturalism to the coral reef understanding of culture and makes a connection between 
creoalization and the electrical field metaphor. 
60 See Rasmussen’s model described above in this chapter, p. 26-27. 
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boundaries of Christianity and Islam or to emphasize the difference between the religious and the 
secular but to create a new space by what is shared (= communicated) in the space of dialogue.  
Leirvik argues that transreligious dialogues need to be critical of power, and that both the 
Islamic and the Christian tradition have elements of what he calls “prophetic criticism” toward 
injustice and power abuse. He suggests that participants in Christian-Muslim dialogue 
distinguish between their cultural, religious, and political identity in order to identify the 
different challenges dialogue should confront (Leirvik 2001: 186).  
Leirvik is concerned with the respect for the religious other in a dialogue, but his 
argument is not directed primarily at protecting the religious traditions as other traditions but at 
protecting the individual participants in the dialogues from being violated in their otherness. He 
does warn against downplaying or trying to diminish differences between the religious traditions, 
but his main concern appears to be the integrity of the individuals (Leirvik 2001: 89-91). 
Possibly inspired by Levinas, he claims that violation of the integrity of the other as the radical 
Other, of trying to shape the other in one’s own image, is the worst possible violation of the 
other’s integrity (Leirvik 2001: 90). On this basis, he dismisses any attempt to create a 
harmonized, global theological synthesis of the religious traditions (Leirvik 2001: 91).  
Is it only the religious aspect of the religious other that should be treated with such 
respect, or should attempts to resolve cultural, social and gender differences be given a similar 
warning against reducing otherness into sameness? Leirvik emphasizes that transreligious 
dialogues sometimes need to address problems within the faith communities and their practices 
and confront each other in respectful ways, not only on theological and scriptural issues but also 
with respect to ethical questions and actual practices within the faith communities. To view 
culture and religion as static – or stable – entities is, according to Leirvik, to underestimate the 
actual potential for change within both cultures and religions (Leirvik 2006: 23). He constructs 
an opposition between dialogue and identity politics and claims that both cultural and religious 
identity politics construct conflicts based on an essentialist view of both cultures and religions, 
conflicts that may be prevented with insights from cross-cultural, cross-religious dialogical 
encounters (Leirvik 2006: 32).  
This view on differences and dialogue indicates that Leirvik views religion and culture as 
more fluid than the multiculturalist approach does. He views fluidity not only descriptively but 
normatively as well.  
Rasmussen and Leirvik’s view on transreligious dialogue is more in line with the 
approach to difference in the cultural complexity view. The “cultural complexity” view of culture 
allows individuals and society to challenge the multiculturalist position at different levels. This is 
so, first, in the concept of culture, which is suggested to be fluid and dynamic rather than stable 
or static. Second, this is apparent in stating that cultural boundaries can be strengthened and 
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reproduced through multiculturalist politics to facilitate cultural and religious differences 
because differences have been signified and politicized (Eriksen 2009: 11). Complexity in 
“cultural complexity,” according to Eriksen, refers to a relational complexity consisting of 
infinite mutual relationships in a modern society, acknowledging that humanity and humans 
cannot be reduced to “products” of social, cultural (religious), or genetic circumstances. In 
addition, “complexity” means that a researcher admits her limitations in representing or grasping 
an exhaustive description of reality (Eriksen 2009: 18). The “cultural complexity” view is thus 
not a coherent position of its own alongside a more established multiculturalist discourse, but it 
does raise important criticisms about the very basis of multiculturalism.  
To view religious traditions as fluid poses some challenges. One of them is to not violate 
the other in his/her otherness through an apprehension of the other’s tradition as fluid from the 
outside, and in a way the believer her-/himself does not recognize. The question of representation 
is also a challenge for this model but from the opposite angle: if a representative of a religious 
tradition represents only her-/himself, what would be the legitimization of the individual as 
representative if not of the religious tradition as community?62 And what impact may the 
encounter/dialogue have in a religious community if the representatives do not follow the 
tradition as it understands and practices its faith? 
 
The Two Models: Possible Consequences  
Transreligious dialogue is always situated in a particular context, and positioned in a dynamic 
relation where it may both influence the context and be influenced by it. The political 
organization and contemporary views of cultural and religious differences in a society may 
influence how difference is viewed and facilitated in transreligious dialogue. 63 
                                                 
62 Leirvik argues that if a representation aims to be of common interest, it needs to be in touch with what he calls 
“mainstream currents” within the Christian and the Muslim tradition and relate to the context (Leirvik 2006: 117). If 
this is not done, he claims that there is a danger of misrepresentation or of privileging some representations of Islam 
or Christianity (or representations of the Christian and Islamic interpretative traditions) at the expense of others, 
without reflecting on doing so. But Leirvik adds a claim of self-reflexivity, as well: in order to make an attempt at 
presenting a view of Muslim-Christian relations in general one has to position (or at least locate) oneself in the total 
landscape to clarify one’s own position, to make one’s aim and moves transparent. 
63 How do social theorists and social scientists place transreligious encounters/dialogue in their models of 
facilitating and governing religious and cultural difference? There is not much written interaction between the two 
fields, and less by the social scientist, but in an analysis of the press discourse on the case of the Muhammad 
cartoons, what is called “dialogical multiculturalism” includes a “religiously inclined version” (Kunelius and Eide 
2007: 18). Dialogical multiculturalism is set up as a category alongside “liberal fundamentalism,” “liberal 
pragmatism,” and “religious or ethnic fundamentalism” to map the global discourse linked to the cartoon 
controversy. Dialogical multiculturalism is marked by its highlighting of dialogue as the highest priority, with 
possibilities of mutual education and self-reflexivity, and the dismissal of universalism (understood as a hegemonic 
discourse) and ethnocentric epistemological privilege. The religious version is to include a respect for what is sacred 
to the religious other. 
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 The first model, “difference as constitutive,” where the main focus is to protect the 
integrity of religious traditions and accentuate the respective religions’ positive contribution to 
society, may in many ways be the mainstream representation of transreligious dialogue. The 
dialogical value of respect for the other is operationalized through the aim of establishing 
relations based on knowledge and community across boundaries, not on agreement. Defense of 
one’s own religious tradition and protection of its boundaries would be expected, and accepted. 
The agency for change in this model is to work actively for Western societies to be more 
open to the message of the religions and to reduce discrimination against the religious other 
(Hardy 2006: 186). Internal critique of the religious traditions and the canonical scriptures, as 
well as shared critique where representatives of the religions criticize each other, is not 
accentuated. This means that marginalized groups within the religions risk being silenced, and 
that the encounter/dialogue may take place at their expense. The encounter itself does not aim at 
becoming a “third space” but rather at establishing a pluralistic religious workshop, where no 
new sign system emerges from the encounter since one relates primarily to the established sign 
systems (cultural or religious). For feminist theologians or for religious believers with an agency 
of change within the religious traditions, this model does not provide sufficient flexibility. 
 The second model, “differences as challenge,” balances mutual respect and agency for 
transformation. It could be criticized for focusing too much on the individual participant, at the 
risk of losing the connection to the mainstream discourses in the religious traditions. However, 
this model provides tools for accepting diversity within the traditions and for self-reflection that 
provides space for both respect and transformation, when functioning at its best. Freire’s slogan 
for dialogue as “transforming and re-humanizing the world” fits this model well. The perspective 
of fluidity regarding culture and religion is also applied to the relation between the secular and 
the religious, which is not static but intertwined and fluid.  
 Agreement is not an aim for this type of dialogue either. The establishment of a “third 
space” requires that an unstable, plural place emerge from the encounter. But there is an 
expectation of mutual transformation and possibly of a shared agency coming out of the 
encounter (diapraxis, cf. Rasmussen) and moving beyond a reestablishment of religion as a 
contributor to secular societies. One may, for instance, imagine an encounter of this kind to 
establish a common criticism directed not only at society but at the religious traditions 
themselves, including the canonical scriptures. The second model is therefore to be preferred by 
religious feminists opting for change in the religious traditions themselves. 
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Models in Conflict – Or Mutual Dependence? 
One may say that there can never be too many spaces available for religious encounter or too 
many models for how these encounters should happen. I believe this is true. At the same time, 
critical investigation is necessary to provide tools of self-reflection.  
 The two models can be seen as complementary: both are needed, and together they 
provide spaces for religious people having various positions and aims. Representatives of the two 
models may challenge and criticize each other and thus develop discourses of criticism that are 
useful for all involved.  
 But the models may also be seen as contradictory. If the hegemonic discourses within the 
religious traditions prefer the first model to the second, there may gradually be less space for 
encounters aiming at transformation and self-criticism, which is bad news for feminists and other 
marginalized groups within the traditions.  
 Another possibility is that the encounters shaped by model two gradually change the 
hegemonic discourses in the religious traditions, together with intrareligious discourses of 
change. This would be a long-term process and should probably not be relied on as the only way 
forward for those aiming at transformation of the religious traditions.  
 
 Facilitating Difference and Encounter/Dialogue in the Group 
The part of the analysis of the empirical material that focuses on the relational side of the 
interpretative process concentrates on possible instabilities and changes in the modes of 
interaction. By this I mean changes in interpretative positions toward texts and contexts, toward 
the other representatives in the group and toward oneself, as it is traceable in the transcriptions. 
But I also include the analysis of how the meaning making of the texts influences this 
positioning, asking if the Hagar/Hajar narratives create a different way of communicating than 
the prescriptive texts of 1 Timothy 2:8-15 and Sura 4:34.64 One of the questions will be if the 
group’s process can be related to one of the two models of dialogue or if it relates to both but at 
different stages in the group process. Useful concepts for exploring the material in this way 
would be to look for the appearance and disappearance of interpretative communities, the 
occurrence of statements formed as testimonies, and how differences are addressed and dealt 
with.  
 
 Interpretative Communities 
The expression “meaning making” in this study is an attempt to coin a term for a type of 
interpretation process that is comprehensive in character, including the interpretation of texts, 
                                                 
64 For a further presentation of the texts and the selection of the texts see Chapter 3. 
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contexts, and self and other. The term refers both to an act of understanding and to the creation 
of a platform for acting through words (performative speech, diapraxis). Meaning making in this 
project is a collective act, and it is relational. 
According to Stanley Fish,65 interpretative communities arise when it becomes apparent 
that people share interpretative strategies (Fish 1980:171). Fish emphasizes that he does not 
mean sharing interpretative strategies of reading texts in a conventional way. He places the 
existence of the interpretative strategy prior to the reading, focusing on the way readers shape the 
text. In more traditional hermeneutics this may be called pre-reading or prejudice. 
For Fish, the interpretative communities are not stable entities. They shift as people and 
texts vary and change. But the existence of interpretative communities is a stable fact to him – 
not because they are naturally present or universal but because they are “constitutive of being 
human” (Fish 1980:172). Fish claims that one cannot really systematize the interpretative 
communities in any fixed way. Rather, in his view, their existence is demonstrated by a mutual 
recognition of fellowship among the “members” as a shared pre-understanding (Fish 1980:173). 
An interpretative community thus, according to Fish, already exists before it is confirmed in the 
common encounter with the text, the speaker, or whatever is the object of interpretation. It 
becomes visible through the mutual recognition. 
The use of the notion of interpretative communities in the analysis of the empirical 
material in this study needs some further reflection and adaptation. Whereas Fish limits the 
appearance of the interpretative community to its prior understanding, I will look for 
understanding acquired in the group’s process. I will include acquired understanding as a term. 
This means that I regard pre-understanding as fluid and in constant flux. This fits well with 
Fish’s understanding of interpretative communities as shifting and unstable, but the perspective 
that will be added in this study is the process of establishing potentially new pre-understandings 
among the participants.  
Linking up with the earlier discussions on hermeneutics and dialogue, I suggest that one 
sign of an interpretative community may be the appearance of a common “we” openly articulated 
or more indirectly expressed. Fabian says that a common “we” requires coevalness, the creation 
of an intersubjective time. He seems thus to focus more on the agency of the individual than 
Fish’s more descriptive approach to community. Creating intersubjective time does not require 
agreement but mutual recognition. The creation of a common “we” related to dialogue suggests 
that differences and disagreements do not prevent participants in dialogues from creating a 
common “we”.  
                                                 
65 Fish is an advocate of reader response criticism. This school emphasizes the readers and the interpretation by the 
readers as the decisive part of textual interpretation. The author and the textual expression itself are thus shifted to 
the background. 
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Through a close analysis of the transcriptions presented in the analysis, it will be possible 
to identify the “we’s” that occur: What makes them appear and disappear? Do they occur more 
often toward the end than in the beginning? And are they patterned across religious and/or 
cultural lines, or do the occurring “we’s” cross back and forth over these lines? The answer to the 
two latter questions may indicate which of the two models of transreligious dialogue the group 
mostly relates to at that moment. 
 
Testimony 
Paul Ricoeur reflects on testimony as part of biblical hermeneutics in his book Essays on Biblical 
Interpretation (Ricoeur 1980). Claiming that investigating testimonies is required for biblical 
interpretation (Ricoeur 1980: 144), he states that they have a narrative and a confessional pole. 
The narrative is the “facts” and experience, while the confession is the process of making 
meaning of this (Ricoeur 1980: 135). Testimony is the integrated expression of these two poles. 
Ricoeur sees the interpretation of a testimony as a violation of the integrity between the two 
poles, and suggests that a testimony should be interpreted within its “internal dialectic” (Ricoeur 
1980: 144-145). This requirement obviously represents a challenge in a transreligious dialogue. 
It would require an intimate knowledge of the other religion represented to be able to interpret 
testimonies in this way. Testimonies are expressions conveying self-reflection as well as 
religious belief, and they require an audience, or at least a listener. Testimonies may represent 
transformative speech addressing the “here and now” in a transreligious context; giving a 
religious testimony may open the way up for others to do the same. Although usually a form of 
expression shaped by religious particularity, a testimony could thus create a space for others to 
express themselves in the same way.  
 The participants in this study use religious testimonies in their making of meaning. One 
question would be how this impacts on the relational interpretation: Does it create closeness or 
distance between the participants when religious particularity is spelled out in this way? Is it the 
personal narrative aspect of the testimony that communicates the strongest, or is it the 
confessional message? 
 
Managing Differences and Power Discourses  
The discussion about the two models of transreligious dialogue views differences differently. 
One question in the analysis would be how the participants make meaning of and relate to the 
cultural and religious differences in the group. There are other differences present as well: 
personal opinions, educational background, age, and social status. Is the significance given to the 
religious and cultural differences, for example, stable throughout the process, or does it shift?  
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The questions of how to signify difference and how people use and relate to differences 
in power discourses are intertwined. Differences may be regarded a threat within a hegemonic 
discourse, requiring everyone to submit (aiming at the assimilation of “the different”), but in 
more open discourses and in dialogue differences are (ideally) acknowledged to be a part of the 
communication.67 The Norwegian social scientist and feminist Randi Gressgård claims that a 
dialogical approach toward differences might open up new, creative ways of looking at oneself 
and the other, without fixing others and without getting stuck in one’s own frame of reference. 
To her, a dialogical view implies an acknowledgment of heterogeneity and difference as a 
“productive force and not as aberrations from a given norm” (Gressgård 2005: 170-171).68 
The participants comment directly on the issue of differences, saying that differences in 
views are anticipated and wanted in whole project and, therefore, should not be seen as a 
problem (Inger23-25, p. 222). At other times, the participants struggle with how to handle 
differences, a struggle that manifests itself mainly in the forms of communication that are 
sometimes marked by confronting and defending strategies. How familiar the respective 
participants are with being part of pluralistic interpreting communities may be reflected in how 
they relate to differences in the group. The challenge in the analysis will be how the 
significances of difference impact on the meaning making of text, context, and the group’s self-
understanding. Can difference, for instance, be seen as a possibility for obtaining new knowledge 
and new understandings? Does difference automatically produce distance? Or do acknowledged 
differences also contribute to creating a “third space,” a conversation marked by transparence, 
equality, and possible diapraxis growing out of a transcontextual space? 
 
                                                 
67 Randi Gressgård elaborates on the dilemma of difference in relation to multiculturalism in her book Fra identitet 
til forskjell (From Identity to Difference) (Gressgård 2005). Her message is the need to recognize human difference 
in a way that does not fix and “other” those defined as “different.” The problem in defining someone as “different” 
is, according to Gressgård, that this defining usually implies a hierarchical social organization where the majority 
(those who are not “different”) defines the others (the minorities or the “different”). This will, to follow Gressgård’s 
argument, lead in the long run to the assimilation of the “different” into the “non-different” (the assimilation of 
minorities into the majority) and result in a lack of necessary self-reflexive moves among the majority (the “non-
different”). Gressgård denies essentialist ideas about group identities and points out that essentialism suppresses 
differences within these groups (Gressgård 2005: 178). She writes about dialogue as a tool for avoiding fixed 
stereotypes of groups (as well as of individuals), since a dialogical openness toward the other is the only possibility 
for having access to one’s own potential to be self-reflexive on “evaluating standards” (Gressgård 2005: 169). 
Gressgård refers to dialogue as a space where one should be prepared for shocks and surprises and includes 
perspectives of change (Gressgård 2005: 170). Leaning on Christopher Falzon’s interpretation of Michael Foucault, 
Gressgård suggests that “dominance is the radical negation of dialogue” (Gressgård 2005: 170). 
68 My translation. 
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Feminisms, Muslim-Christian Dialogue, and Hermeneutics 
 
This section will discuss the role of feminisms as challenging the terms “hermeneutics” and 
“dialogue” in this study in a more focused way than my earlier more occasional use of a feminist 
perspectives have done.  
The term “feminism” is contested,69 and by expressing it in the plural I indicate that in 
this study “feminism” is defined as a multitude of normative criticisms and agencies aimed at 
changing women’s statuses and roles so that they are equal to men. I only discuss this in the 
following to the extent that is relevant for this study. Following a broad definition of feminism, 
one can state the task of feminisms to be detecting and analyzing gender injustices and assuming 
the role of agency for change in line with gender justice. This elaboration (not definition) on my 
use of the term “feminisms” can include both a model of total equality between women and men 
and a complementary model where the genders have different roles, although viewed as being of 
equal value and importance. The notion of justice is the key word, having both an objective and a 
subjective element.  
In this section I will discuss the relation between Muslim-Christian dialogue and 
feminism and situate this relation in the Norwegian dialogue scene. I shall present various ways 
feminist interpreters in the Christian and the Islamic traditions give a brief review of some of the 
particular hermeneutical challenges coming from Christian and Islamic feminist theology. The 
views and interpreters presented are examples only, selected because of their relevance for this 
study. 
Lastly, I will introduce some of the tools for the later analysis: the search for a gendered 
hermeneutics in the group, how one should look for the construction of gender and the 
implications for making meaning, and how possible shared agencies among the participants to 
work together for a change in discriminatory practices against women can be identified.  
 
Feminism and Muslim-Christian Dialogue 
The English Christian feminist theologian Ursula King, who is one of the pioneers in viewing 
interreligious relations in a feminist perspective, has declared feminism to be the missing 
                                                 
69 Often regarded as a Western concept connected to European and North American women’s movements, I believe 
that the strong connotation between “Western” and “feminism” is about to change because the more inclusive 
“third-wave feminism” has been influential the last decades (Cudd and Andreasen 2005: 7). The acknowledgment of 
diverse goals for feminists and the move toward the intersectional analysis of powered structures, where not only 
gender, but ethnicity, class, sexuality, etc. are seen as interacting with gender in structures of oppression and power, 
has been decisive in making feminisms provide available tools beyond the classical (Western) feminist struggle for 
gender equality at all levels through signifying gender difference as the only significant difference.  
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perspective in interreligious dialogues (King 1998). She states that organized interreligious 
dialogues lack both women participants (or includes very few women) and a general, or even 
limited, gender perspective. The Swedish feminist theologian Helene Egnell states that feminism, 
as an ethical and ideological program for changing patriarchal structures, is generally not in view 
in interreligious encounters, except for specific women-initiated dialogues that take place within 
influential organizational structures, such as the World Council of Churches, but have limited 
effect in creating new ways of reflecting on gender within the religious traditions and within the 
field of interreligious dialogue (Egnell 2006: 325). Egnell addresses Muslim-Christian 
encounters and Islamic sources as fields where only a few Christian feminist theologians are 
active (unlike e.g. Buddhism and Buddhist-Christian encounters). Egnell asks if this is a sign of 
Islamophobia in Western feminist thought (Egnell 2006: 329). She further claims that Muslim-
Christian dialogue and the relation to Islam will be the next “test case” for feminist theology, 
meaning Christian feminist theology. 
In the section on dialogue, I discussed some issues related to feminist agencies for change 
through transreligious encounters related to the two suggested models. I found that the first 
model evaluates and relates to religious differences in a multiculturalist manner, trying to protect 
the boundaries between the religions and the self-referring hermeneutical traditions. 
Multiculturalism has been criticized for neglecting individual rights – and women’s rights in 
particular. Susan Okin’s criticism of multiculturalism and her question: “Is multiculturalism bad 
for women?” (Cohen et al. 1999) could be rephrased into the question: Is transreligious dialogue 
bad for women?70 
I have argued elsewhere that awareness of gender models and gender roles in Muslim-
Christian dialogue initiatives is crucial to the contextual relevance of these dialogues in a 
European and Scandinavian context (Grung 2008). Because people in the Scandinavian contexts 
are generally concerned with gender equality as an issue of justice, religions and the 
interreligious initiatives would be expected to comply with ideals of gender equality. The main 
areas of conflict in the public sphere between Muslim minorities and the majority often seem to 
be related to gender issues and women’s rights. In this respect, the multiculturalist dilemma of 
how to balance group-based rights and individual rights is often intertwined with a widespread 
stereotypical image of Islam as a monolithic, static, and oppressive religion for women. Islam 
and Muslims are targeted mainly with reference to their religious identity in this matter; culture 
and social position are discussed only to a lesser degree. The practices regarding gender roles 
                                                 
70 Okin’s concern is that multiculturalism grants specific culturally identified groups the right to continue 
oppressing women based on the political legitimization of oppressive cultural practices. Okin, however, has been 
criticized for a lack of self-criticism on behalf of majority populations and their possible questionable practices in 
gender issues and for aiming at the assimilation of the cultural Other (Jacobsen and Gressgård 2002: 198-202). 
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and women’s rights within Christian churches, on the other hand, are not discussed to a great 
extent.71  
My suggestion in my 2008 article for Muslim-Christian dialogues in Norway was to 
include women in dialogue activities at all levels and to include a critical gender perspective in 
the substance of the dialogues. The latter would mean addressing particular themes concerning 
women in the religious communities and applying a gender-sensitive openness and a gender 
perspective when discussing all themes and issues in the dialogues (Grung 2008: 297). The 
background for these recommendations is twofold: first, to use the Muslim-Christian 
dialogues/encounters to counteract hegemonic stereotypical images of Islam as only negative for 
women (with links to colonial, neoconservative and orientalist thinking about Islam and the East) 
and stereotypical images of Christianity as spotless in this respect. In a dialogue there is a 
possibility for a mutual learning about the religious traditions in their diversity, as represented by 
believers (women and men) who can elaborate on historical and contemporary religious practices 
from within. Second, my recommendations aim at enabling dialogues to address important issues 
to improve the current situation of both Muslim and Christian women within these traditions and 
to ensure that the dialogues contribute to gender sensitivity as part of self-reflection within the 
field of transreligious dialogue as such. 
In this way, Muslim-Christian dialogue may avoid a view of religions as static entities 
and prevent dialogue from becoming a space where patriarchal patterns and structures are 
confirmed. The problem in practice seems to be first and foremost connected to the power of 
definition: Who decides about the participants, the themes, the method of meeting, and the 
“general perspectives”? Who decides how religious differences should be facilitated and 
addressed?  
The challenges can be articulated as follows: How can one enter into a space of dialogue 
where religious identity is the significant, expected, and respected difference between the 
participants and at the same time prevent dialogue from reproducing a view of religion as static 
and unchangeable? How can a neglect of differences between the participants other than the 
religious one, such as culture, gender, and social background, be avoided in a Muslim-Christian 
dialogue? To neglect or underplay these other differences might lead to a culture-blind, gender-
blind, and socially blind dialogue, and my concern is the possible production and confirmation of 
gender blindness in transreligious dialogues in particular. 
 
 
                                                 
71 On this issue, see Gry Friis Eriksen’s report on the implementation of gender equality in the Church of Norway 
where she claims that gender equality generally seem to be taken for granted in the Church, with no need for a 
further discussion about “facts on the ground” (Eriksen 2004). 
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Feminist Critique from Within  
The participants in this study engage in feminist critique of Christian and Islamic interpretative 
practices of the Bible, the Koran and hadith. The earlier presentation of Christian and Islamic 
interpretative discourses thus needs to be completed with a more pointed feminist approach – in 
order to frame and give perspective to the participants’ meaning making.  
The historian of religions Anne Sofie Roald compares Christian and Islamic feminist 
theology to look for similarities and differences in their hermeneutical strategies in reading the 
Bible, the Koran, and the sunna. She divides Christian and Muslim feminist reinterpreters into 
two main groups: reformists and reconstructors, and, basing herself on the New Testament 
scholar Carolyn Osiek, she suggests five hermeneutical approaches: loyalist, revisionist, 
sublimationist, rejectionist, and liberationist (Roald 1998: 19; Osiek 1985: 99-103).  
The reformists aim at reforming their tradition, and Roald divides them further into 
Osiek’s suggested approaches of loyalist, revisionist, and sublimationist. Loyalists accept 
canonical scripture as divine revelation and reject the need for feminist agency. Revisionists 
claim that the theological content of the scriptures does not pose a problem for feminists. It is the 
social and historical structures that need to change. Sublimationists interpret the texts 
allegorically (Roald 1998: 19).  
Reconstructors, whom Roald divides into rejectionists or liberationists, Osiek’s two final 
approaches, work for more radical changes. The rejectionist view finds the canonical scriptures 
to be penetrated by patriarchal ideas to such a degree that they have to be rejected. Liberationists 
focus on transforming the social structures shaped by patriarchy (Roald 1998: 19). 
Roald finds many similarities in the ways Christian and Islamic feminists challenge the 
traditional interpretation of canonical scriptures. She identifies the different approaches of 
reformists and reconstructors among feminists in both traditions. Roald describes the differences 
between Christian and Islamic feminist theologians in two ways: first, the view of the Koran as a 
divine text among Muslim feminists versus the view among Christian feminists of the Bible as 
written by humans (men) (Roald 1998: 41). The question of male authors is thus exempt from 
the interpretation process of the Muslim feminists. Second, the interpretation history in the 
Christian tradition mostly includes a historical-critical approach to the biblical texts, and Roald 
finds that Christian feminist theologians continue to work within this framework, although they 
supplement it with, for example, gender studies. In Islamic interpretative history, the historical-
critical method is generally not applied, and recent research, including many Islamic feminists, 
focuses on how to apply laws and regulations to a changing social environment through the use 
of textual analysis (Roald 1998: 40).  
The implication of Roald’s comparison is that to a large degree the Muslim feminists 
focus on interpreting the hadith and fiqh, with a close analysis of the contemporary context and 
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its gendered power structures. One exception is the American Muslim feminist Amina Wadud 
who concentrates on the Koran (Wadud 1999). Christian feminists’ work focuses mostly on the 
Bible, but this may, for rejectionists, even include a moral/ethical rejection of the biblical text or 
parts of it.  
 
Examples of Islamic Feminist Hermeneutical Critique 
Amina Wadud declares that “patriarchy is a kind of shirk [ultimate violation of divine unity], 
stemming from the Satanic notion of istikbar [thinking of oneself as better than another] … ” 
(Wadud 2009: 102). This is perhaps the strongest possible accusation in Islam, since it is seen as 
undermining the unity of God.72 Wadud criticizes the Islamic tradition for not implementing 
what she claims to be the koranic message about the relation between women and men: that they 
are different but have the same rights, obligations, and “equally significant responsibilities on the 
social-functional level” (Wadud 1999: 102-103). She makes it clear that if she has to choose 
between the Koran and the sunna on this issue, she would say that the Koran overrules the 
sunna. Wadud is careful not to dismiss the status of the sunna, although in practice she 
introduces an interpretational hierarchy between the Koran and the tradition (sunna).  
Other Muslim feminists claim that the most important interpretative work has to be done 
in the area of fiqh, in the human applications of the divine law (sharia). The Islamic feminist 
Ziba Mir-Hosseini addresses primarily the interpretation of the sunna as the most efficient way 
to reform the Islamic tradition in order to improve and secure the rights of women. Mir-Hosseini 
points to the distinction between sharia and fiqh and claims that the difference between them is 
underplayed in present Islamic jurisprudence, resulting in patriarchal influences on fiqh being 
mistaken for divine, eternal principles in sharia. The crucial element is that laws, if made by 
                                                 
72 In Islamic tradition the doctrine of the unity of God, tawhid, is fundamental, together with the perception of the 
Koran as God’s revelation (Hjärpe 1985: 15). Together, these doctrines have implications for the interpretations of 
the Koran among both Sunni and Shia Muslims since they emphasize consensus within the umma in interpretative 
matters. The oneness of God reflected in the community and the umma may be seen as referring to the same frame 
of tawhid (Esposito 2003: 317-18). The South African Islamic scholar Farid Esack elaborates on the meaning of 
tawhid in the hermeneutical situation in South Africa during apartheid. To him, the concept of tawhid means 
opposing the divisive structures of apartheid and working actively for the equality of all people, regardless of 
ethnicity. It also meant rejecting the dualism between the secular and the spiritual (Esack 1997: 92). According to 
Esack, to apply tawhid as a hermeneutical concept in the interpretation of the Koran is to use “… the different 
approaches to the Qur´an – philosophical, spiritual, juristic or political – [which] must be regarded as components of 
a single tapestry. All of these are required to express the fullness of its message” (Esack 1997: 93) Esack claims that 
the former South African apartheid system was a rejection and destruction of tawhid because it was divisive for 
humankind (Esack 1997: 92). He claims that this may be interpreted as an act of shirk, which means to “put 
someone or something in the place of God” (Esposito 2003: 293). It is interesting to note that Esack both addresses 
and includes all of South African society in this matter, not only Muslims or the umma. Esack does not explicitly 
categorize a patriarchal, gender-divisive hierarchical system as shirk, even if he is concerned with women’s rights 
(Esack 1997: 239-248).  
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humans, can also be changed by humans. Mir-Hosseini strongly suggests that affairs concerned 
with human relations (muamalat) should be particularly open to ijtihad and places most gender-
related issues in this category (Mir-Hosseini 2007: 86-87). Mir-Hosseini and Wadud thus have 
different foci regarding the importance of the sunna versus the Koran in addressing a need for a 
new interpretation of the Islamic tradition.  
Mir-Hosseini is concerned with what she experiences as a discrepancy in Islamic 
practice, i.e. that, on the one hand, the Islamic tradition highlights justice and equality as an 
integral part of Islamic practice but, on the other, does not treat men and women on equal terms 
in Islamic jurisprudence (Mir-Hosseini 2007: 85). She suggests that a “democratic, pluralist and 
rights-based Islam” would acknowledge the current social context and open the way for the value 
of gender equality (Mir-Hosseini 2007: 85). Mir-Hosseini relates the concept of justice to 
equality and turns to the sources of Islamic jurisprudence to argue that gender justice and gender 
equality both can and must be implemented through a new interpretation of fiqh.  
Mir-Hosseini and Wadud have different backgrounds. Mir-Hosseini is Iranian but now 
lives in the UK, whereas Wadud is an African-American convert to Islam, living in the USA. 
Shia Islam, which is the predominant Islamic tradition in Iran, traditionally has a more flexible 
approach to fiqh. This is grounded in the position of the Shiite ulama, which takes a more 
independent position toward making new juridical interpretations than their Sunni counterparts 
(Roald 2004: 158-160). This gives the ulama more interpretative power in Shiism. To work for 
change would then mean engaging in the interpretation of the fiqh. In a traditional Christian 
culture like the USA, where Christian Protestants have enjoyed an epistemological hegemony for 
centuries, focusing on the “scripture itself” (in this case the Koran) would be more natural. Both 
Mir-Hosseini and Wadud explicitly claim that they relate to both the Koran and the Sunna, but in 
fact they focus on only one of them in their arguments for new and more gender-inclusive 
interpretations. If one were to locate them according to Roald’s categories, they would be both 
reformists and revisionists. The rather significant difference between them shows, however, that 
the categories are useful only to a certain degree for describing common interpretative strategies, 
at least in the case of Wadud and Mir-Hosseini. What they share is a commitment to establish 
new interpretations and practices derived from the Islamic tradition itself. 
 
Examples of Christian Feminist/Womanist Hermeneutical Critique 
The Swedish feminist theologian Anne-Louise Eriksson demonstrates the dilemma between 
viewing the Bible as authoritative and being a feminist at the same time (Eriksson 1999). She 
identifies the interpretative power over the biblical texts as the crucial question. Along with 
“third-wave feminists,” she questions “women’s experience” as a unified category. She claims 
that there is no unified expression of women’s experience, thus abandoning the position that 
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women should be epistemologically privileged in the interpretation of the Bible because of their 
gender,. Rather, for Eriksson, feminist hermeneutics in biblical exegesis is a matter of revealing 
the gendered power structures of the biblical texts (Eriksson 1999: 95). The next step, to apply 
the interpretation of the biblical text as an authority in one’s own life, should, according to 
Eriksson, be tested in terms of whether the interpretation of the text(s) contributes to one’s own 
“liberation and re-creation” (Eriksson 1999: 96). This is where her article ends. Eriksson 
suggests a hermeneutical principle with a feminist argument behind it, emphasizing the gendered 
power structures in the Bible and the gendered power structures of biblical interpretation. Her 
emphasis on personal experience is a significant marker. The hermeneutical issue Eriksson 
addresses is how to understand and deal with the relation between text and reader in biblical 
interpretation. If the message of the Christian Gospel is incarnated in the reader as a quest for 
liberation and divine re-creation, may this not be a hermeneutical principle of the Gospel as 
experience? The crucial point in this connection would be the relation to the tradition and the 
community for the biblical reader. Christianity is not an individual faith but a community-based 
religious practice. The question of interpretative authority is not solved but seriously questioned 
on the basis of Eriksson’s feminist hermeneutics. 
The earlier mentioned Christian feminist theologian Kwok Pui-Lan combines feminism 
and postcolonial criticism in her suggestions for biblical hermeneutics (Kwok 2005). Kwok 
states that feminist postcolonialism stresses the connection between colonialism and patriarchy, 
and she insists that a relevant Christian feminist theology must apply intersectional analyses of 
biblical texts and of contexts (Kwok 2005: 80-81). One of the most important ways to subvert 
what Kwok calls the “dominant Western patriarchal interpretations” (of the Bible, that is) is to 
“emphasize the roles and contributions of ordinary readers” (Kwok 2005: 83) in order to 
“enlarge the interpretative community and stress that these readers possess the ‘suppressed 
knowledges’ that academic elites often dismiss” (Kwok 2005: 83). The integration of 
“suppressed knowledges” is thus seen as crucial to completing the interpretative community of 
the churches. If this is to have a real impact, it would require other parts of the community to 
listen – and to share interpretative authority.  
A branch of Christian theology from a gender-perspective is the African-American 
womanist theology. Sharing some of the perspectives of feminist theology, womanist theology 
insists that making the liberation of women an isolated issue in a particular community is not 
necessarily a preferred way for African-American women in the USA because their path to 
liberation is more intertwined with the struggle of African American men than with white, 
middle-class American women.  
 The womanist theologian Delores S. Williams discusses the Bible as providing both 
liberative and survivalist strategies for Christian women (Williams 1993). Focusing on African-
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American women in the USA, she calls for attention for the role the figure Hagar has played for 
African-American women and men. In a discussion with Christian feminist hermeneutics, she 
states that historically, for African-American women, both men and women from the ruling 
“white” class represented patriarchy. Liberation from oppressors in the days of institutionalized 
slavery could easily mean putting one’s life at risk, and thus a strategy of survival and quality of 
life was preferred above attempted liberation. Williams says that even today in the USA “the 
welfare of the oppressed is tied into the welfare of the oppressors” (Williams 1993: 195), just as 
the welfare of men and women within the African-American community is mutually dependent 
because they need to stand together in the struggle for a decent life. The hermeneutics of 
liberation and the hermeneutics of survival/quality of life should be present in dialogue, Williams 
claims (Williams 1993: 194). Going back to the Hagar narrative, Williams state that this 
narrative in Genesis is not about liberation but about survival – it is not the image of a liberating 
God that is present in the narrative but of a God rescuing Hagar and Ishmael from dying of thirst 
in the desert (Williams 1993: 196-197). 
Williams does introduce a transreligious perspective, but only to a limited degree. She 
does not make any thorough transreligious connections, although various forms of Islam have 
played a significant role in identity construction among Afro-Americans in the USA. However, 
the hermeneutics of liberation versus the hermeneutics of survival/quality of life might be 
transferable to hermeneutical discussions between Christian and Muslim women on the readings 
of the Bible and the Koran and the hadith. The connection would be contextual, and not 
necessarily textual.  
Eriksson, Kwok, and Williams explore the challenge of the interpretation of biblical 
texts. Kwok and Williams integrate biblical interpretation into contemporary as well as historical 
power discourses. Eriksson could perhaps be viewed as being partly a rejectionist, whereas it 
would be possible to place Kwok and Williams among the liberationists. This would put all three 
of them in Roald’s category of reconstructors. But it would be possible to categorize parts of 
their approaches as reformist/revisionist, since all three relate to elements within the Christian 
tradition in order to transform that tradition, as I understand them. 
 
Shared Hermeneutical Challenges among Muslim and Christian Feminists? 
Although the different dynamics of the interpretation of canonical scriptures in the Christian and 
Islamic traditions are reflected in Christian and Islamic feminist hermeneutics respectively, they 
share at least two positions. The first is that one of the crucial battles concerns interpretative 
authority, including the internal textual hierarchies in Islam. The second is that what these 
theologians define as patriarchy should not influence the interpretations of the canonical 
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scriptures or the practice of a tradition. For some, patriarchy is situated on the interface between 
gender, class, culture, and ethnicity. 
A point of disagreement would be on the question if the scriptures and traditions themselves 
represent patriarchy beyond the contemporary (and historical) existing interpretations, and the 
balancing of the Koran and the sunna among Muslim feminist interpreters. The difference 
between the Christian and the Islamic traditions regarding the status of the Bible and the Koran 
makes feminist theologians focus their work differently. Muslim feminists are more reluctant to 
criticize the Koran than Christian feminists are to criticize the Bible.  
 
Muslims, Christians, and Feminism in Norway 
As shown above, the feminist challenge has come from within the religious communities as well 
as from society and public discourse in countries where feminism and gender equality are highly 
regarded. Muslim women in the West often face a particular challenge because stereotypical 
images of Muslim women as subjugated by their religion are common (Thorbjørnsrud 2003). 
Thus, they often have to struggle for their positions and rights on at least two fronts: to defend 
their religious faith and practice of Islam outside their community and to defend their rights as 
women within their religious community. Christian women in the West are in a similar position 
in some places, but in the Norwegian majority context arguments from the secular feminist 
movement are to a large extent consistent with the practice in, for example, the Church of 
Norway. The Church has changed its practice through new interpretations of traditions and 
doctrines but has also gradually adapted to mainstream society’s norms. It is important to 
remember, however, that as recently as 1993 the announcement of the first woman bishop in the 
Church of Norway, Rosemarie Köhn, aroused debate among the Christian religious leaders in the 
Church of Norway because of her gender.73 Both secular and Christian Norwegian feminists 
would say that there is still a considerable way to go both in the Church of Norway and in 
Norwegian society as a whole before gender equality is fully achieved. 
Christian and Muslim women in the Norwegian context are challenged in different ways 
if they want to keep their religious faith and feminist views together. This becomes apparent in 
the empirical material in this study, where some of the Christian participants with a Norwegian 
background synthesize the message of the Christian gospel with the ideology of gender equality 
and relegate discrimination against women in the Church of Norway firmly to the past. Other 
                                                 
73 The perhaps most difficult question after the appointment of Köhn was how to resolve the question of supervision 
by a (woman) bishop with regard to ministers in her diocese who did not accept her authority on theological grounds 
(because of her gender). The Council of Bishops in the Church of Norway decided that the ministers in question 
could refrain from Köhn’s supervision, and instead seek this from her dean (October 1995). See 
http://www.kirken.no/?event=doLink&famID=11821 [accessed 26 June 2010]. 
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Christian participants with other cultural backgrounds do not equate the practice of the Christian 
churches and feminism. For the Muslim participants, a completely different picture emerges: 
they struggle for a reinterpretation of the canonical scriptures within their Muslim communities 
to obtain a form of gender justice they believe is deeply rooted in an authentic message of Islam, 
and at the same time they defend their right to be Muslim women in Western society. The 
participants in this project share one belief: they all agree that Christianity and Islam originally 
carry a message of gender justice and gender equality. What this means for the Christian and 
Muslim participants in practice may differ and how to obtain this in present religious practice is 
perhaps viewed differently, but I believe that this is how the participants keep their religious faith 
and their faith in gender justice integrated. 
 
Gendered Hermeneutics and Feminist Interpretations in the Empirical Analysis 
In a feminist analysis of making meaning of texts, context, and the group’s self-understanding, 
the question of how gender and women is understood by the participants is relevant. I have 
already mentioned that the participants keep their religious faith and their feminist views 
integrated by claiming that both the Christian and the Islamic tradition were not originally 
oppressive with respect to women, and that discrimination against women in the name of these 
religions is to be seen as a distortion. But this is the view they have of their own religious 
tradition, be it the Christian or the Islamic. What are their views of the tradition of the other, and 
of the existing cultural and religious plurality? How the religious and cultural differences in the 
group are interpreted with regard to feminisms and the mainstream discourse that sees Muslim 
women as subjugated is presented in the discussions will be shown in the later analysis.  
My main focus will be on how the participants use gendered hermeneutics in their 
interpretations of texts, interpretative discourses of text, and context. By gendered hermeneutics I 
mean how views of gender/women influence the interpretation as a pre-understanding and as a 
concurrent reflection in the conversations. Do the participants, for instance, use moral 
enrichment or moral critique as a tool for feminist criticism or evaluation of the canonical 
scriptures? Do they apply what Delores Williams calls strategies of liberation, strategies of 
survival, or both when interpreting the texts? To what extent do they engage with feminism when 
evaluating the interpretative practices of the canonical scriptures in their religious communities, 
and do they criticize intrareligious hierarchies of canonical scriptures? 
One of the main questions in this project is if the Christian and Muslim participants can 
reach a shared agency, a common project, through co-reading each other’s canonical scriptures. 
This agency or project could be to establish a shared critique of canonical scriptures or of the 
interpretative situation. But it may also mean working to change contextual religious or societal 
practices or discourses they identify in the process.  
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Chapter 3: 
Methodological Considerations, Choices, and Tools 
 
 
In this chapter, I will discuss the methodological approach to the empirical material in this study 
and clarify my methodological choices. The first part of the chapter is descriptive in nature, 
explaining the process of establishing the project’s empirical material: the selection of 
participants, texts, and working methods. The choices behind these methodological steps are 
based on normative reflections. The most significant normative discussions related to the 
methodology follow the description: to establish a group as the primary entity of research and 
what type of group this is, the relation between the method described, and the normative 
concepts of dialogue and feminisms, and finally, the use of categories and the problem of 
representation. These discussions are also connected to the theoretical framework.  
The question of how to carry out research on a transcultural group of Christians and 
Muslims in a Norwegian context needs to be addressed both methodologically and ethically. Part 
of this discussion is about my own role in the group, in the establishment of the empirical 
material, and in analyzing the material.  
At the end of this chapter, I will discuss and argue for the way the empirical material is 
presented in the analysis and the methodological challenges connected to this. We need to start, 
however, by situating the project more generally within a methodology, to clarify the working 
premises for the selection of the participants, texts, and working methods.  
 
Situating the Project Methodologically 
The empirical material in this study has been established through a process of qualitative 
research. In Christian theology, empirical research on human informants and human social, 
religious, and cultural behavior is not yet a common working method for producing new 
knowledge, except by sociologists and social anthropologists of religion within the field of 
Christian theology who have been using the methods and theories from the fields of sociology 
and social anthropology for decades. The growing influence of and collaboration with the social 
sciences, however, may result in an increase of empirical research projects within the field of 
Christian theology, also outside the defined fields of sociology/anthropology of religions, such as 
this project. The reason this project is not framed within the established sociology/anthropology 
of religion is because I am searching for knowledge of a sort other than what these fields usually 
provide: They map existing religious and cultural practice in religious groups or organizations. 
This study is a detailed exploration of the hermeneutical process of Christian and Muslim women 
initiated by the project itself, interpreting Christian and Islamic canonical texts. While applying 
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methods of social science, the project’s theoretical framework is more connected to the field of 
interreligious studies, as shown in the introduction. 
Qualitative research was the most relevant method for establishing the empirical material 
in this study. The qualitative research method is consistent with a hermeneutical perspective, 
since the establishment of empirical material is seen as a part of a broader process where all the 
different steps in the research process occur in a dynamic relation of interpretation and 
reinterpretation. The presuppositions of the researcher, the selection of respondents and research 
aims, and the theoretical and methodological resources are thus connected and interact 
throughout the whole research process of qualitative research (Holter and Kalleberg 1996: 12-
14). The subjective element of the researcher is acknowledged; she is not viewed as either 
invisible or objective but is to make her presuppositions, views, and working process 
transparent. The questions qualitative research generally asks are less related to statistics and 
large overviews of vast material than to studies of a strategic selection of informants or material 
where the researcher decides on the strategy. The aim of qualitative research is often to disclose 
some kind of meaning and interpretation of meaning rather than primarily looking for causes and 
explanations – the question is often how rather than why. This implies that qualitative studies 
usually have a relatively small number of informants/participants compared to quantitative 
studies, where validity is based on large numbers of informants generally recruited to correspond 
to some sort of representation. Validity in qualitative research is not secured through 
representativity but through transparence of how the study is committed and through its 
analytical and hermeneutical processes (Holter and Kalleberg 1996: 22-23), mapped in social 
sciences by the term “double hermeneutics” (Giddens 1993: 170).74 
Qualitative empirical studies usually include individual interviews with informants, but 
studying groups of people has become more common (Holter and Kalleberg 1996: 145). 
Different methods and practices are applied in various qualitative research involving groups. A 
group interview is a tool where the researcher collects information from several persons at the 
same time. The researcher asks the questions and facilitates the group’s discussions. In a group 
interview, the informants share their information with one another, and not only with the 
researcher. This is the case in other forms of qualitative research of groups as well. Group 
interviews could be in the form of focus groups: focusing on one topic and moderated according 
to a specified interview guide (Puchta and Potter 2004: 6) Or, it could be an “in-depth” group 
interview, covering a broader spectrum of issues.  
Action Research is a form of research related to qualitative research.  Usually having the 
explicit aim of introducing specific changes through research projects, it is a strongly value-
                                                 
74 See Chapter 2 for elaboration on the term “double hermeneutics” in this study, p. 21-22. 
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oriented research method often working with groups of informants/participants (Reason and 
Bradbury 2006:xxii). Most often, in Action Research the researcher is a full participant in the 
groups, usually introducing an agenda of processual change through her research. 75 
The role of the researcher and the empirical material emerging from the various ways of 
conducting qualitative studies involving groups would thus be different in organized group 
interviews, focus groups, and Action Research groups. I will discuss this further below. 
 
Establishing the Empirical Material:  
Selecting Texts, Participants, and Working Methods 
The selection of texts, participants, how the group was organized, and how the actual group 
meetings proceeded, will be described below. A short presentation of the participants and a 
description of their presence and absence throughout the process are included. 
 
The Texts 
The texts selected from the canonical scriptures in Christian and Islamic tradition represents both 
narrative and non-narrative prescriptive texts. I wanted to include different types of texts to see if 
this created different ways of making meaning in the group. The texts had to relate to women, as 
figures in the text or as prescriptive texts concerned with women and should in some way 
correspond with each other across religious boundaries.  
Islamic tradition relates to the Judeo-Christian canonical texts, visible both in the Koran 
and the hadith literature. Several characters in the Judeo-Christian Bible figure in the Koran and 
the hadith, such as Abraham/Ibrahim, Noah, Josef/Yusuf, Jesus/Isa, Moses/Musa. There are two 
women among these “shared” figures, Mary/Maryam, the mother of Jesus/Isa, and Hagar/Hajar, 
the mother of Ishmael. The figure of Mary/Maryam provides the most extensive text material in 
both the Koran and the Bible, but because of the special status of Mary in the Christian tradition, 
I was reluctant to choose her. I thought this might lead the discussions and interpretations in the 
group to be less focused on communicating about the texts and more protective of their “own” 
views of Mary. In addition, the view of Mary in the Christian tradition is marked by confessional 
differences and the textual material on her is scattered throughout the biblical scriptures, giving a 
complex representation of the Mary figure. Thus, I chose the figure of Hagar/Hajar instead. This 
choice also presents challenges of balancing: Hajar is a figure of great importance in the Islamic 
tradition. The narrative of Hajar is well known and Muslims often refer to it. Hagar is less 
important in the Christian tradition, and she does not generally have a high status. She remains 
                                                 
75 It is also possible to do research on groups through participatory observation, where the role of the researcher is 
to observe only. This would be done in already existing groups, as part of a broader fieldwork, for instance. 
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the poor and excluded slave woman who gave birth to Abraham’s oldest son, and she disappears 
from the story when she and Ishmael are banished into the wilderness.76 The Muslim participants 
would have been able to relate more closely to Mary/Maryam than the Christian participants 
could relate to Hagar/Hajar, which could have been an argument in favor of choosing the 
Mary/Maryam narratives.  
But the content of the Hagar/Hajar narratives (in both traditions) includes the dramatic 
event of Hagar/Hajar alone with her son in the desert, an event representing a physical and 
existential threat of her own (and her son’s) life. I found the dramatic quality of this story to be 
promising for a group discussion. In addition, through selecting the Hagar/Hajar narratives, I 
included texts from both the Old and the New Testament and from the hadith and the Koran – 
since the prescriptive texts were taken from the New Testament and the Koran. This makes it 
possible to evaluate the participants’ meaning-making strategies applied to different types of 
canonical texts within the traditions. 
The decisive argument for choosing the figure of Hagar/Hajar, however, was that she is 
closely connected to the narrative of Abraham/Ibrahim in both traditions. Abraham has become a 
“favorite figure” for illustrating both historical and current close relations between Jews, 
Muslims, and Christians, as a patriarch they have in common. Dialogues and encounters between 
Christians, Muslims, and Jews are often called Abrahamic, and the believers children of 
Abraham, suggesting that Abraham/Ibrahim is the ancestor of all Jews, Christians, and Muslims. 
To select the Hagar/Hajar narratives is to enter into the story of Abraham/Ibrahim and his family 
differently, exploring what “Abrahamic” dialogue would yield if Christians and Muslims were 
gathered around the family story through Hagar/Hajar. This could provide new knowledge and 
perhaps generate some new and possibly critical perspectives on the use of Abraham/Ibrahim as 
a symbol of community, with its patriarchal connotations.  
The non-narrative or prescriptive texts were also selected on the basis that they should 
correspond to each other. Sura 4:34 from the Koran is seen as a challenge among Muslims 
because of its reception history. The text has been – and still is – used to legitimate men’s 
violence against women in marriage and to legitimize a gendered hierarchy in marriage where 
men can rule over women (Roald 2001: 145-184).  
Unlike the Bible, there are not many verses in the Koran that specifically prescribe 
normative gender roles and gender models. The selection of a prescriptive text from the Bible 
                                                 
76 Hagar does play an important role as a figure in some fields of Christian theology, particularly in the African- 
American womanist theology. In her book Sisters in the Wilderness (Williams 1993) Delores Williams explores the 
meaning of the Hagar narrative for Christian African-American communities. In the New Testament Paul refers to 
Hagar as a symbol of the old covenant in his letter to the Galatians, as the slave woman who is the image of the old 
slave status of people under the law before the new covenant in Christ (Galatians 4: 21-31). 
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was thus more difficult. The New Testament was preferable because this part of the Bible 
generally has a higher status in the Christian tradition and because the prescriptive texts on 
gender models and gender roles in the New Testament are included in the current or recent 
debates on gender within the Christian tradition, generally speaking. The text from 1 Timothy 
2:8-15, which includes a restriction on women teaching and a statement about women being 
saved through childbirth, was considered to be the most relevant text. This text places men above 
women in a hierarchy based on its interpretation of the narrative of the Fall of humankind 
(referring to Genesis), but it also refers to childbirth as the only way to salvation for women, 
constructing a rigid role for women in making divine salvation for women accessible only 
through fulfilling a role as female procreator.  
Basically, I chose the two most problematic – from the perspective of gender justice – 
texts I could find in the Bible and the Koran regarding prescriptions of the women’s role and 
place in the two traditions. These texts share a potential for being used as a religious 
legitimization of female subjugation: women as subordinated to men, opening the way to 
physical abuse in marriage, the silencing of women in both the public and private spheres, and 
opening the way to confirming and reinventing a patriarchal, hierarchical social system. If 
Christian-Muslim encounters and a common reading of canonical scriptures was to confront the 
oppression of women based on canonical texts, I figured this was one of the most urgent places 
to begin. In deliberately looking at the challenging texts, I also had another agenda: to prove that 
it was possible to discuss allegedly problematic texts and difficult issues in a Muslim-Christian 
encounter. Organized transreligious dialogue/encounters are sometimes accused of avoiding the 
“difficult questions.”77 Even if I personally disagree with statements suggesting this, there is 
always a temptation to assume that communication is best built through following paths that 
seems to be easy.  
The selection of texts reflects my research interests. That I selected the texts alone is 
significantly different from the way I would have done it if I planned a dialogue group. Selecting 
themes and texts for a dialogue should ideally be a mutual decision in a group or done by some 
of the participants from different traditions in a preparatory group together.  
At the last meeting of the group I asked the participants for their views on the selection of 
texts. Some of them said that if it had been up to them, they would have selected other texts to 
discuss, texts they regarded as more central to their own religious tradition and beliefs. The 
Christian participants in particular took this view, but at least one of the Muslim participants later 
shared in a conversation about the transcriptions that she had felt the same way. They felt that it 
                                                 
77 The Norwegian researcher Jill Loga claimed, for instance, in an article in the Norwegian newspaper 
Klassekampen, that religious dialogue in Norway is dominated by liberals, avoiding sensitive and difficult questions 
and thus engaging in dialogue at the expense of the rights of others (Klassekampen, 10.24.2009). 
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was particularly the two prescriptive texts that not only threatened to misrepresent their whole 
tradition if viewed alone as representative texts but were also far from representing what the 
critical participants themselves appreciated the most in their canonical scriptures. The selection 
of texts ended up being choices that provided useful knowledge for me but possibly at the cost of 
what the participants themselves would have been more interested in discussing. 
The criticism of the selection of texts by some of the participants is, however, significant: 
Does this project’s use of particularly the two prescriptive texts contribute to a narrow 
perspective of the traditions? While spotting isolated texts and giving them attention, more 
important discussions regarding women in the traditions might be overlooked. In focusing on a 
pair of texts used often by the most extreme patriarchal representatives of Christianity and Islam 
to advocate their views, would this project actually risk fuelling the fire and confirm these texts 
as crucial to the traditions – perhaps even reviving them from a life in the shadows? The same 
argument could be made from a perspective from outside the traditions. For some, these texts 
represent the negative image they already have of the Christian and Islamic traditions as 
hopelessly lost in patriarchal structures. The selected strategy in the project by using these texts 
is confrontational, shaped not only by the emic perspective of the canonical scriptures from 
within the traditions but also by how outsiders might read the texts.  
The four texts selected for the project, two pairs of texts from the two traditions, 
represent two different kinds of texts as the basis for discussion. Part of the project was to 
investigate how the strategies of making meaning differ when the group interpreted different 
kinds of texts. Would there be significant differences in the way the texts worked as providers of 
meaning, and how would this influence the transcultural, transreligious communication in the 
group? One might anticipate that narratives provide a “better” material for a dialogue than 
prescriptive texts, based on the diversity a narrative may invite its readers to reflect on. On the 
other hand, prescriptive texts could prove easier to discuss for the same reason: a possible lack of 
invitation from the texts to project individual, different life stories on to them. Prescriptive texts 
are argumentative and may generate a more ethical/ideological discussion. The question about 
how the texts influence communication is addressed in the analysis (parts III and IV). 
 
The Selection of Participants and Composing a Group  
I searched for ten women participants, self-declared Christians and Muslims78 (five from each 
tradition), with various cultural backgrounds. I opted for the Muslim contingent to be dominated 
                                                 
78 By self-declared I mean that the participants themselves identified with the Christian or Muslim traditions and 
that none of the participants were evaluated by me or anyone else regarding how “strong” or “weak” their 
identification to their tradition was. More significant was the criterion of activity either within the religious 
community or in transreligious/transcultural dialogues/encounters. 
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numerically by Pakistani-Norwegian Sunni Muslims and the Christian contingent by Norwegian 
Lutheran Christians.79 This idea was based in having a majority within the respective religious 
contingents in accordance with the patterns of cultural majority groups among Christians and 
Muslims in the Norwegian context.80 This was not based on the notion of creating a 
representative group but on the idea that having “two majorities” (Norwegian and Pakistani-
Norwegian) might reduce the risk of a hegemonic discourse based on one majority group and 
increase the possibility of a conversation with more varied and shifting power dynamics.  
The idea of selecting participants from specific different religious and cultural 
backgrounds reflects a premise of representation, even though the group as such was not 
intended to be representative of the Norwegian Christian and Muslim landscape. To categorize 
people primarily according to religious and/or cultural background and as a requirement for 
participating seems to be based on the idea that they represent something distinctively different. 
This idea of representation could be problematic if it implies a notion of religious, cultural, or 
ethnic essence and differences between these variables as essential differences. As discussed in 
the chapter on theory, a view of cultures and religion as static entities entails the risk of 
stereotypes and may impede communication across boundaries as well as self-reflection. At the 
same time, different religious categories are one of the premises of this project, since it is based 
on Christianity and Islam as two separate, religious categories.  
But to separate the traditions into two categories is not necessarily to essentialize them or 
fix them. To counteract any such fixing of “Islam” and “Christian” in the study, I selected 
participants with different cultural backgrounds (Norwegian, Pakistani-Norwegian, Iranian-
Norwegian, etc.) and from different denominations within the religious traditions (Sunni and 
Shi’a Muslims, Lutheran and Roman Catholic Christians). This methodological choice should 
not be interpreted as an attempt to compose a representative group where the participants were 
expected to represent all these cultural and religious categories. A group of ten is too small to 
meet the requirements for being representative in any way, and my aim was not to fix the identity 
of the participants or to impose an image of essential identity or differences upon them. My aim, 
rather, is to prevent the project from becoming a confirmation of differences based on categories 
through aiming at a strategically planned diversity among the participants.81  
                                                 
79 For the participants with a different cultural and contextual background in addition to the Norwegian, I use 
hyphens, starting with the other background: Pakistani-Norwegian, Iranian-Norwegian, etc.  
80 By 1 January 2009, 508,000 people out of a total Norwegian population of 4, 8 million were immigrants or 
descendents of immigrants. The Pakistani group was the second largest (after the Polish) consisting of 30,000 
people, mostly Muslims (ssb.no/innvandring/ )[accessed 23 June 2010]. Among Norwegian Muslims, including 
around 93.000 members of Muslim faith communities (ssb.no/trosamf/tab-2009-12-09-01-html)[accessed June 23 
2010]. Sunni Muslims are a majority (divided into several organizations and mosques) and the Lutheran Church of 
Norway is the largest religious community in the country, with 3.87 million members (2008).  
81 Cf. the discussion later in this chapter. 
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I also employed criteria other than religious and cultural background in selecting 
participants. One of them was the requirement that the participants be able to express themselves 
in Norwegian. Because I wanted variation with respect to age, I included participants from 
various age groups, the youngest being in her early twenties, and the oldest in their sixties. The 
variation in ages was as similar as possible between the Christian and the Muslim contingents. 
Further, it was one of the criteria that the participants had some level of education in their own 
religious tradition. I did not include Christian theologians, however, because it would be difficult 
to find Muslim women in Norway with an equally advanced education in Islamic theology. To 
include Christian theologians would thus detract from the balance regarding educational capital. 
But this choice also had another reason, even though it would have been interesting to study the 
meaning making of Christian and Muslim women theologians: it was more important to me to 
find active practitioners of the traditions than to find theologically trained persons. Most 
religious practitioners are not theologically trained, and their making meaning of texts and 
contexts are often overlooked in theological research (both Christian and Islamic), including the 
field of interreligious studies. To include them in research could open up some new perspectives 
on texts and context because they face the challenges of text and context in a different way than 
trained theologians often do. 
I searched actively for participants who participated in either the work of their own faith 
community or in transreligious/transcultural dialogue/encounters. The latter criterion possibly 
worked both ways. The project would most probably appeal only to people who were active in 
these fields.  
I did not have a declared feminist agenda or a particular view of gender and gender issues 
included in the criteria for selecting participants. I assumed, however, that the women who 
accept the invitation to participate were engaged by or involved in women’s issues and/or 
feminism in some way because they were told beforehand about the texts and that it would be a 
women’s group.82  
Although I composed the group very carefully, as shown above, a quite different question 
was how the group would function in reality, not least concerning the participants’ attendance 
and absence. I will return to this matter when addressing the issues of absence and presence in 
the group.  
 
                                                 
82 The participants were also informed of the working title of the project, which in the beginning was: Women, 
Experience and Sacred texts: A Feminist Christian-Muslim Hermenutical Analysis. 
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Recruitment and Presentation of the Participants 
To return to the establishment process of the empirical material: the participants in this study 
were recruited in two ways. Some of them were people I already knew about and had met in 
various contexts of interreligious dialogues/encounters in recent years. Some were recruited 
through asking resource people in the field of interreligious and intercultural work for possible 
candidates. I made direct contact with potential candidates by phone and later by letter to inform 
them about the project and ask if they wanted to participate. All of the candidates I asked 
appeared to be positive about the project, but some declined to participate because they did not 
have the time and opportunity. I learned that Christian and Muslim women engaged in 
interreligious and/or intercultural work are generally busy and often requested as resource 
persons within the Norwegian religious and political structures.  
The participants will be presented below regarding information about their approximate 
age, civil status, cultural/geographical backgrounds, work status, education, religious 
membership, and, to a relevant degree, activities. They appear in this text with fictive names, 
chosen either by themselves (they were asked to do so if they wanted, and some did) or by me. I 
have generalized the information to protect their anonymity. How they were recruited for the 
study and how many group meetings they attended is added at the end of each presentation. 
 
Aira. Aira is in her sixties, married, with adult children. She was born and raised in Pakistan but 
has lived in Norway for many years. Aira was educated in Islamic studies and comparative 
religion at Pakistani and European universities and is employed in the field of education. She is 
active in her mosque and in community building across cultural and religious lines. Aira was 
recruited for the study by me directly, since I had met her in community building work. She had 
met several of the other participants before at various occasions before the first group meetings. 
Aira took part in all the group meetings in the study. 
 
Eva. Eva is also in her sixties, divorced, with adult children. She was born in Norway and has 
lived there all her life. Eva is now retired but worked as a teacher of religion for decades after 
completing a university degree in Christian theology. She is a member of the Church of Norway, 
where she has been an active church member at many levels, but she was not involved in 
interreligious activities before.  
Eva was recruited to the project through resource persons in the Church of Norway with 
whom I had contact, and I had never met her before the first group meeting. She met the other 
participants for the first time at the first meeting. Eva took part in all the group’s meetings except 
for one.  
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Shirin. Shirin is in her forties, married, with children. She was born and raised in Iran and lived 
there until she fled the country for political reasons and migrated to Norway with her family 
some years after the 1979 revolution. Shirin obtained a university education in Iran and did 
further studies at the university level in Norway after she arrived, including studies in religion. 
She has occasionally worked in Norway, but for the moment she is not employed. Shirin is a 
Shi’ite Muslim and has occasionally taken part in interreligious encounters in Norway.  
Shirin was recruited directly by me to join the study since I had met her at interreligious 
activities. Shirin attended all of the groups meetings except for the last. 
 
Inger. Inger is in her forties, married, with children. She was born in Norway and has lived there 
all her life in various parts of the country. Inger has a university degree but does not have any 
formal education in religion. She works in public health care and is an active member of the 
Church of Norway. She had not participated in organized interreligious activities before. She met 
the other participants for the first time at the first meeting.  
Inger was recruited to the project in the same way Eva had been, i.e. through resource 
people in the Church of Norway, and I had never met her before the first group meeting. Inger 
took part in all of the group meetings in the study. 
 
Senait. In her late twenties, Senait is a student at one of the universities in Norway. She is 
unmarried and was born in Norway of parents of Pakistani origin. She is active in several 
mosques in Oslo and had taken part in organized interreligious activities before the project, 
which is where I met her and recruited her for the study. She had met some of the other 
participants before the first meeting. 
Senait took part only in the first group meeting of the study, because shortly after she had 
to move too far away to be able to attend further meetings. 
 
Maria. Maria is in her forties, divorced, with children. Maria grew up in an Eastern African 
country as a member of the Roman Catholic Church, but she is presently a member of the 
Church of Norway, which she joined after she moved to Norway several years ago. She is 
educated in social work and works as a social worker. Maria has not been engaged in organized 
interreligious work but has worked on intercultural community building.  
Maria was recruited to the study through resource persons on interreligious work in 
Norway, and I had never met her before the first group meeting. Maria met all the other 
participants for the first time at this meeting as well. Maria attended all of the meetings of the 
group except for one. 
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Kafia. In her forties, Kafia was born in Morocco and migrated to Norway some time ago. She is 
married and has children. Kafia works in social services. She is a Muslim but does not attend any 
mosque at present.  
Kafia was recruited for the study through a contact person in the social services, and I 
had never met her until I interviewed her in the middle of the study. She did not attend any of the 
group meetings but did read the reports of the meetings so as to be informed about the work. 
Kafia felt that she had too many obligations and was too busy to be able to come to the meetings. 
She also struggled occasionally with health problems. 
 
Rima. Rima is in her forties, married with an adult child. She was born and lived in a large city 
in the Middle East for about thirty years before migrating first to Sweden and then to Norway 
with her family. Rima was educated in the Middle East and works in Norway in a position that 
matches her educational skills, which do not include religious studies. Rima is a Roman Catholic 
Christian who is active in her parish. She has been engaged in culturally based dialogue work in 
Norway.  
Rima was recruited to the project through resource persons in the interreligious dialogue 
field in Norway, and I had never met her before the first group meeting. She met all the other 
participants for the first time at this meeting. Rima attended the first two meetings but, due to 
health problems, could not be present at the rest of the meetings. 
 
Fouzia. Fouzia is in her thirties, born and raised in another European country by parents who had 
migrated from Pakistan. She then moved to Norway where she has lived for some years with her 
husband and children. Fouzia works in social care and is a member of one of the Pakistani 
mosques in Oslo. She has been engaged in cultural dialogues and was recruited to the study 
through a contact person in social care in Oslo. I had not met her before the first group meeting, 
and she met the other participants for the first time at the first meeting. Fouzia attended the first 
two group meetings.  
 
Susanne. Susanne is in her late twenties, married, with children. She was born in Norway and 
has lived there most of her life except for parts of her childhood spent in a different country. 
Susanne has a university degree that included studies in Christian theology. She is employed by 
the Church of Norway and is also an active member. Susanne has taken part in organized 
interreligious activities before.  
Susanne was recruited to the study directly, since I had met her in organized religious 
work. She had met some of the other participants before the first meeting. Susanne participated 
in four of the group meetings throughout the study. 
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The Group Meetings 
There were six group meetings in total, lasting between two and a half and three and a half hours 
each. They were organized between 3 June 2005 and 15 September 2006, a period of somewhat 
more than a year and three months. On the average, this meant one meeting every second month, 
except in the summer. Some of the participants wished to have the meetings closer together, 
which would have provided the possibility of a more intensified process and possibly a greater 
continuity between the meetings. When suggested, this proved impossible, since finding times 
that suited everyone was generally a great challenge. All the meetings were in the afternoon and 
took place at the Faculty of Theology of the University of Oslo.  
Here is a brief overview of the overall structure of the meetings’ contents: at the first 
meeting, the participants shared parts of their life stories, selecting what information they wanted 
to give to the others. The participants thus knew one another to a certain extent when discussion 
on the canonical texts started.  
To start a group process by sharing life stories is to start constructing a shared space of 
mutual trust and is sometimes used in transreligious dialogue as a methodological tool for 
initiating a communication process through listening and narrating life stories (Egnell 2006: 
156).83 To start a group process by presenting claims and opinions may, on the other hand, 
quickly create a space where positioning according to different positions and opinions might 
freeze communications in determined patterns (Eidsvåg 1997: 227). The analysis does not 
include empirical material from the first meeting but only cites it, since the focus of the study is 
on making meaning of the texts. But in the analyzed material, the sequences of communication 
vary between being confrontational and being more marked by narrating and listening. This may 
suggest that trust on the one hand and more confrontational positioning on the other are more 
intertwined than suggested in the references above and perhaps show that trust can emerge from 
confrontational discussions as well if communication is not too fixed in this pattern over a long 
period of time. 
The second and third meeting focused on the Hagar/Hajar narratives from the Bible and 
the hadith. The fourth and fifth meeting addressed the non-narrative prescriptive texts. The sixth 
meeting was an evaluation and a closure of the process.  
                                                 
83 Egnell’s empirical study on organized interreligious dialogues for women shows that listening to/narrating the life 
story is part of many dialogues. The reasoning behind it is that it creates trust; it constructs the persons as subjects 
for themselves and for the others through telling their life story. In Egnell’s material this is often connected to 
feminist perspectives on communication (Egnell 2006: 156-157). 
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The meetings were recorded by a tape recorder and a video camera, the audio recording 
being the primary one.84 The visible presence of the tape recorder and the video camera during 
the meetings clearly reminded the participants that they were being recorded and filmed at all 
times.  
A discussion ensued at the second meeting on the question if the recording should be 
paused during the breaks. This occurred after the participants had read the transcriptions from the 
first meeting,85 in which the conversations in the breaks had been included. Several of the 
participants regretted this and wanted to introduce a distinction between a “public” and a 
“private” space within the frame of the meetings. They asked me to turn the recorder and video 
camera off during the breaks in the future, which I then did. The discussion in itself showed me 
that the participants, or at least several of them, were conscious of the different spaces created in 
the meetings: there was one shared space for all, a “public space,” the “official” talks, that was 
subject to research. Then there were “private spaces,” occurring primarily during the breaks, 
where two or more of the participants shared information or reactions literally “off the record.” 
This indicates an awareness of which information to share in the different spaces, as well as a 
consciousness of being subject to research in the shared “public” space. The discussion also 
showed another important aspect: the participants felt they were in a position to control my 
access as a researcher to their different spaces.  
To stop the recording during the breaks meant that I would miss the informal chatting 
between the more formal discussions as part of the empirical material. I made the decision I did 
because I wanted to respect the participants’ need to have a break. Allowing them some “private 
space” was in line with my general policy of granting the participants the opportunity to 
participate in decisions regarding the organization of the group meetings, including the 
possibility of correcting or deleting their own transcribed statements in the transcriptions (more 
on this later). 
I was interested in access to knowledge and utterances the participants would identify 
with and regard as representative of their views. I had no wish to obtain information they did not 
want to submit. It turned out that the conversations were focused and marked by intense 
discussions and conversations. This may have been promoted not only by the engagement of the 
participants but also through the distinction between “public” and “private” sections of the 
meetings.  
                                                 
84 I included the videotaping to consult it in case I was unable to recognize the speakers when transcribing. The 
project was not aimed at analyzing the video recording separately. I later found that I did not have any problem 
identifying the various speakers by their voices, so I did not need to consult the recorded videos. 
85 The participants were given the transcriptions from the meetings to check them; see elaborations on this later in 
this section. 
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I initially intended to include some of the participants’ personal reflections on the group’s 
process as voices in the empirical material. So, at the first meeting I gave all the participants a 
notebook and said any notes they made during the process could be an important additional 
source for me if they were willing to make such notes and give them to me at the end of the 
process. I believed that this was a way to have access to a different kind of material than what 
was revealed during the meetings. In the end none of the participants wanted to give me their 
notes at the end of the process. Some had not used the book at all, while others claimed that their 
notes were too personal. The notebook had been defined as part of the “private space” for those 
who used it.  
 
Structure and Moderation of the Meetings 
The six meetings followed more or less the same organizational structure. They started with a 
light meal since most participants came directly from work. Other than providing necessary 
nutrition, this also created the possibility of sharing a meal: eating together is a way to establish 
community. The meal, however, was not an event on its own – the conversations on texts or 
themes started immediately. There was at least one break during the meeting. The beginning and 
the end of the meetings were fixed and they usually started and ended on time because of 
everyone’s tight schedule. This structure meant that there were little room for informal chatting 
and exchange of information outside the structured conversation.  
At the four meetings concentrating on the texts, the “texts of the day” were read at the 
beginning.86 Both texts were read aloud (except for the third meeting, where they were read 
silently) by volunteers among the participants. In all meetings except the last, one or two 
Christian participants read the text from the Bible, and one or two Muslims read the text from the 
Koran/hadith. Sometimes the the Christian text was read first and sometimes the Muslim text 
was read first.87  
The initial plan was that I would moderate only the first meeting when the participants 
introduced themselves, and then pass the role on to the participants. My role as moderator at the 
first meeting was primarily to keep to the schedule and ensure that everyone had the time and 
opportunity to speak. One of the participants suggested that each meeting should have two 
chairs, one Christian and one Muslim. The group – and I – approved of this. At the end of the 
                                                 
86 The four texts were divided into two groups, one for the Hagar/Hajar narratives (discussed at meetings two and 
three), and one for the prescriptive texts (Sura 4:34 and 1 Timothy 2:8-15, discussed at meetings four and five). 
87 The texts were also sent by post to the participants in advance, to ensure that the ones wanting to prepare 
themselves had the texts available. This way they also had a first encounter with the texts in the project as presented 
to them at the same time or at least in the order they preferred to read them. 
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first meeting, however, nobody volunteered to moderate the next meeting. It was only after the 
second meeting some of the participants felt ready for this.  
The plan of having two moderators did not work out as planned because of the absence of 
some of planned moderators. It turned out that Inger, Aira, and Maria moderated one meeting 
each, and I moderated the last meeting. It was important to me that my plan of passing this role 
on to the participants was at least partly successful because this made me able to take a more 
observational role, not influencing the conversations through that process. Even if the role of the 
moderator at the meetings was generally one of non-intervention and a merely organizational 
duty, I regarded the double role as researcher and moderator as something I wanted to avoid as 
much as possible. As moderator, I risked influencing the interaction between the participants in 
the sense that, for instance, they would be concerned what I might think about what they said, if 
it was “correct” according to their tradition or not, or if they engaged in conversations in a way I 
approved. They may have been thinking about these things anyway (and this is sometimes 
evident in the transcriptions), but I found this to be a way to limit it. 
 
Individual Interviews 
Between the fourth and the fifth meetings I conducted individual interviews with all the 
participants except for one, who had moved too far away (Senait).88 My motivation behind this 
interview was primarily to obtain knowledge about how the participants experienced the group 
meetings and the group process. Since all information shared in the group was shared not only 
with me but with everyone present, this was an opportunity to respond to the process while still 
in progress, and it gave me an opportunity to ask them questions directly, something I hardly 
ever did in the group meetings. The aim of the individual interviews was not, however, to collect 
a different kind of empirical material or to broaden my research focus. This is why there are few 
references to these interviews in the study, and they are not analyzed separately. The interviews 
thus provide a “backup” for the quality of the main empirical material and function primarily as 
background material for my analysis to check my interpretations. The individual interviews did 
not yield any material that contradicted the material from the meetings. 
                                                 
88 The participants selected the location of these interviews. Because all the group meetings were held in a meeting 
room at the University of Oslo, which meant traveling and the interruption of their daily routines, I wanted to 
minimize the added effort this interview meant for them. I also considered the interview to be a part of my research 
where the one-to-one situation created a different power balance than in the group, with me as the interviewer and 
researcher emerging more clearly as the defining party. To give the participant the possibility of determining the 
location, would possibly make them more empowered and in control of the situation. The interviews were done at 
my university office (four) or in the participants’ homes (two), at the offices of the participants (two) and in a café 
(one). The interviews lasted between one and three hours, and the participants were given an interview guide 
beforehand.  
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Since my main focus was on the group process and the events at the meetings, I did not 
want to conduct the individual interviews before the group had met several times. If I had started 
out with individual interviews before the group met, there would have been the risk that the 
participants would relate primarily to me or be more aware of their relation to me when talking 
in the group, with the possible result that the interaction with the other participants would be 
weakened. The reason I selected the exact timing between the fourth and fifth meetings was that 
the group at this point had discussed the Hagar/Hajar narratives and the non-narrative, 
prescriptive texts, and there were still two scheduled meetings left.  
 
Attendance and Absence of the Participants 
It is not unheard of in qualitative research that informants drop out, although this problem is not 
often addressed in the literature on method. Dropping out as an informant/participant in a 
research project could be coincidental, but I believe it also could be a message articulated 
through absence – a way of becoming visible when one does not feel visible and listened to when 
present. It might also be interpreted as a way to reject a project or to reduce its meaning for 
oneself after one has been disappointed, or simply finding out that what was in it for one since 
being a participant was not enough to induce one to make the effort.  
The participants in this project knew beforehand that they had consented to a process 
involving six meetings and one individual interview. A crucial element in the project beyond my 
control was how many participants would turn up at the meetings. The participants all had 
multiple obligations in different fields: work, family, friends, volunteer work in their faith 
communities. Some had to travel a rather long way to attend the meetings. The group was 
compiled in such a way that there would be an equal number of Christians and Muslims and of 
the cultural variations in the Christian and the Muslim parts of the group. So any absence 
changed a presupposed numerically balanced representation. My previous experience in 
transreligious/transcultural dialogues was that often the most difficult part was to get people 
together physically. I addressed this as a possible challenge at the first meeting and suggested 
that there should be a specified minimum number of both Christian and Muslim participants 
present in order for a meeting to be considered part of the study. There were two reasons for 
suggesting such a minimum of balanced participation as a requirement: to ensure that the 
conversations and interactions were more diverse, and thus more valuable as research material 
and to avoid a situation where a Christian or a Muslim participant had to carry the possible 
burden of representing their tradition alone.  
The end of a discussion on the need for a minimum numerical balance between Christians 
and Muslims was that the participants decided there should be at least two Muslims and two 
Christians present at each meeting.  
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The first meeting had the highest attendance: Nine participants attended; only Kafia did 
not turn up.89 At the second meeting the numbers of participants was eight, and the third meeting 
was held with five participants. The fourth had four, and the fifth and sixth five and four 
participants respectively. The required minimum of two Christian and two Muslim participants 
was accomplished at all meetings except the sixth. The participants present at the sixth meeting, 
an evaluation of the project, decided that they wanted the meeting to proceed anyway.  
Six of the participants were regular in their attendance: Susanne, Inger, and Eva, all with 
a Christian Norwegian background but belonging to different age groups; Maria, a Christian of 
African-Norwegian background, Aira, a Muslim of Pakistani-Norwegian background, and 
Shirin, a Muslim of Iranian-Norwegian background. These six participants thus provided most of 
the continuity in the project, becoming a group within the group. 
The patterns of absence and attendance among the participants raise some important 
questions. What impact did this have on the group process and the dialogue process? What 
impact did it have on the quality of the empirical material, and can these patterns give some 
relevant information about the whole process of making meaning of texts and contexts? 
To address the first question: for a group, the presence and absence of participants  
impact both stability and content. To some degree, one could say that the instability regarding 
the presence of about half of the participants made it necessary to reconstitute the group at every 
meeting. On the other hand, there were six participants who created stability and continuity. No 
new participants were invited to replace the absentees for two reasons. First, nobody withdrew 
formally from the project, and I did not want to close the door on them if they returned. Second, 
replacements would create an even greater instability in the group process.  
The effect on the empirical material is obviously that the different perspectives of the 
absent participants were lost. The empirical material proved, however, to be sufficiently complex 
and broad to proceed with the project as planned. 
How the absence of nearly half the participants at two thirds of the meetings regarding 
the project as a whole is to be interpreted is another question. I asked the absentees about this in 
the individual interviews. The major drop in the participants came between the second and third 
meetings. Did something happen at the second meeting to keep some from attending further? Did 
                                                 
89 Kafia did not attend any of the meetings. The reasons she gave in the individual interview I had with her was that 
she had been too busy with work and family obligations, had experienced some health problems, and had to travel 
several times to assist her family in Morocco. She stated that she would have liked to have been there and that she 
did not want to withdraw from the project. She did say she would try to make it for the two last meetings, which, in 
the end, she did not do. But Kafia’s situation touches on a problem that may be representative for many active 
women belonging to minority groups in Norway: The expectations that they work, be engaged in their communities, 
take care of family both in Norway and abroad, as well as being addressed by the public to be representatives of 
their faith or cultural community is simply too much. The total pressure may in the end affect their health and well-
being. 
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their absence have something to do with being exposed to the texts, with the issues discussed, the 
other participants, or with something else connected to the project? Or were there other causes, 
ones outside the project itself? All the absentees interviewed claimed that the reason they did not 
make it to the meetings was due to busy periods, conflicting and more demanding obligations, or 
their own health situation. No one mentioned anything connected to the project as a reason for 
being absent. This does not exclude those causes from still being factorss in the project or that 
they may have been combined with factors related to the project or even other factors. The 
material from the individual interviews, however, does not provide any other explanation than 
those mentioned above.  
The stability among the Christian participants of Norwegian background was 
significantly higher than for all other categories of participants: All three of them were among 
the six most stable participants. Maria (a Christian with a African-Norwegian background) and 
the two Muslim participants who showed a similar stability (of Pakistani-Norwegian and Iranian-
Norwegian background) all had a university education. They were first-generation immigrants to 
Norway and had the experience of being exposed to plurality in groups over many years with a 
cross-cultural and/or cross-religious network. It is not possible to generalize on how the issue of 
participation reflected the degree to which the participants felt themselves to be part of the 
Norwegian society based on such a small group of informants. But if a strong cultural 
membership in the Norwegian majority context should be considered a variable providing higher 
participation than the opposite, the pattern of participation in this project would at least partly 
support this empirically. One of the participants who withdrew had lived her entire life in 
Norway as a descendent of immigrants (Senait), and she did not withdraw because she did not 
feel part of Norwegian society. 
The meetings in this project were rather long, usually around three and a half hours, and 
the discussions were generally intense and challenging. The prescriptive texts could have scared 
participants away beforehand. A message, which the absentees never stated explicitly, could be 
that they did not find their participation to be worth the effort and/or that other obligations were 
more important to them. Possible different expectations of the project could also have played a 
part: perhaps the six participants who constituted “the group within the group” experienced the 
project more as meeting their expectations than the others did. 
The result for the establishment of the material was that the group often had a majority of 
Christians present, and this may have shaped both the material and the communication in the 
group. 
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Transcriptions 
The group meetings and the individual interviews were recorded and transcribed. The complete 
transcriptions of the meetings were sent to the participants by post. I was usually able to do this 
between meetings, so that the transcriptions would provide a certain degree of continuity 
between the conversations and discussions at the different meetings – if the participants read 
them. But the initial reason for doing so was to give the participants access to reading what they 
had said. To seek approval of the transcriptions by the interviewees (participants) establishes 
transparency and thus increases the validity of the material because errors could be discovered 
and corrected (Holter and Kalleberg 1996: 22).  
I exceeded the possibility of feedback for the participants beyond correcting possible 
mistakes: I also granted them the right to delete parts of their own transcribed statements after 
the first reading. By doing this, I risked losing valuable material, but I still decided to do it, not 
because I believe qualitative research requires this as a rule but because I thought it had a 
function in this particular project. I wanted the participants to feel as safe as possible when 
entering into a demanding space of encounters and discussing sensitive issues like faith, gender, 
and canonical texts. 
Some of the participants in this group may become future partners in trust building 
activities of dialogue/encounter, or I may meet them as dialogue partners myself. Trust cannot be 
compartmentalized into separate spaces between research and dialogue activism. This matter 
touches on a possible conflict between establishing research material and being active in 
dialogues/encounters outside the field of research. This problem arises if the interests of the 
participant and those of the researcher conflict, and the researcher feels obliged to leave 
important material aside in order to ensure possible future relations. The material the participants 
might not want to release could provide possible interesting knowledge. In this project, however, 
I was not looking for this kind of material, and my decision about the transcriptions was not 
motivated by possible future projects inside or outside academia.  
The motivation is partly grounded in the dialogical values I want to integrate into the 
project both theoretically and methodologically, and in the fact that I want to listen to feminist 
postcolonial theories criticizing the “Western” and “male” dominance in mainstream research in 
order to objectify the cultural and gender “other.” To construct a representation that fits into 
one’s own presuppositions of “the other” could mean reducing the representation of “the other” 
in a way that makes her unable to recognize herself. Giving the participants the right to influence 
the representation of them is an attempt to reduce the risk of othering the other through research. 
The researcher would still have a separate and different responsibility for the project than the 
participants. But I believed – and still believe – that it is possible to include a participant’s right 
to influence her own representation, and at the same time ensure the necessary distance and 
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professional integrity of the researcher. I will return to this when I discuss my own role in the 
project. 
It appeared that there were few places in the transcriptions that the participants wanted to 
change or remove. A few obvious errors due to language problems were corrected,90 and in two 
separate cases there was a wish to remove references to Iranian law (in one case) and comments 
on the translation of the koranic text (this case is described in the material, with the consent of 
the participant).91These cases did not change the content of the more general and relevant 
contributions. When the analysis of the empirical material was finished, the participants were 
invited to read the transcriptions of their own contributions as they were presented in the finished 
text. This was primarily to correct misunderstandings, but it also opened the way for other 
comments. Due to the situation in Iran at the time of completion (the first six months of 2010) 
the Iranian-Norwegian participant was granted the right to edit her own contributions for safety 
reasons. Both Aira and Shirin asked to read the complete analysis beforehand and did so. The 
outcome of this was that some of Shirin’s sayings were deleted, but these did not concern the 
interpretation of the texts nor were they related to the group process. Several of Aira’s 
contributions were, at her suggestion, reformulated into more correct English that communicated 
what she intended to say more precisely, without changing the original meaning of what she said. 
Some of her contributions were also deleted according to her wishes: these were mostly 
repetitions of earlier sayings, but a few of them were changed due to misunderstandings that had 
occurred, without changing the meaning bearing content.  
If the withdrawals had been many, and significantly changed the material, this would 
have been a challenge, and could have implied necessary changes for modifying the project in 
some way. 
 
Languages and the Transfer from Oral to Written Language 
The language in the group meetings was Norwegian. This was the only common language that 
made communication possible, even if it did create a difference between the participants. Some 
had Norwegian as their first language, some as their second or third language. The difference 
concerning Norwegian language skills is likely to have influenced the interaction between the 
participants in favor of the native Norwegian speakers. It probably influenced negatively the 
possibility of some of the participants to express themselves in the conversations. Everyone, 
                                                 
90 One example was that I had mistaken the word “tool” for “watchdog” in one of the transcriptions (in a discussion 
on what the Koran and the Bible represented in the traditions). In Norwegian the words verktøy (“tool”) and 
vakthund (“watchdog”) can sound somewhat similar. This mistake caused amusement in the group, and it proved to 
me that showing the transcriptions to the participants was a good investment in quality proofing the transcriptions. 
91 The participant with an Iranian-Norwegian background found that she was mistaken in her reference to the laws 
on punishment for causing traffic accidents in Iran. This was deleted from the transcriptions.  
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however, spoke Norwegian fluently, even if it was not their primary language (cf. criteria for the 
selection of participants). 
The texts from the Koran, the hadith, and the Bible were all presented to the participants 
in a Norwegian version. This was because it was the only possibility for everyone to be able to 
read the texts and because this is the way the texts are accessible for most of the Norwegian 
public. There was only one native Arabic speaker among the participants, a Christian from the 
Middle East (Rima). Some of the Muslim participants did know some koranic Arabic. None of 
the Christian participants knew Greek or Hebrew, the original languages of the biblical texts in 
the project. The texts used in the dissertation are English versions of the Bible and the Koran, 
selected because of their degree of closeness to the Norwegian texts in the project rather than 
their closeness to the text’s original language.92 
The transfer from oral language at the meetings to a written text in the transcriptions was 
done without changing the way the participants expressed themselves, meaning that the language 
was not modified or improved but kept its distinctive oral character. When reading the 
transcriptions, the participants reacted to this in a skeptical manner at first. I did not change it 
because I did not want to change the intended meanings or manner of speaking, which would 
have been unavoidable if I “corrected” the language. The participants got used to this and 
accepted it; in the end, some of them also appreciated it and said that the distinctive oral manner 
of speaking had a value of its own and should not be changed. 
The participants were constantly challenged to respond to the texts and to one another. 
The hermeneutical situation was complex, and reflections had to be done quickly and on the 
spot, since the challenges emerged fluidly through the conversations. A requirement of 
“reflecting while speaking,” and “reflection through conversation” as part of the speaking 
conditions for the participants should be in the minds of the readers of this text when reading and 
interpreting the transcriptions later. 
The translation of the transcriptions from Norwegian to English were done by me, and 
even if I tried to translate them into oral English, nuances and meanings that were present in the 
Norwegian transcriptions may have been lost in translation. There have been some linguistic 
improvements made without interfering with the content in order to improve the transcriptions’ 
ability to communicate. Transcriptions of statements by participants with Norwegian as their 
second or third language, translated into English by a native Norwegian speaker, requires 
particular attention in this respect. 
 
 
                                                 
92 See the notes regarding the versions I use in the analysis where the texts are also cited in a full (English) version. 
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Methodological Discussions 
There are two points to be made in introducing this methodological framework: First, there is the 
question about the group as the object of the research and the further situating of the 
methodology connected to this. Second, there is the question of representation. 
 
Why Establish a Group for this Project? 
Because the aim of this project is to study a Christian-Muslim process of reading texts to gain 
knowledge about the process of interpretation in a relational perspective, including how this 
process influenced or changed the interpretation of texts, contexts, and the relation itself, the 
research presupposes a group. But a group of the kind this project requires (consisting of women, 
both Christians and Muslims, in a cross-cultural situation, and reading their canonical scriptures 
together) was not readily available in the Norwegian context. If there had been one, I would have 
asked for permission to do research on this established group. But given the situation, I decided 
to put a group together for the purpose of this project.  
Doing qualitative research into a group, rather than into people as individuals, has a 
significant impact on the role of the researcher vs. the informants/participants. Not only does the 
group relate to the researcher(s), but the individuals in the group also relate to one another. The 
balance of power between researcher and informant is numerically changed. This may imply that 
the empirical material established by studying a group is less vulnerable to the influence of a 
researcher’s questions and anticipations. The presence of the researcher or the knowledge that 
what is said is recorded and becomes research material will affect the process but to a lesser 
degree perhaps.  
What would be a suitable category into which the group in this project should be placed? 
Is the group a focus group, a group interview over a period of time, or is it a “dialogue group”? If 
the group is called a dialogue group, what methodological implications would this have, and how 
is the described process of establishing the material in this project to be seen in relation to Action 
Research?  
 
Is this Action Research? 
Action Research (AR) is research where the researcher is a participant, through her research, in 
the field she is researching. The aim of the research includes improving current practices and/or 
implementing change. AR is deeply rooted in practical life and is strongly value-oriented 
(Reason and Bradbury 2006: xxii). The strong value orientation seems to fit well with the themes 
of this study that is theoretically and methodologically related to the normative fields of dialogue 
and feminism. But where action research clearly expects the researcher to have an active, 
participating role, which might blur the distinction between the researcher(s) and (other) 
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participants (Reason and Bradbury 2006: xxiv), this project intends to study the meaning-making 
strategies and processes of the participants, without my direct participation in the substantial 
discussions related to this. In the group meetings, I did preserve the distinction between the 
researcher and the informants/participants in this respect.  
Conducting the establishment of the empirical material through group interviews was 
ruled out for the same reason: Through formulating questions – a crucial part of making meaning 
– I could easily enter into a leading role, providing premises for the conversations and 
discussions. I did not ask follow-up questions or pursue themes during the meetings, except on a 
few occasions to clarify the meaning of what had just been said, and once at the end of the fifth 
meeting, when I asked the participants summarize their views.93 Thus, the group meetings cannot 
be characterized as group interviews.94  
Action Research often aims at implementing concrete changes in a specific field, and in a 
particular direction, often located in a specific community. This project is not directed toward 
implementation of concrete changes or changes in a specific direction. This would violate the 
theoretical framework of the project based on reflexive interpretation, hermeneutics, and 
dialogue. But what about the incorporated values in the concept of dialogue and the critical 
perspectives of feminisms and power criticism, also present in the project’s framework? 
The distinction between the interpretation of the participants and my interpretation and 
analysis of this interpretation is established in the chapter on theory (cf. “double hermeneutics”). 
If findings in the analysis show strategies of making meaning to be consistent with agenda(s) of 
feminism(s), identify occurrences of dialogical events/communication, or exercise different 
kinds of power criticism, these findings will be significant. But this is different from 
presupposing or influencing the process of the group in these specific directions. What might 
emerge as action or agency by the group is in the hands of the participants. To be involved in 
constructing an agency for change at the group level in this project is not part of my role as 
researcher in the group, unlike the researcher’s role in AR.  
However, to put together a transcultural Christian-Muslim women’s group to study 
specific gender-related texts from the Bible, the Koran, and the hadith in a Norwegian context 
where gender equality is regarded a crucial value is clearly a value-loaded act.95 Some of the 
participants also knew me as active in various Christian-Muslim dialogues. So, even if the 
project as such does not have a specific aim at transformation or a concrete plan for further 
                                                 
93 See p. 322 ff. 
94 And even if I was present mostly as an observer during half of all the meetings, and at the meetings I chaired did 
not enter into conversations on substantial matters, my participation in the group could not be called participatory 
observation because I did more than observe – I organized the events. 
95 As described above, I initially used the word “feminist” in the working title of the project, and this was given to 
the participants when I asked them to participate. 
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action, it could provide a challenge to the participants in a way that might change their 
perspectives or agencies. This challenge may have been communicated through the project’s 
framework, through the group process, or through both.  
The two models of transreligious dialogue/encounter suggested in the chapter on theory, 
i.e. “difference as constitutive” and “difference as challenge,” both relate to different aspects of 
and possibilities connected to dialogical values.96 When I say that I want to relate to core values 
in dialogue throughout this project, the values of dialogue (such as equality, not violating the 
otherness of the other, re-humanizing of the world), and the mutual transformation defined as a 
possible result of a dialogue according to the second model in particular might fit Action 
Research methodology. The difference would be that an action researcher could possibly have 
decided on the desired direction of the change from the beginning, whereas a dialogue-based 
transformation should, ideally, be impossible for one person to direct. A dialogical 
transformation may take different shapes and directions for the different participants.  
If starting a process of reflection in a group is defined as an aim in itself, this work would 
be close to AR in this respect. But AR requires a decision by the researcher, implying that a 
particular worldview (that of the researcher) is exempt from discussion at the level of the 
participants. Even if Action Research claims to be dialogical and empowering for the objects of 
research, it cannot, in my view, be seen as equivalent to dialogue, and it may endanger the 
reflexive interpretation process of the researcher if the aims of the research (implementing 
change through research) are too fixed.  
 
Naming the Method: “Qualitative Research into an Organized 
Transreligious/Transcultural Group” 
I believe the methodology worked out for this project comes closer to “traditional” qualitative 
research than it does to Action Research, since I maintain the distinction between researcher and 
participants rather consistently. The hermeneutical framework has methodological consequences 
since it entails the constant questioning of the researcher’s presuppositions and interpretation. 
The project does, however, have some similarities with Action Research: strongly value-
oriented, with the possibility of creating and/or changing the agency of the participants. The 
analysis will explore if the group’s meaning-making results in communicative events of dialogue 
or the establishment of fluid and shifting interpretative communities.97 
 
                                                 
96 See Chapter 2, p. 60-67. 
97 See Chapter 2 for the theoretical discussion on the concept of interpretative communities, and the relation 
between dialogue and interpreting communities. 
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Is the Group a Dialogue Group? 
Dialogue was discussed theoretically in the former chapter. What are the implications of this for 
methodology? Could the group in this project be called a dialogue group? Should it be called a 
focus group? 
The “group process” and “meaning making”98 are the preferred terms to describe what 
happens when the participants meet and discuss. By “group process” I mean the relational 
meaning making taking place in the group, including the self-reflexive work of the participants, 
and the reflection they did in between the meetings. The “group process” starts when the group 
first meets and ends when the sixth and last meeting is finished. There is a distinction between 
the “group process” and what I would call the “dialogue process,” both regarding content and 
extent. A dialogue process can have a distinct start, but the end is not clear-cut because the 
relations and conversations among participants in a dialogue might continue after the organized 
process. For the participants in a dialogue, the narratives and insights from the dialogue might 
continue to shape their lives and reflections about other and self. In this way the dialogical 
process may continue when a group, and a group process, has vanished. 
Dialogue, according to how I use the concept theoretically, presupposes differences 
between the participants and does not aim at agreement. The agenda of dialogue is to explore 
differences and investigate possibilities for common reflection, and possibly shared agency 
(diapraxis). This might be the case in a focus group as well, but a dialogue group is qualified 
differently through the emphasis on differences and concentrating on the communication process 
in the group. A focus group often has a narrower focus decided by the researcher. In a dialogue 
group the foci should not be under the complete control of anyone, whether or not that individual 
is the researcher. If this happens in what is supposed to be a dialogue, some of the participating 
subjects cease to be subjects as such and become observers or are marginalized into roles where 
they are defined and controlled by others. A dialogue needs to have more than one defining 
subject and, ideally, it should provide equal shares of control and power to all those participating. 
This is common for the two models presented earlier. 
 Transreligious dialogue groups are established mostly to function for a certain period of 
time. If the dialogue aims at building relationships and trust, and investigates complex matters 
(theological, ethical, political), it is an advantage that the same people meet every time. In more 
institutionalized dialogues, where the aim is to establish formalized contact between religious 
communities or organizations, the representation of the institution as such might overrule the 
personal dimension, with the result that different people might be present at different times.  
                                                 
98 See Chapter 2, p. 35. 
  
106 
In a dialogue, everyone is contributing ideally to the conversations and the meaning 
making. In the case of this project, everyone contributed except me, the researcher. This violates 
the principle of a dialogue. If I had chosen Action Research as my method, this problem would 
have been solved. Instead, I would have the problem of dealing adequately with the plurality 
claim of the dialogue, as stated above. I would also not be able to avoid contributing to my own 
research material. 
The end result, then, after these considerations of the research method and naming of the 
group is that what I do is qualitative research, including a methodology influenced by qualified 
dialogue values, which is precisely why I cannot call the group a dialogue group because, 
according to dialogical values, this would mean that the researcher had violated the principle of 
equal access to the power of definition among the participants by defining normative aims for the 
group alone and in advance. Instead, it would need to be called a meaning-making group. If it is 
impossible to use the term dialogue about the group as a fixed term in advance, it is possible to 
investigate how the group’s process relates to dialogical values (cf. p. 365 ff) and to the two 
proposed models of transreligious dialogue presented in the former chapter.  
 
The Question of Representation 
Framing this study as “Muslim-Christian” in the title, I thus determine religious identity to be 
more crucial than cultural identity. This should be discussed further. Organized transreligious 
work could run the risk of neglecting cultural differences and presuppose a strong religious 
identity among the participants – at least strong enough for one to be identified as a “Christian” 
or a “Muslim” – and to take part in an activity based on one’s religious beliefs. The expected 
difference in such a dialogue, which ideally would provide a more open space for interaction 
with a lack of hegemonic discourses, could turn into a confirmation of differences, overlooking 
similarities and underplaying differences of a different, non-religious basis. Even though 
religious differences are the only explicit kind of differences presupposed in transreligious 
dialogues/encounters, the expectation of difference over similarities may extend beyond religious 
differences, and include other parts of people’s identities and backgrounds as well. This is related 
to similar dilemmas in cultural studies of various kinds, gender theory, and philosophical 
discussions on sameness and difference: if the aim is to create a greater degree of equality in a 
community, across differences, the identification of differences and establishment of categories 
in building the premises for such work may instead reinforce or create the differences it aims to 
overcome (Gressgård 2005).  
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In this project the participants are identified in terms of their religion above that of their 
culture.99 But by mixing religious and cultural categories in the composition of the group, there 
were various cultural and intrareligious backgrounds both in the Christian and in the Muslim 
contingents. I intended via this means to avoid a reproduction of a “waterproof” binary system of 
Christianity and Islam as unified, opposing categories. A binary system of “Norwegian” and 
“hyphen-Norwegian,” as coinciding with religious backgrounds, was more difficult to challenge, 
since all the Muslims were immigrants or descendents of immigrants. But through including 
immigrants (“hyphen-Norwegians”) among the Christian participants, a possible binary relation 
between “Norwegian” and “hyphen-Norwegian” would at least not coincide with “Muslim” and 
“non-Muslim,” “Christian” and “non-Christian,” or “Muslim” and “Christian.” The Christian 
participants of the group were not intended to bear any common notion of “Norwegianness” or 
the Muslim group the notion of “hyphen-Norwegianness” or “immigrants” alone.  
Regarding religious traditions and representations, the participants addressed this issue at 
the second meeting.100 The question was if they were to represent a whole religious tradition or 
themselves as individuals within a tradition. They agreed that they should only “speak for 
themselves.” How the participants viewed their own representation, however, varied throughout 
the process. 
 
Representation and Gender: Why Only Women? 
I made the choice to construct a group consisting only of women. One of the strategic challenges 
in religious communities within the Christian and Islamic traditions for agents of change in 
gendered hierarchies seem to be how to engage men in discussions about gender issues and in 
interpretations of canonical texts and their implications for both men and women. A binary 
system of men and women as dichotomic categories, based on an essentialist view on gender, 
including an idea of universal experiences of all women without differentiation, are problematic 
with respect to understanding the meaning of gender as a category. To be more specific, the 
problem that arises through any use of the category of gender and gender dichotomy as stable, 
universal, and fixed is that these statements are always situated in a particular context, which is 
never stable, universal, and fixed.  
As stated in the Chapter 2, “third-wave feminism” challenged the earlier feminist view of 
universal experiences for all women, claiming that this idea reflected white middle-class Western 
women’s experiences only. The call for a more comprehensive critical power analysis than those 
                                                 
99 I deliberately did not include people with a history of religious conversion, since I thought this might complicate 
the material in a way that did not accord with my primary aim. Still, I was unaware that one of the participants 
appeared to have been converted – from Roman Catholicism to the Church of Norway (Lutheran). 
100 See Chapter 4, p. 127 ff. 
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based on gender as the only variable opened up the way for the concept of intersectional 
analysis. In intersectional analysis different identities and backgrounds that could be separate 
reasons for discrimination are viewed together in order to explore how the different factors relate 
in different kinds of oppression (McCall 2005: 1771). Intersectional analysis aims at showing 
how the various factors causing oppression work together: Are they cumulative? Or does one of 
the identities play a different role in a certain discourse of power/lack of power? 
After having said all this, why did I select only women as participants? The simple 
answer is that I was interested in what women had to say about the texts. The texts speak about 
women: What do women have to say about the texts?  
The complicated answer has to do with the traditional gendered power structures in the 
Christian and Islamic traditions. Men have been the dominant textual interpreters in both 
traditions. This is due to their privileged access to education and knowledge, but most of all 
because the positions having authority to interpret and to decide what are legitimate 
interpretations were mostly reserved for men. In order to make room for women’s voices, 
women’s interpretations, and to involve women in negotiations on the authority to interpret, it is 
necessary to implement what the feminist postcolonial theorist Gayatry Spivak would call 
“strategic essentialism” (Spivak 1993). Strategic essentialism involves making a strategic choice 
regarding the essence of something and should not be confused with ontological essentialism. 
Essentialism is based on strategy, not theory. The reason for doing this, according to Spivak, is to 
create a space that makes it possible to work for contextual changes for feminism and against 
sexism. This space should be specific in its aims in order to avoid a confirmation and reinvention 
of the fixed binary gender system. To avoid the latter, Spivak insists that this praxis must be self-
critical and conscious about its strategic aims.101  
The social theorist bell hooks discusses the same dilemma. This is the dilemma that exists 
between the need to fight injustice created by essentialism and at the same time to have to use 
identification with a particular group to be able to make one’s claims and address the injustice 
directed toward a person as member of a particular group, such as African Americans in the USA 
(hooks 1990: 29). In hook’s reasoning, the anti-essentialism among postmodern theorists may 
undermine the needed agency for change for underprivileged groups.  
My choice to put together a group of participants consisting only of women is consistent 
with the Spivakian concept of strategic essentialism, if her requirement of having a self-critical 
approach, and a strategic aim, is interpreted as directed toward me as a researcher and not to the 
participants. This means that I must bear in mind that the work I do in this project is embedded in 
                                                 
101 Spivak emphasizes that her term “strategic essentialism” should not be misused to reintroduce essentialism as a 
goal through the back door. The aim for strategic essentialism should not be hidden at any time but displayed openly 
and integrated in a process of creating more consciousness.  
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specific binary systems, and that I should include a self-critical reflection on how my theoretical 
and methodological choices affect my analysis of differences in order to avoid a fixed 
essentialism to be reestablished through my research. 
 
What Did the Participants Think about Being Only Women? 
I asked the participants at the last meeting about their reflections on being a part of a group 
consisting only of women. Aira (Sunni Muslim with a Pakistani-Norwegian background) stated 
that she believed that the fact that the group consisted only of women had created more openness 
within the group. She believed it had reduced the risk of being misinterpreted and created an 
opportunity to talk in peace and quiet. She highlighted, however, that drawing conclusions and 
implementations of changes was impossible without the collaboration of men and that it was 
important to communicate the results of the group to men. This comes close, I believe, to the 
Spivak’s notion of “strategic essentialism.”  
Eva (Lutheran Christian, Norwegian background) claimed that if there had been men in 
the group, “they would have dominated us – at least they would have tried to do so.” She 
emphasized, however, that it was important to remember that women’s issues in the Norwegian 
society were addressed and fought for by men first. Maria (Lutheran Christian, African-
Norwegian background) thought it would have been interesting if men had attended as well. She 
claimed that women’s issues regarding minority groups in Norway is typically very concerned 
about women, forgetting about immigrant men and their needs. Inger (Lutheran Christian, 
Norwegian background) stated that “it was right to have this as a women’s group” and that 
women had some common experiences that they needed to articulate. Inger, too, claimed that it 
was important to communicate the interpretations of the group to “the right men,” meaning 
challenging men with an oppressive interpretation of the texts.  
When the participants discussed this, they also reflected on their religious context. Maria 
claimed that she believed the developments to be generally positive for women: even if things 
were proceeding slowly, they were still moving in the right direction in Norway. She added that 
her African background could be the reason why she viewed the situation in Norway more 
positively than she felt the other participants did. She stated: “I view this more positively than 
you because you are a bit spoiled, to put it that way. You have female ministers and all that, and 
then I think: Oh! How nice it is here that it’s like that!”  
Thus, all said that they preferred a women’s group to a gender-mixed group in the 
project, except Maria. Inger was the only one who suggested gender-specific experiences as a 
reason for a separate group of women. The importance of communicating and working with men 
toward change, however, was emphasized. I will return in the analysis to looking at the 
participants on gender, texts, and contexts, and how they view their own agency. 
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Ethical Perspectives 
This project was approved by NSD, the Norwegian Social Science Data Services, and follows 
the procedures required by this institution regarding research ethics and safeguarding personal 
information about the participants. 
 
Anonymity and Confidentiality 
The participants were granted anonymity. Full anonymity is, however, difficult to obtain, since 
people who know some of the participants may recognize them in the text if they add up all the 
information revealed about them. The real names of the participants have been changed in this 
study. Two of them took the opportunity they were given to pick their own pseudonyms while 
the others are given a name by me.102 The names I selected are picked to give a cultural and 
religious connotation to their religious and cultural backgrounds.  
Revealing other information about the participants, such as country of origin, place of 
work, exact age, etc., is generalized into less traceable information. The participants with East 
African and Middle Eastern backgrounds are not presented with their specific country of origin, 
because the number of people in their category within Norway is small. The Iranian-Norwegian 
participant was given the right to edit her statements throughout the process with a view to the 
safety of her family and friends in a currently unstable Iran (2010).  
One of the participants wanted to appear in the dissertation with her real name. I found 
this difficult to grant, given that it was not the same praxis for all. This does, however, raise an 
ethical question: Why should participants in a research project not get credit for their 
contributions if they invest a large amount of time and effort, sharing knowledge and experience 
crucial for the research? It would be interesting to follow a discussion on this issue, which I 
believe belongs to the field of research ethics as well. If I chose not to do so, it was, in addition 
to what I mentioned above, because the researcher is responsible for the study and its outcome. It 
may be difficult for a participant to overview the possible consequences of a study, and a 
participant should not be held accountable for the researcher’s analysis, over which the 
participant has no control. 
 
My Role  
Qualitative research is not an objective activity; it always implies selection of material, methods, 
and theory, and relates to at least one, usually several, discourses of power. The researcher is not 
a tabula rasa but is shaped through her experiences, background, opinions, and perspectives. The 
                                                 
102 I wanted the names to be an issue they could decide if they wanted, in order to give them a subjective influence 
on something as personal as a name is, even in a confidential research process. 
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challenge is to make the subjective elements a resource, rather than a weakness creating blind 
spots. This demands a self-reflexive process by the researcher, being able to be transparent and 
conscious about her situated role and work.  
Throughout this project, I had more than one role. The most important one was to be a 
researcher, but in order to conduct the study I was also the organizer of the meetings, as well as 
moderator at half of the meetings. There are two areas where my role is particularly important as 
a subject for discussion. The first is my presence and sometimes my role as moderator at the 
meetings. The second has to do with conducting the analysis of the material, as a person with a 
particular background. I am a Norwegian Christian, trained as a theologian, as well as a known 
participator in Muslim-Christian dialogues/encounters in Norway for the “insiders.” Obviously, I 
have perspectives and experiences that were quite important with respect to how the study was 
conducted. The participants knew about my background. I found that my background in dialogue 
work was both an advantage and a burden. The advantage was the experience of interpreting 
encounters like this and being able to make theoretical and methodological choices with a basis 
in practical dialogue work. The burden – and disadvantage – was that I could not freely take part 
in the process and could not get involved in a real encounter with the participants myself.  
During the meetings of the group I did not enter into conversations or ask questions 
related to the texts or the participants’ discussions about texts and contexts. Given the main 
empirical material in this project, I wanted to distance myself from contributing directly. 
Through selecting both texts and participants, naming the project, and selecting the location of 
the meetings, I had decided the premises for the process. I did not intend to enter into the process 
itself. I articulated this to the participants, but they still asked me on a few occasions questions 
about the texts or other substantial issues during the meetings. I answered these questions briefly, 
with reference to other researchers or the religious traditions, and not with my own views. But 
these incidental questions showed that my withdrawal was not making me invisible in any way; 
my presence, even if I was inactive in the conversations, was noted and possibly influenced the 
participants.  
To withdraw while present in a group might have a negative influence on the rest of the 
group, if the withdrawal is interpreted as lack of interest or creating a distance. It can also be 
interpreted as an act of executive power, since one does not show the vulnerability and openness 
needed for sharing. During the meetings, also when functioning as moderator, I brought my 
laptop and made notes while the others spoke. This was not primarily because I needed the notes 
(although they often proved useful afterwards) but because it made me visibly busy in the role of 
researcher and the participants would then rather address another than me.  
I generally did not intervene in verbal conflicts or heated discussions. This put me in a 
difficult position sometimes and brought to light a problem with organizing this kind of group. I 
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had to break with my own habits from earlier dialogues, and my own belief in how to moderate a 
dialogue. The conflicts that occurred brought important information for the investigation of the 
participant’s meaning making, and as such they were valuable as research material. At the same 
time I felt this to be a dilemma at times. Some of the participants may have expected me to take a 
more active caretaking role in the discussions. 
I did, however, intervene in some of the heated discussions by asking the participants if 
they wanted to continue the discussion or if they wanted to spend the time differently. 
Sometimes they explicitly said that they wanted to go on with the discussion; other times they 
shifted focus. The possibility for everyone in the group to have their say became mostly a 
responsibility for the participants themselves, even if the chair (which was sometimes me) 
attempted to organize the discussions in a semi-structured way. This might have had the function 
of empowering some of the participants and doing the opposite to others.  
The participants did make individual choices in the group process displaying 
consciousness of themselves as active decision makers. Examples of this are when one suggested 
spending some time discussing a current theme instead of the texts (Inger) and once when the 
ways the texts were discussed was organized a bit differently by one of the participants while 
moderating the meeting (Aira).  
In the individual interviews and in the evaluation at the last meeting, few of the 
participants commented on my role. The direct comments were positive: Inger called the process 
democratic and said that she had felt free to speak. Others stated that the space in the group felt 
safe enough to share. The absent participants, however, might have had other and more critical 
comments on this that were never stated or heard.  
My own role in analyzing the material is different from a more “classic” researcher’s role 
in such a discussion: My background as a Christian theologian and an ordained minister in the 
Church of Norway means that I have a different and a much more intimate knowledge of the 
Christian tradition than I do of the Islamic tradition. Even if I try to compensate for this and am 
aware of it, it is still a premise for how I structure and analyze the material. The experiences I 
have with Muslim-Christian dialogues also influence the way I analyze as well as my selection 
of research method and theory.  
 
The Empirical Material in the Study and the Analysis 
 
Content 
The most important empirical material of this project consists of the transcriptions of the six 
group meetings, which amounts to around three hundred written pages. Additional material 
includes the individual interviews and the research log I kept during the process of the meetings. 
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The individual interviews and the research log will be consulted only when they illuminate the 
main material from the group meetings.  
 
Presentation of the Empirical Material 
Through my analysis I want to show parts of the meaning-making process in a rather detailed 
way. The reason for this is because I find there is little empirical documentation following a 
process of this kind in most other research on interreligious (transreligious) hermeneutics and in 
women’s transreligious encounters. I want to show what might lie behind theological and ethical 
statements about this field (transreligious relations, women’s issues, and transreligious encounter 
including canonical scripture) in the actual conversations and reasonings of the participants.  
This is why I have included selected parts of the transcriptions in the analysis (Part III 
and IV). The appearance of transcription material in this dissertation is rather extensive, and my 
reason behind this way of doing the analysis (besides documenting some of the conversations) is 
to make the analytical work transparent for the reader.103 It is also, however, an epistemological 
choice to let the participants articulate their own viewpoints in the transcription, and I believe 
this influences how knowledge is signified through this study: The participants are both knowers 
and interpreters.  
The transcriptions are structured in a particular way: they are edited into meaning bearing 
lines and numbered chronologically according to the participant’s statements throughout the 
analysis. It was Catherine Riessman in her work on narrative analysis in medical anthropology 
(Riessman 1993) who inspired me to structure the presentation of the empirical material in this 
way.  
This became a method for creating distance and space within the transcriptions, making 
them more accessible for reading, easier to refer to in the other parts of the text, and the 
participants’ statements became more visible. The division of the transcriptions into numbered 
lines is part of the analytical work. After a while, I realized that the transcriptions looked almost 
like the traditional canonical scriptures of the Bible and the Koran, divided by numbered verses 
and ayats. The transcriptions became my text for “exegetical” investigation. 
The transcriptions selected were the ones I considered to be the most significant 
discussions and conversations for further analysis. This is based on the issues coming up and 
how relevant I judged them to be for the subject of the study. They were also selected because of 
the relational dynamics.  
                                                 
103 Doing research on transcultural and transreligious hermeneutical processes while having a particular self-
situated position as a Norwegian Christian Lutheran feminist theologian also requires transparency regarding the 
steps I take as researcher analyzing the material. Through the presentation of the transcriptions the reader is invited 
to follow the interpretative steps. 
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The transcriptions are organized mostly chronologically and are edited to a certain extent 
to keep the thread in the conversation. To structure them thematically would have allowed 
focusing on and illuminating specific themes. But since one of the aims of the study is to 
investigate meaning making in a group through process, the temporal dimension of the 
transcriptions and the chronological order makes it possible to show traces and dynamics of 
possible changes due to the group process.  
 
The Analysis 
Although the presentation of the transcriptions is inspired by Riessmann and by narrative 
analysis, the analysis in this study is not a narrative one. It contains elements from narrative 
analysis, where self-representation is seen as part of narrating and narrating is regarded as 
reflection on experience (Riessman 1993: 10). Narrative analysis also includes a relational 
aspect: as reflection on experience, stories change in relation to the listener(s), and this change 
may reveal information of the process of making meaning itself (Riessman 1993: 11). Narratives 
are thus a relational production, always situated in a relation and a context. These insights from 
narrative analysis are reflected in the analysis.  
 But the participants express themselves not only through narratives; they also use 
arguments and conduct argumentative discussions. They present their analyses of texts, contexts, 
power relations, and their own agencies. Discourse analysis could have been a possible tool for 
analyzing this part of the material. With its focus on power and power structures within meaning 
producing discourses, using the term “discourse” about a particular way of articulating and 
understanding the world (Winther Jørgensen and Phillips 1999: 9), discourse analysis is a 
method for disclosing the relation between making meaning and power. This is, however, too 
narrow a focus on this material if this method is the only one used. Several discourses are 
represented in the material, and the discursive struggles within which the participants would be 
involved (within the group in various contexts in which they participate such as their own 
religious communities) are complex. To show this complexity is important in this study, but at 
the same time it means that it would be reductionist to frame the meaning making in the group as 
a representation of one particular discourse. It is rather an encounter between several discourses, 
which means that the instability is too high for conducting a discourse analysis on the material. 
However, the analysis in this study is concerned with power and power criticism and shares the 
position of both narrative analysis and discourse analysis that the articulating subject is always to 
be understood in relation (narrative analysis) or decentered (in discourse analysis) (Winther 
Jørgensen and Phillips 1999: 24). This entails that the subject never produces meaning 
independently but is always part of a discourse. On the other hand, along with with feminist 
researchers (and others) using discourse analysis in their work, I find that reproducing discourses 
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always includes subjects as individuals (still always in relation) negotiating and possibly 
transforming discourses and creating new ones (Søndergaard 2000: 67). The Foucault-inspired 
fragmenting of power into discursive negotiable fields without larger structures of power beyond 
smaller discourses are criticized by many, including many feminists, who argue that larger 
structures that reproduce inequalities of power still exist (Woodhead 2007: 567).  
The analysis in this study is influenced both by narrative analysis and discourse analysis, 
but the latter is used mostly as a useful methodological and theoretical context, and not as a 
method of analysis as such. The operative tools in the form of questions and themes are based on 
the theoretical and methodological frameworks in chapter 2 and 3. The analytical operations are 
based on the premises of reflexive interpretation and look for the appearance (and disappearance) 
of various communicative events in the material: interpreting communities, articulated 
coevalness, and moments marked by dialogue. It will search for different meaning-making 
strategies in the texts and see if these strategies change throughout the group process. Through 
investigating the meaning making of both texts and contexts, I will look for a possible 
emergence of a transcontextual space, a “third place” as a platform for a shared agency. The 
overall meaning given to the presence of the texts and negotiations of the meaning of context(s) 
and gender are on-going perspectives. In the concluding part (part IV) these findings will be 
discussed with the overall aims of the study (see the part I) and with the two models of 
transreligious dialogue/encounter: “difference as constitutive” and “difference as challenge.” 
  
The Structure of the Analysis 
The analysis is organized into ten discussions, based on the transcriptions from four of the 
meetings: the first discussion concerns the participant’s general view of the Bible and the Koran, 
then four discussions follow that are connected to the Hagar/Hajar narratives, and five to the 
prescriptive texts. The presentation of the selected transcriptions is analyzed successively. After 
each of the ten discussions and the accompanied analyses, I address the most important 
analytical findings in broader discussions with the theoretical and methodological frameworks. 
The most significant findings in the analysis are addressed in Part V (Chapter 7). 
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Part III: 
 
Situating the Bible, the Koran, and the Hadith: 
Readings of the Hagar/Hajar Narratives 
 
  
117 
Chapter 4: 
Sharing Images and Experiences of the Koran and the Bible 
 
 
The first meeting in the group produced an atmosphere of curiosity. Maria (African-Norwegian, 
Catholic and Lutheran background) said at the end of the meeting that she felt that the 
participants were characterized by openness, which made her feel that people had been saying 
what they really meant. Nine of the ten participants were present. They all spoke for about 
twenty minutes about themselves, their background, their work, and family life, and their 
personal reflections on religion. The group also decided on two matters of methodological 
procedure in the process. First, there was a mutual agreement not to share personal information 
revealed at the meetings to outsiders, although it was acceptable to share reflections on the 
process itself. Second, it was agreed that to hold a group meeting at least two Christians and two 
Muslims had to be present. 
Some of the participants shared views on the Bible and/or the Koran at the first meeting. 
These views were often rooted in their experiences as readers. Inger (Norwegian, Lutheran) 
stated that she preferred not to read the Bible by herself in private but to listen to others 
explaining and preaching on the text in a church setting. Susanne (Norwegian. Lutheran) 
concurred with this. Rima (Arab-Norwegian, Roman Catholic) stated that she had started to read 
the Old Testament as a young woman, and then stopped reading it because she found it 
depressing. Eva (Norwegian, Lutheran) distinguished between the Old and the New Testaments 
and claimed that the Old Testament was “not to be recommended for sensitive souls,” whereas 
she, on the other hand, embraced the New Testament because it was about Jesus Christ. Maria 
emphasized that her favorite story in the Bible was the narrative about Jesus and Mary 
Magdalene.  
Senait (Pakistani-Norwegian, Sunni Muslim), Aira (Pakistani-Norwegian, Sunni Muslim) 
Shirin (Iranian-Norwegian, Shia Muslim) and Fouzia (Pakistani-Norwegian, Sunni Muslim) said 
that they read the Koran regularly, since it was an important part of their lives. They displayed 
differences in how they related to the Koran: Fouzia emphasized the usefulness of the Koran in 
practical matters, as a concrete guide for everyday life. Senait focused on how the Koran could 
help women obtain their rights. Shirin stated that her experience of reading the Koran was that 
her understanding of the texts was changing all the time. Aira took the Islamic perspective of 
“the people of the book”104 to say that she believed that, although there were differences, the 
                                                 
104 The Islamic tradition refers to Jews and Christians as “the people of the book” (Waines 2003: 14 ). 
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three religions all had texts. Her suggestion of a joint challenge was “to see how texts can help 
us, rather than hinder us.” 
This short introduction to the broader discussion on the canonical scriptures seems to 
reflect the difference between the status of the Bible in the Christian tradition (represented by 
Lutherans and Roman Catholics) and the position of the Koran in Islam. The Christians, both 
Lutherans and Roman Catholics, appeared to be rather reluctant and selective in their use of the 
Bible, and most of them said that their religious practice was not based on individual Bible 
reading. Eva and Maria were the exceptions: they explicitly valued parts of the biblical text and 
claimed that they were important to them. The Muslims, on the other hand, stated that they feel a 
strong connection with the Koran and used it as a guide, as a communicative link to the 
canonical scripture of the religious traditions of all “the peoples of the book,” as a text that could 
be interpreted and reinterpreted and as a possible aid in improving the situations of women. 
At the second meeting I asked the participants to share brief reflections on their 
experiences of reading the Bible and the Koran.105 My question was not specified in such a way 
that I asked the Christian participants to talk about the Bible and the Muslim participants to talk 
about the Koran. Even if this was the pattern that would unfold through the shared reflections, I 
wanted to open the group up to cross-reflections if they occurred. The intention behind my 
question was twofold: to map existing general views on the Bible and the Koran so that it would 
be possible later to see how and if they were applied to actual texts, and to start a process of 
sharing knowledge and reflection within the group to prepare for later work on specific texts. 
Later in this meeting the conversation moved on to discussing the Hagar/Hajar narratives in the 
Bible and the hadith. 
A complex conversation took place in the further discussion of the theme in the second 
meeting. The conversation went in different directions. For some of the participants, the most 
important matter turned out to be how to discuss rather than focusing on matters related directly 
to the Bible/Koran and the relation between them. 
 
Is it OK to Leave the Bible on the Floor? Different Understandings of 
Materiality and Respect for the Bible and the Koran 
 
The physical aspect of the holiness of the Koran and the ritual dimension of reading it were 
thematized by Fouzia’s contribution. 
 
Fouzia1:  Ok. Let’s take a look at how… 
                                                 
105 The question was also formulated in the invitation to this second meeting. 
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Fouzia2:  We have a lot of respect for the Koran. 
Fouzia3:   We need to prepare ourselves mentally when we are going to read it. 
Fouzia4: I believe we need to go and wash ourselves and make ourselves clean 
before we touch it. 
 
Fouzia speaks in terms of a “we,” referring to Muslims in general. She positions herself 
to speak on behalf of the Islamic tradition. The practice she refers to is wudu, the Islamic custom 
of ritual ablution before praying and touching the Koran (Esposito 2003: 341). She defines wudu 
as an act expressing respect. Then she shares a narrative: 
 
Fouzia5:  Several years ago I had a Christian living with me. 
Fouzia6:  And suddenly she put the Bible on the floor. 
Fouzia7:  And when I went into her room I took the Bible and lifted it above my 
head …. 
Fouzia8: [S]he got angry with me and said: “Why do you come into my room just 
like that?” 
Fouzia9:  “But you left your Bible on the floor.” 
Fouzia10:   “Look at my Koran. Because I have such respect for it I don’t leave it 
behind me, I will not put it ….” 
Fouzia11:  But then she said it’s only a book. It’s only paper and texts 
Fouzia12:  We pay respect to that. 
Fouzia13:  Reading the Koran gives us a lot of mental energy. I experience that 
when I have problems. 
Fouzia14:  When I am involved in a conflict, the first thing I do is to wash myself 
and then read. 
Fouzia15:  Then I feel I’m very close to God, that he’s listening to me. 
 
Fouzia contrasts her own respect for the Koran and the Bible with what she perceived to 
be a Christian’s disrespect for the Bible. According to this narrative, Fouzia acted to stop 
disrespectful treatment of the Bible, and she used her own relation to the Koran as a model for 
how her housemate should treat her Bible. Fouzia’s act crossed religious lines and entailed 
entering another person’s private space without being invited. The question is: Why does Fouzia 
act like this? The narrative does not give a complete answer to that question. Does Fouzia act on 
her own behalf because she wanted to safeguard respectful treatment of the Bible in her 
surroundings? Or does Fouzia act on what she found to be in her Christian housemate’s best 
interest, namely to protect her from acting disrespectfully toward the Bible? If it is the former, 
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she is motivated by her own religious tradition to ensure that the Bible would be treated with the 
same signs of respect that she used to treat the Koran because of the Bible’s position in the 
Islamic tradition. If it is the latter, she used her own religious patterns of behavior to correct the 
act of a believer from a different religious tradition.  
The conclusion of the narrative has the form of a testimony (Fouzia13-15). By 
performing the testimony Fouzia returns to the here and now of the group and leaves the time of 
the narrative behind. 
Then Fouzia shares another narrative, which is considerably longer: 
 
Fouzia16:  I have a short story if I may …. I told it to a client. 
Fouzia17:  There was a woman who had come from Pakistan. This was a couple of 
years ago. 
Fouzia18:  Before she arrived here, her daughter died, sixteen years old, two days 
before they arrived in Norway. 
Fouzia19:  She did not see her daughter one last time; she was busy meeting the 
guests who came by. 
Fouzia20:  When she came here, she lived close to me, and I could hear her crying 
at her window every day. 
Fouzia21:  One day I rang her doorbell and I asked her: “What is the matter with 
you? I can hear you crying from my house.” 
Fouzia22:  Then she told me that she had lost her daughter. 
Fouzia23:  Then I asked her: “Why don’t you pray for her?” 
Fouzia24:  “I do pray. I am sitting here on my sofa praying.” 
Fouzia25:  Then I said: “Do you know what? Right now it’s not prayer time, but if 
you wait for an hour, it will be. Then, you go and wash yourself.” 
Fouzia26:  The doctors here in Norway had tried everything. She had … but it didn’t 
help her. 
Fouzia27:  Then I said: “I will pray, and then you can pray together with me.” 
Fouzia28:  Then she went and took a shower. 
Fouzia29:  And I said: “Now you can pray. God will listen to you. He will not hear 
you if you are sitting on that sofa. You have to be clean in order for God 
to listen to you. You have to show him respect, that you are … clean and 
close to God in order to speak with him. Then he will care.” 
Fouzia30:  She had been crying; her husband was upset because she did not take 
care of …. 
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Fouzia31:  Suddenly, she started praying. She was sitting on the carpet and started to 
cry. 
Fouzia32:  Suddenly, she sat down on the sofa and said: “Now I feel more complete. 
God listened to me.” 
Fouzia33:  Then she asked: “When is the next prayer time?” After this she started to 
pray five times a day. 
Fouzia34:  And she started to look after her children and her husband and became an 
ordinary housewife once again. 
Fouzia35:  She told me some weeks ago: “God can hear you everywhere, Fouzia It 
was what you told me, that God does not listen if I …. So I just have to 
go and wash myself, and then he will listen.” 
Fouzia36:  He is everywhere. Of course he is everywhere. He can hear us. 
Fouzia37:  It is how you think about it … the situations …. 
Fouzia38:  The Koran gives us an understanding of other religions. It is only the 
Koran that tells about other religions and other prophets coming to the 
world. It also tells a lot more. And I think we show respect for other 
prophets. 
Fouzia39:  There is not much about previous religions in Christianity. 
Fouzia40:  And the Koran gives us guidance about how to solve all our problems, 
solutions for everything between birth and death. So we can find … we 
will get answers from it. 
Fouzia41:  But when I read the old version of the Bible I found it a lot easier to 
understand, to compare it to what the Koran says about women. In the 
old version there are a lot of similarities. But in the new version the 
words and the content have been changed more. 
 
 
This narrative, as told, contains multiple messages. First, Fouzia shows that she is 
deliberately using the narrative form to share experience and knowledge with the group 
(Fouzia16). She asks for permission to tell the story, showing her own awareness of the others as 
audience. Fouzia16 indicates that she had told the story before, to a client. The narrative is thus 
not any narrative but has most likely been used earlier as a means to share experience and 
knowledge. This suggests that Fouzia is familiar with expressing her experience and knowledge 
through narratives, and this seems to be the way she prefers to share her views with this group 
too.  
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The narrative has several pedagogical points, if read as an educational narrative: it 
emphasizes the importance of ritual ablution in Islamic religious practice (Fouzia25, 29, 35). The 
Islamic prayer to which the narrative refers is the ritual prayer, salah, which requires ritual 
ablution, and the prayer ceremony includes reading the Koran (Waines 2003: 24).106 The 
narrative provides an image of God as a close and caring listener if the ritual ablution is followed 
(Fouzia29, 35). This is exemplified by the woman Fouzia is helping in the story (Fouzia32-35). 
Fouzia35-36 do, however, underline that God’s presence is not spatially limited to 
ritually clean spaces. God as the listener and the helper is established in the narrative through 
wudu and salah (including reading the Koran) but also as context-sensitive with respect to the 
believer’s situation. God can help when the Norwegian doctors cannot (Fouzia26). 
Fouzia’s narrative ends with a conclusion about the Bible and the Koran, taking the 
listeners and the narrator back to the here and now (Fouzia38-41). This includes a testimony 
about the inclusiveness of the Koran to other faiths, and the koranic message about respecting 
other prophets than Muhammad. Christianity, not the Bible, is set up as a negative counterpart, 
according to Fouzia, without reference to other religious traditions. The Bible is mentioned in 
Fouzia41, where Fouzia talks about the old and new versions of the Bible. The old version is 
presented as having a great deal in common with the Koran, whereas the new differs more.  
Fouzia’s statement about the Bible could be referring to the Islamic dogma of tahrif, 
according to which an originally divinely revealed text has been corrupted and changed by 
humans into a new text not to be regarded as divine (Muslim-Christian Research Group 1989: 
78-79). According to this dogma, the original Jewish and Christian scriptures are viewed as 
having been tampered with by Jews and Christians (Leirvik 2006: 132-133), and could represent 
the new version to which Fouzia is referring.107 “The old version” would then mean the 
uncorrupted biblical scriptures, according to the dogma of tahrif, which are different from the 
Christian and Jewish scriptures as they appear today. A different interpretation of Fouzia’s 
reference to the old and new versions of the Bible would be that she simply means the Old and 
New Testaments. 
Through telling this narrative, Fouzia establishes a direct position for herself as a narrator 
to the group. She also shows the group her position as an educator and a helper within the 
                                                 
106 The personal prayer in the Islamic religious tradition, dua, does not require ritual ablution (Waines 2003: 92).  
107 The Islamic dogma of tahrif has played a problematic role in Muslim polemics on the Christian canonical 
scpritures, and may pose a challenge to Muslim-Christian dialogue about the Bible and the Koran. Leirvik finds the 
dogma of tahrif on the one hand and the inclusive teaching concerning Christians (together with the Jews) as 
“people of the book” on the other as representing a tension within the Islamic tradition on how to relate to Christian 
canonical scriptures (Leirvik 2006:133). The challenge posed by the dogma of tahrif for Muslim-Christian relations 
has to do with the question of who has the right to define the canonical scriptures of a tradition as “true” or hold 
them to be “falsified.” This may have a parallel in the view of Muhammad in the Christian tradition: Is he to be 
regarded as a prophet or not?  
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narrative she shares. This narrative gives a message through a positive example, in contrast to the 
earlier story about the Christian woman who left the Bible on the floor, illustrating a point 
through a negative example. The conclusion of Fouzia’s narrative seems to have a certain 
apologetic character if she is referring to the dogma of tahrif.  
Fouzia’s two narratives marked the start of an intense discussion between some of the 
participants. Susanne and Eva immediately ask for a clarification of what Fouzia said about the 
old and new versions of the Bible: Did she mean the Old and New Testaments? After some 
questions, Fouzia says that she was talking about the Old and the New Testaments, but she still 
makes the point that the new version has been changed compared to the content of the Koran. 
Both interpretations mentioned above thus seem to be possible. 
Eva is the one who is most provoked by Fouzia: 
 
Eva1:  Yes, I can see that we have quite different understandings about the holy 
book … because the Bible is holy for me too, in particular the Gospels 
… they are about Jesus Christ. 
Eva2:  I can leave the Bible on the floor; it’s not very practical, but I can do it, 
and it has nothing to do with my respect for the Bible. 
Eva3:  There is one thing I am very afraid of, and I think most Christians are, 
and that is magic. 
Eva4:  So when you say that if you wash your hands, Allah will listen to you … 
I’m almost provoked by that 
Eva5:  because I think that a person who is devastated does not need to wash her 
hands first and only then will Allah listen. 
Eva6:  This is a kind of external gesture that almost becomes like magic 
Eva7:  because God is there all the time. I can pray to God without a prayer mat 
and I think I could be made dirty by anything, and God will hear me. 
Eva8:  The more miserable I am, I would almost say, the less money I have for 
buying carpets, and the less opportunity I have to wash myself the closer 
God is to me. Because then I am a poor human being in need of God’s 
help. 
 
Eva’s statement in Eva2 reveals a difference between her notion of respect and Fouzia’s. 
Eva dissolves the connection established by Fouzia between holiness, respect, and the physical 
treatment of the Bible (and of the Koran). For Eva, respect is primarily connected with inner 
thoughts and feelings. Eva articulates that the most holy part of the Bible for her is the gospels in 
the New Testament because “they are about Jesus Christ” (Eva1). The content is decisive in her 
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evaluation of the texts as holy or not, and she does not talk about the holiness of the Bible as a 
physical book.  
Eva proceeds by directly criticizing Fouzia. She accuses her indirectly of arguing for a 
magical relation between religious practice and achieving a wanted result (Eva3-4). She views 
the religious ritual of wudu, or Fouzia’s representation of it, as a magic ritual, followed by stating 
a warning against magic. 
While Fouzia expresses herself mostly through narratives, Eva communicates in an 
argumentative manner. The pedagogical points in Fouzia’s narratives are criticized (Eva4-6, 
Eva8), and Eva speaks partly on behalf of “most Christians” (Eva3) and on behalf of the Islamic 
tradition when in Eva4 and 5 she makes claims about Allah. The group, both Christians and 
Muslims, usually uses the word “God,” as Eva usually does as well. The use of “Allah” could be 
an act of distancing and a way of making it obvious that she is referring to Fouzia’s presentation 
of the Islamic image of God with which she disagrees.  
Eva acknowledges that different views of what she calls “the holy book” (in singular) 
exist within the group (Eva1). It is not clear if she is referring only to the Bible or to “a holy 
book” in a more general sense. Eva does not explain what she believes the differences to be nor 
does she evaluate them. But through her contribution as a whole, she contrasts Fouzia’s 
narratives with her own belief in a God and Allah who listens without paying any attention to 
rituals, that respect and holiness have nothing to do with outward gestures, and that her own 
religious practice is based on the opposite correlation: the more the external frames are absent, 
the more God listens. 
But Eva7 and Fouzia36 give almost the exact same image of God: omnipresent, listening 
to people everywhere and in all situations. Eva does not comment on this aspect of Fouzia’s 
contribution. In Eva’s verbal response, it is the differences between the two that are highlighted 
and accentuated. Both Fouzia and Eva are polemical in their communication, making a statement 
on behalf of the religious other or the other religious tradition in order to make things “right” 
according to their own standards. Fouzia does this indirectly through the message of her first 
narrative when she rescues the Bible from the floor where a Christian has put it, and Eva does it 
when she states that Fouzia’s presentation of the Islamic godhead is wrong. 
Eva continues: 
 
Eva9:  About the Bible, to me, the Old Testament … it is not for me as a 
Christian, it is the background for Jesus and very interesting to read. 
Eva10:  But I see very clearly what it is that is new about Christianity, and that is 
when Jesus, for instance, says that the Sabbath is there for humankind 
and not humankind for the Sabbath, 
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Eva11:  that means that humans are at the center. Not the laws. The laws serve 
humans, humans do not serve the laws. 
Eva12:  And we are even liberated in Christ, we are liberated from these laws. 
Eva13: And you, now you say that in the Koran there are answers to all the 
questions of life. Is it an answer in the Koran when someone kind of 
opens it up that the answer will be right there? 
Eva14:  If so, it is just like the Old Testament, and then one has the Torah, right, 
but it is not like that in the New Testament: there we have perfection. 
Eva15:  That means the fulfillment of all the commandments: That you shall love 
the Lord your God and your neighbor as yourself. And that gives the 
answer to all life’s situations. 
Eva16:  This means that the individual has to think, that you have to use your 
head, and you have to think: What does it mean for me in this situation to 
be a neighbor for my fellow humans? What does it mean to love God in 
this situation? 
Eva17:  Then it becomes what you said: the human being is made responsible. 
Eva18:  I cannot point at one thing in the law, and then kind of follow it … this is 
exactly what Jesus does not do, Jesus shows all the time that the human 
being is above the law. 
Eva19:  And this is what I think is very different. That the Old Testament and the 
Law are very much alike in Judaism and Islam, but Christianity is 
different. 
Eva20:  Because in Christianity, humans are made responsible and stand close to 
God in a way, and it is not these outward gestures that matter. What 
matters is the inner, spiritual life. 
 
Eva argues for a sharp distinction within the Bible: the Old Testament is merely a 
background text, whereas the New Testament represents a completely new type of religion 
(Eva9-10, Eva19). She calls the New Testament “perfection” (Eva14). Eva’s argument is based 
on an interpretative position toward the Bible, considering the portrayal of Jesus and his sayings 
in the New Testament to be the hermeneutical key, the center through which everything should 
be interpreted. This is the classical Lutheran dogma of the biblical interpretation of the Law and 
the Gospel, as well as a Christocentric interpretation (Ulstein 2006: 110-111).  
Eva juxtaposes the Old Testament, Judaism, and Islam (Eva19), stating that they all 
represent religious practices that are preoccupied with religious laws, unlike Christianity, which 
is concerned with people. The distinction Eva makes is based on her view of the difference 
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between casuistic jurisprudence (which Eva claims to be represented by the Old Testament, 
Judaism, and Islam) and more general ethical rules in religious practice (Eva claims that this is 
what the New Testament presents). Eva’s proclamation of the uniqueness of Christianity and 
Christ is not only based on a positive presentation of Christian tradition and the New Testament 
but is also marked by a negative representation of the Old Testament, Judaism, and Islam. 
Eva constructs a uniqueness of Christianity that consists of the following: humans as the 
center of religion (Eva11), “the golden rule”108 (Eva15), human reason and responsibility, and 
proximity of humans to God. Within Eva’s contribution, however, there are traces that she may 
have been influenced by two of the Muslim participants’ earlier statements. First, Eva 
emphasizes human reasoning (Eva16). Aira told a story at the first meeting (which she will 
repeat several times throughout the process) about Muhammad asking a believer to use and trust 
his own reasoning in a situation when he could find no adequate answer in the Koran or the 
hadith. Eva may or may not have this story in mind when she emphasizes human reasoning, but 
her point corresponds with Aira’s story. Second, Eva uses the same phrase that Fouzia used 
earlier about finding all the answers in the scriptures – Eva claims that she finds all the answers 
in “the golden rule” in the New Testament (Eva15). Influenced or not by Fouzia’s earlier 
statements and however differently they develop this point respectively, they share the view 
about finding answers in the canonical scriptures.  
The communication about views and experiences of the Koran and the Bible developed 
into a rather polemical mode of communicating. Shirin comments on the mode of 
communication: 
 
Shirin1:  I must say that it would have been better if you did not talk like this 
because there are different opinions. 
Shirin2:  You seem to have the opinion that the Koran does not make people 
responsible, but my opinion is that the Koran does make people 
responsible. 
Shirin3:  You can have that opinion, but I don’t think it’s true. 
 
Shirin comments not only on the content of what is being said but also addresses how Eva 
expresses her views. To articulate explicitly that one wishes something that was said not to have 
been said could be a rejection either of a person or of a view. But through articulating a response 
(Shirin1) instead of keeping silent about it, the response may contribute to the further 
communication process. The intention behind such a criticism could be decisive for how it 
                                                 
108 The Bible text referred to as the “golden rule” is Matthew 7:12 in the New Testament. 
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influences further communication. The speaker’s evaluation of the quality of the communicative 
space in where the criticism is made also matters. The question is if this space is safe and 
sensitive enough to include criticism. Shirin1-3 may indicate that her response is so strong that 
she needs to articulate it in order to continue to be a subject in the communicative situation 
without being compromised. It can indicate that she judges the space in the group to be safe and 
solid enough to carry the weight of such a criticism. Shirin’s possible expectations for the 
continued communicative process may also play a role.  
Shirin’s criticism of Eva consists of two main elements. First, she finds that Eva presents 
her views on Islam as if it was the Islamic view, presenting Islam as a monolithic, unified entity 
with one voice. Second, Shirin disagrees with Eva on the issue of the role of human 
responsibility in Islam. The latter disagreement seems to be the least problem for Shirin. She 
acknowledges the right and possibility of expressing different views and, based on this, claims 
her own right to disagree with Eva.  
What Shirin initiates in this sequence is a negotiation of common communicative rules in 
the group. 
 
Eva21:   No, but this is how I understand it …. 
 
Shirin4:  You say that you understand it that way. Then you say that you think like 
that. 
Shirin5:  Don’t say that Islam says …. 
Shirin6:  The way I see it, if one asks …. 
Shirin7:  I’ll say that you think this and that about Christianity, I don’t say that 
Christianity is like that. Then you take responsibility for …. 
 
Eva22:  So you say that this is “my understanding,” and not the Christian 
understanding? 
 
Shirin8:  It is the Christian understanding in the way you understand it. 
 
Shirin launches the question of representation as part of the communicative process in the 
group: If one experiences one’s religious tradition to be wrongly or inaccurately represented by 
another participant, who in this case belongs to a different religious tradition, this represents a 
challenge. The other challenge Shirin identifies as connected to the question of representation is 
how to present one’s own tradition. The interchange between Eva and Shirin is a process of 
mutual clarification on the question of representation. Both Eva21 and Shirin4-7 emphasize the 
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personal, subjective representation in the communication. Eva22, however, reveals a critical 
point in the subjective representation: Does emphasizing the personal and subjective element of 
interpretation diminish the objective aspect of what is shared in the group? Is it possible to 
represent one’s subjective opinions and views and a whole religious tradition at the same time? 
Shirin’s answer (Shirin8) is inclusive. She links the tradition and the personal interpretation of 
the tradition together, suggesting a communication that entails distinguishing between but not 
separating the subjective and the objective in the representation.  
Shirin is, however, clear about a communicative request for Eva in Shirin5. In Shirin’s 
view, Eva should be more careful when framing the Islamic tradition. Shirin does not exemplify 
this further or say that Eva’s representation of Islam was estranging her as a Muslim believer. 
Instead, she uses the example of how she herself interprets Eva’s representation of the Christian 
tradition: she does not generalize about the Christian tradition based on Eva’s representation of 
that tradition (Shirin7).  
The problems Shirin addresses represent a further step in her negotiations on how the 
communication in the group should unfold. How is one to represent one’s own tradition and to 
talk about the tradition of the other is a practical (and a methodological) matter in cross-religious 
and cross-cultural communication. But it is also an ethical matter and touches on the question of 
how to relate ethically to differences when communicating. The ethical aspect may be implied in 
Shirin’s further reflection (Shirin13).   
 
Rima1:  Do you know what I think? I think it’s time to stop and go back to what 
Islam says and what Christianity says. 
Shirin9:  Yes, it is …. 
 
Rima2:   It’s time to interpret. 
 
Shirin10: Christianity says, Islam says ….  Isn’t it better to say: I am a Muslim and 
I think in this way. 
Shirin11: I want to do it that way during the time we spend together. I think that is 
a better way. As a Muslim, as a Christian, I ….  
 
Eva23: So I should say: This is the way I see it; this is the way I understand 
Christianity. This is the way you want me to put it? 
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Shirin12: As a Christian, you cannot … I don’t know … It is better you say “as a 
Christian,” and I say “as a Muslim,” she says as a Muslim. 
Shirin13: I suggest that this is the best way to do it. Then we take responsibility for 
ourselves, not for the others. 
Shirin14: After she has written the book,109 she will not come to you and say: Why 
did you say that about Christianity? I don’t perceive it that way. Or 
somebody will come to her and say: Why did you say that about Islam?  
Shirin15: As a Muslim, I say this, and this is where I stand. You, in particular, say 
all the time “Christians say,”…. I say as a Christian person, you 
understand it in this way.  
 
The discussion is extended to include more than one issue when Rima enters the 
conversation, suggesting a change of perspective. She suggests returning to discussing issues of 
the Islamic and Christian tradition (Rima2), leaving the discussion about communicative moods 
behind.  
Shirin nevertheless continues to clarify her views in Shirin10-15, suggesting how one 
should represent one’s religious tradition in the communication process (Shirin10): the 
subjective, personal element should be acknowledged and included in the representations. This 
emphasizes the interpretative element in communicating a religious faith as part of a religious 
tradition. Shirin claims that there is a personal responsibility connected to representation in the 
communication (Shirin13), and thus turning the question of representation into an ethical one. 
She exemplifies the responsibility by stating her views on how one should represent one’s own 
tradition: as an individual and not as if one speaks on behalf of the whole tradition (Shirin15). In 
this way she opens up the way for a plurality of representations of the religious traditions, 
possibly seeking to establish a space for her individual interpretations. As a Shia Muslim, Shirin 
represents a minority, both within the group and among Norwegian Muslims. A minority 
position may encourage one to work for spaces of plurality, where the majorities do not overrule 
or dominate the minorities or people are defined as “different” (Gressgård 2005: 170-171). Shirin 
has some former experience with transreligious and transcultural dialogue and may be drawing 
on this to articulate her suggestions for the mode of communication in the group (Shirin12-13). 
The subjective aspect of communication has various positions in different models of 
transreligious dialogues.110 If a dialogue is structured along multiculturalist-type patterns in its 
view of differences, the space for subjective interpretations of one’s religious traditions may be 
                                                 
109 This is a reference to the researcher. 
110 See the two models of transreligious dialogue proposed in Chapter 2, p. 60-65. 
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more limited. The representation of a religious tradition is expected to be less fluid than fixed, 
viewed from both the inside and the outside of a tradition. To keep close to the authoritative 
mainstream interpretation of the traditions may be an aim in itself if one is concerned with 
stability and maintaining religious boundaries. This would affect how one presents one’s 
tradition and how one addresses the other traditions. In dialogues closer to a cultural complexity 
view of differences, the subjective, personal interpretation is given more space, possibly at the 
expense of the legitimized representation of religious traditions. In the above sequence it may 
seem that Rima expresses a wish to leave a subjective discussion and enter into communication 
on other issues more directly connected to the content of the traditions. Still, she is concerned 
with interpretation of the traditions and thus seems to include the subjective element in her 
suggestion of a new turn in the conversation. 
  Shirin appeals to the framework of the study and to the researcher in her argumentation 
(Shirin14), in the hope, perhaps, of gaining support from me in the discussion. But more likely 
(since I explicitly stated that I would not take part in the discussion) this is an attempt to bring 
about a meta-reflection: It would not be right to give the researcher responsibility for what the 
participants said. The personal responsibility to speak for oneself thus exceeds the conversation 
here and now and is claimed to be a general principle.  
Eva’s question to Shirin (Eva23) indicates that there is communication between them, 
since Eva seems to check to see if she had understood Shirin’s suggestion about communication 
correctly. Shirin criticizes Eva personally in Shirin15 and contrasts Eva’s behavior with her own 
example. A polemical discussion that started on theological issues and continued as a discussion 
about communication mode in the group turns personal. 
 
Rima3: But some things are like a general truth, such as Jesus encouraging us to 
forgive and to revolt. That is a truth; it is an important part of Jesus. 
Rima4:  This is not a question about her understanding or mine. 
 
Shirin16: No. I believe that all the religions of the book encourage us to do this. 
Shirin17: Personally, I become provoked when somebody claims that these are 
Christian values. 
Shirin18:  I am a Muslim because I have heard this many times, and it is not right, 
and it is not the truth. Because all religions, Judaism, Christianity, and 
Islam, have had the same values, until now. 
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Shirin19: If something gradually happened throughout history, OK, we can sit 
down and discuss it. But if one says “Christian values” all the time I 
become provoked. I don’t like that. 
 
Right after this sequence I intervened and asked the group if they wanted to continue the 
discussion. I was not sure if everyone felt included in the rather heated discussion and decided to 
ask what they wanted. Aira said she believed the discussion was important, and should continue. 
Everyone seemed to agree with her, and so the discussion went on. 
Rima tries once again to change the direction of the discussion, this time more directly 
toward an objective level of discussing the content of the religious traditions (Rima3-4). She 
challenges Shirin’s emphasis on the personal and subjective and claims to need to include an 
objective level of truth. This is a more open challenge about the mode of the encounter, 
suggesting that the religious traditions should be introduced in a different way, as substance, not 
only as references. 
Shirin, while still in the discussion on representation, responds to what she probably 
perceives to be Rima’s claiming of “forgiveness and revolt” (Rima3) as exclusively Christian. 
There is nothing in Rima’s sayings that indicate such a claim, but the two of them address 
different themes in the same conversation, making the communication vulnerable to 
misunderstanding. Eva was the one claiming Christian uniqueness earlier in the conversation 
with Fouzia (Eva14 and 19). The process of communication has a certain cumulative character: 
what was said earlier influences how later sayings are interpreted and the succeeding 
communication. 
Shirin refers to former experiences of the same kind: Christians (and/or possibly others) 
who claim values to be exclusive to their tradition, while Muslims (and people of other religious 
traditions) who recognize the same values within their tradition are not acknowledged. Her 
response, however, is not to quarrel about whether the values in question are Christian or Muslim 
but to claim that they are shared by many. She regards the values to be common ground rather 
than exclusively belonging to one tradition. If Christians, on behalf of their religious tradition, 
claim exclusiveness of values such as forgiveness, Shirin experiences this as an exclusion of her 
as a Muslim from having the same values and implying a wrong conception of Islam. Again, the 
question of representation is addressed but from another angle. Claiming specific values 
exclusively to represent a particular religious tradition leads to a mistaken representation of the 
other traditions: 
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Shirin20: I just have to say this. It is not the first time I hear this. I have heard this 
many, many times. 
Shirin21: Now, we are friends here, aren’t we? I don’t want to leave. That is why I 
say out loud that I don’t like this. 
Shirin22: Because I believe that all the religions have arisen for the same reason, 
that they are all equal. 
 
Shirin poses a challenge addressed to the other participants in Shirin21. This leads the 
discussion about modes of communication to a further question about social relations. Shirin 
suggests the notion of friendship to describe the social relations in the group. Her articulated 
qualification of friendship includes the possibility of speaking out about what is on one’s mind. 
The discussion so far in the meeting may have created a need for Shirin to clarify social relations 
and suggest a social contract in the group. The Christian theologian Nicholas Adams reflects on 
the notion of friendship in transreligious encounters, exemplified in the practice of Scriptural 
Reasoning (SR) (Adams 2006: 52-53). He states that SR values “friendship over consensus” 
(Adams 2006: 52-53), and even though he does not elaborate much on the content of friendship, 
he suggests that friendship is a possible concept for describing the social relations in SR.111 His 
reasoning is that friendship (at least ideally) may encounter differences and disagreements and at 
the same time confirm a mutual engagement and concern between people despite those 
differences.  
Shirin articulates an exit strategy for herself in the above sequence, formulated 
negatively: To say that one does not want to leave means that leaving is an option. It is possible 
to leave both the communicative and the physical space of the group. In either case, it would 
mean the end of communication, at least temporarily. Shirin thus establishes herself as a subject 
with a right to speak out and the freedom to decide whether she wants to stay or leave. She 
establishes subjective interpretations of the social relations in the group (friends) and of the 
relations between different religions (they are equal.) 
 
                                                 
111 In Adams use of the concept of “friendship” in the social relations in SR to frame a social relation that does not 
aim at agreement and consensus, he explicitly contrasts openness to plurality in a friendship with what he claims to 
be a general attempt to reach agreement and consensus in interreligious dialogues (Adams 2006: 52). This view of 
dialogue as an activity that aims at agreement, contrasts with other views on dialogue presented in Chapter 2. Only 
on this basis does it make sense to contrast the notion of friendship with interreligious dialogue as Adams does. He 
seems, however, to have in mind interreligious dialogues with a practical aim for solving particular social and 
political problems and challenges when he states this, and thus has the view that interreligious dialogue mainly 
represents an instrumental and political means of interacting across religious boundaries. Adams emphasizes that 
friendship in the context of SR is not to be regarded as private and not primarily to be seen as a relationship between 
two individuals. The notion of friendship in SR is related to the whole group of practitioners as a group of friends, 
and the character of the friendship is more public than private (Adams 2006: 53). 
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Shirin23:  Then we can continue. Excuse me for …. 
Eva24:  No, I think it is really good that you speak out. 
Eva25:  But I do believe it is somewhat interesting for you to listen to me, to how 
I view this as a Christian. 
Aira1:   Yes. 
Eva26:  Isn’t it? And then, of course, you can argue with me and say that this is 
not correct, but …. 
 
Eva acknowledges Shirin’s right to speak out, and adds her appreciation of it (Eva24). At 
the same time, it may seem that Eva questions Shirin’s interest in listen to her as a Christian. 
Aira confirms her interest in listening to Eva’s contributions and interrupts the bilateral 
communication. In Eva25, Eva presents herself the way Shirin had earlier asked her to do 
(Shirin12), i.e. as part of a specific tradition but speaking as an individual subject, only on her 
own behalf. Eva shares some expectations about the communication in the group too. She wants 
to be listened to, expecting the others to be interested in what she has to say, and simultaneously 
also claims the right and the possibility of disagreements and mutual correction. These 
expectations may well be included in a notion of friendship suggested by Shirin.  
 
Shirin24: No, no, that is not the case, but when you say that Jesus Christ says this 
or that …. 
Shirin25: But the way you say that Muslims …. 
Shirin26: But you can go on …. 
 
Eva27: Then I must say that I didn’t intend to say anything wrong. I can 
understand that you’re provoked by that. 
Eva28:  And it was perhaps wrong to say that humans are made responsible. It 
came out kind of wrong. 
 
Shirin27: No, it is correct. 
 
Aira2:  It is entirely correct. 
 
Eva29:   I just have to say one thing.  
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Shirin28: I perceived you [as saying], and you say every time … that the Old 
Testament and the Koran does not say that. That was what provoked me. 
  
Eva30: But there are huge differences between the Old and The New Testament. 
We cannot get past that. 
 
This sequence is complex: Shirin continues the discussion on representation, addressing 
Eva in particular. Eva comes back to the former issue of human responsibility and tries to clarify 
an anticipated disagreement (Eva28) that does not really exist according to Aira (Aira2) and 
Shirin (Shirin27). All believe that humans are responsible for their actions, and they base this 
view on the Koran and the Bible respectively. Eva does not respond explicitly to Shirin’s 
challenges: the issue of representation, the mode of communication. 
Shirin defends not only the Koran but also the Old Testament (Shirin28). Eva reconfirms 
her view about the degree of difference between the Old Testament and the New, but, unlike 
earlier, she does not include the Koran with the Old Testament on the “wrong” side. But because 
Shirin groups the Old Testament together with the Koran (Shirin27), the connection between the 
two is still upheld. 
Eva31:  I must say something 
Eva32:  because when you say that Muhammad and Jesus are the same, I’ll say 
stop. They are not the same. There is quite a big difference. 
Eva33:   I will hold to this. I just have to say that. 
 
Eva continues to talk about differences, this time those between Muhammad and Jesus 
(Eva32). Nobody has suggested that Muhammad and Jesus are “the same” in the discussion, at 
least not in those words. Shirin had claimed that the scriptures of Judaism, Christianity, and 
Islam have shared values and had suggested that these might be a common ground for ethics. Her 
reference to mutuality and shared values may be the reason why Eva extends her presentation 
about her view on differences between the Christian tradition and all other religious traditions, 
and Christianity and Islam in particular. The differences Eva is concerned with are extended to 
include the view of Jesus and Muhammad (Eva32). Eva expresses a personal limit: this is a point 
on which Eva is not willing to compromise (Eva33).  
The expression and role of differences as part of a transreligious encounter is significant 
and can be displayed in various ways. At an individual level, the right to claim absolute limits 
with respect to that on which one is willing to compromise as well as to grant others the same 
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rights can be seen as a dialogical value of not violating the otherness of the other.112 The real 
challenge may be how to continue to be able to talk about the differences and sort out if some 
views represent a threat to a person’s identity, or represent an important issue in need of 
clarification. The latter would mean acknowledging that there are differences without the need to 
overcome them or suppress them, which would mean choosing dialogue over domination, the 
latter expressed through construction and the maintenance of hegemonic discourses (Gressgård 
2005: 170-172). 
 
Aira3:  Yes. This was very interesting to listen to. 
Aira4:  But there might be some misunderstanding when you talk about one 
thing in different contexts. 
Aira5:  She talked about washing oneself before praying and that is mental 
preparation. 
Aira6:  It does not mean that God does not listen. 
Aira7:  God listens to me whether I have washed myself or not. God hears me 
everywhere, under all different conditions. 
Aira8:  But sometimes if you feel that you have prepared yourself mentally, it 
might be ….113 
Aira9:  It is written in the Koran that God responds to the distressed one,114 the 
sad ones, the crying ones, the suffering …. 
Aira10:  When we read the story of Hagar, she cried to God, and God listened to 
her prayers, and she did not have water to wash herself.  
Aira11:  God will listen if one calls upon him. There is no doubt about it. It is not 
only under special circumstances that God is listening. God is listening 
under all conditions. 
Aira12:  But you have to know how you can …. 
Aira13:  If I am in despair, how can someone I ask for help help me if I doubt 
him? 
Aira14:  No. If I give myself entirely to God, “it is only you that can help me,” 
God will hear me no matter what, and he knows about my weaknesses. 
Aira15:  Maybe I don’t know how to call on God so that he can hear, but God 
listens to everyone. 
                                                 
112 See Chapter 2, p. 56. 
113 In a comment on the transcription of Aira8, Aira emphasizes with respect to salat and holding the Koran that one 
must perform the ritual washing beforehand. 
114 Cf. Sura 27:62. 
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Aira16:  It is not just the Bible that makes humans responsible. 
Aira17:  The Koran says: one gets what one strives for.115 Then it is my 
responsibility to strive. 
Aira18:  And it is not like the laws are made for me and I get the answers.  
Aira19:  I have … if you read the transcription from the last meeting, I said that 
there was a person from the province whom the Prophet asked: “How 
will you solve the problems that you will get in that country?” 
Aira20:  He said: “I will look in the Koran.” Then he said: “If you do not have it, 
what will you do?” Then he said: “I will find it in the tradition.” Then he 
said: “what if you don’t find it there?” and then he said that he would use 
his reason. 
Aira21:  Then the Prophet said: “God bless you because you will use your reason 
to find out how we can solve different problems and challenges in 
different situations.” 
Aira22:  So, there is not a direct answer to everything in the Koran. It is a guide 
for people. Laws, different laws. But we need to make new rules in new 
situations, this is called ijtihad. 
Aira23:  Ijtihad is striving to find solutions …. You should stay within the 
framework of the Koran, that this is allowed and that is not allowed.116 
Aira24:  We can argue. But we are not allowed to hurt anyone in any way. 
Aira25: So there is some difference when you say that you should wash your 
hands or wash your hands before you …. 
Aira26:  To us, both the Bible and the Koran is the word of God, and when you 
read them, we need to be totally prepared. So, in the Koran it is written 
that nobody should touch them before they are clean. 
 
 
Aira returns to Fouzia’s earlier contribution (Aira5). She refers to the discussion on 
modes of communication (Aira4), and her analysis seems to be that there have been 
misunderstandings due to the presence of different contexts. Aira24 may also be a comment on 
the recent communication in the group, seen from an Islamic, ethical viewpoint. To disagree and 
argue is allowed, but the boundary is when someone gets hurt – or when the intention is to hurt 
another. Aira24 is, however, referring mainly to the act of ijtihad as a possible process of 
                                                 
115 Cf. Sura 53:39. 
116 Aira emphasizes when reading through the transcriptions that one has to be equipped with scholarly knowledge 
of the Koran and the sunna, the Arabic language, fiqh, and Islamic history to be able to do ijtihad. 
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reasoning and arguing although it is to be done within the frameworks given through the Islamic 
tradition. Part of this is to ensure that it is not done in a way that creates destructive conflicts. 
Aira clarifies the points discussed between Eva and Fouzia step by step through her 
Islamic theological reflection and knowledge. She communicates both through argumentation 
and through a narrative. The narrative she tells in this sequence (Aira19-22, including Aira’s 
interpretation of the narrative) she had also told in the first meeting. She refers to the report of 
this meeting to underline that it has already become part of the group’s story. Aira’s narrative has 
many similarities, including its main point, with a narrative found in the hadith (Abu Dawud, 
Book 24, Number 3585) on Muhammad’s conversation with his follower Ali ibn Ali Talib 
before sending him to Yemen. The Muslim reformist thinker Tariq Ramadan refers to the same 
narrative in Abu Dawud in his argument for reinterpreting the Islamic tradition in a European 
context (Ramadan 1999: 28-28).  
Aira states that the pedagogical point is that Muhammad himself not only allowed but 
encouraged his followers to use their own reason when the Koran and the tradition were not 
sufficient providers of answers to current questions. Aira connects this with the notion of ijtihad, 
which covers the act of individual reasoning in the Islamic tradition. Ramadan uses the narrative 
from the hadith to argue for a typological Islamic use of intelligence and skills in the service of 
the Islamic faith, with the aim of implementing Islamic teaching as accurately as possible 
(Ramadan 1999: 28). Ramadan later develops this line of argumentation into the use the concept 
of ijtihad. Aira also uses the narrative to introduce ijtihad as a concept (Aira22). She does not 
refer to Ramadan, but her own emphasis of this narrative may be central to her in constructing 
her own theological position on making meaning in the Islamic tradition. She constructs a 
position for herself as a believer with a right as well as an obligation to interpret – within the 
framework of the Islamic sources. 
Aira claims that a believing Muslim will not find all the answers in the Koran directly 
(Aira22). This seems to be contrary to what Fouzia stated (Fouzia40) and may indicate a 
difference between their views of the Koran and the process of finding answers within the 
religious tradition to which they both belong. The situations of Fouzia and Aira are different: 
Fouzia is situated in a practical situation of assisting someone in need of help, whereas Aira is 
situated in Islamic theological reasoning. The difference may reflect more of a difference 
between someone with primarily practical skills over against a person with scholarly theological 
skills. Aira does not, however, emphasize the potential difference between herself and Fouzia. 
She rather supports Fouzia’s points about ritual ablution and broadens the supply of theological 
reasoning behind it through her references to the Koran and the hadith in her arguments. 
Aira comments on how she perceives the relation between the Bible and the Koran: Both 
scriptures make humans responsible (Aira16-17), and both are the word of God (Aira26). She 
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thus joins Shirin on the issue of similarity. She includes the ritual of ablution as a requirement 
even when reading the Bible. It is not clear if she means that this requirement applies to both 
Christians and Muslims or only for Muslims reading the Bible.  
 
Rima5:  It is a punishment. 
 
Aira27:  A punishment? 
 
Rima6:  That nobody should touch …. 
 
Aira28:  One has to be clean ....117 
Aira29:  It is for the believers, the ones that believe in it, isn’t it? 
Aira30:  To me, it is not a punishment. To me it is a mental preparation for 
speaking to God. 
Aira31:  You understand this differently from me. 
 
Rima’s commentary on the ritual of ablution seems to come as a surprise to Aira, and 
Rima does not elaborate further on her negative claim. Aira responds to her comment as a 
question, once more explaining the meaning of ritual ablution. In addition, she brings in an 
element of subjectivity: The message of ritual ablution is for believers; it does not make sense 
outside the realm of faith. Aira refers to believers, most likely including only Muslim believers. 
The difference between her and Rima is merely stated by Aira (Aira31) and is not evaluated or 
judged for the rest. 
Aira shows an attitude of inclusiveness and provides clear statements on her own views 
and reflections. Her experience in transreligious and transcultural dialogues as well as her 
education in Islamic theology probably shapes both what she says and how she says it. She does 
not address different views as a problem, whether or not they are between the traditions or within 
her own tradition. 
Maria will be the last participant cited in this discussion that started with sharing 
experiences and views of the Bible and the Koran, and then gradually developed to include 
several complex issues: 
 
Maria1:  Yes. As far as I have understood, Christians and Muslims …. 
                                                 
117 When Aira read through the transcriptions in their final form, she pointed out that what she means in this 
statement is that washing and cleaning before reading the Koran is compulsory for Muslims.  
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Maria2:  I do not see any need to defend how one practices one thing or another 
because I feel that a religion is a belief and that it is up to each and every 
one to find how one can get in contact with God. 
Maria3:  Some wash their hands and they pray; some do not wash themselves at 
all, they go to church or whatever.  
Maria4:  To me personally, it is not important, because everyone has to find the 
way one thinks is the right one to get close to God. 
Maria5:  And then I think that the discussion would be a little more interesting if it 
was concerned about substantial matters and not the way we practice. 
Then it gets very … we kind of clash. 
Maria6:  Because what you practice … the way of practicing is perhaps not the 
same, but it doesn’t really matter 
Maria7:  Because to me it’s really important to listen to what the content of the 
Koran is, how it is, and how you do it and what your faith means to you. 
Just like what Christianity means to me. 
 
Maria finds a connection between the issues addressed, and the mode of communication. 
Her analysis is that the discussion became vehement because the participants were focusing on 
their religious practice. She describes these as non-substantial issues (Maria5) and says she 
misses discussions on substantial matters: the content of the Koran, and what faith means 
personally for the participants, including herself (Maria7). She suggests, perhaps, that the latter 
issue would be more subjective, and thus perhaps less prone to cause tension. To discuss the fact 
that people in the group have different religious practices is pointless for Maria; it should instead 
be shared and the differences simply acknowledged. Maria signals curiosity about the other 
religion and reveals her subjective view of both religion and religious practice: most important is 
that it is right for the individual believer (Maria4).  
Maria distinguishes between individual faith and religious rituals and expresses an 
extensive tolerance with respect to differences in religious faith and religious practice. Her 
approach to differences is not that they are a threat in any way nor does she merely state that they 
exist; she declares differences to be interesting. This positive view of differences and diversity as 
expected and welcomed stands out in the group’s discussion thus far. 
Maria’s last sentence in Maria7 is the beginning of a personal testimony. After presenting 
her curiosity about the other, she uses her own faith as an attempt to create common ground. 
Shirin and Aira both suggested common ground between Christians and Muslims on the basis of 
canonical scriptures and shared ethical values. Maria seems to suggest a common ground based 
on the individual participant’s faith story and experience of belonging to a tradition. Instead of 
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suggesting an objective common ground based on acknowledged similarities between the 
traditions, she focuses on the subjective way of creating a community. 
 
The First Discussion in the Group: Complex Communication 
The sharing of experiences and views of the Bible and the Koran develops into a complex 
communication about several issues. After the first contributions by Fouzia and Eva, a discussion 
on modes of communication and how to discuss was established (launched by Shirin) and stayed 
intertwined with the communication that focused more directly on the issues connected to the 
Bible and the Koran. Both the hermeneutical and communicative processes are thus expressed 
and commented upon, and sometimes it is clearly stated that the mode of communication affects 
the interpretation of thematic issues. 
The issues regarding the canonical scriptures of the Bible and the Koran were connected 
to other issues: the religious practice of ritual ablution, the views on the role of the Koran and the 
Bible in their respective traditions, and the relation between the Koran and the Bible as canonical 
scriptures within traditions all emerged as issues in the discussion. In addition, reflections on the 
nature of God, particularly on God’s attitude toward humans, and the issue of human 
responsibility were raised.  
This demonstrates the difficulty of structuring a discussion on a specific theme in a 
culturally and religiously diverse group. But the most significant interpretation of the complexity 
in the communication is perhaps how difficult it is to have a discussion on the canonical 
scriptures of the Bible and the Koran among Christians and Muslims without moving into other 
issues as well. Reading the scriptures and experiences connected to the scriptures seem to be 
matters deeply integrated into the life of the participants in the discussion. This implies that it 
makes little sense for them to focus the discussion so strictly on the Bible and the Koran as texts.  
 
A Web of Meaning Making 
Instead of a clear-cut thematic communication limited to the views of and experiences of the 
scriptures, the participants in the discussion create a web of meaning making. Fouzia’s narratives 
are based on her interpreted experience. Both the first narrative about the Bible and the second 
about the Koran are framed in her own interpretations of the narrated events. Her attention is on 
the materiality of the scriptures, such as the physical treatment of the Bible and the Koran, and 
the preparation of oneself in relation to the scriptures. These issues represent a religious practice 
for Fouzia, grounded in her religious identity. Eva and Maria show through the discussion that 
they regard the matters important to Fouzia as insignificant (Maria) or dubious, perhaps 
unacceptable (Eva). Different views on what is regarded as important and acknowledged 
religious practice regarding the Bible and the Koran come to the surface. The differences 
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expressed contribute to the web of communication, and how one should relate to the differences 
is singled out as a separate issue.  
Fouzia relates to her own religious tradition when interpreting her narratives, and reflects 
parts of the Islamic interpretative tradition when she frames her narratives. Aira relates even 
more broadly to the Islamic interpretative tradition and brings in material from the hadith (the 
story about the man asking Muhammad for advice), the Koran, and introduces the Islamic 
interpretative tool of ijtihad. Eva elaborates on her view of biblical interpretation and the 
differences within the Bible between the Old and New Testaments. She bases her views on the 
classical Lutheran hermeneutical tools of Law and Gospel and introduces a Christocentric 
hermeneutics. Maria and Shirin do not relate extensively to the sources of their respective 
traditions, although Shirin does relate to the Islamic tradition when she states that values Eva 
claims to be exclusively Christian are also a part of the Islamic tradition (and other religious 
traditions).  
The Muslim participants in the discussion all relate to the Christian tradition as being 
close to their own, as part of “people of the book.” The acknowledgment of Christianity is 
sometimes clearly on Islamic premises, as in some parts of Fouzia’s contribution; in other cases 
there is recognition on more equal terms.  
The Christian participants in the discussion lack Christian doctrinal support for how 
Islam could be included in a Christian view of the world. The three Christian participants in the 
discussion resolve this challenge in different ways: Eva categorizes Islam together with Judaism 
and the Old Testament as something “other,” fundamentally different from the Christian 
tradition. Rima does not demonstrate any explicit view on this, other than an attempt to turn the 
discussion to the interpretation of what she calls the truths in the two religions. But she expresses 
estrangement toward ritual ablution as an Islamic practice and calls it a “punishment.” Maria 
expressed her personal view that everyone needs to do what is right for her to get into contact 
with God. Maria does not discriminate between religions and expresses curiosity about Islam and 
the Koran. 
All those who participated basically agreed that God cares for humans and listens to their 
prayers. They also agree that the canonical scriptures are useful and can provide support for 
humans, even if the majority believes that the scriptures must be interpreted through the use of 
human reason. The disagreements concern how to view the scriptures of the other.  
  
Searching for a Communicative Mode and Naming the Social Relations 
Part of the meaning making in the group in this discussion includes attempts to situate the 
communication, negotiating a shared communicative space, and naming the social relations 
within the group. It was Shirin in particular who argues for the need for this. But since this was 
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at the beginning of the group process, it is likely that the participants were trying to find out how 
to articulate their views, how to understand the presence of the others, and how to interpret the 
situation.  
The participants express themselves either through narratives or argumentation, except 
for Aira, who uses both forms to express her views. There may have been a disconnect in the 
communication when a narrative is met by argumentation or the other way around. The 
communication between Eva and Fouzia is an example: Fouzia never answers Eva’s criticism of 
ritual ablution. Aira may be able to communicate to all the other contributions since she 
combines narratives and arguments.  
Through Shirin’s questions, rephrased as “Who are we speaking on behalf of?” and “How 
do we speak about the other?”, she addresses the mode of communication in the group. She 
describes a communicative problem when it is unknown who or what someone is representing 
while speaking or the uneasiness that is felt when one does not recognize what is said about 
oneself or one’s tradition. Shirin thus starts to negotiate the communicative space but at the same 
time creates a space through her open-hearted articulations. Eva supports her through confirming 
her right to speak out and through openly appreciating her openness.  
Maria also comments on the mode of communication but she argues that it might have to 
do with the way in which the issues were addressed rather than how the view of self and other is 
expressed. To agree on religious practices is beside the point for her – she addresses the 
expectation of agreement as an obstacle to a more open and harmonious communication. She 
seems to expect that a communication with a greater openness toward differences would make it 
possible to have a more interesting conversation. 
The participants who address the mode of communication all state that openness is an 
aim. Maria seems to prefer a more harmonious communication, but for Shirin and Eva it could 
seem that openness is more crucial than harmony. The degree of openness and the question of 
conflict level may be related: A greater openness can possibly lead to a higher level of conflict. 
Shirin’s addressing language and representation is a demand for respect but also for a truthful 
and inclusive reference practice regarding both one’s own tradition and the tradition of the other.  
Shirin extends her discussion on the communicative mode to include the question of 
social relations in the group. To her, it seems to be a connection between the mode of 
communication and the category of social relations. It is how the mode of communication 
develops that makes her question the character of the social relations. She suggests framing the 
social relation as “friendship.” Nobody else comments on this suggestion at this stage of the 
process, or suggests other ways to frame the social relations in the group. The question about 
friendship thus still hangs in the air after the discussion. 
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To aim for a common ground of discussion, however, can be interpreted as a move 
toward framing a social relation, although this is mentioned at the level of religious traditions. 
The question is how an acknowledgment of common ground on the basis of the religious 
traditions influences the social relations in the group. A shared solution to the question of 
representation seems to be more urgent, with the result that the form and type of social relation 
of this group can be determined. 
 
What is at Stake for the Participants in this Discussion? 
The whole discussion was intense and sometimes quite heated. Behind this engagement may be a 
feeling that something important is at stake. If one asks what is at stake in this discussion and for 
whom, the answer would be as complex as the communication was.  
Two keywords that represent crucial parts of the communication process are difference 
and personal integrity.  
The participants describe difference in various ways. The differences that are addressed 
are related to religious differences as well as to different ways to communicate and situate 
statements. Religious difference is declared to be a problem for which Fouzia’s first narrative, 
exemplified by different religious practices regarding the Bible, was to find solutions. The 
solution is presented as selecting one practice over the other. Eva, on the other hand, addresses 
the lack of recognized religious difference as a problem when she states that it would 
compromise her personal integrity if Jesus and Muhammad are said to be “the same” (Eva32). 
Aira says that differences are to be expected, and this is acknowledged to be correct. Rima wants 
to explore the differences more, and Maria claims that religious differences should be fully 
accepted and that the differences in faith stories create possibilities for listening and sharing. To 
Aira, Rima, and Maria it seems that religious differences do not pose any threat to their personal 
integrity. 
Both acknowledging and protecting religious differences is presented as crucial. At the 
same time, and particularly for some of the Muslim participants, the acknowledgement of 
common ground between Christians and Muslims is equally crucial. The question of 
representation and respect for personal integrity is linked together by Shirin. For her, a lack of 
consciousness in the matter of representation of self and others jeopardizes the whole 
communication process and makes her question the social relations in the group.  
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Chapter 5: 
Making Meaning Of The Hagar/Hajar Narratives  
 
 
The first texts from the Islamic and Christian canonical scriptures that were read and discussed in 
the group were the narratives about Hagar/Hajar. The texts from both the Old Testament and the 
hadith were sent to the participants by mail before the meeting with the invitation. This was done 
to give the participants the opportunity to prepare for the discussions of the texts if they wanted 
to and to show which textual versions of the stories would be the starting point of the discussion. 
The participants’ possible pre-knowledge about the narratives was not mapped beforehand.  
The texts were in Norwegian, and the text from Genesis was edited to include the whole 
story about Hagar and exclude other parts of the narrative about the family of Abraham. The 
Hajar story from the hadith includes one verse from the Koran. The biblical text in Norwegian 
was taken from the most commonly used version, i.e. that by the Norwegian Bible Society 1978 
(Bibelen 1978). The Norwegian version of the hadith narrative was taken from a textbook of 
source texts used by Norwegian teachers in religious education (Thomassen and Rasmussen 
1999: 198-199). In this work I will use English editions of these texts: the New Revised Standard 
Version (Bible 1989) and an English translation of the hadith by Al-Bukhari (CMJE 2008-2009). 
My criterion for selecting these versions was their degree of closeness to the Norwegian text 
versions used in the group. I looked for similarity in both content and wording.118  
The reading, conversation, and discussion of the Hagar/Hajar narratives took place during 
the last half of the second meeting and in the third meeting. The discussion presented in chapter 
4 took place immediately before the group read and started to discuss the Hagar/Hajar narratives.  
Four of the discussions/conversations from the meaning-making process of the 
Hagar/Hajar narratives are presented in this chapter. They are selected because of their relevance 
for showing various meaning-making strategies and for portraying discussions I found 
interesting, important, and conducive to the aim of the study. The presentation of the discussions 
follows the chronology of the group’s communicative process, except for the first and second 
discussions, which overlapped in time. The first discussion concerns the practice of naming 
women in relation to their children, and it took place before and after the second discussion. The 
second is a discussion that started with questioning how Hagar/Hajar could leave Ishmael, her 
son, in the desert, and engages the participants in discussing possible answers. The third is a 
                                                 
118 Some verses in the Norwegian translation of the Genesis text are, however, closer to the King James Version 
(Prickett and Carroll 1997). 
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more general, reflective sequence that addresses several themes, but this discussion is marked by 
longer contributions and more thorough reflections on the narratives, many of them testimonial 
in character. The fourth discussion is concerned with the notions of obedience and forgiveness 
and their relevance in illustrating differences between the Christian and Islamic traditions. 
At the second meeting both Hagar/Hajar stories were read aloud in the group by Susanne 
and Eva, who shared the reading of the Genesis story about Hagar between them, and Aira who 
read the text from the hadith. This meant that Christian participants read the text from the 
Christian tradition and a Muslim participant read the text from the Islamic tradition. The readers 
volunteered and, following my suggestion, the biblical text was read before the text from the 
hadith.119 The third meeting also started with reading the two texts, but this time the participants 
read both texts silently before the discussion started. The Hagar/Hajar narratives are quoted in 
the following text, to invite the readers of this text to start with a silent reading of the narratives: 
 
The Hagar/Hajar Narratives from the Old Testament and the Hadith 
 
Genesis Chapter 16:1-16 and Chapter 21:8-21 (New Revised Standard Version) 
1 Now, Sarai, Abram’s wife, bore him no children. She had an Egyptian slave-girl whose 
name was Hagar, 2 and Sarai said to Abram, “You see that the Lord had prevented me 
from bearing children; go in to my slave-girl; it may be that I shall obtain children by 
her.” And Abram listened to the voice of Sarai. 3 So, after Abram had lived for ten years 
in the land of Canaan, Sarai, Abram’s wife, took Hagar the Egyptian, her slave-girl, and 
gave her to her husband Abram as a wife. 4 He went in to Hagar, and she conceived; and 
when she saw that she had conceived, she looked with contempt on her mistress. 5 Then 
Sarai said to Abram, “May the wrong done to me be on you! I gave my slave-girl to your 
embrace, and when she saw that she had conceived, she looked on me with contempt. 
May the Lord judge between you and me!” 6 But Abram said to Sarai, “Your slave-girl is 
in your power; do to her as you please.” Then Sarai dealt harshly with her, and she ran 
away from her. 7 The angel of the Lord found her by a spring of water in the wilderness, 
the spring on the way to Shur. 8 And he said, “Hagar, slave-girl of Sarai, where have you 
come from and where are you going?” She said, “I am running away from my mistress 
Sarai.” 9 The angel of the Lord said to her, “Return to your mistress, and submit to her.” 
                                                 
119 The question of which text that should be read first represented a challenge. Obviously, one of the texts had to be 
read before the other. Since both texts were made accessible to the participants in advance, and thus presented 
simultaneously to them before the meeting, I suggested that the biblical text be read first, for historical reasons. No 
one objected. The chronological argument represents some problems, however, because this in itself may give the 
impression of a hierarchy among the texts. There was, however, no break between the readings of the two texts, so 
the discussion started with both texts at the same time.  
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10 The angel of the Lord also said to her, “I will so greatly multiply your offspring that 
they cannot be counted for multitude.” 11 And the angel of the Lord said to her,  
“Now you have conceived and shall bear a son;  
you shall call him Ishmael, for the Lord has given heed to your affliction.  
12 He shall be a wild ass of a man, with his hand against everyone,  
and everyone’s hand against him;  
and he shall live at odds with all his kin.”  
13 So she named the Lord who spoke to her, “You are El-roi”; for she said, “have I really 
seen God and remained alive after seeing him?” 12014 Therefore the well was called Beer-
lahai roi, it lies between Kadesh and Bered. 15 Hagar bore Abram a son; and Abram 
named his son, whom Hagar bore, Ishmael. 16 Abram was eighty-six years old when 
Hagar bore him Ishmael. 
Genesis 21:8-21 
8 The child grew, and was weaned; and Abraham made a great feast on the day Isaac was 
weaned. 9 But Sarah saw the son of Hagar the Egyptian, whom she had borne to 
Abraham, playing with her son Isaac. 10 So she said to Abraham, “Cast out this slave 
woman with her son; for the son of the slave woman shall not inherit along with my son 
Isaac.” 11 The matter was very distressing to Abraham on account of his son. 12 But God 
said to Abraham, “Do not be distressed because of the boy and because of your slave 
woman; whatever Sarah says to you, do as she tells you, for it is through Isaac that 
offspring shall be named after you. 13 As for the son of the slave woman, I will make a 
nation of him also, because he is your offspring.” 14 So Abraham rose early in the 
morning, and took bread and a skin of water, and gave it to Hagar, putting it on her 
shoulder, along with the child, and sent her away. And she departed, and wandered about 
in the wilderness of Beer-sheba. 
15 When the water in the skin was gone, she cast her child under one of the bushed. 16 
Then she went and sat down opposite him a good way off, about the distance of a 
bowshot: for she said, “Do not let me look on the death of the child.” And she sat 
opposite him, she lifted up her voice and wept. 17 And God heard the voice of the boy; 
and the angel of God called Hagar from heaven, and said to her, “What troubles you, 
Hagar? Do not be afraid; for God has heard the voice of the boy where he is. 18 Come, 
lift up the boy and hold him fast with your hand for I will make a great nation of him.” 19 
Then God opened her eyes, and she saw a well of water. She went, and filled the skin 
                                                 
120 In the King James Version, this verse can be read as follows: And she called the name of the Lord that spoke 
unto her, Thou God seest me: for she said, Have I also here looked after him that seeth me? 
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with water, and gave the boy a drink. 20 God was with the boy, and he grew up; he lived 
in the wilderness, and became an expert with the bow. 21 He lived in the wilderness of 
Paran, and his mother got a wife for him from the land of Egypt. 
 
Hajar in the Hadith and the Koran: Al-Bukhari, Vol. 4, Book 55, Number 583: 
Narrated by Ibn Abbas: 
121Abraham brought her [the mother of Ishmael] and her son Ishmael while she was 
suckling him, to a place near the Ka’ba under a tree on the spot of Zam-zam, at the 
highest place in the mosque. During those days there was nobody in Mecca, nor was 
there any water. So he made them sit over there and placed near them a leather bag 
containing some dates, and a small water-skin containing some water, and set out 
homeward. Ishmael’s mother followed him saying, “O Abraham! Where are you going 
leaving us in this valley where there is no person whose company we may enjoy, nor is 
there anything (to enjoy)?” She repeated that to him many times, but he did not look back 
at her. Then she asked him, “Has Allah ordered you to do so?” He said, “Yes.” She said, 
“Then he will not neglect us,” and returned while Abraham proceeded onwards, and on 
reaching the Thaniya where they could not see him, he faced the Ka´ba , and raising both 
hands, invoked Allah saying the following prayers: 
“O our Lord! I have made some of my offspring dwell in a valley without 
cultivation, by your Sacred House in order. O our Lord, that they may offer prayer 
perfectly. So fill some hearts among men with love towards them, and provide them with 
fruits, so that they may give thanks.” (Koran 14.37) Ishmael’s mother went on suckling 
Ishmael and drinking from the water. 
When the water in the water-skin had all been used up, she became thirsty and 
her child also became thirsty. She started looking at him, tossing in agony: She left him, 
for she could not endure looking at him, and found that the mountain of Safa was the 
nearest mountain to her on that land. She stood on it and started looking at the valley 
keenly so that she might see somebody, but she could not see anybody. Then she 
descended from Safa and when she reached the valley, she tucked up her robe and ran in 
the valley and reached the Marwa mountain where she stood and started looking, 
expecting to see somebody, but she could not see anybody. She repeated that (running 
between Safa and Marwa) seven times. 
                                                 
121 The first sentence in this story from the hadith is not included in the Norwegian version used in the study. That 
is why it is not included here. The omitted sentence that begins this story is: “The first lady to use a girdle was the 
mother of Ishmael. She used a girdle so that she might hide her tracks from Sarah” (CMJE 2008-2009). 
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The prophet said, “This is the source of the tradition of the walking of the people 
between them (i.e. Safa and Marwa). When she reached the Marwa (for the last time) she 
heard a voice and she asked herself to be quit and listened attentively. She heard the 
voice again and said, “O! You have made me hear your voice; have you got something to 
help me?” And behold! She saw an angel at the place of Zam-zam, digging the earth with 
his heel (or his wing) till water flowed from that place. She started to make something 
like a basin around it, using her hand in this way, and started filling her water-skin with 
water with her hands, and the water was flowing out after she had scooped some of it.” 
The prophet added: “May Allah bestow Mercy on Ishmael’s mother! Had she let 
the Zam-zam (flow without trying to control it), Zam-zam would have been a stream 
flowing on the surface of the earth.” The prophet further added: “Then she drank and 
suckled the child. The angel said to her, “Don’t be afraid of being neglected, for this is 
the House of Allah which will be built by this boy and his father, and Allah never 
neglects his people.” The House (i.e. Kaba) at that time was on a high place resembling a 
hillock, and when torrents came, they flowed to its right and left. She lived in that way till 
some people from the tribe of Jurhum or a family from Jurhum passed by her and her 
child, as they were coming through the way of Kada. They landed in the lower part of 
Mecca where they saw a bird that had the habit of flying around water and not leaving it. 
They said, “This bird must be flying around water, though we know that there is no water 
in this valley.” They sent one or two messengers who discovered the source of water, and 
returned to inform them of the water. So, they all came.” The Prophet added, “Ishmael’s 
mother was sitting near the water. They asked her: “Do you allow us to stay with you?” 
She replied, “Yes, but you will have no right to possess the water.” They agreed to that. 
The Prophet further said, “Ishmael’s mother was pleased with the whole situation as she 
used to love to enjoy the company of the people. So, they settled there, and later on they 
sent for their families who came and settled with them so that some families became 
permanent residents there. The child grew up and learnt Arabic from them and caused 
them to love and admire him as he grew up, and when he reached the age of puberty they 
made him marry a woman from amongst them.” 
 
The First Comments on the Hagar/Hajar Narratives 
Rima (Arab-Norwegian, Roman Catholic) was the first to say something about the stories. She 
recalled a story about an angel who dug for water in the desert with its feet to rescue a nameless 
mother and child. Rima remembered being told this story during her childhood in the Middle 
East, without any Christian or Muslim connotations: it was just a story, and she found it 
beautiful. The Middle East’s vast areas of desert make the search for water easy to understand. 
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To be in the desert without any access to water is a potentially life-threatening situation, and to 
be responsible for a small child or to be a child in such a situation adds to the dramatic content of 
the story. An equally dramatic rescue by an angel who saves the human figures in the story from 
dying of thirst gives a happy, miraculous end. It is not difficult to see that this story may work as 
a bedtime story for children in the Middle East and that it may function as a cultural narrative 
beyond religious and confessional structures of meaning.  
Aira (Pakistani-Norwegian, Sunni Muslim) recognized the stories as providing the 
narrative origin of the Zam-Zam well in Mecca, where Muslims drink water during hajj (the 
Islamic pilgrimage to Mecca) when they perform the ritual of sa’y: they run back and forth 
between the heights of Safa and Marwa seven times to search for water in remembrance of 
Hajar’s struggle (Esposito 2003: 103).  
Rima and Aira thus reveal a pre-established relation to the narratives. Whereas Rima’s 
pre-knowledge is that of a nameless mother and child, a miracle story from the desert, Aira has 
specific religious pre-knowledge of the narrative as the origin of the performance of sa’y in the 
Islamic tradition. 
Some of the Christian participants expressed reactions to the narratives’ contents. Inger 
(Norwegian, Lutheran Christian) called the story “terrible, when looked at with modern eyes.” 
Inger explained that she thought so because she thought the story implied that women who were 
not mothers did not have dignity, that the text legitimized slavery, and that Hagar was expelled 
with her son to the desert. Inger called this latter point “the utmost brutality you can imagine.” 
She also said that she found the hadith narrative more substantial and vivid than the biblical text. 
Susanne noted that Sarah was absent as a character in the hadith text. She found that in 
some ways the hadith could represent a continuation of the Hagar narrative from the Bible when 
it tells about Hajar and Ishmael settling in the valley after they were rescued, an event not 
included in the biblical story. Rima, too, asked about the role of Sarah in the Islamic tradition in 
general. Her question was if Sarah is considered a Jewish woman in Islam. Shirin answered by 
saying that in the Islamic tradition Abraham/Ibrahim was a Muslim.122 There was no further 
discussion on the religious status of Abraham/Ibrahim, Sarah, or the other shared characters in 
the Judeo-Christian and Islamic narratives about the family of Abraham/Ibrahim. Thus the 
conversation did not induce a discussion about religious ownership of the figures but rather 
helped to clarify different interpretations of the figures in the traditions, in particular regarding 
                                                 
122 According to Islamic tradition, Abraham/Ibrahim was the first Muslim (Esposito 2003: 4). In the Koran, 
however, Abraham/Ibrahim is not called the first Muslim at first but hanif, which literally translated from Arabic 
means “God-friend” (Leirvik 2006: 42). To be a hanif implies being a monotheist, obedient to God, upright, and 
avoiding all kinds of polytheism (Esposito 2003: 108). In later koranic texts Abraham/Ibrahim is called the first 
Muslim (Leirvik 2006: 42). 
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their possible different positions in the respective religious universes. Mapping these kinds of 
differences is important for further substantial communication and for creating a possible shared 
interpretative space.123 
Eva found that the portrayal of Hagar in the two narratives differed greatly. In Eva’s 
view, the biblical Hagar is portrayed as a woman who finally took charge of her situation, and 
she referred to Genesis 18:21 where Hagar is the one who finds Ishmael a wife. On the other 
hand, Eva claims that Hajar in the narrative from the hadith is left completely in the hands of 
others. Eva further accuses the figure of Abraham/Ibrahim in both stories of being irresponsible 
and cruel to both Hagar/Hajar and Ishmael.  
Eva’s last comment in this introductory sequence touches on examples of naming related 
to Hagar/Hajar in the two narratives. In Genesis 16:13, Eva found what she characterized an 
important incident in the biblical narrative: when Hagar gives God a name.124 She expresses 
surprise about this verse, and claims – on the basis of her own astonishment – to have noticed it 
for the first time, that the Christian tradition had in fact overlooked Hagar by focusing only on 
Sarah. She also stated that she was disturbed about her observation that Hajar was not mentioned 
by name in the text from the hadith: she is simply called the mother of Ishmael. 
 
 
Discussion 1 Related to the Hagar/Hajar Narratives: 
The Practice of Naming Women 
This discussion took place in two rounds, before and after Discussion 2 about why Hagar/Hajar 
abandoned Ishmael in the desert. The internal chronology of the two parts of Discussion 1 was 
retained throughout the referred transcriptions. The discussion started after Eva expressed her 
views on the two narratives as recorded above. She continues: 
 
Eva34:  And I find it a bit typical that in the text from the hadith, Hagar is not in 
charge. 
Eva35:  Here you can see that she does not even have her name written in the text 
… the Muslim tradition …. She is indicated in relation to her son. It 
doesn’t say Hagar, it says “the mother of Ishmael,” doesn’t it? 
Eva36:  And, as a Western woman, it makes me a little upset to be called… 
John’s mother because of my relation to my son, and not Eva… 
 
                                                 
123 See Chapter 2, p. 26-28. 
124 Genesis 16:13: “So she named the Lord who spoke to her, ‘You are El-roi’; for she said, “have I really seen God 
and remained alive after seeing him?’”. 
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Rima7:  This has nothing to do with Islam. It is the tradition.  
 
Aira32:  Yes. 
 
 
Eva34 raises a question: When Eva claims that Hajar lacks status as an acting subject 
throughout the text from the hadith and states that this is typical, to what is she referring? Does 
she mean typical of hadith literature, of the Islamic canonical scriptures, or the entire Islamic 
tradition? Or is she referring to canonical religious scriptures in general, both Christian and 
Islamic? What she does mean by typical may indicate if she is using the narrative from the 
hadith as a negative contrast to the biblical story about Hagar – where she stated earlier that 
Hagar is described differently.  
Eva35 suggests that she is concerned with the text from the hadith but also that she may 
be referring to her own conception of the Islamic tradition in her argument. Her statement on 
Hagar’s weak position is supported by an observation Eva made while reading the hadith 
narrative: Hagar/Hajar’s name is not used; rather, she is called “the mother of Ishmael” (Eva35). 
Eva’s pre-knowledge and presuppositions about Islamic tradition seem to be part of her 
references when interpreting the text from the hadith. The differences Eva claims to observe 
between the two Hagar/Hajar narratives in the portrayal of Hagar/Hagar is either deduced from 
Eva’s presuppositions of the differences between the Islamic and the Christian traditions 
regarding women’s position in general, or it is being used as a basis to claim this difference. The 
role of the text is thus either to function as a confirmation of Eva’s presuppositions or else to 
serve as a suggestion to investigate if the position of women differs in the two traditions 
(generally).  
Eva makes a self-reference about her interpretative position (Eva36). She refers to herself 
as a “Western woman” – a cultural and perhaps political but not religious reference. This may 
suggest that she is using her cultural/political identity to confront this particular practice of 
naming, of which she explicitly says she does not approve. Her identification could imply 
suggesting a dichotomy between “the West” and “Islam” on the naming issue, and not one 
between “Christianity” and “Islam.” 
Rima’s comment, however, states that naming women in relation of their children is a 
traditional practice, rather than an Islamic religious custom (Rima7). Aira confirms this (Aira32). 
The separation of religion and tradition/culture as a possible way to analyze the naming, or rather 
the lack of naming, of Hajar in the text from the hadith, shifts the focus from Islam as the reason 
for this custom and addresses tradition and culture instead. Both Rima as Christian and Aira as a 
Muslim make the same point. Rima’s cultural background from a Muslim majority country in the 
  
152 
Middle East provides her with knowledge about Islam and the experience of distinguishing 
between Islam and Middle Eastern culture. Neither Rima nor Aira evaluate the different customs 
of naming women in their comments, so they do not reveal what they think about these practices. 
Instead, they suggest an analytical tool for the discussion: a distinction between Islam and 
tradition/culture where the latter may or may not be influenced by Islam. 
 
Eva37: Yes, it is tradition, but it is written here, isn’t it? So, we can see the 
origin of the tradition, can’t we? 
Eva38:   And not to have your own name is quite important. 
Eva39:  And here, in the next sequence in the text it is written, God says: “And 
when he had reached the top, where they could not see him, he turned 
towards the Ka’ba, lifted both hands to Allah and said this prayer: ‘Lord, 
I have settled a part of my offspring in a valley where nothing grows’.” 
Eva40:  This does not include Hagar, “offspring” … he settled his son there, not 
Hagar. 
 
Shirin29:  Everything belongs to him, both wife and son. 
 
Eva41:   Yes, but she is not mentioned.  
Eva42:   Hagar and her son … he says “offspring.” 
 
Aira33: Excuse me. In the Koran it says ahli. That means family, and that is both 
wife and children. It does not say so here. 
 
 
Eva turns the argument made by Rima and Aira around in Eva37. She suggests that the 
tradition of naming women in relation to their children may originate from the hadith – as part of 
the Islamic canonical tradition. This questions the relation between cultural versus religious roots 
of traditional practices, and Eva may comprehend that the relation between Islam and the cultural 
tradition is more complex than Rima and Aira see it, both of whom distinguished rather sharply 
between Islam and tradition in this respect. However, Eva is not exploring a possible complexity 
around the origin of this practice of naming women. She is connecting the custom of naming 
women in relation to their children with Islam because of how she perceived the text from the 
hadith.  
The underlying question is how one can distinguish between religion and 
tradition/culture. Since culture and religion are often intertwined in social practice and may 
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mutually legitimize each other’s practices, it is difficult to distinguish between them on a general 
basis. Religion may be seen to be opposed to culture or to parts of cultural practice, or the two 
areas may be seen as complementary fields with no real mutual friction between them. The 
religious believer may identify herself arbitrarily with culture or religion or enhance the 
significance of culture and/or religion by referring to oneself as “Western” or “Christian,” as 
“Arab” or “Muslim,” or as “Western” and “Muslim.” It is necessary to analyze the context 
further in order to tell if the use of cultural or religious categories in naming oneself and others 
carries a specific significance. However, how one identifies oneself in a discussion might suggest 
which discourse it is to which one relates at different times, given that there are several 
discourses present that provide room for a choice. As mentioned above, when Eva identifies 
herself as a Western woman, and the object of her criticism is defined as part of Islam, the 
probable line of conflict is drawn between the categories of the West and Islam, rather than 
between Christianity and Islam.  
Eva38 underlines the importance of “having your own name,” in a negative way. 
“Having your own name” is asserted over against being named in relation to one’s own child, 
which then would mean not having one’s own name. For Eva, having a name of one’s own thus 
seems to mean that the name refers to a person as an individual, with no reference to 
relationships or kinship.125  
The question of who is naming the children in relation to whom the mother is 
subsequently named is not raised. If one names one’s own child, this would be an indirect way of 
naming oneself. If a relative or society names the child, they then indirectly name the parent of 
the child. The focus in the discussion is, however, not so much on the practices of naming but on 
the right to be addressed by others by a personal name and how to assess the practice of being 
named in relation to one’s child. So far in the discussion, this is dealt with as exclusively a 
women’s issue. 
In Eva39 Eva moves into the broader area of patriarchal family structures she identifies in 
the text from the hadith. The sequence she quotes is the one verse from the Koran that is cited in 
this narrative, and thus it has a different status in the Islamic tradition from the rest of this text. 
Eva is critical with respect to how she perceives Abraham/Ibrahim talking about his family. She 
argues that he did not even mention Hagar/Hajar in this verse. Here she may implicitly be 
continuing a comparison between the biblical Hagar narrative and the text from the hadith, 
adding arguments for her comprehension of the hadith as a text where Hagar/Hajar is portrayed 
as being less in charge of her own and her son’s destiny than in the biblical text. 
                                                 
125 The discussion is about the cultural practice of using a person’s personal first name versus being named in terms 
of one’s children. Last names or family names are not mentioned. 
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Both Shirin and Aira argue that what was meant in the text was that Hagar/Hajar was 
included in Abraham’s declaration about his family (Shirin29, Aira33). Aira criticizes the 
translation in the Norwegian version of the hadith that was read in the group for causing this 
misunderstanding. She provides the Arabic term used in the koranic text, which means “family” 
(since this is a verse from the Koran) to correct the translation “offspring.”126 At the next 
meeting, however (Meeting 3), Aira corrected her own statement. She had checked the koranic 
verse in the meantime and found that the word in the Koran was not the Arabic word for family, 
as she had suggested, but the word for offspring, as it had been translated. She stated this in her 
first contribution at the next meeting but claimed that this did not change her overall perspective 
of the text. She argues, however, that this does not in any way mean that the text or Ibrahim 
means to ignore Hajar. She points to Ibrahim’s prayer in the koranic verse in the hadith narrative 
as an expression of concern for both Hajar and Ishmael. 
Shirin29 perceives the patriarchal perspective of the tradition in a different way. Shirin 
explains that Abraham is to be regarded as the “family owner” of both Hagar/Hajar and Ishmael. 
This includes Hagar/Hajar, as part of his property. Shirin’s point, however, is that Hagar was not 
excluded. 
The discussion now moved into what became Discussion 2, but Maria later went back to 
the discussion on the practice of naming women. She introduces a new perspective: 
 
Maria8:  For me, when I read both these texts, I thought that very little has 
changed between those times and ours. 
Maria9:  The only difference is that things are more formalized.  
Maria10: I believe that the difficulty of not getting any children still bothers 
women. 
Maria11: Just that today it is possible to have access to the technology …. So you 
can … You don’t need a man to have a child today. 
Maria12: But it is also that … this is very interesting for me because there is a lot 
of tradition. Because when I read this, it could have been written from 
some of my places in Africa. 
Maria13: It’s just right: if a woman is married and without children, they find 
another woman for the man in order for him to have children. So this is a 
current theme today, not only at that time. 
Maria14: And good technology has arrived, then it gets fixed with technology and 
as I said it is a little …. 
                                                 
126 In the Norwegian translation of the hadith: avkom. 
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Maria15: And what Eva brought up, that she is named in relation to her son … to 
me this is a joy when someone calls me in relation to my daughter 
because I am …. They call me mama Isabel, then I feel very proud. 
Maria16: So it is very traditional, too, what you are called. And in Africa, we don’t 
call women by their names … never. We call them in relation to their son 
or daughter, for instance …. 
 
Eva43:  John, my oldest son’s name is John.  
 
Maria17: Yes. If you came to Africa, people would say mama John. They would 
not call you Eva. They would call you mama John. 
Maria18: There is quite a lot of tradition in the texts. 
 
 
Maria finds that the temporal gap between the historical contexts of the texts and present 
contexts does not automatically imply that significant changes have taken place. The text from 
the Bible and that from the hadith differ in their respective historical contexts as well as in their 
time of origin, but Maria does not reflect on this difference when fusing the times of the texts 
together as “those times.” The different cultural, historical, and religious contexts of the texts are 
thus underexposed as Maria constructs a common time for the two texts. Her main aim is to 
show the similarities between “those times” and “our time” concerning the position of women as 
connected to the social expectation of having children. The latter could be interpreted as “now” 
but perhaps also as “in our lifetime,” going beyond the exact present. The issue of childlessness 
is part the theme of the Genesis narrative but does not connect immediately with the text from 
the hadith. 
If the perspective of time in Maria’s meaning making is simplified into the categories of 
“then” and “now,” she constructs two different time categories in her statements. While 
recognizing them as different times, Maria still merges them by presenting the fact that 
barrenness for women today is still a problematic in exactly in the same way that it was in the 
Genesis text. However, the new perspective she includes is loaded with experiences from another 
geographical location than the immediate Norwegian context. A man is allowed or expected to 
turn to another woman if his wife is barren in order to ensure that he has children – just as 
Abraham did in the Genesis narrative. Maria states that “they,” without further specification, 
would find him another woman, thus describing it as a social and cultural act in the African 
context, rather than an individual one, to which she is referring (Maria13).  
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Maria extends the geographical and cultural area in view, merging the “then” and the 
“now” of the African contexts mentioned (Maria12). Through her use of spatial references she 
may be expressing her view that the place where a woman lives is more crucial for her life than 
the times in which she lives. In her use of the category of time, “then” and “now” merge, but her 
spatial perspective visualizes a difference that is already there but has not been articulated until 
now. 
The technology mentioned as a solution for childless women in Maria11 emphasizes this 
point. Technology of this kind is not available for everyone at a global level. This creates a 
spatial as well as social division between women who have access to this technology and those 
who do not. 
Maria does not apply the observed temporal merging between “then” and “now” – 
brought about through similarities between the African context and the historical context of the 
Hagar/Hajar narratives – in the same way to contexts outside Africa. The Norwegian context is 
not mentioned. The temporal merging expresses Maria’s view of the relation between the 
Hagar/Hajar narratives and the African context to which she refers: they are closely related on 
social and cultural issues concerning the naming of women and women’s status as parents. The 
interpretative or meaning-making problem Maria addresses is thus related to a gap between 
places or contexts, between African contexts and, for instance, Norway, and between the 
Norwegian context and the biblical text. 
Maria’s temporal and spatial meaning making creates a new interpretation of the past 
represented in the texts through accenting a current context geographically distant. By 
connecting the African context to the Hagar/Hajar narratives, she brings the past (“then”) closer 
to the here and now.  
The view of historical evolutionism, which is basically that the historical development of 
all cultures and societies follow the same pattern, and that cultures are evaluated by the extent to 
which they have embraced Western modernity, could also lump the pre-modern times of the 
biblical text and the African context together in one category. Johannes Fabian criticizes 
social/historical evolutionism for being ethnocentric and for denying coevalness and thus 
equality between people living in different cultures (Fabian 1983: 17, 30-31). But this is hardly 
what Maria intends in this sequence. Social/historical evolutionism and its categorizations of 
other cultures often portray the “then” and “there” as one-dimensional times/places – 
constructing an image of the people living in such times/spaces as inferior to the here/now, with 
the West as the epistemological center. Maria does not seem to mention the African context she 
speaks about as an example of the “distant” as inferior. Her message can be taken as an attempt 
to bring the realities of a distant context (“there”), into the space of “here,” in order to signify 
experiences from other places in the here and now. Maria displays an interpretative position as 
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being multi-located and uses this to challenge the presupposition that Norway or the West is the 
only (or the central) interpretative context for the Hagar narrative.127  
Finally, Maria addresses the issue of naming women in relation to their children 
(Maria15). One of the problems of a childless woman in, for example, an African context as 
described by Maria may be that she had no children in relation to whom she could be named, so 
her childlessness would be confirmed every time her name was mentioned and in her self-
presentation. In this way a woman’s status with respect to motherhood and naming are linked 
together. It could be that this is exactly what a man must avoid through arranging a new partner 
if the present female partner does not produce children (Maria13). If a proper name in this 
context is linked with being a parent, to ensure a proper name for a man seems to be more 
important than doing so for a woman. 
Against the background of Maria’s descriptions of the consequences of childlessness for 
an African woman, the problems presented by Eva earlier (connected with being named in 
relation to one’s children) are put in a different perspective. Maria does show that she perceives 
the custom of being named in relation to her children quite differently from how Eva does 
(Maria15). Instead of interpreting this as depriving her of a “name” of her own, she expresses joy 
and pride over being included in this custom.  
In Maria16 Maria refers to the process of naming as “traditional.” Naming a person is 
part of a broader tradition for Maria, and even if her further example of a tradition is African, she 
does not exclude other practices of naming as “not traditional.” Maria’s argument extends the 
discussion of naming from concentrating on cultural tradition and religion in Islamic and Muslim 
practice to including African customs of naming. She does not mention religiously motivated 
traditions or religion in her contribution. Through this the religious element in the discussion is 
supplied with a cultural perspective on the tradition. “Tradition” is introduced as something 
distinct from religion, at least it appears this way in the discussion. 
In the discussion so far, the notion of tradition is used only concerning the practice of 
naming a woman after her child’s name, not for the practice of addressing a woman by her 
personal first name. Tradition is thus connected to the African practice Maria describes and to 
the practice in the hadith, connected to a practice in Muslim communities at the time of origin of 
the hadith text. A direct religious legitimization of this practice in Islam is denied. Nevertheless, 
the spatial and temporal space of this particular practice of naming is described as being in the 
                                                 
127 Kwok Pui-Lan uses the expression “diasporic consciousness” as a skill that reveals dominant discourses in a 
feminist postcolonial based criticism of the notions of “center” and “periphery” as they are displayed in these 
discourses. She emphasizes that the multiple location of a diasporic female subject creates a need to negotiate 
contexts, and that this may situate her in a position to be able to decenter the center (Kwok 2005: 44-51).  
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“then” of the hadith, the “now and there” in Africa and not in the “then” of the biblical text about 
Hagar or in the “here and now” of the Norwegian context.  
Maria (in Maria16) expresses herself in a way that may reflect both closeness and 
distance toward the practice of naming that she claims is “traditional.” She includes herself in an 
African “we,” while at the same time noting that the traditional naming of women implies that a 
woman’s “own name” is never used. What is a woman’s “real” name in a context where she is 
named in relation to her children? For Maria, it seems that she refers to a woman’s “own name” 
here as her first name. She might be putting it that way because she views the issue in that way, 
but it may also be because she wants to be understood by the others. If the latter, this might 
indicate that Maria relates to what she perceives to be a dominant discourse in the group, and this 
would be a discourse where the immediate interpretation of what the “real” name of a woman 
was is her first name. Maria may have internalized the perspective of looking at oneself and 
one’s own background from a dominant Western perspective. If it is done automatically, and the 
view of the other is internalized into one’s own view of oneself, this connects to postcolonial 
theory’s criticism that the colonized or dominated ones are made to look at themselves as 
through the eyes of the colonizers or the dominant group. But including the assumed or actual 
perception by the other of oneself may also be a result of self-reflexivity and communicative 
knowledge, if done deliberately. Maria’s perspective is perhaps best framed by Kwok Pui-Lan’s 
term diasporic counsciousness, which is multi-located and may be able to recognize difference 
as “outsiders from within” (Kwok 2005: 49).  
Maria ends her contribution by inviting Eva to name herself following the African 
custom as a performance (Maria17), and Eva accepts the invitation (Eva44). This act includes 
Eva in an imagined African context as a possible visitor, demonstrating that as a guest, she 
would be named according to the tradition there.  
Maria18 connects “tradition” with “the texts.” In Maria16 the African practice of naming 
is called “traditional.” The spatial and temporal space of the texts (from the Bible and from the 
hadith) are connected to the current African contexts of Maria and thus all labeled as close to 
“tradition.” 
 
Inger1:   Can I just ask … what do they call the fathers? 
 
Maria19:  It is the same. Father John, it is the same. 
 
Eva44:   Do they? 
 
Maria20:  And if they don’t have children you will be called …. 
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Eva45:   In relation to your husband. 
 
Inger is the first participant in the discussion who addresses the naming of fathers, rather 
than only the mothers. This broadens the perspective to include both genders. Maria claims that 
in the African context to which she refers, both parental genders are included in the practice of 
being named in relation to their children. Inger does not ask about the practice in hadith or in 
predominantly Muslim cultures. Eva44 might show that Eva is surprised by this information. 
Maria then attempts to add information about how men, or men and women without children, are 
named, but Eva answers this question with regard to women (Eva45). Maria does not correct this 
statement, so Eva’s answer is left as its stands.  
The question of how men without children are named is not raised, nor does anyone ask 
how women without either husband or children are named.  
 
Practices of Naming as an Example of Discrimination Against Women  
in Text and Context 
The core issue in the discussion, which is the practice of naming a woman in relation to her 
child, was introduced by one of the Lutheran Christian Norwegian participants as an example of 
discrimination against women in the hadith. This is based on the observation that Hajar is 
referred to exclusively as the mother of Ishmael in this text. The way the participant reflects on 
this implies a possible connotation of the entire Islamic tradition, on the basis of the text from the 
hadith. In the hadith Ibrahim acts under his first name, and not as the “father of Ishmael.” In the 
background is the biblical text, which calls Hagar by her personal name and in which Hagar 
names God. The premise for evaluating the hadith as discriminatory against Hajar in particular 
(and women in general) is that the practice of naming demonstrated in the hadith is regarded as 
discriminatory against women. Notably, the participant who addresses this does not start a 
discussion about any of the incidents or practices in the Genesis text that may be used as a 
starting point for reflecting on possible discrimination against women in the Bible or in the 
Christian tradition.  
Throughout the discussion about religion versus cultural traditions, the participants with 
African, Middle Eastern, and Asian backgrounds (Maria, Rima, and Aira) all claim that the 
naming practice present in the hadith is not particularly connected to Islam as a religion. They 
connected the practice to cultural traditions in different times and places.  
Not everyone agrees with the premise that this way of naming women is problematic or 
discriminatory against women. The Lutheran Christian African-Norwegian participant claims 
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that there are other cultural practices representing far more important challenges to women’s 
situation.  
It seems that Maria, Rima, and Aira together form a transreligious and transcultural 
interpretative community. They share a pre-understanding of where to situate the practice of 
naming women in relation to their children, namely in what they call “the traditional,” which is 
distinguished from the religious, apart from Maria’s statement linking “tradition” closely to the 
texts. What these participants have in common is that they are from so-called non-Western 
countries. They may all share a diasporic consciousness, sensitive to changing positions between 
outsiders and insiders and with a multi-local perspective (Kwok 2005: 49). To characterize a 
certain naming practice as “tradition” or “traditional,” however, is only done to name practices of 
the “then” and “there,” represented by the hadith and the African context to which Maria is 
referring. The “here and now” naming practice located in the West, and the naming practice in 
the biblical story, are not called “traditional.” The question is how the labels “tradition” and 
“traditional” are being used and if the participants use them in the same way. If “tradition” is 
used as an antonym of “modern,” it could suggest a certain distance (in time and space) to what 
is called traditional. The distinction between Islam and tradition that some of the participants 
propose may indicate that they do not regard Islam as foreign to modernity. The Muslim 
participants hesitate to criticize the text from the hadith. The translation is questioned, but not the 
text. 
Maria, Rima, and Aira do not seem to evaluate the naming practice in the hadith as a 
grave example of discrimination against women, like Eva does. This means that her possible 
attempt to create a platform for a shared feminist criticism of the text from the hadith on this 
basis does not succeed. Instead, Maria introduces another issue as more problematic for women, 
namely the social consequences of childlessness in specific contexts.  
Eva addresses the one verse from the Koran in the text from the hadith as another 
example of the devaluing of Hajar in the narrative. Eva may not know that this part of the text is 
quoted from the Koran. Shirin accepts the challenge and refers to the patriarchal structure of 
family ownership. Aira, however, turns to the translation of the Arabic term in the Koran to look 
for an inclusive interpretation with regard to Hajar, of what is translated as “offspring.” Thus, the 
translation is suggested as being responsible for the exclusion of Hajar. Later, Aira corrected her 
information about the koranic text and confirmed that the word “offspring” was part of the 
original text. She pointed out, however, that Ibrahim confirmed Hajar’s importance and his care 
for her through his prayer.  
Inger’s question about the naming of men in the African tradition to which Maria refers 
moves the discussion in a different direction: in order to say something about the gendered 
influence of a practice, it is necessary to map the practice regarding both genders. The 
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confirmation that both genders are included in the practice may show that possible gender 
discrimination has to be evaluated more closely in order to see the practice of naming in a larger 
context. 
 
Communicating across Cultural Paradigms 
 in a Discussion of Religious Canonical Texts  
To identify oneself and situate one’s speaking may shift according to contexts and 
circumstances. The participants who can be described as multi-located, inhabiting a diasporic 
consciousness (cf. Kwok), are skilled in distinguishing between religious and cultural practices 
and between various cultural practices. In a discussion or conversation one’s self-identification 
can change due to the issue on the table or, as in this discussion, an issue derived from a religious 
canonical text. To address a question situated mainly in cultural and social traditions seems to 
make some of the participants identify themselves culturally rather than religiously: Eva 
identifies herself as a Western woman whereas Maria identifies herself as an African. Rima does 
not identify her position clearly either religiously or culturally, and neither does Shirin. Aira talks 
from a religious perspective. 
In this particular discussion, adding the cultural perspective provides more clarity. It can 
be asked if this has an impact on the mode of communication in the group when a cultural 
identification emerges into the foreground of the communicative positions. Does this make them 
change either their reasoning or the discursive resources they use in the conversation? Some 
participants continue to speak from a religious perspective. But for others, the intersection 
between culture and religion might not be seen as an intersection at all but as a rope of different 
cords that are fully integrated. 
In the former discussion, the issue of religious representation was discussed. In this 
discussion, the claim of speaking as a “Western woman” or as an “African” is not discussed 
further. The participants in question do not clarify further as to where they are speaking from or 
on behalf of whom. Nor is there any discussion concerning religious representation. This may 
suggest that the cultural identification is considered to be less problematic within the group and 
perhaps that cultural identity is regarded as less significant than religious identity. But it could 
also indicate that it becomes simply too much to question all different types of representation at 
the same time.  
Returning to the former questions, it may seem that naming an issue as “cultural” opens 
the way for new interpretative communities across religious divides. For some participants, 
however, it seems to be less important to discuss issues identified as cultural practices, unless the 
intention is to claim a distinction between cultural and religious practices. 
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The fact that one of the participants criticizes the hadith on the basis of an explicitly 
Western perspective may indicate that a specific discourse on Islam, the West, and feminism, 
where Islam as such is viewed as contradicting ideals of gender equality, is used as a pre-
interpretative frame for the criticism. The question also arises if this participant relates to the text 
from her own tradition (the Genesis text) as a religious text during the discussion and to the text 
of the other tradition more as a cultural expression or as part of the context than as a canonical 
scripture. 
 
Naming and Dialogue 
Paolo Freire calls dialogue a shared act of naming the world (Freire 2000: 88). This act of 
naming re-humanizes human beings, since naming the world is a transforming act and humans 
were originally intended to name the world around them (Freire 2000: 88) In this discussion the 
issue is the naming of women, based on cases both within the texts and brought in from cultural 
contexts (the West, Africa). Even if the participants do not agree on calling the practice labeled 
“traditional” discriminatory against (and thus de-humanizing) women, there seems to be a 
general agreement that naming is important. Perhaps a dialogue about “naming the world” may 
be rephrased as “naming women,” and the act of naming together could be replaced by 
“exploring and discussing different ways of naming and their contextual significance.” And 
perhaps the act of naming the world is not as simple as Freire puts it but needs to be situated and 
discussed. 
 
Discussion 2 Related to the Hagar/Hajar Narratives.  
Eva: “How could Hagar/Hajar abandon Ishmael in the desert?”  
Eva also introduces the next discussion initiated by reading the Hagar/Hajar narratives. The 
question Eva poses that dominates the following discussion is: How could Hagar/Hajar leave 
Ishmael in the desert and walk away? 
 
Eva46:  And there is one thing I find very strange in both texts. It is that both 
Hagars, I would almost say, Hagar in the biblical text and Hajar in the 
koranic text, abandon their child. 
Eva47:   I don’t believe that. 
Eva48:  This … they can’t stand him screaming or watching him die, so they 
abandon him. 
Eva49:  And the child lies under a bush there somewhere, and then the mother 
abandons her child. 
Eva50:  Do you know what? I don’t believe that. 
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Eva51:  This must have been written by a man. 
(Laughter among the participants) 
Eva52:  I don’t believe it for a minute. 
Eva53: So, if I had a small child who was crying, would I leave him under a 
bush and walk away?  
 
Eva’s statement that the narrative was obviously written by a man makes everyone laugh. 
This shared laughter that also occurs on later occasions in the group and may be interpreted in 
different ways.128 It is not obvious that Eva is trying to be funny, and it is not necessarily so that 
the other participants find what she says funny either. It can be interpreted as the result of a 
surprise, to indicate that Eva’s suggestion is unexpected. The laughter could be a way to relieve 
tension or simply to express a mode of absurdity. However the laughter is interpreted, it is a 
shared and spontaneous expression without words in the group, even if the laughter itself could 
carry more than one meaning. 
What troubles Eva is that she is not able to make meaning of the narrated event of 
Hagar/Hajar abandoning Ishmael in the desert. She refers explicitly to both texts and relates to 
parts of both narratives where they share the same plot, while still relating to them as 
distinctively different texts. The parts of the narratives that deal with Hagar/Hajar and Ishmael in 
the desert have significant similarities, and she identifies Hagar’s abandonment of Ishmael as a 
point in common. 
In Eva47 Eva states that a possible way of making meaning of this particular shared part 
of the narratives is to label it as “not true.” She repeats this remark twice afterwards, in Eva50 
and Eva52. But in what way does Eva mean that this narrated event could be called “not true”? 
There are different possibilities that would challenge the texts at different levels. She may mean 
that she does not believe that a historical event with a mother and a child alone in the desert is 
likely to have played out like this. This implies that the event of Hagar/Hajar abandoning 
Ishmael is not regarded as trustworthy historically, in the sense that what it narrates is unlikely to 
have taken place, historically. If this is Eva’s interpretive step, it suggests that she wants to 
explore the plausibility of the narratives’ historical reference.  
But Eva is reading a written narrative and relating to a text, not a historical situation. She 
is interacting with the narratives in the present and not in the past time. Even if she addresses a 
problem concerning the historical plausibility of the narratives, she interacts with textual 
narratives, and with the other participants in the group – all situated in the present. Her struggle 
                                                 
128 I will elaborate more on this in the analysis of the meaning making of the prescriptive texts; cf. Chapter 6, p. 
232-233. 
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to make meaning of the narrative is situated in the here and now, as a contemporary reader “in 
front of the text.”129 When Eva accuses the text of being “not true” on this specific point, the 
accusation is directed toward the narratives in the present, since both the historical contexts of 
the texts and the narrators/authors are unknown and out of reach.  
The above reflections do not, however, exclude the possibility that Eva means to address 
a historical situation, even if it is out of reach. According to Mieke Bal, the need to address moral 
dilemmas in the past by using contemporary approaches cannot be avoided if one takes the past 
seriously. At the same time it is necessary to be aware of the contextual difference and to accept 
the limited access of a present reader to the past (Bal 2008: 48). Eva’s approach, if it uses Bal’s 
criterion of taking the past seriously by addressing contemporary moral dilemmas, definitively 
does so.  
Eva expresses rejection of the information from the narrative that Hagar/Hajar abandons 
her son three times in this sequence. This rejection includes a moral evaluation of Hagar/Hajar’s 
act of abandonment. The dilemma of leaving her son might be a moral dilemma for Hagar/Hajar 
in the narratives, but it now becomes a dilemma for the reader of the text, for Eva, when she tries 
to make meaning of the story.  
Through her comments and statements Eva constructs a position for herself regarding the 
narratives/canonical scriptures: She relates to the narratives as written texts by positioning 
herself as a subject in relation to the text. As a subject, she defines her possibility and mandate to 
be critical of the texts, which entails asking critical questions, implying the possibility of 
abandoning the texts or parts of them. She does not establish this position only in relation to the 
text of her own tradition but also in relation to the text from the Islamic tradition as well. Her 
subjective position is not static and distanced regarding the texts: she is involved in the dilemma 
she derives from the narratives so that her own associations, reactions, and reflections are 
involved in exploring and challenging the narratives.  
Her interaction with the text, substantial in her meaning making, occurs through 
analogical thinking. This is how Eva finds a basis for constructing a meaning of the problem she 
identifies in the text, as demonstrated when she states what she would have done in a situation 
analogous to the situation of Hagar/Hajar, shown by her rhetorical question in Eva53. She claims 
that she herself would never leave a child under similar circumstances. In addition, through her 
statement in Eva51, she widens the analogy based on her own presupposed acting to include all 
                                                 
129 The expression “in front of the text” is usually connected to what is called reader-response criticism in literary 
theory. Kwok states that biblical interpretation has become more and more located in interpretative communities 
(another term from the reader-response school, which was founded by Stanley Fish; see Chapter 2), and that this is 
now a collectively dominant emphasis in interpreting the Bible. The former dominant paradigms, i.e. “behind the 
text,” connected to historical criticism, and “in the text,” influenced by literary criticism (Kwok 2005: 103).  
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women, not only herself, by a negative expression eliminating all female as writers of the texts. 
Eva constructs a narrator/author who is to be held responsible for the appearance of the moral 
dilemma (Eva51) as a solution. The only and decisive attribute she gives the narrator/author is 
the male gender. The implication is that the gender of the author/narrator is important for how 
the text should be interpreted. The gendered limitation of experience has given the narrative of a 
mother and child in the desert a distorted content. Behind this reasoning is a view of women’s 
and men’s experience as profoundly different. 
These interpretative steps suggest that she operates with a gendered hermeneutics that is 
based on analogical interpretation130 and on a particular anticipation of the relationship between 
the genders and between experience and gender. Eva leans on reasoning where women and men 
are viewed as having different experiences and thus writing the story differently and in addition 
she equals being a women with motherhood. Eva thus enters into a specific form of gendered 
hermeneutics related to so-called second-wave feminism (Cudd and Andreasen 2005: 7-8), 
where women’s experiences are universally categorized as different from men’s and bases a 
feminist critique on an anticipated unity based on gender.131 
In Eva46 and 48 Eva refers to Hagar/Hajar as “they,” i.e. in the plural. Ishmael is still 
referred to in the singular (Eva50). Doubling the person that leaves the child behind may have 
the effect of making the event even more dramatic: the child is abandoned by not only one but 
two mothers. In Eva49 Eva returns to the singular, talking about one “mother.” It seems that 
Eva’s alternation between the plural and the singular shifts in line with her view of the 
intertextual relation between the two narratives as fluid. She moves between relating to the 
narratives as one merged story at some points, and keeping the stories distinct at others. 
Eva suggests two answers to her own question: The first is to reject the historical 
plausibility of the event of Hagar/Hajar’s abandonment in the texts and see the author or the 
narrator as a man without the necessary knowledge of what he is writing/narrating. But when 
Eva searches for an answer to her own question within the framework of the narratives, she 
suggests an answer connected to her impression of Hagar/Hajar’s emotional state (Eva48): 
Hagar/Hajar left Ishmael to avoid the emotional pain of watching her son die or to escape the 
sound of his screaming. In both answers Eva is deeply involved in the moral dilemma she 
describes as the obstacle to her relating to the text at all. 
Rima and Aira suggest a different answer to Eva’s question: 
                                                 
130 See the section in Chapter 2 on Analogical Reasoning and Moral Enrichment/Critique, p. 48-50. 
131 So-called “third wave” feminism, usually considered as having started in the late 1980s, is influenced by 
poststructuralism and criticizes the notion of universal experiences for women. Instead, this is seen as “essentialism” 
and criticized for not taking diversity among women seriously and for constructing the categories men-women as 
binary opposites (Cudd and Andreasen 2005: 8 ). 
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Rima8: She walks away from him to find water, doesn’t she? She walks away in 
order to find water? 
 
Eva54:   No. 
 
Rima9:  Yes. 
 
Eva55:   Wait. Look here… 
  
Aira34:  Yes, yes. 
 
Rima and Aira both look for an answer within the frames of the two narratives. Rima 
finds an immediate meaning in Hagar/Hajar’s act of abandonment: She leaves Ishmael to find 
water in order to rescue the both of them from dying of thirst. This does not rule out an 
emotional engagement on Hagar/Hajar’s part, but the emphasis is on a different aspect of the 
action: she did not leave Ishmael primarily to protect herself emotionally. Rather, her action was 
directed toward a goal, i.e. to find water.  
What is the basis of the difference in the meaning making of this act? It may be caused by 
different positions taken toward the texts as readers, or it may go back to different experiences as 
a reference framework for analogical meaning making. To take the first possibility: Rima and 
Aira may have greater confidence in the text and in the narrative from the beginning because it 
was already well known to them. Their analogical reference, to take the last possibility, may 
include different experiences of existing interpretations of the narrative. I will return to this later 
when Aira shares her meaning making of the texts. 
In the further discussion, none of participants pay much attention to distinguishing 
between the two Hagar/Hajar narratives. The narratives have now merged – in the discussion. 
 
Eva56:  Here it says in the biblical text:  
Eva57: “Then she went and sat down opposite him a good way off, about the 
distance of a bowshot: for she was thinking: I cannot watch the boy die.” 
Eva58:  That’s why she leaves. 
Eva59: And it says: “She could not watch him … she went … and looked for 
people.” 
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Aira35: I cannot watch the boy die without doing anything; I will go up and find 
him some water. 
  
Eva60:  It doesn’t say that. 
 
Aira36:  Yes. That’s what it really is. 
 
Rima10: She’s going around in circles, isn’t she. 
 
Eva61: It says: “She could not endure looking at him.” “Safa was the nearest 
mountain to her.” “She stood on it and started looking at the valley 
keenly so that she might see somebody, but she could not see anybody.” 
  
Inger2:  She was looking for help. 
 
Eva62:  She did. 
Eva63:  But she cast him away … she couldn’t look at him. 
 
Inger3:  And you could carry a baby even if you went out. 
 
Eva claims repeatedly that Hagar/Hajar abandons Ishmael in order to protect herself 
emotionally. She bases her argument on both texts and quotes directly from the texts to 
legitimize her view (Eva57 and 61). The two narratives are quoted separately but face the same 
challenge from Eva. Inger and Aira relate to a common plot and do not differentiate between the 
narratives. Both interact with a merged narrative and suggest alternative answers to the puzzle of 
Hagar/Hajar’s abandonment of Ishmael. 
Aira keeps emphasizing what Hagar/Hajar is going to do (trying to find water) and not 
what she had done (leaving Ishmael). Inger1 is a contribution to the practically focused 
reasoning suggested by Rima and Aira earlier, still within the interpretative frame of the 
narratives. But in Inger2 Inger suggests a practical solution for the figure of Hagar/Hajar in the 
narratives, and thus she moves, as Eva did earlier, to a reading position that interacts closely with 
the narratives by suggesting an alternative plot to solve what Eva and now Inger see as the moral 
dilemma: Hagar/Hajar could have carried the boy with her when looking for water. This is an 
attempt to establish a contrafactual narrative, a “what if” question to bring in other premises for 
the narrative in order to change the plot. Inger uses analogical reasoning to do so, based on the 
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presupposition that anyone in Hagar’s situation could carry a baby with her/him. This is 
presumably addressed to both texts but as a merged plot. 
 
Eva64:  She left him, and a mother doesn’t do that. 
 
Aira37:  No, for me it’s because she cannot let him die of thirst. 
Aira38:  Because he doesn’t have water, so she has to do something. 
 
Eva64 does not follow up on Inger’s attempt to establish alternative premises for the 
story to solve the moral dilemma. Nor does she substitute her focus on the act of abandonment 
for a focus on the act of providing water. Eva64 may be interpreted in different ways. She could 
be criticizing Hagar/Hajar for being a bad mother, which would be a moral judgment on the 
Hagar/Hajar figure as a mother in the narratives (the mothers once again having merged in Eva’s 
statements). If so, the problem of the abandonment becomes a moral dilemma in relation to the 
Hagar/Hajar figure. Or she might be indicating that the act of abandonment has to be dismissed 
as a trustworthy part of the narratives, because the texts clearly situate Hagar/Hajar as a mother, 
and a mother simply does not act this way. If this is the content of what Eva says in Eva64, the 
reason why this event is narrated like this is, Eva has suggested earlier, because the narrator is a 
man. In the latter case the problem of the abandonment moves from the figure of Hagar/Hajar to 
a dilemma in the interpretative interaction with the text.  
Aira, as the only Muslim participant taking part in this discussion, repeats her 
understanding of the reason for Hagar/Hajar abandoning Ishmael: It is of a practical, literally 
life-saving character. This is not necessarily a rejection of imagining Hagar/Hajar to be less 
emotionally stressed, but the emotions would, according to this interpretation, have a practical 
outcome. Aira’s comments relate to the debate about what a mother should or should not do as a 
moral dilemma (Aira38). According to Aira, Hagar’s duty as a mother is not primarily, perhaps, 
to stay with her son but to do something to meet his life-threatening need for water, even if this 
means leaving him alone. 
 
Eva65:  You are interpreting something that is not in the text. 
 
Aira39: Then it is written wrongly … somebody has translated it from Arabic, 
this is not the actual text. 
  
Eva66:   So the translation is wrong? 
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Aira40:  Yes. 
 
Eva67:  All right. 
 
Aira41: I will claim that one hundred percent. Because the meaning is that she 
had to do it out of necessity. 
Aira42:  We who perform hajj …. 
  
 
Eva68: Yes, because it is written here: “She could not endure looking at him.” 
Eva69:  She went away and found Safa to be the nearest mountain. 
   
Aira43: Yes, because she would be standing at the top of the mountain searching 
for someone who could help her. 
 
Inger4:  She was looking for water. 
 
Eva70:  Because … You put that meaning there; it doesn’t say so. 
 
Aira44:  The translation is wrong. 
Aira45: Because if you understand it … she went there to find water, and she 
looked in that direction many times.132 
Aira46: I will tell you that, when we perform our pilgrimage then, as it says here, 
this is sa’y. 
Aira47:  This is why one performs sa’y. 
Aira48: Sa’y means that one runs back and forth between Safa and Marwa, the 
two mountains. 
Aira49: And then she runs really fast at certain points in order to watch the child 
… in between the places where she was not able to see the child. 
Aira50: So there are many women and men who are running quickly between the 
mountains … to follow the tradition, in remembrance of her struggle.  
 
                                                 
132 Aira commented on this when reading the final text, stating that what she meant was to emphasize that, in the 
narrative from the hadith, Hajar could see Ishmael from the mountain top. 
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None of the written Hagar/Hajar narratives explicitly mention that the Hagar/Hajar figure 
leaves Ishmael to seek for water. This makes Eva accuse Aira of “interpreting something that is 
not in the text” (Eva65). Again, the two narratives are treated as one by Eva. Aira’s answer, 
however, is limited to the text from the Islamic tradition (Aira39), and she states that the reason 
why it appears as if she interprets outside of the texts is confusion in the translation process from 
Arabic. Aira39 shows one possible strategy to apply to a problem of making meaning of a 
translated text: the translation could be proven wrong, inaccurate, or contested, so that going 
back to the original text and critically evaluating the translation might solve or transform the 
problem. This may make the problem vanish, or make it appear easier to solve in a satisfactory 
way.  
Although the narrative from the hadith does not explicitly say that Hagar went away to 
look for water, it does state that she went to look for other people to get help, and that the 
problem is Ishmael’s and her own thirst. Eva65 may then be concerned mostly with the Genesis 
narrative, reflecting that Eva thinks Aira does not include the biblical narrative of Hagar in her 
representation of the narrative. Aira’s answer in Aira39 clearly reflects only the text from the 
hadith. In this particular elaboration of the narratives’ contents, it seems as if the two participants 
limit their perspective to the text from their own tradition.  
One of Eva’s comments (Eva65) is highly critical of Aira’s way of interacting with the 
narratives so far. When Eva quotes from narratives as a basis for her critique of Aira, this may 
seem contradictory to her own earlier criticism of the texts, questioning their validity. Eva can 
thus be said to take more than one position. On the one hand, she is ready to dismiss the text if 
she cannot accept it as consistent with her own analogical interpretation, but, on the other hand, 
she engages closely with the expressions and wording of the texts. In both positions she remains 
critical. Aira, on the contrary, takes a position where she defends the narratives as well as the 
acts of Hagar/Hajar. In this position she tries to argue for consistency and the existence of an 
acceptable solution to the moral dilemma Eva poses. 
The question in this sequence is still: Why did Hagar/Hajar abandon Ishmael in the 
desert? It seems to be of utmost importance to find a satisfactory answer to this question for all 
parties in the discussion. Eva has stated earlier that her whole relation to the narratives is at stake 
here and that she may be ready to dismiss them if she does not find a meaning in the narratives at 
this particular point. 
Aira elaborates on her answer to why she believed Hagar/Hajar left Ishmael to find water. 
This particular text and narrative is the origin in the Islamic sources for the later developed ritual 
of sa’y during hajj (Esposito 2003: 103). The performance of sa’y is modeled after Hajar’s 
struggle to survive and rescue Ishmael in the desert, and the central act of sa’y, which is running 
between Safa and Marwa, is interpreted as an imitation of her struggle to find water. The ritual of 
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sa’y is highly significant to Aira in her meaning making of the Hagar narrative: The narrative 
and the ritual mutually interpret each other across the time gap.  
In Aira46 she uses the pronoun “we,” including herself and presumably all Muslims as 
potential and actual performers of sa’y. This may be why she is confident that Hagar/Hajar 
leaves Ishmael to find water: to Aira, this is the story of the first sa’y and in performing sa’y, one 
seeks the well of Zam-Zam (Esposito 2003: 103). Aira mentions explicitly that the ritual of sa’y 
includes both women and men. All Muslims who have experienced the hajj have thus become 
part of the Hajar narrative through reproducing or performing Hajar’s struggle across the 
temporal gap between “then” and “now” and across the line between the narrative and text on the 
one hand and religious experience on the other. 
Aira thus presents another way of interacting with the narrative: by participating in a 
ritual performance based on the narrative. In the case of the Hagar/Hajar narrative, the 
performance of sa’y is exclusively reserved for Muslims, since non-Muslims do not have access 
to Mecca or to the hajj. Inger joins Aira’s assumption that Hagar/Hajar leaves Ishmael to find 
water (Inger4), but for Inger, this is not based on the ritual of sa’y as a source for the meaning 
making. Inger’s reasoning is possibly influenced by Aira’s inputs but it can also be the result of 
analogical reasoning. Aira and Inger may share a position toward the canonical texts in a less 
critical quest for meaning, at least in this particular section of the discussion. But when Inger 
suggests different premises for solving the moral dilemma of Hagar/Hajar in the narrative, Aira 
does not suggest any such change. There is no such need for her to keep the narratives consistent, 
only to keep a critical eye on the translation.  
 
Rima10: She was totally confused. 
 
With a possible defense of the figure of Hagar/Hajar, Rima also moves to the position of 
interacting with the narratives, imagining the emotional state of Hagar/Hajar. Rima moves 
toward an analogical reasoning to an existential level that may draw on her own potential 
feelings in a similar situation. There is nothing explicitly narrated that would indicate that 
Hagar/Hajar was confused in any of the texts. Rima does not say anything more about this, 
however, and Susanne enters the discussion: 
 
Susanne1:  But this is not a criticism of Hagar; it is a criticism of …. 
Susanne2:  It is only an observation that this is written by a man because a woman 
might not …. 
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Susanne1-2 suggest a distinction between criticizing Hagar/Hajar as an independent 
figure in the narratives and criticizing the construction of the narratives’ plot. Is criticism of 
Hagar/Hajar’s action in the narrative a criticism of the figure of Hagar as such? Or is it a 
criticism of the textual narratives? Both Hagar/Hajar, as well as the authors of the text or the 
narrators, are beyond our reach. Only the presence of the narratives makes it possible to have 
access to Hagar/Hajar and to criticize her actions. Susanne does not suggest a connection 
between the criticism of Hagar/Hajar and the criticism of the canonical scriptures as such. 
Susanne answers Aira by presenting a different defense of Hagar/Hajar. Aira places the 
problem partly outside the narratives, in the translation of the text, and partly interprets the 
Hagar/Hajar narratives within the reference framework of the Islamic ritual of sa’y. For Aira, the 
challenge is not to keep the texts consistent but to keep the conversation together and explain her 
views. Susanne seems to take a more distanced reading role than the others by using the word 
“observation” in Susanne2. However, she can be interpreted as supporting parts of Eva’s 
reasoning (Susanne2): the puzzle of Hagar/Hajar’s abandonment of Ishmael could be solved by 
constructing a male author/narrator in accordance with Eva’s analogical thinking and gendered 
hermeneutics. Susanne does not, however, address the question of why Hagar/Hajar abandoned 
her son directly. Susanne is possibly defending Eva and relating more to the discussion than to 
the narratives. 
 
Aira51: … I can’t accept that it is because it is written by a man or that he would neglect 
the status of Hagar. She has a high status for us, for all Muslims. 
 
It is not clear if Aira is referring to both texts or only to the text from the hadith (Aira51). In the 
latter case, this would mean that for her both Hagar/Hajar stories have now merged into one – 
but this one merged story is the story as it is narrated in the hadith. 
Aira brings in the status of Hagar/Hajar as a pivotal issue for her by referring to Hajar’s 
high status in the Islamic tradition. She does not clarify how she perceives that Hagar/Hajar’s 
status is in danger of being violated. A possible interpretation would be that claiming that 
Hagar/Hajar made a mistake or acted in a morally dubious way would imply disrespect for her 
status. This could, for instance, refer to Eva’s criticism of the figure of Hagar/Hajar as a mother.  
Aira strongly refuses to blame the supposedly male author(s). She dismisses the 
possibility that the author, male or not, would violate the status of Hagar/Hajar in any way. If 
Aira requires the portrayal of Hagar/Hajar to be flawless in the narratives due to her high 
position in Islam, this would not fit with interpreting her actions as a possible attempt to put her 
own life or well-being before the life of her son. Moreover, Aira dismisses Eva’s gender-based 
hermeneutical position, since an alleged male author does not play any important role for Aira. 
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What is important to her is to explain Hagar/Hajar’s status in Islam, as a figure above criticism. 
Hagar/Hajar’s act of abandonment is, as stated above, not an interpretational problem for Aira, 
but she nevertheless rejects the idea that a male author would distort the narratives. 
 
Eva71:  This is not about neglecting her status. 
Eva72:  It is that she does it. A woman should say that she didn’t. 
  
Aira52:  In my opinion she hasn’t done it, if you understand it. 
 
In this verbal interaction between Eva and Aira, their respective perspectives do not 
appear to relate to the same problem. Eva rejects any relevance of Hagar/Hajar’s religious status 
for the discussion (Eva71). Her problem is how to trust the textual narrative as long as she feels 
that Hagar/Hajar leaves Ishmael alone in the desert. Eva’s analogical interpretation seems to be 
based on the presupposition that, universally, women and men make different ethical judgments 
based on their gender or gendered experience, and there is a possible slide in her argument 
between the subjects “woman” and “mother” (Eva72).  
Aira52 actually shares Eva’s view that Hagar/Hajar did not abandon Ishmael, but the 
agreement is based on different premises. Aira agrees that Hagar/Hajar left the child, as the 
textual narrative states, but she does not agree that the reason was to spare Hagar/Hajar from 
emotional pain, as Eva suggested. Aira has claimed that Hagar/Hajar left to fulfill her duty as a 
mother: namely to get help for her son.  
Both Eva and Aira thus defend the figure of Hagar/Hajar but on different grounds. Aira 
defends both the textual narratives as canonical scriptures, as well as the figure of Hagar/Hajar. 
Eva’s defense of Hagar is based on the presupposition of how women (mothers) act as a 
universal principle. Their different premises may imply a difference between Eva and Aira in 
their perception of the texts and their own positioning as meaning-making subjects. This 
difference may originate from the different perception of canonical scriptures in the Christian 
and Muslim traditions, but this issue has not surfaced in the discussion so far. A different 
positioning as readers of the text has, however, become visible, for Aira’s contributions are 
shaped mostly by her reference to the Islamic religious practice of sa’y.  
Inger then enters the discussion again and turns back to the text from the Old Testament: 
 
Inger5:  In the Old Testament at least it says very clearly 
Inger6: and I don’t think it’s a wrong translation that she abandoned her child. 
Inger7: So I agree. You don’t do that. You can carry a little baby with you. 
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Eva73: No I mean, when he is lying there, dying, then you would want to hold 
your child until it dies – you don’t leave him. 
  
Aira53: She wanted to climb a high mountain and to watch the child at the same 
time …. 
Aira54: Or perhaps someone else who is with her … in a way it was her home 
right there where he is lying, wasn’t it. 
Aira55: It was just her and the baby, right … she is going up the mountain to see 
if there were people she could ask to help. 
  
Eva74: So, the kid is shivering down there, and you climb the mountain? 
  
Aira56:  Only to find help. Only to find help. 
 
Eva75:  All right. 
 
Aira57:  It’s a misunderstanding. 
 
This is the closing sequence of the discussion, and the participants do not come to an 
agreement on why the Hagar/Hajar figure left Ishmael in the desert in both narratives. The 
arguments presented in the sequence by Inger, Eva, and Aira are basically similar to what they 
have already presented, but the tone is sharpened a bit and the engagement with the narrative is 
strong.  
Aira is still the only Muslim participant taking part in the discussion. Inger states that she 
does not see that a critical evaluation of the translation is a possible solution to the problem of 
Hagar’s abandonment of Ishmael regarding the biblical text (Inger4-7). But after she made this 
comment (directed to the biblical text), the two narratives seem to merge into one in what is left 
of the discussion: Hagar/Hajar climbed a mountain only in the text from the hadith, but in the 
discussion this evolves into a shared premise. Eva, now supported by Inger, strongly maintains 
that it is unacceptable that Hagar/Hajar abandoned the child, whereas Aira defends Hagar’s 
decision of leaving him in order to get help.  
In these closing sentences Inger, Aira, and Eva were all at the same level of interacting 
with the narrative(s), with the exception of the part Inger4-7. They talk primarily about an actual 
situation of a mother and her child in the desert, not necessarily limited to the textual narrative, 
although Aira’s references are clearly to the Hajar narrative from the hadith. The question why 
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Hagar/Hajar left her son had become an existential question (for Inger and Eva in particular), 
beyond the text, about a mother and a son in a desperate situation in the desert.  
 
Making Meaning Through Interacting with the Hagar/Hajar Narrative 
In this discussion much of the meaning making is done through engaging in the plot of the 
narratives. To ask questions, to question the plot, and to engage emotionally in the desert drama 
portrayed in the texts are interpretative acts showing this engagement.  
Two ways of interacting with the Hagar/Hajar narrative are represented in this discussion, 
and they are not mutually exclusive. One is to interact through analogical reasoning, sometimes 
including an element of existential interpretation. This way of making meaning entails that the 
reader searches her own experience and references to seek identification with the figures and 
with the narrative plot, thus entering into a discussion or conversation with the text and her co-
readers of the text. This is what Eva, Inger, and Rima do in their search to make meaning of the 
text. 
The other mode of interaction represented is making meaning through the religious 
performance of rituals as a personal or indirect experience. This may be regarded as a more 
specific variety of analogical reasoning, based on experiences within a religious tradition. Aira 
uses the ritual of sa’y to interpret the narratives, and she uses analogical reasoning to interpret 
Hagar/Hajar’s intentions as similar to the ritualized imitation of her struggles.  
Throughout the discussions the two narratives merge into one more often than not. A 
relatively small part of the narratives’ plots is addressed, and, in addition, most of the 
information in this part is the same in both the Old Testament and the hadith. To be able to 
communicate, to merge them into one, makes the conversation more efficient. The differences 
are still present through some precise references where the participants explicitly state which text 
they are talking about. Eva’s contribution, when quoting from both narratives to strengthen her 
own reasoning, is more than just trying to communicate as effectively as possible. It emerges 
rather as a deliberate comparison to argue for her own criticism of the plot – or of the 
Hagar/Hajar figure. Just as she refers to two Hagar/Hajars early in the discussion, she uses the 
presence of two texts from two traditions to strengthen her criticism.  
Constructing a common ground for communication between two textual universes and a 
diversity of religious and cultural frameworks requires the transposition of linguistic expressions 
from one sign system to another (Kristeva 1984: 193 ff). In the movement from one sign system 
to another, the content of the expression may change according to a new context or a new text. 
This requires knowledge as well as contextual sensitivity in intertextual studies (Leirvik 2002: 
28). But what is required to reach a transcontextual space, which Lissi Rasmussen suggests as an 
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aim for interreligious encounter (Rasmussen 1997: 110)? Is awareness of the presence of 
different sign systems a necessary requirement for reaching a transcontextual space? 
With regard to the possible emergence of a transcontextual space, the participants do not 
explicitly address differences between their interpretative frameworks. Still, the differences are 
expressed and thus become part of the communication. An exchange of different viewpoints 
happens through their engagement with the Hagar/Hajar narratives and their respective quests for 
interpretation. This exchange represents at least a possible start of a transcontextual space in the 
making. 
Eva concentrates on a moral dilemma she finds in both narratives, making use of her own 
resources of gendered hermeneutics and analogical reasoning in an attempt to make meaning of 
the narratives. She does not discriminate between the two texts in this respect. The latter means 
that she has moved from a critical position regarding the text from the hadith (in discussion 1) to 
a critical position regarding both texts.  
Aira relates to Eva’s dilemma, even if she does not share it, and thus moves into the 
interpretational context of the other when she becomes engaged with Eva’s statements. Aira, for 
her part, uses her religious tradition as a resource for making meaning of the narratives. The 
Christian participants do not engage much in Aira’s presentation of her interpretation throughout 
the discussion, thus missing an opportunity to relate to Aira’s interpretational context. They may 
still be influenced by it, but the discussion is dominated by Eva’s introductory question regarding 
the moral dilemma of Hagar/Hajar’s abandonment of Ishmael. 
The places in the discussion where the two narratives merge may signal the appearance of 
a transcontextual space. Analogical reasoning is the form of interpretation that opens a way for 
this kind of merging. When the participants engage in the narrated situation of Hagar/Hajar and 
Ishmael in the desert, relating it to their own experiences or imagining themselves in the situation 
of Hagar/Hajar, this implies the appearance of an interpretative community, and provides a 
transtemporal and transcontextual space. But when the differences in the interpretations of 
Hagar/Hajar and the abandonment of Ishmael are addressed, the shared interpretative space seem 
to dissolve because of one of the texts’ relocation in a specific religious tradition. Since the 
Christian participants in this discussion do not consult with their own religious tradition in their 
interpretations but limit themselves to analogical reasoning, the Islamic tradition emerges as the 
distinguishing factor. Since the status of Hagar/Hajar is radically different in the two traditions, 
as exemplified by a Christian Hagar being a neglected figure and the Islamic Hajar as an 
important foremother and model for the ritual of sa’y, this is not very surprising. The merged 
narrative, however, and the shared engagement in the figure of Hagar/Hajar are expressions of 
shared interpretative spaces. 
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Temporal and Spatial Interpretative Maneuvers and Various Reading Positions 
The hermeneutical question of how to make meaning of an ancient text from a different temporal 
and spatial context becomes apparent in the discussion. It is Eva who struggles the most with this 
when shifting between addressing a presumed historical event behind the narratives and 
addressing the narratives themselves. Her starting point is a question based in a moral dilemma 
of here and now. She operates with two notions of time: Her own time, now, and a concept of 
existential time that transcends the temporal gap and constructs a space for Eva to use analogical 
reasoning to interact with the narrative. The concept of existential time functions with a basic 
notion of human universality, across time and place. But Eva does not relate, however, to the 
particularity of time and place behind the two texts. To her, the texts do not represent history but 
a contemporary, existential challenge. Mieke Bal’s notion of “temporal anachronism” as a tool 
for taking both the past and the present seriously in addressing, for instance, moral dilemmas 
(Bal 2008: 48) thus covers Eva’s interpretative maneuver only partially. Bal’s request to accept 
the fluidity of time and acknowledge the reader’s limited access to the past is not reflected on in 
Eva’s meaning making.  
But lack of reflection on the temporal gap and one’s own limited access to the past is not 
only represented by Eva in this discussion. In fact, none of the participants in the discussion pays 
attention to this as an interpretative problem. Aira’s temporal and spatial interpretation of the two 
narratives is done through the ritual of sa’y, and this adds the perspective of ritualized time and 
space, in addition to relating to the hadith narrative as historically trustworthy. Performance of a 
ritual such as the sa’y based on the narrative of Hagar’s/Hajar’s struggle for water is a deliberate 
mixing of times where the past and present merge. The ritual of sa’y is exactly where the hadith 
narrative locates Hajar’s running for water, since this ritual cannot be done at any other location. 
Aira uses the ritual of sa’y as her main interpretative frame in this discussion. This interpretation 
provides her with an answer to the question posed by Eva’s moral dilemma. It is the ritual of sa’y 
that Aira uses and not her own possible experience of taking part in the ritual. For Aira, the ritual 
of sa’y actually seems more important than the Hagar/Hajar narratives in the texts in this 
discussion.  
 
Modes of Communication 
Eva’s question, which she repeats many times, dominates this discussion. The question is posed 
in the here and now and is thus addressed primarily to the other participants and their 
interpretation of the narratives, rather than the texts. The others engage in the discussion on her 
terms, although Aira’s contribution is also independent of these premises. Thus, the discussion is 
rather intensely concentrated on the here and now, without meta-reflections about the mode of 
communication. The focus is on the narrated drama in the desert, Eva’s moral dilemma, and 
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Aira’s ritual of sa’y. The criticisms that appear are not those of the Christian or the Islamic 
tradition in general, and mostly not of the co-participants (except for Eva65). The criticism is 
addressed to the figures in the narratives, the translator, and the presupposed narrator or author. It 
is specific and concretized. This may be the result of the intensity of the discussion, which is 
instigated by Eva’s quite focused question. 
 
Moral Enrichment of the Narratives and Gendered Hermeneutics 
The questions concerning Hagar/Hajar’s abandonment of Ishmael cause different types of 
hermeneutical positions to appear.  
An ethical reading of the text, where the reader identifies with figures in a moral dilemma 
and tries to solve the dilemma by engaging morally with the text may be situated in a 
consciously mixed time (as a kind of responsible anachronism) or situated in the here and now. 
The concept of the moral enrichment of the text (Abou El Fadl, Cohen, and Lague 2002: 15) 
could be perceived as a modified expression of the moral critique of canonical scriptures, 
entailing that the reader needs to engage her moral convictions in front of the text in order to be 
morally enriched by it. Hence, the concept of moral enrichment is more relational in the dynamic 
between reader and text than in a moral critique, since the text and the reader are both involved 
in a mutually enriching process. Hagar/Hajar’s decision to leave Ishmael is in need of moral 
enrichment or moral critique only by a reader who comprehends this act as a moral dilemma. 
The readers’ moral construction of responsible motherhood is applied to this incident in two 
ways: the primary duty of a mother is either to stay with her child, regardless of what happens, or 
to provide life-sustaining supplies by all means.  
At a textual level, there are two interpretative positions derived from the question about 
the narrator/author’s gender. The first position was established as a reflection on the 
consequences of the narrator/author anticipated as male. Historically, this is likely to be the case, 
but here the anticipation was made on the basis of the content of the text itself. This position (as 
explained) has two supports. First, the gender of the author/narrator matters for the content of the 
text because men and women universally have different experiences that would be reflected in 
the narration of a story. Second, the moral criticism should be directed to the author/narrator as 
the one responsible for the content of the text. The second position came as a reaction to the first, 
implying that the gender of the author/narrator was not important either to the content of the 
narrative or as a reflection of universal experiences of women and men viewed in binary 
opposition. The first position was taken by some of the Christian participants, the second by a 
Muslim participant.  
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Discussion 3 Related to the Hagar/Hajar Narratives. 
The Complexity of the Hagar/Hajar Narratives in the Process of 
Making Meaning: Sharing Testimonies in the Search to Identify 
Messages from the Texts 
The last two discussions related to the Hagar/Hajar narratives took place at the third group 
meeting. For the first time in the process one of the participants was the moderator.133 The 
meeting started with a silent reading of the Hagar/Hajar texts from the Old Testament and the 
hadith, following Maria’s suggestion. 
Discussion 3 was, for the most part, in a more relaxed conversational mode than the 
former discussions. The participants reflect more openly about their own meaning making than 
in the previous discussion, perhaps because the focus is not directed intensely at one specific 
question but shifts more. Some parts of the contributions, particularly toward the end, are 
formulated as testimonies. 
 
Shirin30: Yes. What I look for in these two texts are … I am not the kind of person 
who looks at it sentence by sentence …. 
Shirin31: But when I read both texts, in particular when I read one verse from the 
Koran that comments on it, on the story, I don’t find any sign of anyone 
looking down on Sarah. 
Shirin32:  It is a kind of message from God to Abraham 
Shirin33: that says that I will … that Ishmael and Hagar will wander in the 
wilderness, if I am correct. And there a new civilization will be 
established. 
Shirin34: After Sarah had a son as well, things became kind of scattered, since 
faith takes another direction. 
Shirin35: What is very important for me is that perhaps it was so that it should go 
other places than where Abraham originally stayed. 
Shirin36: From the Koran I don’t look at this in the same way as one looks at it 
from the text from Genesis. 
Shirin37: But it is, isn’t it, if two women have the same husband, if it becomes 
kind of a problem. It was like that in the old days, and it is like that now. 
Shirin38: But I don’t know why, I can’t say that this particular story should tell us 
something about that. 
                                                 
133 The plan was that Maria and Fouzia would moderate the meeting together in order to have both a Muslim and a 
Christian sharing the role. Fouzia was, however, prevented from coming, so Maria moderated the meeting alone. 
  
180 
Shirin39: The most important message is that it was supposed to be two nations. 
 
Shirin provides a key for understanding how she usually makes meaning of texts: by 
looking for the main points and overall messages rather than concentrating on details (Shirin30). 
She explicitly mentions both texts in her next sentence, when the question of Sarah’s status 
arises. Shirin probably remembers that the status of Sarah was addressed in the former meeting 
(Shirin31). Thus, the earlier conversation is included in the present one, without any further 
reference, indicating that there is continuity in the process, at least for Shirin.  
While addressing both texts, Shirin emphasizes the verse from the Koran cited in the 
hadith narrative. She thus shows her pre-knowledge about the structure of the text from the 
hadith: she is aware that it actually consists of two different types of Islamic canonical text, a 
koranic verse integrated into the hadith narrative. The text she describes as a message from God 
to Abraham/Ibrahim is exclusively this verse from the Koran (Shirin31-33). She does not refer 
specifically to the text from the Old Testament.  
Shirin observes that there is no mention of Sarah in the koranic verse but rejects any 
suggestion that this indicates that the Islamic tradition looks down on Sarah. Looking for the 
main points in the text, she claims that the essential message of the story is not to describe a 
possible rivalry between two women. The essence of the message is that God created two 
peoples out of Abraham/Ibrahim’s double fatherhood. The two sons, Ishmael and Isaac, meant 
the founding of two nations instead of one, and the situation of Hagar/Hajar and Ishmael in the 
desert created the possibility of establishing a new civilization (a new branch of the family and a 
new religion) in Mecca.  
This message to Abraham/Ibrahim, according to Shirin, is also addressed to later readers 
of the narrative, since it provides a formative story about the establishment of the Islamic 
civilization in Mecca – and an explanation of the existence of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam as 
willed and planned by God.  
Sarah is Abraham/Ibrahim’s first wife, but Ishmael is his oldest son. Shirin refers to 
Sarah’s giving birth to a son as the point where “faith takes another direction” (Shirin34). Seeing 
Islam as the original faith, starting with Adam and Eve, and with Abraham/Ibrahim as the first 
Muslim believer (hanif, or even muslim), this is the point in history where Judaism and later 
Christianity split from Islam. This reflects the Islamic view that even if Islam is more recent than 
Judaism and Christianity its roots go back to the origin of humanity. Christianity emerged from 
Judaism and remains in an ambiguous relation with Judaism in different ways. However, both 
the Islamic and the Christian traditions recognize that there has been a religious development 
where other religions have been crucial in the making of the two: Christianity in relation to 
Judaism and Islam in relation to Christianity and Judaism.  
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Shirin40: And Hagar wasn’t oppressed.  
Shirin41: In our faith we respect both women, Sarah and Hagar. 
Shirin42: I can’t see that it is a difference of class … that one looks down on … or 
that Sarah asks why should Ishmael have the same status as my son. I as 
a Muslim have never thought like that from our tradition. 
Shirin43: What I can see as a difference, perhaps, that if a slave woman … at that 
time it was a kind of accepted social order to have a slave woman or a 
slave man, if I am correct. 
 
Shirin’s reference to class and slavery in the texts viewed from an Islamic perspective 
signals that these categories are unfamiliar to her when discussing the Islamic narrative about 
Hajar. The question of slave status and social class is, on the other hand, disclosed and is crucial 
to the plot in the Hagar narrative in the Old Testament. Shirin rejects the view that social 
difference plays a role in the Islamic version of the narrative, just as she stated that the later 
religious difference that supposedly emerged from the events of the narrative is not a problem. 
Nevertheless, she makes a comment about slavery as an institution as socially accepted “at that 
time” (Shirin43), referring to the historical context of the narratives. This contextualization of 
slavery may be an indirect defense of the Old Testament text. Shirin does not, however, use this 
text’s reference to Hagar as a slave to criticize the canonical Jewish-Christian scripture: instead 
she finds parallel references to slavery in the Koran (Shirin47): 
 
Shirin44: And since we know that religion is not intended to make a revolution. 
Shirin45: It will take the traditions and start with reforms, and …. At least this is 
my perception of Islam.  
Shirin46: The day it came, it did not come as a revolution but as a process to 
transform society. 
Shirin47: That’s why, for instance, in the Koran, you can see that there are some 
rights for slaves and slave women that one wonders about today. Why 
was one supposed to accept it in that way? 
Shirin48: But afterwards one can see that it was there, just as a lot of other things 
that ought to change, this was the way it should change. 
Shirin49: Today one talks a lot about things in the Koran that ought to be changed 
and that should be reformed. 
Shirin50: Today one cannot accept that there are slaves or slave women. Because 
society has developed and changed. That is why it can be changed as 
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well. They couldn’t see then that it was a problem. Today we can see that 
it is. 
Shirin51: There are many things that should be reformed within the religion. 
 
Shirin uses institutionalized slavery as an example of a changed social practice and 
suggests that the general interpretation of the koranic texts referring to slavery may have changed 
too as a result. Shirin is not referring to details in the Hagar/Hajar narratives. Instead, she states 
how social changes, as well as changes in koranic interpretation, should happen from her point of 
view. From the beginning the way of change was intended to be through reform, rather than 
revolution (Shirin45-46). Shirin states very clearly a need for change and reform (Shirin49, 51).  
In Shirin49, however, it is not entirely clear if Shirin means that the Koran itself ought to 
change or only its interpretation. Her emphasis on new social structures and new insights that 
make the reader ask different questions “now” in contrast to “then” (Shirin47, 50) may imply 
that her focus is on change in koranic interpretation.  
Shirin suggests that it is not only religion that has the capacity to change society, social 
changes can and should change religious practice as well. Shirin establishes a connection 
between social and religious change. When she emphasizes that the way of change should be 
reform, rather than revolution, her Iranian background may be playing a role in her dismissal of 
revolutionary change as a tool in Islam, since she experienced the Iranian revolution in 1979 and 
left with her family to go to Norway for political reasons some years later.  
 
Aira58:  Perhaps I see this a little … when we read these two texts it is very … I 
feel that they have different mindsets. 
Aira59:  One of them is viewed, as she said, as status oriented. It seems 
discriminatory that one sees that Sarah herself gets hurt, that she feels 
that Hagar is looking down on her. 
Aira60:  But when she says: Cast out that slave woman … she does not have any 
respect for her. 
Aira61:  And this, it seems to me, is not really… for me, I don’t know what you 
believe, but to me divine revelation is not like that. 
Aira62:  That this is part of the revelation … it might be that people’s own 
opinions have entered this because they have traditions like that. 
Aira63:  Those traditions are present in all tribes when there are two women 
sharing one man, they have … between them, and one wants more status 
than the other, and the other wants another status. 
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Aira elaborates on the relationship between Hagar/Hajar and Sarah and comments on the 
difference she finds between the Hagar/Hajar narratives in the Old Testament and the hadith. 
Shirin mentioned this relationship briefly and claimed that it was not a main theme in the texts. 
Aira uses the portrayal of the troublesome relationship between Sarah and Hagar/Hajar in the 
biblical text to discuss the question if this part of the text qualifies as divine revelation in her 
view. She uses this to distinguish between the two narratives according to the Islamic doctrine of 
the divine revelation represented in the Bible: it may be mixed up with people’s opinions, and 
thus not part of divine revelation (Leirvik 2006: 132-133). Aira takes the conflict between Sarah 
and Hagar in the biblical narrative to be part of a general human experience across time (Aira63), 
much like what Shirin stated earlier about the timeless character of a situation where two women 
compete for one man.  
 
Aira64:  Here we don’t find any of this scene instigated by jealousy; it is not even 
mentioned in the text that she … that Ibrahim had taken one of them 
away from the place because of Sarah’s wish. 
Aira65:  When Hagar asked him: “Why do you leave us here, is it God who has 
told you so?” then he said: “Yes.” This shows that she, Hagar, had great 
faith in her God and great faith in her husband. 
 
Aira focuses on the narrative from the hadith and uses it in contrast to the biblical 
narrative: the text from the hadith does not include any description of conflicting interests or 
jealousy between the two women (Aira64). Sarah’s absence from the hadith narrative is not 
commented upon. Explaining her presence in Aira’s reflection could be a reference to Shirin’s 
earlier statements. Or it could be a spillover from the biblical narrative into Aira’s reflection on 
the text from the hadith.  
When Aira moves on to her interpretation of the hadith narrative, she develops the image 
of Hagar/Hajar further as a model figure with respect to faith in Islam. While being abandoned 
with the child, she kept her faith in both God and her husband. In Aira65 Hagar/Hajar’s faith in 
God and in Abraham/Ibrahim seems to be linked together. 
 
Aira66:  She knew that Ibrahim would not lie, that he would not let her down if it 
was not necessary to do so. 
Aira67:  It comes from the will of God, and when God has said that you … he 
will not let you down. 
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Aira68:  So she does not become afraid in any way; it is her strong faith. It is 
conviction. If I had the same conviction and faith in God, I could have 
sat all alone ….  
Aira69:  And it says here that she did not show any worry because she has only 
one child, and then her husband leaves her, she does not have anything to 
eat or drink, how long can the child stay alive with that bag of water and 
some dates. There is nothing there. But she had trust in God, and that 
means that what we see here is strong conviction. 
Aira70:  And then, we have great respect for Sarah, and here I believe that some 
of people’s own opinions have come in, and this part of the Genesis story 
is not a part of revelation as far as I can understand. 
Aira71:  But if we see this from an entirely feminist perspective, then yes, there 
are two women, and this and that can happen. But to call Hagar a slave 
woman is degrading to her status for Muslims.  
Aira72:  She is … according to our belief, she is the wife of Ibrahim, and he is a 
great prophet, and God promised Ibrahim that he would make him the 
father of great nations … and to talk about Sarah and Hagar like this is to 
show little respect for them.  
 
How can Aira say that Hagar/Hajar knew that Abraham/Ibrahim “would not lie”? The 
answer comes in Aira67-68, where Aira continues to reflect in the form of a personal testimony 
on the basis of what she finds to be crucial in the story, namely Hagar’s/Hajar’s faith: To follow 
the will of God has the consequence that God will not let the believer down. In Aira67-68 Aira 
establishes a close relation between Hagar/Hajar in the narrative and Muslim believers in 
general, including Aira herself. These statements show a high degree of identification with the 
figure of Hajar in the hadith. Through this identification the temporal and spatial gaps between 
the narrative and experienced reality represented by Aira and other contemporary Muslim 
believers cease to exist. In the former discussion it became apparent that Aira used the ritual of 
sa’y as an important reference for her interpretation of the narratives. Here she does not mention 
the sa’y but only the consequence of faith in God as a shared experience between Hajar, all 
Muslims, and herself. 
According to the British Muslim Scholar Tim Winter, Muslims who engage in the 
practice of Scriptural Reasoning “see themselves not just as interpreters, but as para-witnesses to 
the scripture and the exegetic cumulation” (Winter 2006: 110). The background of Winter’s 
suggested term “para-witness” is the practice of succession (isnad) among Muslim scholars. The 
historical chain of interpretation is the transmission of living knowledge that does not cease to 
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influence the believers’ own life, and thus the texts’ interpretation is never far from the context 
of the believer.134According to Winter, it is the formal restraints on interpretation in the Islamic 
tradition and its relation to history as an axiom that makes it possible to operate with the term 
“para-witness” (Winter 2006: 110). 
What is the distinction, then, between being a witness and being an interpreter? Paul 
Ricoeur discusses the relationship between interpretation and testimony and investigates how the 
two may be related in biblical interpretation: he claims that, without testimony, hermeneutics 
lacks perspective and a temporal dimension in history (Ricoeur 1980: 144; Riceour 1980: 144). 
Testimonies, on the other hand, need to be interpreted, but this interpretation needs to be done 
within their own dialectic that, according to Ricoeur, consists of narration and confession 
(Ricoeur 1980: 154). Aira’s testimony constructs a role for her not only as an interpreter but also 
as a witness of the narrative from the hadith when including herself in the reception history of 
the text in the way she does. Her own narrative and confession merges with her making meaning 
of Hagar/Hajar’s faith. 
Aira repeats that she does not regard that part of the Genesis story that relates the conflict 
between Hagar/Hajar and Sarah as a part of “revelation” (Aira70). Here she refers to the 
teachings about divine revelation in Islam. Apparently, she does not reflect on the difference 
between Christianity and Islam regarding the issue of divine revelation since she relates only to 
the texts themselves and from an Islamic perspective. Her aim is to explain her own 
interpretation and give her own testimony. 
To address a problematic relation between Sarah and Hagar in the Old Testament 
narrative is possible, according to Aira, if one reads the text only within the interpretative 
frameworks of feminism (Aira71). She finds this way of discussing irrelevant. She follows up 
her views of the limits of feminist interpretation: 
 
Aira73:  So both of them were promised by God that they would be blessed. 
Aira74:  So, when we see here it is … the story gives a worldly impression in 
itself, but the story of Hajar is more spiritual, when I read it .… 
Aira75:  But we believe in both of them, that Sarah was there, and we respect her, 
it is possible that it might have been a conflict between them, we cannot 
deny that. 
                                                 
134 Winter claims that Islamic exegesis and interpretation of the Koran and the hadith has followed a different track 
than the Christian and Jewish traditions. He states that he believes the Islamic tradition has escaped the “reductionist 
Enlightenment” (Winter 2006: 110) event and “continued in fidelity to classical paradigms of faith, worship and 
devotion, while the Renaissance re-paganised European thought, and the Enlightenment secularised it”(Winter 2006: 
109).  
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Aira76:  But we don’t believe that God creates stories for the sake of stories alone 
… that one should create a story about it … to pass on that conflict to us. 
Aira77:  Both are humans. They can disagree, fall out, or be in conflict. That is 
not unthinkable.  
Aira78:  But, at the same time, when you look at both texts, and it is we, Muslims, 
who believe in the ways of God, he knows that one person will be in this 
country and spread the message of God there, and the other will spread 
the word of God there at the other place.  
Aira79:  I don’t read the text with a typical feminist mindset …. 
Aira80:  The koranic text shows that he stood there, worried about them, and at 
the same time prayed to God for them … God, I have left my offspring in 
a deserted valley, let the people have mercy on them. 
 
The reason why Aira dismisses criticism of the text from a “feminist mindset” (Aira79) 
may be found in Aira73: According to Aira’s meaning-making of the Hagar/Hajar stories, both 
women “are promised by God that they would be blessed.” For Aira there is no need to dig into 
the texts looking for possible relational conflicts between the two women; focusing critically on 
the conflicts in the texts is to miss the stories’ main message. Aira does not deny that there could 
have been conflicts between Hagar/Hajar and Sarah, but in order to be able to include this 
element of human flaw, she moves beyond the frames of the narratives to which she relates (the 
hadith text and what she evaluates as part of divine revelation in the Old Testament text). She 
talks about real conflicts, in real lives, where the “now” and the “then” merge as part of human 
experience. But, in her view, divine revelation is not a place for human conflict-oriented 
storytelling.  
Aira asks: Why should God want to pass this conflict on to us by including it in the 
revelation? The question indicates that if something is included in the divine revelation, it should 
be done for pedagogical reasons. The inclusion of the Hagar/Hajar-Sarah conflict in revelation 
may cause a problem regarding human division, according to Aira: It could potentially create a 
ground for the conflict between Sarah and Hagar in the narrative to be transferred to the 
narratives’ readers, inducing the readers (as social agents) to realize the conflicts in 
contemporary contexts between people identifying themselves (or others) as descendants of 
either Sarah or Hagar/Hajar. Aira might think that, if the narrative were regarded as divine 
revelation, it would have a possible greater authority and thus possibly be more likely to be used 
to legitimize antagonisms. Thus, Aira cannot find room for this conflict in the narrative because 
she feels that it would not be in accordance with God’s will that a divinely revealed narrative 
transmit such material to fuel possible forthcoming hostilities.  
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Aira agrees with Shirin that one of the main messages in the narratives is the origin of 
more than one divine tribe, which would mean that the word of God would not be limited to 
being propagated in one location. She explicitly includes both narratives in Aira78 when 
addressing this but highlights her own tradition as the viewpoint for expressing what she finds to 
be the core meaning. In addition, she explicitly calls Muslims the “people who believe in the 
ways of God” (Aira78). This expression can be interpreted as exclusivist, but since she has just 
acknowledged that the word of God has two differently located sources that develop into the 
Jewish, Christian, and Muslim religious traditions, to see this as Islamic exclusivism would seem 
to be mistaken.  
The viewpoint of Muslims as “people believing in the way of God” may be seen as a 
testimonial statement within the group, perhaps to clarify possible further divisions between the 
Muslim and the Christian participants in the discussion on the narratives. To Aira, the Muslim 
way is to believe in the “way of God.” This statement may be an indirect question or a challenge 
to the other participants, perhaps to the Christian participants in particular: Do they believe in the 
“way of God” as well? Aira does not explain what she means by “the way of God” in the 
singular, other than saying that it is something in which Muslims believe.  
In the last part of her contribution, Aira takes sides in the two conflicting portrayals of 
Abraham/Ibrahim in the two narratives. In Aira79 she seems to link feminist critique to the 
Abraham/Ibrahim figure in the Genesis narrative, as interpreted by her Christian co-participants. 
She might not reject a feminist critique of Abraham as he is portrayed in the biblical text, but her 
way of expressing the content of the koranic verse in the hadith narrative shows which 
Abraham/Ibrahim figure she relates to: a caring, faithful believer (Aira80). Aira does not see any 
need for a feminist critique of the Hagar/Hajar narrative in the hadith, including criticism of 
Abraham/Ibrahim. The verse from the Koran is referred to as “the text” (Aira80). For Aira, it is 
the koranic verse that represents the main testimony about how Abraham/Ibrahim acted in 
history. Then she returns to the event of sa’y, which she mentioned several times in earlier 
discussions, but this time it is in a more personal way: 
 
Aira81:  Yes, we say this, and millions of people go there. And, as it is mentioned 
here, that sa’y ... the Prophet said that we, because of that, because Hagar 
was the one who ran seven times from one mountain to another … Safa 
is one of these two mountains. Marwa is the other. She went there only to 
find water. It was not because she could not bear to see her child cry. She 
has a strong faith that nothing bad would happen to them: God is with 
him, I will go out and try to find out if there is anyone who can give me 
water or help me. 
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Aira82:  So today when we perform sa’y, it is only a way of remembering the 
struggle of that day, the struggle of Hagar. Because all the pilgrims, men 
and women, everyone runs seven times. 
Aira83:  I have been there, and I ran seven times from Marwa to Safa. Then it was 
just as if I had the same worries that Hagar had, and when you look at it, 
you feel God’s presence, and feel that … God said, I am here for you, I 
have heard the boy’s cry, so she stayed and we feel that in remembrance 
of that day we run seven times; it is called sa’y. Then we feel that God 
will listen to us too. 
Aira84:  These are spiritual things, if you think about it, so one cannot see it with 
feminist critique. 
 
Aira expresses the identification between Hagar/Hajar even more strongly than before: all 
Muslims performing sa’y and herself as participating in the sa’y. The Hagar/Hajar narrative, 
acted out as ritual performance, goes beyond the role of both interpreter and witness in relation 
to the text. The performative aspect invites one to act out the narrative ritually and opens the way 
for a physical identification with, in this case, the figure of Hagar/Hajar. And what Aira shares is 
her experience of running in the desert to search for water, like Hagar/Hajar, while experiencing 
the same struggle, the same fear – and the divine presence. 
The experience of sa’y seems to be Aira’s main key for making meaning of the 
Hagar/Hajar narratives. In discussing the background of these narratives, she repeats that she 
believes that Hagar/Hajar left Ishmael to seek for water (cf. the earlier discussion), and that the 
caring and listening God is present throughout the narratives for all the figures involved. 
Through the interpretation of the sa’y, however, the divine presence is not limited to the time of 
the narratives (“then”), but is present in the ritual (“now”). The testimony of Aira in its narrative 
part, to use Ricoeur’s distinctions, is connected spatially to the Hagar narrative: it happens at the 
place where it – according to the hadith narrative – happened to Hagar/Hajar. The ritual is 
connected to the place between Safa and Marwa in Mecca, and the time is set in the month of 
hajj in the Islamic calendar. 
Aira emphasizes that the ritual of sa’y is gender inclusive: all the pilgrims, regardless of 
gender, culture, and social status, take part in the same rituals as equals. The only requirement 
for participating is religious; all are to be Muslims. 
Aira84 may be seen as a conclusive remark, related to the various criticisms of the 
Hagar/Hajar narratives in earlier discussions in the group. Aira seems to claim a need to separate 
what she calls “spiritual things” from feminist critique. It is not entirely clear if she refers to her 
own experience of sa’y, the Hagar/Hajar narratives themselves (those elements of them she 
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considers to be part of the revelation), or both. Perhaps it expresses a wish to share a personal 
religious experience without being criticized from a feminist perspective.  
Earlier in this discussion Aira distinguished between worldly and spiritual things 
(Aira74), and later related this distinction to the feminist critique of the narratives, with feminist 
critique as part of the “worldly.” Does this interpretative say something primarily about how 
Aira views feminism? Or does it say something about where she wants to place feminism in the 
meaning making of the texts? In any case, it says something about Aira’s confidence in her own 
religious tradition and the canonical scriptures. This confidence may include an expectation of 
equality between women and men in the Islamic tradition, as shown in the practice of sa’y. 
Aira’s statement that one cannot see spiritual things with feminist critique (Aira84) implies that 
Aira is setting a limit for the relevance of feminist perspectives. It does not necessarily mean that 
Aira dismisses feminist perspectives in all other cases. The question would then be exactly where 
Aira places feminism in her views of religion and her own religious identity and in her 
interpretation of canonical scriptures.  
 
Eva76:  I think I have a feeling that you, Aira, are entering into a very defensive 
position, defending Islam and kind of feminist women … 
Eva77:  because I regard myself a feminist, but I am a feminist because I am a 
Christian, and when I see the message of Jesus I believe that as a 
believing Christian I have to be a feminist.  
Eva78:  And I need to have that respect for my sisters, and when I see everything 
that has been committed against women throughout history, I am very 
happy we live in a time when we are trying to get rid of all kinds of 
discrimination against women and people of other races, other sexual 
orientations, and everything.  
Eva79:  But since women are half of all of humanity, that is perhaps the most 
important thing. 
 
Shirin52:  And, in addition, one raises kids; that is a position. 
 
This sequence relates primarily to Aira’s preceding contribution, not to the Hagar/Hajar 
narratives. The narratives may be included as a negative background for Eva’s remarks in Eva78 
through bearing witness to a “time of discrimination.” Eva establishes a gap between “those 
times” (“then”) and “our time” (”now”) with respect to the level of human discrimination. She 
claims human discrimination to be something “we are trying to get rid of” in the present, 
whereas previous times were characterized as times of discrimination. Eva’s use of the term “our 
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time”, when describing a time where discrimination is combated, may go beyond a temporal 
perspective and include a spatial one through a further location of the “we.” The statement can 
be interpreted as a universal claim, but since the “we” is not specified further, the statement may 
reflect a contextually bound “we.” But Eva is mainly concerned with historical changes and does 
not specify, culturally or contextually, the location of the change. Eva’s use of “we” may refer to 
everyone living in “our times,” to the group of participants, or another group identity in which 
Eva includes herself. Thus the “we” also can refer to “Norwegians,” “Christians,” women in “our 
time,” or everyone fighting discrimination. In the sequence right before this one Aira refers to 
the community of Muslim believers in her use of “we.” Like Aira, parts of Eva’s contribution 
(Eva77-78) may be regarded as a testimony, but of a different kind. Eva states that she finds 
Aira’s position in the discussion to be defensive with respect to Islam. But Aira’s openness and 
testimonial statements about her own experiences may have inspired Eva to share her personal 
experiences the way she does in Eva77-78. Eva gives a double testimony that is not linked 
directly to the textual narratives. Her confession is of feminism and the Christian faith together. 
The narrative of Eva’s testimony is her narrative of a struggle against discrimination against 
women throughout history, and she refers to women in general as her “sisters.” 
While declaring herself a feminist, Eva argues that her feminist standpoint came to her as 
the only logical response to Jesus’ message as interpreted by her. Even if she applies this 
conclusion as a necessity only to herself, her argument is made in such a way that could imply 
that she views being a feminist as the only way to be a true Christian. 
Eva does not, however, base her feminist stance only on the Christian tradition but more 
specifically on the message of Jesus. In the narrative part of her testimony she adds a historical 
and universal reason for taking this stance (Eva78). Eva relates feminism to other kinds of anti-
discriminatory strategies but suggests a ranking of them with feminism on top because “women 
are half of all of humanity” (Eva79). 
Shirin’s comment (Shirin52) may be seen as confirming and extending Eva’s more 
general reasoning about feminism in adding the role of raising children, which she calls “a 
position.” This can be a descriptive or a normative statement: simply to state that women raise 
children or that it is the women who should raise children. 
 
Eva80:  That too. But the way I view this, and I believe I see this very clearly, it 
is God’s revelation through history. And this is a different time, people 
live in different ways, and we have gradually understood more of what 
God wants to say to us, and what God is, what divinity is, and this 
belongs to a different time. 
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Eva81:  And the way I see it, it is quite clear: slavery is inhuman, and the view of 
women … it is not equality, but it is a different time and I would say that 
luckily we have gradually seen more of God's revelation, and I do 
believe that Norway has never been as Christian a country as it is today. 
Eva82:  I believe that two thousand years ago we had …. We did not find it easy 
to understand the message of Jesus, it was really radical … it was 
difficult to understand it.  
Eva83: And we see that, after the period of Jesus’ life, Paul had a huge job to 
soften Jesus’ revolutionary message.  
Eva84:  But I do believe that, as time passed, we have come closer to the 
understanding of the message of Jesus, perhaps. With respect for every 
human being, everyone, regardless of black or white skin color, woman 
or man, small or big, rich or poor. 
Eva85:  To me the most striking thing is that this describes a different time, when 
lots of discrimination went on, and the people did not understand perhaps 
as much as I believe we understand today, I do believe that we 
understand more.  
 
Eva still does not address the Hagar/Hajar narratives directly, presumably only in Eva85, 
where she once again referred to “a different time” as a negative background for “today.” If she 
really does make use of the narratives as a negative background in this sequence, she relates to 
them en bloc, without distinguishing between the two concerning their historical chronology or 
cultural and religious differences. In addition, she refers to “the people” who were living in her 
constructed past and characterizes them as inferior in their understanding of the connection Eva 
makes of divine will and human rights compared to her constructed “we” in the present.  
Her main focus is to explain further her view of a historical process that has led humanity 
to less discriminative practices, generally speaking. In the historical process toward less 
discrimination, Eva claims that Christianity, or more precisely the message of Jesus, has played a 
crucial role. To her, it is improved understanding that brought about the change she claims. It is 
not entirely clear if she means that the improved understanding consists solely of a more correct 
understanding of Jesus’ message or if it includes other elements as well. Does she suggest that 
the changes she describes took place as a process of social evolution, in which the message of 
Jesus – gradually interpreted as anti-discrimination – was the basis of a change but engaging 
broader social reflection as well?  
In any case Eva does not explicitly include sources for the change she describes other 
than a better understanding of the message of Jesus. She might in fact seem to be defending an 
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exclusivist view of Jesus’ message as the only (or the most important) source of an anti-
discriminatory development of humanity that she believes has taken place. Through this, she 
shows a confidence in her own tradition that has some similarity to Aira’s earlier declared 
confidence in the Islamic tradition. How Eva is to be understood depends partly on whom she 
means to include in her “we.” One of the questions would then be: Is the change Eva describes 
found further on in the discussion? 
Even if Eva talks mostly about time and change in general, she does refer to a specific 
place and context in Eva81 where she states: “Norway has never been as Christian a country as it 
is today.” If the “we” in the sequence is “Norwegians” and the context is “Norway,” this may 
imply that she meant that Norway – as shaped by the Christian Protestant tradition (and possibly 
other forces or dynamics that she did not mention explicitly) – is the place for her where this 
non-discriminatory practice is taking place. She explains this social practice as deeply connected 
to a better understanding of the divine revelation of Jesus’ message. In Eva80 she refers to God’s 
revelation and includes herself in the “we” who, according to her, have seen this “very clearly.” 
Eva does not mention any countries or locations other than Norway as examples of places where 
this level of understanding has been attained.  
If this way of comprehending human history and the impact of the Christian tradition is 
to be seen as exclusivist or perhaps even triumphalist, in relation to what is it exclusive or 
triumphalist? What seems at first to be an example of Christian exclusivist standpoint may turn 
out to be more closely connected to Norway in particular and to imply a certain idea of what 
Norway represents, with reference to the Christian tradition as practiced in Norway. Eva does not 
elaborate further on what she is referring to specifically when she says “Norway.” It may imply 
the Norwegian state at a political level, but it could also mean the inhabitants of Norway, which 
would beg further questions about a precise determination. Does it include all inhabitants or does 
it refer to a religious and/or cultural majority? In any case, the concept “Norway” is used as a 
given entity, and it is, together with the message of Jesus in the Christian tradition and a 
temporal “now,” the place and time Eva determines to be closest to a human community without 
discrimination, particularly of women. 
The way Eva speaks about current times in Norway as the place and time where human 
equality is unfolding shares similarities with Aira’s testimony of the performance of sa’y as a 
ritualized space where human equality is performed in the remembrance and co-experience of 
Hagar/Hajar’s struggles and of God’s concern. Whereas Aira bases herself on the narrative from 
the hadith and the Islamic ritual of sa’y, which is open only to Muslims exclusively, Eva places 
her trust in the Christian message of human equality as it unfolds in Norwegian society, perhaps 
also as institutionalized in the Norwegian welfare state. The question of access to these times and 
spaces of human equality, however, is not without limits. Spatial access to Norwegian welfare 
  
193 
system is shaped by political decisions, whereas access to Mecca is restricted to Muslim 
believers.   
Eva uses the narratives of Hagar/Hajar in precisely the opposite way than Aira, namely to 
demonstrate the discriminative practices of the “then” as a negative background, whereas Aira 
uses it to open a way to the experience of equality in the sa’y.  
 
Eva86:  And there are lots of things I could say, but when you say that some look 
at this in a spiritual way and some look at this in a more material way,  
Eva87: I do not agree that seeing something in a more material way is better than 
seeing it spiritually,  
Eva88: I do not agree that I am less of a believer because I am a feminist. Just to 
make that clear. 
 
Aira85:  I will not say that … a Christian could see it the same way that I do. I 
also call myself a feminist.135  
Aira86: I have my own frameworks where I can be a completely independent 
woman and do not tolerate any discrimination.  
Aira87:  But when I read the text in a spiritual way, I refer to my belief in God. It 
is not only Muslims who can see this in different ways. I believe that 
many people who believe in God will view this in different ways.  
Aira88:  But there is a mixture of revelation and some experiences from different 
people in the Genesis text. That is my …. 
 
The verbal interaction between Eva and Aira develops into a discussion about two issues: 
what it means for a Christian or Muslim religious believer to be a feminist, and what it means to 
have a spiritual versus a material or “worldly” way of interpreting the canonical scriptures.  
Eva does not explicitly refer to the Hagar/Hajar narratives or to textual material as the 
object of her own interpretation. Through her reflections earlier on the developments throughout 
history and the present on what it means to be a feminist, she expands her horizon of meaning 
making. The object of interpretation is broader than just the narratives or canonical texts. Eva’s 
horizon seems to be just as much about the interpretation of the context and of concepts like that 
of feminism. The Hagar/Hajar narratives are only in the background. 
                                                 
135 When Aira later commented on the transcriptions in the text, she highlighted that she does not believe that a 
feminist is any less of a believer than others, and that she believes the different positions in this discussion may be 
related to different religious backgrounds, and not to the question of being a feminist. 
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It is difficult to understand the meaning of Eva87 in relation to the whole sequence. Does 
Eva change the order of the qualifications “in a material way” and “spiritually” here? The overall 
meaning is nevertheless similar, regardless of whether the order of qualifications is changed or 
not. Eva resists an epistemological hierarchy between interpreting in a material/worldly way 
versus a spiritual way. She does however accept it as a fact that some do operate with such an 
epistemological order (Eva86). She may link different ways to “see something” with her own 
rejection of being “less of a believer because I am a feminist” (Eva88), when she resists the 
distinction between spiritual and worldly interpretation. This is her basis for rejecting being 
placed within a worldly framework of interpretation as a feminist.  
Aira denies that the different ways of interpreting she suggests correspond with being a 
Christian and Muslim believer respectively (Aira85). She also indirectly denies that her way of 
interpretation prevents her from being a feminist. She does not specify the object of 
interpretation at this point, although in her former sayings she concentrates on the narratives. 
Here, however, she does not reintroduce the narratives as her focus. She may thus be moving 
into Eva’s broader (and less clear) focus of what the object of meaning making, including 
contexts and concepts, is.  
Aira explicitly identifies herself as a feminist too (Aira85). She also explains what being 
a feminist means to her (Aira86). She emphasizes that she has the right to define her own frames 
of how to be a woman and the right to define herself as a feminist by her own frames of 
reference. It seems that just as Eva does not want to be suspected of being less of a believer 
because she is a feminist, Aira does not want to be regarded as not being a feminist because of 
her claim to interpret the Hagar/Hajar stories in a spiritual way. This implicitly poses the 
question of the right to define someone as a believer or a non-believer or to be regarded as a 
feminist or not. In other words, the question of representation shows up again, as it had done 
earlier in the group’s process, but now from a different angle. This time the question is about the 
right to define one’s presentation of oneself as a believer and as a feminist. 
In Aira87 and 88, Aira repeats her main points on interpretation but includes the fact that 
she views interpretative plurality to be a matter of fact among people who “believe in God” 
(Aira87). This signals a consciousness and possibly openness toward different ways of 
interpretation within the Islamic tradition as well as in other religious traditions. Christian 
tradition is not mentioned here explicitly, but Christians are most likely to be included as part of 
the general statement regarding people who believe in God. Aira’s main focus stays with the 
Hagar/Hajar narratives in her meaning making, whereas Eva explores other areas more 
connected to the discussion in the group and the broader social context of women. 
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Inger8:  Yes, well, I do have a difficult relationship with many of the writings in 
the Old Testament. 
Inger9: Because I believe that much of what is written there goes against what I 
have learned from Jesus. 
Inger10:  In a way, I have … it is the New Testament and the story about Jesus that 
is … that I link my own belief to, and if the Old Testament can elaborate 
on that to any extent, that’s fine, but if not, I don’t hold on to it and put it 
aside.  
Inger11:  But I do get curious, it is after all a central part of the origin of our faith, 
so it is interesting to read it. 
Inger12:  And I get curious about what the Koran says about Sarah because we do 
not get to know anything about her in this text. How is she presented or 
is she presented? I can get answers to that later on. If you, if we, if you 
can say something about that. 
 
Aira89:  There is not one word about that story. 
 
Inger13:  There is nothing about Sarah? 
 
Shirin53:  When you are done, we can take a look at it. 
 
Inger14:  Then you can say something about it. Yes, I am curious about that.  
 
Inger starts by introducing her own relation to the Old Testament in general as part of the 
Christian canonical scriptures and does not enter directly into the Hagar/Hajar narratives. Nor 
does she comment on the recent issues of feminism and different ways of interpretation that have 
been discussed by Eva and Aira in particular.  
Inger10 describes the implications of her hermeneutical position for her attitude as a 
reader of the Old Testament. The problem, as she puts it, is that she finds that some of the 
writings in the Old Testament contradict the teachings of Jesus – on which she bases her own 
religious belief. Inger presents herself as a selective reader of the Old Testament: if she finds that 
the particular text she is reading elaborates on the teachings of Jesus, she accepts them, but if she 
finds that they do not, she puts them aside (Inger10). 
In Inger11 she does refer to the Hagar narrative as central to “the origin of our faith” 
while investigating her own hermeneutical key (as presented earlier). This may be a way to 
include it in the category of texts from the Old Testament to which she wants to relate. She does 
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not establish a connection between the Hagar narrative and Jesus’ teaching, and this may indicate 
that Inger operates after all with an open, and not fixed, perspective of how to relate to the Old 
Testament texts. Her attitude can also indicate that she acknowledges that her personal 
hermeneutical way of relating to the Old Testament text should include “an open window” for a 
broader Christian community of readers and interpreters in the past as well as in the present. 
Since Inger was presented with a text from the Jewish-Christian tradition that is not of her own 
choosing but chosen for her, her reflections in Inger12 could also simply be a way to reflect in 
such a way as to make the best of making meaning in the situation she is in.136 
Inger articulates a double curiosity: first toward her own tradition and the Old Testament 
narrative on Hagar, and then toward the Islamic tradition regarding the Hagar/Hajar narrative. 
This may disclose one of her reasons for engaging in the conversation. Her curiosity is directed 
not only toward the other tradition but also toward her own. Her curiosity leads to an articulated 
question that in turn results in an interaction: she gets answers, or rather promises of answers 
later on, from two of the Muslim participants, Aira and Shirin. These promises lead to an 
articulated expectation (Inger14). 
 
Inger15:  Well, when I read the texts, then the one from the Koran is a very kind 
text. It is almost without … it is very kind, gentle and caring, and 
Abraham does show concern … even if she has to go out and manage on 
her own, but he expresses concern and has feelings of care for her. 
Inger16:  She is abandoned in the Koran as well, but at least he expresses concern, 
and in a way he leaves her in the care of God. 
Inger17:  But here, in the Bible, it is as if … there is no concern for Sarah by 
Abraham, so he is really awful, as I pointed out last time. 
Inger18:  The biblical text is a bit more realistic, perhaps more true about how we 
humans really are: we are jealous, we are evil, we can’t bear anyone 
threatening our position. So in this way it is perhaps more … well, true 
about how we really are as humans and what we are struggling with. 
Inger19:  And then there is this that I find difficult throughout the whole of the Old 
Testament: that some are chosen above others. This contradicts our sense 
of justice so much, doesn’t it …? 
Inger20: That Sarah and Isaac are chosen above Hagar and Ishmael. I find this a 
very provocative idea that I object to. 
                                                 
136 See Chapter 3 for the participants’ view of the texts selected for discussion, p. 85-86. 
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Inger21:  And then, on the question if there is a revelation here, that is, if it is 
God’s voice in this text, I find that difficult to grasp here, for my part. 
These are my first reactions to these texts. 
Inger22: Let me just say one thing: I think it is great that breastfeeding is 
mentioned three times in the Koran, and once in the Bible, and this, as a 
part of women’s lives, is lifted up and appreciated. I think that’s cool; it’s 
a tiny little bit of women’s perspective in the middle of all this. 
 
Inger reflects on the Hagar/Hajar narratives through comparing them, and she makes 
the comparison by shedding light on how the figure of Abraham/Ibrahim is portrayed in the two 
texts. Inger finds that Abraham/Ibrahim in the narrative from the hadith is portrayed as “kind, 
gentle and caring” (Inger16) toward Hagar/Hajar and Ishmael, whereas in the Old Testament 
narrative he is portrayed as “awful” and without concern (Inger17). Inger describes the biblical 
narrative as being “perhaps more true about how we humans really are” and hence states that the 
Old Testament version of the Hagar/Hajar narrative is more realistic.  
Inger’s evaluation appears to be based on her own knowledge and experience of 
humanity and reality. Her reasoning functions as an acknowledgement that the harsh reality 
presented in the narrative by the Old Testament (“then”) is more analoguous to the reality she 
observes and experiences today (“now”). This view of the present represents a contrast to Eva’s 
earlier presentation of a far more positive view of the development of history and contemporary 
times. Their respective analysis of the current context seems to be strikingly different. Inger’s 
perception creates a connection between the Old Testament narrative past (“then”) and the 
present (“now”), possibly bridging the temporal gap (at least to a certain extent) through her 
view that human conditions are difficult both “then” and “now” and that human beings have not 
basically changed much through history. Eva focuses on the distance between the different times 
and claims that conditions as well as humans have improved.  
Inger and Eva, with supposedly a rather equal background both culturally and 
religiously, display radically different views of the present living conditions for humans. This 
could suggest that they relate to and include different contemporary contexts in their perspective 
of what present “reality” is. Eva concentrates on the Norwegian context in her positive 
evaluation in the “now”; Inger does not locate her perspective geographically or spatially but 
assumes a universal view on how human beings behave in “reality” across contexts (Inger19). 
Inger may represent a different and more pessimistic view of the position of women, regardless 
of historical context, but claims rather that human conditions and human actions have always 
been, and still are, full of conflict and difficulties. 
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Inger’s view of the two narratives is similar in a certain respect to Aira’s view: the Old 
Testament narrative displays human conflicts and brutality, whereas the hadith story has a more 
clear-cut educational and moral aim. They do reach different conclusions, though. It is not clear 
in the end if Inger prefers the “niceness” of the hadith story to the “reality” of the Old Testament 
story, and perhaps this kind of competitive approach is not something Inger is aiming for but 
rather wants to avoid. She starts by comparing the Abraham/Ibrahim figure in both narratives, 
claiming that the Old Testament narrative is closer to “reality” in portraying a more “realistic” 
image of Abraham/Ibrahim as well. Inger’s relies on her own analogical reasoning with respect 
to human conditions in making meaning rather than trusting the texts as such. 
Aira’s conclusion is, as mentioned above, that the revelation in the Old Testament 
narrative is mixed up with human experiences and views, and she deals with the problems she 
finds in the Old Testament text (regarding the text’s unveiling of human relationship problems) 
by questioning the quality of revelation in this text. In doing this, she is in line with the 
traditional Islamic view of the Old Testament and its relation to divine revelation. Inger, too, 
addresses the question of revelation in the Old Testament but from a different vantage point. The 
issue that makes her question if the Hagar story in Genesis can be regarded as divine revelation 
is the text’s representation of the notion of divinely chosen people. Inger claims that this 
particular notion is part of the Old Testament in general. In the text from Genesis the different 
status of Sarah and Isaac versus that of Hagar and Ishmael is the reason why Hagar and Ishmael 
are driven away, reflecting the notion of Sarah and Isaac as “chosen,” and Hagar and Ishmael as 
the “not chosen.” The problem Inger articulates about the concept of the “chosen” here is that 
this contradicts “our sense of justice” (Inger20). If someone is chosen, it implies that somebody 
else is not chosen. If justice means equal treatment for all humans, this unequal categorization of 
the chosen and not chosen can establish a basis for systematic religious and social injustice. Inger 
does not explicitly take the issue further by asking if injustice can be part of divine revelation, 
but I interpret this to be the underlying question here. The “chosen” in religious canonical 
scriptures like the Bible are chosen in a context of religious legitimization and presented as 
chosen by God. This makes Inger’s critical question transcend this particular narrative.  
Inger22 appears as an appendix in this sequence, with no direct connection to what Inger 
has been saying previously. She expresses appreciation of the appearance of breastfeeding in the 
biblical and koranic texts, calling this “a tiny little bit of women’s perspective in the middle of all 
of this.” Breastfeeding is, of course, an activity practiced by women only, but to be more specific 
it is practiced by women by virtue of being mothers. Not all women are mothers, and not all 
mothers breastfeed their children. To be in a position to breastfeed is then to be in a specific role 
as a woman and a mother; thus highlighting the inclusion of this part of some women’s lives is a 
thin basis for claiming a comprehensive women’s perspective. Inger22, however, does not at all 
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claim the presence of a comprehensive women’s perspective on biblical and koranic texts. It 
seems, rather, as if Inger is looking for something positive to say about the texts from a women’s 
perspective. She relates to both scriptures together on this matter, and her comments include 
both. This may be interpreted to mean that she, despite the view she presents on the two 
Hagar/Hajar narratives as different, does not distinguish too much between the Christian and the 
Islamic canonical scriptures when it comes to a missing women’s perspective. 
 
Maria21:  Yes. When I read these two, I think they are highly relevant, I believe 
that they could have been written today.  
Maria22:  Because I see that it is all about humans and our relations, or how we 
relate to each other. And the crucial point I find in them is faith, that we 
need to have faith. 
Maria23: And that God keeps promises with no difference between the Koran and 
the Bible. In the end he does what he promised to do, to protect humans 
and that humans will become more numerous in the world.  
Maria24:  Then I think like you said, that this is very real, with Sarah and all, it 
happens today, in many societies today. That if a woman can’t have 
children, then men turn to other women and have children with them. 
Maria25: And, of course, this creates jealousy, and a lot of … it’s the same 
problem really. 
Maria26:  And what you said about position, that is highly relevant in our 
workplaces; everywhere people fight for their status and situation. 
Maria27:  And then it is what we talked about, if you talk about slavery at that time, 
we do have a kind of slavery today and that is the traffic in humans. It 
happens today, it is exactly the same. People buy other humans to use 
them.  
Maria28:  And in some countries, maybe not so much around here, but in the Third 
World, for instance, when there are wars going on, women are used as 
sex slaves.  
Maria29:  So this is highly relevant, all the problems that existed then are perhaps 
worse today because we should know better, and still it happens. 
Maria30: And when you say that about chosen ones, about Sarah and Ibrahim, I 
think yes, today we have the royal family. They do get a better life than 
other people.  
Maria31:  Why? What kind of rights, why is it that everyone in Norway has to 
provide for them? It is exactly the same. 
  
200 
Maria32: Throughout history they have been chosen as a particular group through 
inheritance, their children will be king, princess, and prince. It is the 
same even if we don’t call it so. 
Maria33:  So I think, for me when I read this, I think that yes, we have developed a 
lot regarding technology and all that, but human beings are the same. If it 
was a thousand years ago or today, it is the same, our struggles are the 
same. We do the same things, even if we might do it a bit differently 
because we have technology.  
Maria34: So this is how I read this; it is very interesting when I read it. This is 
today. Yes.  
 
Maria addresses several contemporary issues that she believes threaten human dignity 
and make women’s living conditions worse, and connects them to her making meaning of the 
Hagar/Hajar narrative. She claims that several of the issues she finds to be represented in the 
Hagar/Hajar texts exist in a similar form in present times, such as slavery and sexual abuse, 
rivalry, and conflicts among humans, abandonment of barren women, and the existence of 
surrogate mothers. These matters are, says Maria, highly relevant in different contexts today, in 
the “now.” Through her contextual focus in making meaning of the narratives, she explicitly 
challenges the opposite view, namely that the temporal gap between the times of the narratives 
(“then”) and the current time (“now”) means that the issues represented in the narrative are 
outdated. Instead, Maria claims that the similarities between women’s living conditions “then” 
and “now” are more significant than the differences. Several times Maria challenges the view 
that the temporal gap makes the narratives irrelevant when illustrating women’s living conditions 
(Maria21, 27, 34). 
Maria’s comments on the living conditions for women “now” thus contradict Eva’s 
positive evaluation of the present. Maria thus approximates Inger’s views. But whereas Inger 
talks in more general terms about human nature and human struggles as basically the same 
across the temporal gap, Maria relates human/women’s dignity more to social structures and 
contexts. She relates closely to both the texts and the contemporary context at the same time, 
engaging perhaps in what Mieke Bal calls a “[bold] use of anachronistic terms” (Bal 2008: 48) 
when connecting the slave status of Hagar in the Old Testament text to the modern slavery in 
human trafficking.  
Maria locates the human problems she mentions in “many societies today” (Maria24). 
She does not specify the spatial dimension further, but she has mentioned related issues earlier 
while referring to a specific African context.  
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Let us sum up the positions in the discussion on status quo for living conditions for 
women. Eva insists that the situation of women has improved significantly, whereas Inger is 
more reluctant, and Maria holds a view contrary to Eva’s: The conditions have not become better 
but worse (Maria29). What does she mean by this? She does not mean necessarily, perhaps, that 
human/women’s conditions have worsened, objectively speaking but that critical knowledge 
about other people’s situation is available in a way today that is quite different from before. This 
makes the existence of these problems a moral challenge.  
Maria seems to contradict Eva’s view that improved education and a true understanding 
of Jesus’ message have lessened human discriminatory practices. She does not automatically 
connect improved understanding and knowledge to improvements in women’s situations. Rather, 
she points out that the increased knowledge, combined with a lack of action for change, creates a 
bigger moral dilemma than people faced “then,” anticipating that they did not have access to the 
same amount of information. Maria’s African background is obviously an important source for 
her reflection, and experiences from the African context provide different information than the 
Norwegian context. In this way the contextual gap becomes visible as an obstacle to agreement 
on a common analysis of the current situation for women. 
Maria seems to lessen the historical gap that Eva presupposes, introducing instead a 
geographical gap between “the countries around here” and “Third World countries” (Maria28). 
When stating the similarities between the living conditions at the times of the narratives and the 
present, Maria does not mention the Norwegian context until she draws in the Norwegian royal 
family as an example of the notion of chosen people as practiced today (Maria30-32). Inger 
introduced the problem of the chosen earlier, and now Maria actualizes it with a Norwegian 
example. Maria argues that the privileges granted by birth to the royal family of Norway can be 
compared with the privileged status of Sarah and Isaac in the Hagar narrative of Genesis.  
Whereas Eva uses the Norwegian context as a positive example of less discrimination 
due to historical processes influenced by Christian values, Maria uses an example from the 
Norwegian context to illustrate injustice between chosen and not chosen people. There is of 
course a difference here regarding the legitimization of the status of chosen between the narrative 
in the Old Testament and today’s Norwegian constitution; the chosen in a religious sense is 
legitimized religiously or by divinity whereas the sense of being chosen in a political system is 
legitimized by human society. The social result is nevertheless the same: privileges for the 
chosen only. 
But Maria also establishes a link between “then” and “now” in a more hopeful way. Just 
as she claims that human living conditions basically stay the same over time, she also states that 
God’s promises stay the same too. In her description of human challenges and brutality at the 
crossroads of the textual narratives and the current situation, Maria relates mostly to the 
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Hagar/Hajar narrative of the Bible when establishing the challenging issues, although she does 
not say this explicitly. The narratives may have merged into one for Maria, with parts of the 
biblical narrative dominating her elaborations. In her testimony-like statements in Maria23, 
however, she relates explicitly and without discriminating to both the Bible and the Koran as 
canonical scriptures where God makes and keeps promises to humanity. This shows that her 
image of a promise-keeping God is not limited to her own Christian tradition or the Bible.  
Maria’s statement “we need to have faith” (Maria22) is directed to a “we” and a “now.” 
Maria places the promise-keeping God in a shared Christian-Muslim “then.” But since Maria 
stresses that the temporal gap between the “then” and the “now” to be non-significant or even 
non-existent, this may even be a way of placing the shared God in the “now.” To Maria, the acts 
of God may also transgress the temporal gap between “then” and “now,” just as she declared was 
the case for human conditions. 
Aira establishes the meaning of the Hagar/Hajar narrative as a divine legitimization of 
religious plurality and a testimony of Hagar/Hajar’s faith in God. Maria opens the way for a 
religious plurality too. For Maria, plurality is represented by two canonical scriptures both 
testifying about a shared promise-keeping God. This God, according to Maria, wants to protect 
humans and make humans numerous (Maria23). Maria’s general expression of “humans” may 
suggest that she claims that this divine protection takes place across space and over time of 
human existence, regardless of religion. 
 
Time and Place for Testimonies in Making Meaning 
Compared to the discussions presented earlier, the mode of expression and communication is 
different during this third discussion at the second meeting on the Hagar/Hajar narratives. There 
are fewer interruptions, and thus the participants share longer reflections. This means that the 
interaction between the participants is less intense, but the participants do relate to what the 
others say. They also relate to the earlier discussions to some extent. Discussion 3 is dominated 
not so much by one or two of the participants raising questions or issues but is marked by a 
greater presence of the different aspects of the Hagar/Hajar narratives in the participants’ 
contributions. Shirin sets the tone of the discussion perhaps when she says that she wants to turn 
to the general meanings of the texts.  
Two other factors that make this meeting different from the previous ones are that Maria 
is moderating the meeting as one of the participants and that the meeting starts with reading the 
texts silently, not aloud. It is difficult to say in what way these various factors influence the mode 
of communication. The participants also know one another better and are possibly more at ease 
with the overall situation. But, in sum, all the above-mentioned factors may have made it 
possible for the participants to be more open both for listening and for sharing more personal 
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contributions. But there is another way to interpret the more coherent and focused 
communication in the group at this point: the stakes are higher because differences have 
gradually been revealed and the participants have invested more effort in the process. The 
situation may call for stronger statements based on one’s own reasoning and for extensive 
articulation of one’s own meaning making.  
The concept of testimony and witness comes to mind as categories for expressing the 
mode of communication and the roles of the participants. In general, the place of a witness and a 
testimony is often a contested place, where truth is on trial, or in a situation that requires a 
clarification of one’s stance. In the Christian tradition, the religious use of the concept testimony 
often refers to a personal narrative about one’s own challenging experiences as interpreted within 
a divine framework. 
A testimony is more than a mere statement of an opinion or a personal reflection. 
According to Paul Ricoeur, it contains “a fusion … between the confessional pole and the 
narrative pole” (Ricoeur 1980: 144). Ricoeur further states that a testimony has “an aspect of 
manifestation” and is an expression of “[t]he absolute declaring itself here and now” (Ricoeur 
1980: 144). Ricoeur mainly discusses the notion of testimony within the framework of the 
Christian tradition and biblical exegesis. The difficulty of interpreting a testimony is obvious: it 
claims, in some form, an absolute truth. Still, the testimony needs to be interpreted, according to 
Ricoeur, just as it itself is an interpretation (Ricoeur 1980: 143-144). The testimony is a self-
reflective act that has a claim beyond the identity of the witness.  
Does testimony as a category of speech necessarily have to be religious in its motivation 
and content? In this setting, however, the presence of the canonical texts sometimes frames the 
conversation and at other times functions as a catalyst for discussion. Thus, the testimonies 
display both a narrative and confessional pole, framed by the Christian and the Islamic tradition 
present through the texts, and the experience, knowledge, and meaning-making present by the 
participants. The testimonies themselves can be considered to be a combination of relating to the 
canonical texts, to one’s own religious experience or reflection, to ethical/ideological stances, to 
contextual knowledge, and to personal narratives.  
In Discussion 3, Eva, Aira, and Maria all express themselves in ways that can be 
categorized as testimonies. In addition, Shirin gives a normative statement about how she views 
the role of religion and the need for change in the interpretation of the Koran. This too may be 
categorized as a kind of testimony.  
A closer investigation of the testimonies in this discussion would necessitate an 
examination of their narrative and confessional contents, with a view to the similarities and 
differences between them in the way they relate to each other and to the Hagar/Hajar narratives. 
The narrative presence of the texts may encourage or influence the participants to express 
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themselves in specific ways. The plurality of the narratives, and the fact that there are two 
narratives on the table that are related but still different may open the way for a plurality both 
between and within the testimonies. 
Shirin’s statements about the need for “change in the Koran” (most probably addressing a 
need for change in the interpretation of the Koran), as well as her claim that change in the 
religious realm should happen through reform, not through revolution, is not made in first person 
and is thus not really a personal testimony. When I include it in the discourse of testimony, I do 
so because Shirin expresses these views as a “confession” of how she relates (together with 
others – she includes a “we” in her statements) to her own religious tradition. Her statements 
appear at the end of her contribution in this discussion, as a wish for the future based on her 
interpretation of the past.  
The next testimony appears at the end of Aira’s contribution. Her testimony is closely 
intertwined with the performative aspect of the Hajar narrative in the hadith, since her narrative 
and confession is based on her own experience of the ritual of sa’y. The narrative and 
confessional elements are intertwined in Aira’s testimony. She describes her own feelings and 
experiences during sa’y as a way of experiencing God’s closeness as she performs Hajar’s 
physical struggle. Aira, like Shirin, includes a “we” in her testimony, referring to her fellow 
Muslim pilgrims doing the same as she does. Through the performance of sa’y Aira experiences 
equality between men and women because they all, men and women alike, run together seven 
times between the mountains Safa and Marwa. Aira’s testimony shares an experience of a state 
of coevalness with Hajar, as well as with her female and male co-performers of sa’y, and with 
God – across boundaries of time, gender, cultures, interpreted as the divine presence in the 
human realm. The boundary that is not crossed but constitutes the experience of coevalness is the 
religious confession of Islam.  
Eva’s testimony, when she declares herself to be a feminist and a Christian believer, is an 
immediate continuation of her critical statement about Aira’s former sayings. Her testimony 
appears in the beginning of her contribution to the discussion. The testimony itself does not 
contain criticism of other participants’ statements nor of other traditions, religions, or cultures. 
Eva’s criticism of the past is only indirectly posed as a negative mirror to current, more 
positively portrayed developments. At this point, the narrative part of her testimony is not 
directly related to her religious tradition. But elsewhere in her contributions Eva refers to the 
effect of Jesus’ message in history as a decisive factor in bringing about the change in times: 
from the times of discrimination to a current time less marked by discrimination against humans.  
The confessional part refers to “the message of Jesus” and to feminism. When Eva 
declares herself to be a Christian feminist, she relates her interpretation of Jesus’ message to the 
basis for her feministic stance by presenting that stance as a logical result of her understanding of 
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Jesus’ message. Her testimony is thus double: both the Christian religion understood as the 
message of Jesus and feminism are manifested, as is the combination of the two. Eva 
contextualizes her Christian and feminist confession in the Norwegian context as the place where 
she describes the practice of equality between people to be closest to the ideals of a non-
discriminatory human society. In this part the confessional and narrative are intertwined with 
ideological statements and a presentation of her view of history. Eva’s manifestation of Norway 
as a Christian country, more Christian than ever before throughout history, according to Eva, is 
based on the image of Norway as the place of human equality, and has the shape of a religiously 
based political statement. Eva can be said to confess her own Norwegian-ness, alongside her 
confession of the Christian faith and of feminism. However, she does not make this a personal 
statement about herself but about Norway. Eva’s testimony is related to the Hagar/Hajar 
narratives only when she uses them to illustrate a discriminatory past that, according to Eva has 
been fought back through a greater understanding of what the Christian message is really about 
and to general historical developments of enlightenment. The place of equality for Eva is 
contemporary Norwegian society, and this view is based partly on a particular understanding of 
other times. Other places are not reflected upon as such. 
Maria’s statements about the necessity of having faith and the presence of a promise-
keeping God in both the Bible and the Koran also have the character of a testimony. These 
sayings are clearly made on the basis of the Hagar/Hajar stories, used by Maria as a positive 
example of the faith of Hagar/Hajar (and possibly the other characters as well) and of God as 
promise-keeper. The striking aspect of Maria’s testimony is that it is not really a confession of 
one specific religion, although it is a confession of faith in God. Her testimony is simply a 
confession of a plural admission to God’s promises for both Christians and Muslims. The 
narrative part is connected to the description of human relations in the Hagar/Hajar narratives 
(and Maria may relate more closely to the biblical text than to the text from the hadith) as a valid 
description of human challenges in present times. 
What I have presented above as testimonies in the discussion thus have significant 
differences, although they are given in a conversation/discussion on the same texts. The 
Hagar/Hajar stories are integrated into the testimonies in different ways: as a positive or negative 
background in the narrative part (Maria and Eva), as an example of how change in religion and 
the plurality of religions should occur (Shirin), or as a narrative performed in a ritual frame as the 
source of religious experience (Aira). Defining contexts and situating one’s own position, 
however, seems to be as important as relating to the texts – at least for Shirin, Eva, and Maria.  
To give a testimony is a way to fix a “here” and “now” by grasping a momentum for 
contributing one’s own confession and narrative(s) with a particular emphasis. The testimonies 
in Discussion 3 relate simultaneously to a larger historical frame and to self-reflection. The 
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testimonies given by Aira, Eva, and Maria differ in content, but they are still connected through 
sharing the elements of confession, narrative, and manifestation. 
 
Testimonies about Narratives of Equality and Hope:  
Temporal and Spatial Aspects 
A thematic summary of the contents of the testimonies admonishing people to different forms of 
action or agency would include having faith and hope, working for change, acknowledging 
religious differences, believing in a caring God in both the Bible and the Koran, and thus 
establishing a shared image of God in Christianity and Islam. The controversy between Aira and 
Eva on what it really means to interpret the Hagar/Hajar narratives in a spiritual way is blended 
into their testimonies, expressing a disagreement between them on this particular issue.  
Both Aira and Eva, however, testify to the experience of human equality, relating it in 
different ways to the canonical texts of the two traditions. Aira relates directly to the Hajar 
narrative in the hadith and Eva indirectly to the message of Jesus in the New Testament and to 
the Hagar/Hajar narrative as background for illustrating that message. The narratives of human 
equality are framed in time and space: for Aira, the place of equality is during sa’y in Mecca; for 
Eva, it is in contemporary Norway.  
Maria does not testify about any experience of equality but to an experience of 
coevalness between the events in the Hagar/Hajar narratives and events taking place in the 
present. The human misery represented in both eras is contrasted with a faith in a caring, 
promise-keeping God who operates freely across the canonical scriptures of both traditions, 
across Christian and Islamic religious boundaries, and beyond space and time. In Maria’s 
testimony, human equality is present only within the divine perspective of humanity. 
 
Discussion 4 Related to the Hagar/Hajar Narratives. 
Obedience versus Forgiveness in the Christian and Islamic Traditions 
Chronologically speaking, this discussion is a direct continuation of Discussion 3.137 When 
Susanne however, addresses the question of obedience as possibly a significant difference 
between the Christian and the Islamic religious traditions (Susanne7-15), the discussion becomes 
thematically focused on this particular question, and it is extended to include the notion of 
forgiveness in the two traditions. The mode of communication shifts from testimony to a more 
discursive mode, more like the earlier discussions.  
 
                                                 
137 We are still in the second (and last) meeting where the participants are discussing the Hagar/Hajar narratives,. 
This is the third meeting in the overall schedule. 
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Susanne3: I think this is really interesting to listen to; there have been five different 
reflections, so I have actually just noted some things along the way that I 
haven’t had the opportunity to …  
Susanne4:  But as … to what you said, Aira, about spiritual and worldly reading, do 
you think that one text is spiritual and the other worldly, if I understood 
you correctly? 
 
Aira90:  It … 
 
Susanne5:  That one is more spiritual and the other is more worldly. 
 
Aira91: I find that it can be described in that way. One text touches you 
emotionally, and the other describes God’s commands.  
 
Susanne6:  Ok. But this fits well with what I was about to say.  
Susanne7:  Because just that, and something that was said about the reading of texts, 
whether it is God’s revelation or not, has a lot to do, I think, with the 
view of scriptures …. it is very different in Christianity and Islam … and 
perhaps the concept of God. 
 
After expressing an affirmative comment to all the previous contributions so far in the 
meeting, as well as a slight regret that she has not been able to enter into the conversation thus 
far, Susanne checks with Aira to see if she understands her earlier statements correctly before she 
starts to make her own point. This way of communicating serves the purpose of minimizing 
possible misunderstandings and thus provides a verbal interaction where the participants 
involved have a chance to develop a conversation on equally understood premises.  
In her explanation of the difference between the two ways of reading, Aira seems to 
locate the difference in how the subject position is situated in the reading process (Aira91). To 
read with an epistemological basis in human feelings is to situate the reader as an autonomous 
subject, whereas to read with the intention of finding God’s will in the text makes reading an 
interaction between God and a reader equipped with the intention of following her interpretation 
of God’s will as expressed in the text. The latter way of reading does not exclude the reader as a 
subject, but it does erect some limits to the autonomous subject. The subject position is 
established in the dynamics between the text and the reader and situates the final authority in a 
place at least partly projected beyond human/one’s own feelings and experience.  
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Susanne8:  But that this text from the hadith in a way reflects a kind of religion of 
obedience, or a kind of thinking about obedience, where Abraham … 
 
Aira92:  To God. 
 
Susanne9:  To God. And where Abraham is obedient too. He is, but it is still a bit 
different … the emphasis is on different things. 
Susanne10: In the hadith God tells Ibrahim “Go and do this” and he does that.  
Susanne11: But here there is a kind of jealousy, and Sarah chases Hagar away, and 
she comes back and Sara forces Abraham to chase her away again, is a 
lot more … realistic, more the way we already know the world.  
Susanne12:  And then I think that this might have something to do with the way one 
thinks about God, and … this is a bit difficult for me to explain, but do 
you understand what I mean?  
Susanne13: A kind of obedience against more of an understanding of the  
incarnation, that God became human, and that this gives the human more 
space, in a different way.  
Susanne14: I don’t mean to say that Islam is not a humane religion or something like 
that … but that there is a different kind of importance attached to human 
emotions on the bases of these texts.  
Susanne15: And this is not an attack on anyone in any way, it is just an observation 
on the text.  
 
Susanne concentrates her reasoning on possible differences between Christian and 
Islamic tradition regarding the issue of obedience. Her starting point is Aira’s two ways of 
reading the Hagar/Hajar narratives. Susanne poses the question if the narrative from the hadith 
could be interpreted as reflecting a general dogma of obedience within the Islamic tradition 
(Susanne7). Aira immediately intervenes and specifies that the notion of obedience in Islam has 
to do only with obedience to God (Aira92).  
The core of Susanne’s reasoning seems to be her question if the Christian tradition 
provides more space for the human because of the Christian dogma of incarnation, whereas the 
Islamic view of the God-human relationship emphasizes human obedience to God. Does Susanne 
interpret Aira’s suggestion about the two ways of reading that only an “Islamic reading” is to be 
considered “spiritual”? Susanne may be trying to establish a broader comparison between the 
two traditions that emerge from the two narratives and is based on earlier comments and 
interpretations of the narratives in the group. 
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Susanne14-15 are hedging remarks to ensure that her thinking on the differences she 
finds between the Christian and Islamic traditions are not received as criticism. Her motive may 
be concern for others, fear of being misunderstood, or both. Her statement in Susanne14-15 
could give a hint about what kind of misunderstandings she has in mind. Susanne tries to explore 
certain differences through questioning based on her own presuppositions and comprehension, 
which is also made transparent through her open manner of questioning. She wants to explore, 
but she does not want anyone to be offended by it. 
 
Susanne16: And then I thought, after you spoke, Inger, you said that Abraham was a 
scoundrel, and didn’t care, I don’t know if I agree, because Abraham is 
in a way the one who … does what Sarah tells him to do, and actually it 
is Sarah who is the scoundrel here and the reason why Hagar has to 
leave, but it says in verse 11: “The matter was very distressing to 
Abraham on account of his son.”  
Susanne17: So, it really hurts him to do it, and that tells me … that Abraham didn’t 
do this easily. He did it because his wife forced him to. And the reason 
was jealousy. For me, Sarah is more the scoundrel than Abraham. Even 
if he could have said no, but ….  
 
Susanne takes up the frame of the narrative, including the earlier comments made in this 
type of engagement with the texts, and then the discussion about who is to blame for expelling 
Hagar and Ishmael to the desert. Earlier (in Discussion 3) Inger had put the responsibility and 
blame on Abraham/Ibrahim. Susanne presents a different view of the Old Testament narrative: 
the blame is to be put on Sarah who forced Abraham to do what he did. She finds that Abraham’s 
room for acting in the narrated situation is controlled by Sarah and suggests that he acted against 
his own feelings. This is one of the rare comments among the Christian participants during this 
process that defends the figure Abraham in the Old Testament narrative or at least presents an 
option for sharing the blame between him and Sarah.  
Any suggestion that God is to blame for Hagar’s precarious situation, however, has not 
occurred so far. Only the Christian participants have addressed the question of responsibility and 
blame, mostly related to the Old Testament narrative (and sometimes in a merged narrative that 
incorporates the hadith). Within the frame of the narrative, the figure of Abraham/Ibrahim and 
now that of Sarah have been included in one way or another in the blame. In addition, an alleged 
male narrator/author has been blamed. So why have they not blamed God, either as a figure in 
the narrative or as the ultimate source and guarantor of human existence, according to Christian 
and Muslim beliefs?  
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It may be that the participants who criticize the figures in the narratives, who are all 
Christians, do not connect the Hagar/Hajar story with their own concept of God. Maria’s 
testimony in discussion 3 represents an exception, when she uses both narratives to state her 
belief in a promise-keeping and caring God (Maria23). Most of the Christian participants have 
stated that they relate primarily to the message of Jesus in the New Testament as the basis for 
their faith. The Hagar narrative was not well known to them in the first place, and they may 
struggle to relate to it as having something to do with their image of God. 
 
Susanne18: And then there are some observations I made when I read the text now 
that I didn’t see the last time, and that is when God, or the angel of God, 
reveals himself to Hagar in the Genesis text and tells her not to be afraid. 
In the text from the hadith it says that she hears the voice of an angel of 
God after she had been running around a certain amount of times. 
Susanne19: So there are different reasons why the angel talks to her. It is  because of 
her deeds, she ran and acted based on a feeling of despair because she 
didn’t have any water, while in the text in Genesis she isn’t doing 
anything. I think … I don’t know how to interpret it, but I found it 
interesting. These are very scattered and incoherent comments, but …. 
 
This might be a repeated but extended pattern of interpretation if compared with 
Susanne12-14. The interpretative point of access from the Hagar/Hajar narratives is a different 
one. In Susanne19 Susanne interprets the hadith narrative as a plot where the divine messenger 
addressed Hajar and Ishmael only after Hajar’s own struggle to rescue them. In the Old 
Testament narrative Susanne observes that Hagar is passive before the divine message. The 
repeated pattern or framework of interpretation may be the opposition Susanne sees between 
human obedience and hard work in the hadith narrative, and the room for human emotions and 
human weakness/powerlessness in the Old Testament narrative. The question Susanne is asking 
is if these observations are useful for constructing a more comprehensive perspective within the 
Islamic and Christian traditions respectively or if the comments are limited to addressing 
differences between the two Hagar/Hajar stories. At the beginning of the group’s discussions (the 
discussion analyzed in Chapter 4) Eva introduced a distinction between religions of law and 
emphasized Christianity as the religion of grace. This distinction was contested by some of the 
Muslim participants then. 
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Shirin54:  I have done some research, and it is only this particular verse that is in 
the Koran, about this incident. It is in the second paragraph toward the 
end ….  
 
Susanne20:  Ok. 
 
Shirin55:  “I have made some of my offspring dwell in a valley without cultivation, 
so let people have goodwill towards them and give them fruit to eat, so 
that they may give thanks.” That is the only part in this story that comes 
from the Koran. Everything else is from the hadith.  
Shirin56: Personally, I believe that one should … look at it anew, which has 
happened in Iran.  
Shirin57: I feel very close to you when you talk even if you are a Christian … I 
mean, when you start to interpret. For instance, you say that some of the 
things you read in your book you can understand and some you don’t 
understand. It is the same with me. 
Shirin58: I won’t say that it’s not the word of God, but I can’t understand it and it 
is not revelation to me when I read the Koran. It is written in a different 
time and place, but personally, when I read the whole book, what I focus 
on is the spiritual values.  
Shirin59: When I see that … but, for instance, that episode, I don’t know where … 
only this verse, not the story coming from the hadith, I decide that no 
matter what happens in my life, I will not lose hope.  
Shirin60: Then, her viewpoint on obedience and view on humanity, that obedience 
is only to God, you see, in difficult situations.  
 
Susanne21:  I see. 
 
Shirin uses her pre-knowledge about the intertextual structure of the Hagar narrative in 
the hadith, and establishes a difference between the one verse of the Koran integrated into the 
hadith text (which she recites in Shirin55) and the rest of the text. In Shirin59 she repeatedly 
highlights that there is a difference between the koranic part of the hadith narrative and the other 
parts of the text. Shirin does not, however, elaborate on what this difference might entail for the 
interpretation or explicitly say anything about a possible difference concerning status or mode of 
interpretation of the two types of tradition material. But in Shirin54 and 55 she shows the 
difference in status through referring only to the koranic verse from the text and explicitly ruling 
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out any reference to the hadith when she is presenting her personal outcome of the narrative: the 
message Shirin embraces is not to lose hope, no matter what happens to her.  
Shirin repeats what Aira earlier claimed, i.e. that in the Islamic tradition the only object 
of obedience is God. Shirin adds a circumstantial modification to the obligation to obey God in 
the Islamic tradition: “in difficult situations.” She may be referring to the situation of 
Hagar/Hajar in the narrative as an example.  
Shirin expresses a felt closeness to another participant who is referred to as a Christian, 
but Shirin only calls her “you.” The description of what the “you” has been saying matches what 
Inger said earlier. Shirin’s rephrasing of the critical view of the Old Testament corresponds to 
what Inger presented (Inger8-10). This felt closeness is presented as an unexpected experience or 
at least a bit contradictory since Inger is a Christian whereas Shirin is a Muslim. But this may not 
necessarily reflect surprise on Shirin’s own part. It could be that this is a statement meant to 
underline that an experience of common ground is possible between Christians and Muslims 
(which Shirin had earlier advocated between the religions).  
Shirin’s feeling of closeness is addressed to a person, a “you.” This makes it more 
personal than declaring an agreement on a statement or an argument, even if the latter is included 
in the presentation of what this felt closeness consists of for Shirin. Shirin addresses a need to 
look for spiritual values, perhaps exemplified through identifying a common ground across 
religious boundaries. It seems as if Shirin does not find different ways of relating to the 
scriptures an obstacle to this but rather a search for a shared selective reading of the canonical 
scriptures (Shirin58) with a spiritual focus. Shirin does not, however, explain what she means by 
“spiritual values.”  
 Shirin’s reference to Iran in Shirin56 is not explained, but she returns to the case of Iran 
in the next sequence: 
 
Shirin61:  But it is different when some Muslims are so weak and subjugated that 
they only listen to the people in charge … that is not my view, you see. 
 
Susanne22:  That was what I meant.  
 
Shirin62:  Yes, yes. I just wanted to tell you that this obedience is to God in 
difficult situations.  
Shririn63: But in issues connected to society, you have to start thinking, and then to 
solve it. You see?  
Shirin64: And there is a lot of discussion, at least in Iran, I cannot really speak 
about other countries because I don’t have enough information about 
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them, but since a kind of Islamic state was established there, and you see 
how stupid some people are … God, if I say the right thing … in abusing 
the Koran. I can talk about so many stupid things, for instance, that the 
President has said that Israel should be wiped off the world …. 
 
Susanne23:  The map. 
 
Shirin65:  The map. Could you believe how stupid he is, even in the name of God? 
Then I think that the obedience is what they represent, you see.  
 
Shirin now discusses the concept of obedience in Islam related to her perception of the 
political context of Iran. Iran is said to represent an Islamic state (Shirin64) but Shirin is careful 
to underline that her references are only to her own experiences in Iran, not necessarily to other 
countries where Islam is the majority religion or part of the constitutional framework. Obedience 
to political authorities is not included in Shirin’s perception of religiously legitimated claims of 
obedience (Shirin62). She uses the political leadership in Iran as a negative example of 
aggressive and misinterpreted application of the concept of obedience, falsely legitimized by 
Islam. She distinguishes issues in a certain society – Iran still being the example – from issues 
between humans and God “in difficult situations.” Reflection and reasoning should, according to 
Shirin, be the guide for behavior in a society – not obedience to the authorities. The echo of 
Aira’s narrative about Muhammad sending his representative to a foreign place, telling him to 
use his common sense (Aira19-21, p. 136), may be heard in Shirin’s appeal to reason.138 
Shirin differentiates between the leadership and the people in contemporary Iran. 
Discussions within the country itself as a good practice are mentioned in Shirin64, but people 
showing obedience to the system is listed as part of the problem (Shirin61). Shirin states that 
there is a connection between the interpretative practices of the Koran and the requirement for 
human obedience to authorities. What she means to say is not obvious, but in the sequence the 
connection between the need to interpret and discuss the Koran and a need to qualify the notion 
of obedience is established in a social setting. 
Susanne interrupts Shirin’s contribution with one approving comment that signals that 
she shares her critical view of obeying authorities (probably referring to political authorities), 
and one comment showing that she is aware of the statement by the Iranian president Shirin 
                                                 
138 Among Shiite ulama, reasoning (aql) has a more central position than among their Sunni counterparts. See 
Chibli Mallat’s book The Renewal of Islamic Law (Mallat 1993: 33). 
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refers to, i.e. when President Ahmadinejad is supposed to have said in 2005 that the state of 
Israel should be wiped off the map.139 
 
Shirin66: You have to be critical about … you have to take it from there, think, and 
then solve problems. Jews living in Israel and the Palestinians living 
there … they are all humans.  
Shirin67: Now everybody is saying that there cannot be two states because of the 
politics, but some people think that it should be a democratic country 
where all can live in peace.… 
Shirin68: But I do think it will be discussed eventually that we are all humans, and 
that we should live together in peace and harmony. 
 
Susanne24:  There is something about obedience, to the people in power or to God, 
that is well known in our own tradition.  
Susanne25: As with Martin Luther, who emphasizes that you should not obey rulers 
unless … if it is against what you believe, the word of God, or the 
Gospel.  
Susanne26: So, that was the reason why, during the Second World War in Norway, 
the church opposed the Nazi regime, and that was based on the division 
Luther made between that he called the spiritual and the secular realms.  
Susanne27: So, when I mentioned obedience, I was thinking of obedience to God, 
and that this text mirrors a little bit of that view of obedience to God in 
difficult situations, as you say. 
 
Shirin69:  But then, politics is difficult, isn’t it, because it is misused? Politics is a 
secular question. You take the real situation, start to think, and then you 
can reach some strange decisions. 
 
Susanne28:  I agree with you that it has been mixed, but if you consider obedience to 
God ….  
                                                 
139 The president of Iran (2005-), Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, gave a speech in Iran on October 26, 2005, where he 
stated, according to the Western press, that “Israel must be wiped off the map.” The exact wording is disputed, and 
one suggested translation into English from the original speech in Farsi is that he said “the regime occupying 
Jerusalem must vanish from the page of time.” In the discussions after this statement Ahmadinejad claimed that the 
official Iranian policy was to support a one-state-solution to Israeli-Palestinian conflict, after a referendum. He 
denied that his statement was some sort of military threat (news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/6733487.stm) 
[accessed 24 June 2010]. 
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Susanne29: I still think, regardless of what has happened, that this text provides an 
example for me … it says something about Islam as a religion, with a 
concept of obedience to God in difficult situations.  
Susanne30: I find this different in Christianity; I don’t know if you agree with me. 
 
 In this sequence Susanne also applies a political perspective to the religious concept of 
obedience by using the example of the Norwegian church’s resistance to the Nazi occupation of 
Norway during World War II, based on Christian Lutheran reasoning. Shirin broadens her 
political scope and adds reflections on the Israeli-Palestine conflict to her earlier reflections on 
the Iranian case. But Shirin does not, however, address the issue of obedience in her reflections 
on the Israeli-Palestine conflict, introducing instead a new issue about human equality for the 
population in the area regardless of them being Israelis or Palestinians (Shirin66-67). Obedience, 
understood as uncritical acceptance and support of politicians, is, in her view, not a way to 
achieve peace. 
Susanne’s comparison of Shirin’s example of Iran and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and 
the Lutheran doctrine of the two realms applied by the Norwegian church in its resistance to the 
Nazi authorities in Norway 1940-1945 brings together two examples where religious and 
political power are intertwined. Susanne’s use of Luther is interpreted on the basis of this 
Norwegian case. The doctrine of the two realms has been used in other political conflict 
situations by Lutheran churches for opposite purposes, such as the view that the (Lutheran) 
church, as part of the spiritual realm, should not interfere with politics or resist governments in 
order not to interfere in the secular or worldly realm.140 
Susanne’s point is to introduce an example, generally well known in Norwegian society, 
to illustrate the discussion on obedience to political authorities versus obedience to God, from 
her own tradition and context. Still, Susanne claims in Susanne29-30 that her understanding is 
that the Islamic teachings on the need to obey God are different from the concepts of obedience 
in the Christian tradition.  
Shirin69 emphasizes that politics “is difficult,” “secular,” and can be misused. The 
meaning of this statement seems to be that religion would be less vulnerable to misuse if religion 
and politics were separated or, more specifically, that, without a clear separation from religion, 
politics could lead people astray in its demand for obedience.  
 
                                                 
140
 An example of this in recent church history is the action (or rather non-action) taken by the Lutheran churches in 
South Africa during the apartheid period (Lodberg 1988). 
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Shirin70:  Just one more thing, that there are many verses in the Koran that say that 
if you commit a sin, coming to God with it will give you, what is it …. 
 
Eva89:   Forgiveness. 
 
Shirin71:  Forgiveness. You are forgiven. In many, many verses. 
 
Susanne31:  But that …. 
 
Shirin72:  You shouldn’t make it so difficult that you say that you will never sin, 
and if you commit sin, you go to hell. It is not like that. 
 
Susanne32: That’s not what I am trying to say. 
 
Shirin73:  Some say that. 
 
The verbal interaction on obedience is mainly between Shirin and Susanne, and it seems 
to take a sudden turn when Shirin introduces the concept of forgiveness as understood in the 
Islamic tradition. Why does Shirin apparently shift her focus or, formulated more precisely: How 
might the introduction of the notion of forgiveness in Islam fit into the discussion on obedience? 
The answer might be that Shirin does not see the discussion as being mainly about obedience as 
such but rather about how to interpret differences between the Islamic and Christian traditions. 
This is how Susanne introduced the discussion of obedience from the beginning: as a way to 
explore differences between the two. In an earlier discussion Shirin opposed what she perceived 
to be a Christian monopolization of certain values (Shirin16-19, p. 130-131).  
Shirin’s intention by introducing forgiveness into the discussion may thus be to change 
the premises of the current comparison between the two traditions. Susanne suggests that, or 
rather asks if, the views on obedience and grace differ in the Islamic and Christian traditions. 
Shirin has already contested the notion of obedience in Islam, and it seems as if she now wants to 
complement her view of Islam by presenting the notion of forgiveness in the tradition. Shirin 
thus states that both obedience and forgiveness are part of Islam, and any differences between the 
Christian and the Islamic tradition cannot be properly understood by interpreting Islam as a 
tradition without divine forgiveness, even if there may be differences. These differences, though, 
have not yet been presented in a way that everyone in the group can agree on. 
Shirin72 describes a non-identified religious system with no space for making mistakes 
or sin, and with going to hell as a necessary consequence of committing a sin. Shirin does not 
  
217 
explicitly link this merciless system to either the Christian or the Islamic tradition. Susanne’s 
response in Susanne32 possibly means that Susanne does not intend to present this merciless 
religion as a representation of Islam. Shirin73, however, claims that this is actually expressed by 
“some.” There is no further indication of who these “some” are. They might be in the group or 
outside it. It may be that Shirin72 is meant to criticize all religious practice that has no place for 
human errors, since this makes life “too difficult.” 
 
Susanne33:  Let me just finish with one sentence: I think that Christianity is not so 
much about sin, hell, and all that, and forgiveness, but a kind of 
obedience to God, that I …  
Susanne34: I don’t know how to say it, but I … in Christianity, I believe, there is 
perhaps another mindset ….  
Susanne35: Oh, I don’t know how to say this. But more like, listen to God, but also 
use your sense. 
Susanne36: It sounds wrong because I don’t think that …. 
 
Shirin74:  No, no, what you are saying is right, but Christianity did not used to be 
what it later became, you see, don’t forget what has happened in the 
name of Christianity. 
 
Susanne37:  No, no, we have our history, and what I am trying to make my starting 
point here is how I perceive it today, maybe I am wrong …. 
 
Shirin75:  No, you are not wrong. 
 
Susanne38:  This is what I think today. 
 
Eva90:  Now you are saying something like what I tried to argue for, but I don’t 
know if I was clear about it. 
 
Shirin76:  About what? 
 
Eva91:   No, but it is Christianity, you say. 
 
Shirin77:  Yes, that’s right, but it developed because of the mistakes someone made 
three hundred years ago, right. 
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Eva92: Not three hundred years ago; they started two thousand years ago. 
 
 Susanne continues her struggle to express her impression of the difference between the 
Islamic and the Christian tradition. She finds that the differences are there, but the closest she 
gets to explaining them in this sequence is to suggest the existence of “different mindsets” 
(Susanne34). Susanne takes a strong stand against the merciless form of religious practice that 
Shirin described earlier and denounces it as part of the Christian tradition. Instead, Susanne 
explains how she understands obedience in the Christian tradition to be a matter of following the 
will of God as well as using human reason. The inclusion of human reason as an important part 
of the Christian and Islamic interpretive traditions thus continues to be a shared concern among 
the participants. Aira’s story about the place of human reason in the example of Muhammad 
(Aira19-21, p. 136), which she tells in both the first and second meetings of the group, may be 
part of Susanne’s resources of reflection. This narrative may in fact have become a part of 
everyone’s internal reference library throughout the process. 
Shirin’s response (Shirin74) is a reminder to Susanne and the others of the history of 
Christianity. Her concern is that the Christian “then” and “now” are two very different 
representations of the same tradition. The question about difference thus moves from exploring 
dissimilarities between the Islamic and Christian traditions to highlighting changes within the 
Christian tradition. Shirin74 brings in a historical perspective and with it, the question of 
representation in a new version – as historical variations of the Christian tradition. Shirin 
approves of Susanne33 as a way of viewing the Christian tradition but questions this as a valid 
representation of Christian tradition throughout history. Shirin, moreover, introduces a 
distinction between Christian tradition in its historical versions and deeds made “in the name of 
Christianity.” This distinction, suggesting that a religious tradition may be represented in many 
ways, opens the way for interpretations of their respective validity.  
Susanne agrees to include a historical perspective on her own tradition, but at the same 
time she claims the right to express her view based on her present context (Susanne37). Eva then 
enters into the discussion supporting Susanne by referring to her earlier contributions, which she 
is not sure she managed to communicate well enough. The question is: What is Eva is referring 
to and identifying with? If her comment is directed toward the overall theme of the discussion as 
introduced by Susanne, she may be supporting an accentuation of differences between the 
Christian and Islamic traditions through their respective views of obedience and forgiveness. In 
the discussion about views of the Bible and the Koran, as was already mentioned, Eva argued 
that Christianity and Islam diverged in their views regarding forgiveness, grace, and obedience to 
divine laws (Eva9-20, p. 124-125). Eva’s reasoning at that time was not focused primarily on 
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exploring differences between Christianity and Islam but was aimed at stating a difference 
between the Christian tradition and all other religious traditions.  
The verbal interaction in this sequence is somewhat fragmented in its expression, and the 
information disclosed in the statements does not always display the context(s) or issues to which 
reference is made. Not all the participants are sure they get the others’ points either (Shirin76). 
The fragmented reasoning that makes some parts of this sequence difficult to grasp might be 
caused by the difficulty of the theme, fear of being misunderstood, or simply by the complexity 
of all the different issues brought up during a short period of time.  
At the end of the sequence, however, Eva and Shirin join in a shared critique of the 
Christian tradition as played out in certain historical periods. Shirin seems to have specific 
historical incidents in mind, perhaps what has been done politically in the name of Christianity, 
such as colonization or wars, whereas Eva seems to integrate human error as part of the Christian 
tradition from the start.  
Since none of them are referring to concrete, specific matters in this sequence, their 
statements are a bit difficult to analyze. They clearly agree that mistakes have been made within 
the Christian tradition, historically speaking. Shirin says this from the viewpoint of another 
tradition, whereas Eva expresses it as self-criticism or at least self-reflection on behalf of her 
tradition. Eva’s use of “they” (Eva92) suggests that she distances herself from the representatives 
of the Christian tradition whom she believes committed the mistakes that are criticized. Self-
criticism that leads to self-reflexivity when answering on behalf of an entire religious tradition is 
a demanding exercise. 
 
Aira93:  I want to make one thing perfectly clear. When we sit and say spiritual or 
secular, I don’t want to offend anyone. It’s not that I am more spiritual, 
it’s just a way of expressing myself. 
Aira94: And it is not like … I don’t criticize the Bible in the sense that it has no 
status for me.141 To me, it is very important; to me, the Bible or the Old 
Testament has the same status as the Koran. 
Aira95: But when I say that it has come … it describes people’s feelings. Nothing 
is written in the Koran about that. It’s just very … not any different from 
what we find in the Koran, only this verse …. 
 
                                                 
141 When reading the final transcriptions, Aira clarifies that her intention is not to criticize the Bible but that, to her, 
it seems that in some places human experiences are blended with the word of God. 
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Susanne39:  But I wasn’t … because I was the one commenting on that, I just feel … 
I wasn’t offended in any way, not at all. 
 
Aira96:  No. 
 
Susanne40:  I just think it’s interesting because it gave me an association, and I tried 
to follow that in a quite vague way. It wasn’t that easy … it goes both 
ways.  
Susanne41: I didn’t want to offend anyone, either, even if one might  
do so without the intention of offending anyone. But I wasn’t at all … I 
thought it was a simple observation that I shared.  
 
Both Aira and Susanne articulate hedging remarks to the effect that they had no intention 
to offend anyone by what they said. To express concern for the emotional well-being of others in 
an encounter where the social, cultural, and religious codes differ among the people involved, is 
to show empathy and respect. To include the possibility that one can offend someone 
unintentionally is an acknowledgment of the complexity of the situation and the limits of one’s 
own knowledge about this complexity. Reflections of this kind may be important for the 
possibility of communication and for the quality of the communication. 
Aira elaborates on her own previous reflections on different kinds of reading, and 
probably on how Eva might have interpreted her earlier (in Eva86-88, p.193). This may also be 
the direct background for Aira to say that she did not intend to offend anyone, in case Eva felt 
hurt by Aira’s earlier comments. She also makes it clear that she has no intention of constructing 
a hierarchy among the participants regarding their spiritual qualities and that she certainly did not 
meant to put herself at the top of such a hierarchy (Aira93). Following up her earlier statements 
about reading and attitudes to the canonical scriptures, Aira94 and 95 once more articulate her 
respect for the Bible in granting the Bible the same status as the Koran. At the same time, she 
advocates her view that there is a difference between the Bible and the Koran. She relates the 
difference to the Hagar/Hajar narrative and her earlier statements about these differences and is 
careful to refer to only that part of the hadith narrative that is a Koranic verse. Aira now 
addresses differences, as Susanne did earlier. An underlying question in this sequence seems to 
be: How can we talk about differences without offending one another?  
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Eva93:  But it is important that we can speak frankly, too, that we are not so 
careful that we can’t say what we think, in case we hear something that 
contradicts our opinions, we must be able to speak … to be a little tough? 
 
Aira97:  Yes, but when I say that it is the word of God, and when I say obedience 
to God, that is an absolute for me, whether I understand it or not. 
Aira98: It is one thing that is fundamental for a Muslim, and that is, we believe, 
that all the prophets came, that God’s will shall prevail.  
Aira99: And when we say that it is the will of God that we submit to, that is 
actually obedience to God.  
Aira100: The other message that all the prophets and the New Testament give is 
how to improve human relations. These two issues are the main ones and 
they are present in all religions.  
Aira101: We have the same values, the same message. We might understand it 
differently and it can arrive at different times …. 
Aira102: For me, all three books are sacred books and come from God. They have 
come at different times to guide people in various situations.  
 
 Eva comments on Aira and Susanne’s concern about the danger of offending one another 
during the discussions by expressing a requirement for openness across different opinions. She 
worries that openness in the discussions might be at risk if everyone becomes too careful about 
what they say and do not say. The question arises as to whether they are referring to the same 
situations. Eva is probably referring to a situation where someone articulates something with 
which others would disagree, whereas Aira and Susanne are referring to remarks understood to 
be offensive. Eva argues strongly that the participants – both in the positions of articulators and 
listeners – should be able to cope with openness, even if some courage is required. Eva’s remark 
seems to be aimed primarily at preventing self-censorship that would threaten the substance of 
the conversations. Aira and Susanne are more concerned about avoiding offending others 
unintentionally. These concerns could be regarded as contradictory, but they may also be seen to 
express a common search for openness, at the level of opinion as well as the emotional and 
responsive level. 
Aira’s comments (like Aira97) indicate that there are limits to what she wants to put at 
stake: she states that submission to God and the improvement of human relations constitute the 
core not only of her own tradition but of “all religions” (Aira100). She wants to uphold these – in 
her eyes irreplaceable – values, regardless of the mode of communication. Through her 
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statements she admits a great plurality within the interpretations of core values. This plurality is 
expressed in temporal and spatial terms, but it shares the confession of one divinity.  
 
Inger23:  I just want to say that there is no point in … well, it’s not pointless but 
unnecessary to apologize because this is exactly why we are here, and 
that’s why it is important that you brought together people from different 
countries, everyone has different opinions, and I think it is very 
interesting to listen to how you interpret.  
Inger24: And I hope that you find it interesting too, how we Christians, or how I, 
interpret.  
Inger25: And this is what’s interesting. If we all said the same things and agreed 
upon everything then there is nothing …. 
 
Aira103:  I get a little offended if anyone thinks I consider myself to be a better 
Muslim than anyone else. I am the last person to think that.  
 
Maria35:  There is one other thing. I want to ask if we could meet more often, 
because when a long time elapses, things fade … we lack continuity. I 
don’t know how the others feel. 
 
Inger reminds the group that the articulation of difference within the group is an 
intentional situation, implicitly addressing the researcher who brought the group together. She 
adds that she finds the differences interesting and that they signify something (Inger23). Against 
this background, Inger sees no need to apologize for being different. She refers to the Muslim 
and Christian participants as two groups within the group (Inger24), referring to the Christians as 
“we” but adds an “I,” thus expressing both a collective and an individual identity as a participant.  
Aira103 is a personal confession. Aira says openly that she is offended if someone 
suspects her of feeling superior to others in a religious sense. She does not explicitly claim that 
this has happened in the group, and by doing so she avoided a possible further dispute on this. 
Aira addresses the mode of communication and the content as well. The question of emotional 
concern as part of the communicative process is accentuated more strongly than before.  
As the moderator, Maria closes the discussion as well as the meeting by addressing a 
practical matter. She wants the group to meet more often for the sake of better continuity in the 
group’s communicative process. This remark can be interpreted as a positive sign, as a valuation 
of what is happening in the group. But it can also be critical to say that the organization of the 
group’s meetings has a direct influence on the communication and the quality of what happens 
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and that there is room for improvement. There was no time to discuss Maria’s suggestion since 
time was up and everyone had to leave. What she says is a reminder not to underestimate the 
importance of practicalities, the opportunity to meet and talk face to face when trying to build 
complex communities of making meaning. The logistics have an impact on the communication. 
 
An Attempt to Frame Differences 
The issue of obedience seems to come up as a response to the meaning making regarding the 
Hagar/Hajar narratives so far as well as exemplifing differences between the Islamic and the 
Christian tradition. Susanne takes the opportunity to articulate her view by asking for the 
response of the others. General views of the canonical scriptures within the traditions are woven 
into the issue. The hypothesis Susanne presents is that the Islamic tradition is more focused on 
God and obedience to God, whereas the Christian tradition is connected to humanity because of 
the doctrine of the incarnation. Susanne uses her knowledge of the Christian tradition to establish 
a possible connection between the incarnation’s expression of intimacy between the divine and 
the human, and the existence of human feelings and imperfect human relations in the Hagar 
narrative from the Old Testament. Susanne thus turns the exposure of human feelings and 
relations from being a problem into a strength in her view. With this reasoning she tries to 
discuss the concept of obedience in Islam as a different way of viewing the relation between 
humans and God. She exemplifies the relation between humans and God through the obedience 
of Abraham/Ibrahim in the story from the hadith and by referring to the view of canonical 
scripture in Islam (possibly as represented by some of the Muslim participants in the group). 
Susanne thus discusses obedience regarding both the human-divine relation and the reader-text 
relation in Islam through bringing the room for humans and for human flaw into question. The 
relation between humans’ work and divine help is added later as a possible point of division 
between the two traditions, again based on observations from the Hagar/Hajar narratives. The 
Lutheran Christian tradition with its focus on divine grace, salvation through Christ because of 
the incarnation, and the confession of human imperfection as a presupposition for the 
acknowledgement of God’s love can be detected in Susanne’s reflections and questions.  
The political turn in the discussion broadens the perspective on obedience when Shirin 
does not stay within the premises established by Susanne (obedience as a theme in the relation 
between God-humans or reader-text). Shirin establishes a new area for discussing obedience: the 
relation between people, political leaders, and religion. In Shirin’s example from Iran, the 
relation between the people and the political leaders are intertwined with the other two areas 
where obedience was described relationally. Shirin reflects on the dangers of obedience to a 
political leadership that is religiously legitimized and states her own autonomy in her role as a 
reader of Islamic canonical scripture. Susanne’s tradition and Norwegian history provides her 
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with a reference for political disobedience legitimized by Lutheran doctrinal reflection. This is a 
positive example from Norway that contrasts with the example given by Shirin from Iran but 
makes the same point: the combination of political and religious power could create unbearable 
situations. Susanne does not integrate the difference between the two examples from Iran and 
Norway into her project of exploring the differences between the Islamic and Christian 
traditions.  
Obedience in Islam is defined by Shirin to mean “obedience to God in difficult 
situations.” But Shirin exceeds Susanne’s suggested premises for exploring the differences 
between the Christian and Islamic traditions: she insists that the concept of forgiveness is crucial 
to Islam and, by doing so, disputes Susanne’s way of conceptualizing differences between the 
two traditions. Through the way Shirin expresses herself, it seems as if she has some negative 
presuppositions about how Islam is currently portrayed, which she wants to correct. Susanne 
may have touched on some of these issues in her attempt to explore the differences. 
The discussion on obedience and forgiveness, as an exploration of differences between 
the Islamic and Christian traditions, becomes a discussion on the question if these notions are 
constructive tools for analyzing and framing differences between the two traditions. The Muslim 
participants do not recognize Islam as a religion based primarily on obedience to God or the text 
of the Koran, although they do agree that a qualified obedience to God exclusively is part of their 
tradition. But forgiveness, critical discussion about political issues, and the interpretation of the 
scriptures are also central in Islam in the way they understand and practice their religion. What 
both Muslim and Christian participants agree on in this discussion is not how to conceptualize 
differences but that religions should not be without mercy and that mistakes have been made 
throughout Christian history. On the issue of obedience, religion, and politics, both Susanne and 
Shirin question any political authority based on religious legitimization.  
 
How Are Differences to be Discussed? 
The mode of communication is addressed again in this discussion, and this time it concentrates 
on how to avoid offending others and at the same time to feel free to express what one wants to 
say. Both aims require openness and self-reflexivity. The required, expected, and desired 
differences among participants in interreligious and intercultural dialogues and encounters raise 
the question: How are people to relate to existing differences in a way that the emotional 
pressure on the participants is acceptable to them and still address difficult questions in an open 
manner? 
To return to the philosophical discussions on dialogue, respect for the otherness of the 
other and appreciation of the dialogue as a place of equality and shared power of definition is 
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regarded as important. But what do these ideals mean in practical life? And what can we say 
about the fear of offending someone unintentionally or the fear of being offended by someone? 
In this discussion the example given of a potentially offensive speech act is the case in 
which someone’s religious tradition is presented in a way that one does not recognize. To 
express one’s view about the others’ religion and/or culture and to discuss differences between 
one’s own tradition and that of the other(s) requires some knowledge and trust in oneself and in 
the other in order to communicate well. Matters of religious belief such as the interpretation of 
canonical scriptures and religious experience may be regarded as personal and thus be vulnerable 
areas with the possibility of causing emotional distress. But the separation of what is public and 
what is to be regarded as personal or private is culturally dependent. This makes it difficult to 
navigate in a cross-cultural situation. The ideals of dialogue are, however, to communicate across 
such borders. Communication is a risky business, where the possibility of misunderstandings 
always exists. The risk may appear even greater in a complex group. On the other hand, because 
of the expected and acknowledged differences, the communicative openness may be achieved 
more easily than in environments where everyone is expected to share similar opinions and 
background.  
Personality and personal attachment plays a role in trustful communication. As Inge 
Eidsvåg has pointed out, personal issues are sometimes turned into issues related to religious 
background or cultural belonging, and vice versa (Eidsvåg 1997: 230). This can block 
communication. To identify and address a communicative problem may be needed in those cases 
to put communication back on track.  
How differences are viewed influences how they are communicated. The identification of 
differences, as either fixed or important to maintain and perhaps defend, represents a view of 
differences where an effort of bridging the gap is seen as irrelevant or unsuitable. There can still 
be communication across the gap, but identification across the differences might be difficult to 
obtain. If differences are viewed as more fluid and perhaps diversified into various categories 
that are considered fluid as well, the possibility of obtaining an identification and closer 
communication across religious and cultural gaps would be present to a larger degree.  
 
Warning: Transreligious Encounters May Affect One’s Feelings 
In this discussion about differences, it seems that the participants have different concerns. None 
of them, however, suggest stopping communication. The opposite happens: it is suggested that 
the group meet more often. The struggle is about being able to express oneself according to one’s 
intentions, to be able to speak up if one is offended, and to find the delicate balance between 
frankness and care.  
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Part IV:  
 
Situating the Contexts 
Readings of 1 Timothy 2:8-15 and Sura 4:34 
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Chapter 6: 
Making Meaning of Sura 4:34 and 1 Timothy 2:8-15 
 
 
The two texts of Sura 4:34 and 1 Timothy 2:8-15 were read and discussed at the fourth and fifth 
meetings of the group. Some immediate observations of differences between the meetings four and five 
on the one hand and the former meetings about the Hagar/Hajar texts should be noted. The form of the 
texts subject to discussion changed from narrative texts to non-narrative, prescriptive texts. The number 
of participants attending dropped, and the role of the moderators became more active. All these 
developments influence the meaning-making process, as will be shown. In addition, the participants 
have become more familiar with one another as well as with the form of the meetings.  
Aira (Norwegian-Pakistani background, Sunni Muslim) moderated the fourth meeting, with four 
participants present, including herself (Shirin, Aira, Inger, and Eva). Inger (Norwegian background, 
Lutheran Christian) moderated the fifth meeting, which was attended by Aira, Maria, Susanne, and 
Shirin beside herself.142 The group had decided that the meetings could proceed as planned with a 
minimum of two Muslim and two Christian participants attending.143 The fourth meeting met this 
requirement exactly, while the fifth ended up with three Christian and two Muslim participants.  
Aira decided that the fourth meeting should proceed in a slightly different manner from the 
previous ones: She suggested that the Christian participants make their comments on the texts first, and 
then the Muslim participants make theirs. In this way the conversation and discussion became more 
structured than before, since it divided the contributions from the Christian and Muslim participants.  
At the fifth meeting Inger expressed the need to discuss an incident she experienced as connected 
to the conflict over the Muhammad cartoons144 that was very intense at that time in Norwegian public 
debate. The group decided to spend half an hour on this. This implied that the group’s original purpose 
of discussing texts was expanded to cover a current issue from the broader context, a move changing the 
function of the group for a while. This case may be seen as a example of the dynamic of a transreligious, 
transcultural encounter as fluid and could change the original agendas and aims when participants 
experience ownership of the process. This is an expression of a need to situate the group’s meetings in 
the contextual present, in a possibly shared “now,” in order to address experiences of cultural and 
                                                 
142 Fouzia and Rima did not attend any of the remaining meetings, Rima because of health problems and Fouzia  
because of other obligations. See Chapter 3 for discussions on the participants’ attendance and absence (p. 96-98). 
143 This was decided at the first meeting to ensure a minimum of balance in the dialogue and as an attempt to avoid 
a situation in which the burden of representation was left to one person. See the Chapter 3 for a full presentation of 
this discussion. 
144 In the winter of 2006 the so-called “Muhammad cartoons” were printed first in Jyllandsposten, a Danish 
newspaper, and then reprinted in the Norwegian newspaper Magazinet, causing a major discussion in both Denmark 
and Norway, as well as demonstrations against the artists, publishers, and Norwegian and Danish governments in 
many Islamic majority societies. 
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religious encounters outside the group. The inner space of the group cannot be separated entirely from 
its contextually situated space because the participants take part in both and move between these spaces. 
The distinction between the “inner” and the “outer” space of a transreligious, transcultural group is a 
way of dividing space with no correspondence to people’s lives. The discussion itself displayed feelings 
and experiences connected to the incident about the cartoons and illustrated how offensive it could be to 
be the personal target of someone’s anger in a way that felt unfair, how it felt to see significant symbols 
of one’s own belief and identity ridiculed and violated, and how being a Muslim and a Norwegian in this 
situation could mean being doubly affected. 
The fourth meeting started with reading the texts aloud. Aira asked Shirin to read the koranic text 
and Eva to read the New Testament text. Like before, a Muslim participant read the text from the 
Islamic canonical scriptures and a Christian read the text from the Christian canon. The texts were read 
in Norwegian. The texts below are in the English translation closest to the Norwegian versions: 
 
The texts: 1 Timothy 2:8-15 (the New Testament)  
and Sura 4:34 (the Koran) 
 
1 Timothy 2:8-15:
145
  
8 I desire, then, that in every place the men should pray, lifting up holy hands without 
anger or argument; 9 also that the women should dress themselves modestly and decently 
in suitable clothing, not with their hair braided, or with gold, pearls, or expensive clothes, 
10 but with good works, as is proper for women who profess reverence for God. 11 Let a 
woman learn in silence with full submission. 12 I permit no woman to teach or to have 
authority over a man; she is to keep silent. 13 For Adam was formed first, then Eve; 14 
and Adam was not deceived, but the woman was deceived and became a transgressor. 15 
Yet she will be saved through childbearing, provided they continue in faith and love and 
holiness, with modesty. 
 
Sura 4:34:
146 
Men are in charge of women,147 because Allah hath made the one of them to excel the 
other, and because they spend of their property (for the support of women). So good 
                                                 
145 The text printed in the dissertation is from the New Revised Standard Version (NRSV) of the Bible, Division of 
Christian Education of the National Council of the Churches of Christ in the USA, 1989. The text read and 
distributed in the group was from the Norwegian Bibelen, 1978 edition in bokmål, The Norwegian Bible Society. 
146 The text printed in the dissertation is from The Glorious Qur’an: Text and Explanatory Translation.   
Muhammad M. Pickthall,and Marmaduke William Pickthall, Tahrike Tarsile Qur’an, 1996 (first edition 1984). The 
text read and distributed in the group was from the Norwegian version of the Koran Koranen, translated by Einar 
Berg, Universitetsforlaget, 1980. In the Norwegian version Sura 4:34 is numbered Sura 4:38. 
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women are the obedient, guarding in secret that which Allah hath guarded.148 As for those 
from whom ye fear rebellion,149 admonish them and banish them to beds apart, and 
scourge them. Then, if they obey you, seek not a way against them. Lo! Allah is ever 
High Exalted, Great. 
 
 
Discussion 1 Related to Sura 4:34 and 1 Timothy 2:8-15.  
Inger: “Why do I have to read this, in 2006? These texts belong to the 
past”
150
 
Compared to the Hagar/Hajar narratives, Sura 4:34 and 1 Timothy 2:8-15 are short texts and thus 
the reading was quickly finished. Aira states explicitly that comments should be on both texts but 
suggests that the comments should focus on one text at a time. She also wants the two Christian 
participants to comment on both texts first. This structured moderating might be a way to have a 
more systematic discussion than before and could be taken as a precautionary measure to ensure 
that both texts are given equal attention. Separating the comments and the commentators into 
religiously divided sections could concentrate the conversations thematically instead of giving 
rise to a discussion where new themes or new perspectives are introduced all the time. Some of 
the discussions on the Hagar/Hajar texts were quite fragmented thematically, and this could be 
what Aira wants to avoid. 
Inger volunteers to start commenting: 
 
Inger26:  Well, this is … the way I see it, both these texts, from the Koran and the New 
Testament, they are both part of the explanation why women throughout history 
up until today have been oppressed.  
Inger27: And they have been part of the legitimization and reason for men to … to 
actually abuse women in different ways. I would say that. 
Inger28:  So this has … these are old texts.  
(Laughter among the participants)  
                                                                                                                                                             
147 In the Norwegian version of the Koran that was read in the group, the word for “supporter” is the Norwegian 
word bestyrelsesautoritet. This could be translated as “executive authority” and has different connotations in 
Norwegian than the word “supporter” has in English. In the later discussion the Arabic word qiwama from the 
Arabic Koran is brought up and discussed.  
148 In the Norwegian version of the Koran, this is expressed as “(de skal) bevare det som er hemmelig, fordi Gud 
ønsker det bevart,” which in English would be “they shall protect what is secret because God wants it to be 
protected.” 
149
 In the Norwegian version of the Koran “rebellion” is the Norwegian word oppsetsighet, which could be 
translated as ill-will, insubordination, or disobedience. 
150 Certain subheadings in this chapter are selected from the participants’ statements in the transcribed texts. 
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Inger29: I get really angry when I read them, both of them, and I think: Why do I have to 
read this, in 2006, these texts belong to the past. 
Inger30: But still, they are part of our background, and these texts still shape the situation 
of women up until today. 
Inger31: So this is my spontaneous … or the first thing I want to say. But of course, there 
are other things one can say too. 
 
Inger describes her reaction when reading the texts as “anger” (Inger29). Based on this 
anger, and by describing the texts as outdated, she asks why she has to read them. She questions 
primarily the significance of reading the texts, not the meaning of the texts themselves. Inger 
partly answers her own question in Inger30, where the texts are acknowledged as part of “our 
background,” and thus changes meaning from being mere reminiscences of a distant past to 
becoming part of the present – still influencing the situation of women. Based on the premises 
that it is important to know one’s background and that these texts still represent an ethical 
challenge, Inger constructs an answer to her own question of “Why read them?” 
But Inger’s question may not be merely rhetorical. There can be an existential aspect as 
well, intertwining with the rhetorical aspect. If that is the case, the question is not fully answered 
by Inger’s own reply, since this still does not give any answer to the question of how to relate to 
the texts in the present and how – or if – Inger will relate to the texts as a contemporary reader. 
In her analysis given above, women lack agency and are not seen as acting subjects. Her question 
of “why read them,” however, constructs a subject position toward the text for herself as 
interpreter. For Inger, this positioning begins with investigating the significance of reading the 
texts rather than by starting to interpret the texts themselves.  
Inger26-27 states that the oppression of women is an undisputable fact, happening in the 
past and present, both “then” and “now.” She does not situate the oppression contextually and 
uses temporal expressions to show the extensiveness of the oppression of women. This might 
express a spatial reference for her as well, implying that the locations are “everywhere.” She 
does not specify the basis on which she makes her review of the abuse and oppression of women. 
Inger seems to consider this to be self-evident for everyone present. 
Inger relates to both texts in her first comments. She starts by identifying a relation 
between the texts’ reception history and the situation of women. Her analysis of this relation is 
that the texts are both an explanation for the oppression of women and a legitimization of this 
oppression. She does, however open the way up for the inclusion of elements other than the texts 
to explain the legitimization and origination of the oppression of women by stating that the texts 
are only one part of the total picture. She does not elaborate on how she believes the texts 
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interacted with their cultural, social, and political contexts to construct oppressive situations for 
women, but she does suggest that men have been or are the agents of oppression.  
Crucial questions to take her reasoning further are: What roles have the texts played in 
introducing and delivering premises for the oppression of women, and what are the roles of 
socially and culturally constructed gendered hierarchies in this respect? Is there any significance 
in establishing “text” and “context” as two different categories, with separate roles in the 
construction of a gendered hierarchy, if the texts are intimately intertwined with the cultural and 
social contextual practices of oppression? And what is the role and responsibility of the male and 
female readers of the texts as social agents? 
To analyze the relation between texts, contexts, and agency in order to find the origins of 
a gendered hierarchy is a complex task. Inger’s point is to stress the connection and to state that 
text, context, and agency interact in constructing a social structure where women are oppressed. 
When she portrays men as the agents of the oppression of women (Inger27), she may be pointing 
to men as readers and interpreters of the texts, but she is also possibly pointing to men as social 
agents upholding cultural and social systems that interact with the texts. In addition, Inger frames 
men as the actual oppressors and abusers of women. Women stay in the background as inactive 
throughout Inger’s comments. Men relate to the texts, and women simply face the consequences 
of this. 
In the middle of Inger’s contribution above, everyone burst into laughter. Laughter erupts 
suddenly three times within the first half hour of the meeting. How is this laughter to be 
interpreted? What does it express? Nobody comments directly on the laughter; it just happens. 
What causes the laughter? The texts themselves are not particularly amusing. The laughter does 
not seem to be related directly to the texts but rather to comments on the texts. The comments 
preceding the outbursts of laughter seem to be received as critical statements about the texts (as 
in Inger28) or, in one case, a critical statement about Paul as the alleged author of the text from 
the New Testament. One of the comments causing laughter is a comment including Sura 4:34. It 
is either Inger or Eva who make the comments that are followed by laughter in this discussion.  
Laughter in a communicative situation may express relief of tension or a reaction of 
surprise to a discrepancy that has been suddenly revealed, if not simply amusement. Laughter 
can be seen as an expression of distance, such as irony, or a confirming act to ensure that a 
controversial statement has been accepted. What is interesting is that there have not been many 
such sudden outbreaks of laughter in the group before they encountered the texts of Sura 4:34 
and 1 Timothy 2:8-15.151 Perhaps the laughter provided a balancing of the texts’ contents and 
                                                 
151 There was an outburst of laughter in the group when Eva claimed that the Hagar/Hajar narratives had to have 
been narrated/written by male authors/narrators in Discussion 2 about these narratives (Eva51, p. 163). 
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was needed as a confirmation of a community between the readers in front of these texts because 
of a challenging interpretative situation? 
 
Inger32: That text from Timothy, then we are into the New Testament, this is after the 
time of Jesus, and even then, one is actually saying things like this. 
Inger33: But it is not Jesus who says these things, it is Paul, and one has to take Paul with 
a pinch of salt. 
 
The relation between texts from the Old and New Testament were commented on 
occasionally in the discussions on the Hagar/Hajar narratives, and one of the hermeneutical 
strategies used by the Christian participants in making meaning of the Hagar narrative was to 
establish an epistemological barrier between the two parts of the Bible, where the New 
Testament was given an epistemologically and hermeneutically privileged position.  
Inger now addresses the question of intrascriptural hierarchical authority within the New 
Testament. The question is framed as Paul’s authority over against that of Jesus. Inger introduces 
a new hermeneutical distinction in the New Testament texts (Inger32-33). This distinction is 
between alleged sayings of Jesus and alleged sayings of Paul. She claims that the authority of the 
alleged sayings of Jesus overrules the alleged sayings of Paul. Inger comments directly on Paul’s 
authority – he has to be “taken with a pinch of salt” – and says that the one speaking here is “not 
Jesus” (Inger33). Inger thus establishes a center for the interpretation of the New Testament, 
which are the alleged sayings of Jesus. The Christ-centered hermeneutical principle is used in 
Lutheran hermeneutics both as a general principle and as a critical principle of interpretation 
(Ulstein 2006: 110-111, 113). Classical Lutheran hermeneutics, however, also rests on an 
emphasis on apostolic authority.152 Thus Inger’s reasoning may be related more to Christian 
liberal theology where the sayings of Jesus and those of Paul are viewed as being in conflict and 
preference is given to the sayings of Jesus.153 
                                                 
152 The authority of the apostles in Lutheran hermeneutics is grounded in their being the first witnesses to Jesus 
Christ not in an authoritative position as such. Luther seems to acknowledge criticism of the apostles if they 
compromise what he held to be Jesus’ message. But their credibility as such, being the crucial witnesses to Jesus’ 
message, should be retained (Ulstein 2006: 112-113). 
153 Gerd Theissen explains the contribution by Rudolf Bultmann to biblical hermeneutics as “identifying a core in 
the New Testament: the proclamation of the cross and the resurrection of Jesus, which transforms believers through 
faith as they die and rise with Christ. Life before and after this transformation is interpreted in existentialist 
categories of authentic and inauthentic experience” (Theissen 2007: 26-27). According to Theissen, this leads to a 
dismissal of the ethical imperatives derived from the Bible because the biblical kerygma was to be interpreted only 
in an existentialist way. Theissen claims this view to be “Protestant to the core” (Theissen 2007: 27) and that this 
approach may imply a reductionist and individualist way of biblical interpretation (Theissen 2007: 27). European 
Christian theologians following Bultmann re-vitalized the focus on Jesus as the historical Jesus starting in the first 
half of the 1900s. This was based on the quest for the origins of the Christian message and to explore the 
particularity of the Christian tradition (Henriksen 2006: 206).  
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Inger34: But at least he makes some demands on the male in the first sentence: he should 
be, he should have clean hands and be “without anger and argument.” So there 
are some requirements for how this male should behave. 
Inger35:  And perhaps if the male himself did not live properly, he might not be granted 
the right to decide over the female. At least we can hope that this is the case. 
Inger36: And we are to be invisible; we are not supposed to dress up, as it says in the New 
Testament, 
Inger37:  although it is nicely said that our good deeds will be to our credit. 
Inger38: That is … well … it should be to the credit of all people, not only women. 
Inger39:  And then we are asked to be silent and submit ourselves.  
Inger40:  And luckily enough, when it says that “I do not permit a woman to teach” – this 
means that she should be silent – it is Paul who is saying that. 
Inger41:  And then I think: What did Jesus say about the position of women? And I can’t 
remember. It means that I have to look it up or someone has to tell me. 
Inger42:  But this is said by Paul, and we can criticize him.  
 
In approaching the text from 1 Timothy Inger evaluates the statements in the text from 
the perspective of gender equality. That the text makes demands on men as well as on women is 
evaluated positively, but all the demands directed exclusively to women are judged negatively. 
In verse 8, however, the commandments are directed to men only, but Inger still evaluates this 
positively. The reason may be that the content of this verse (“pray with holy hands, without 
anger and argument,” 1 Timothy 2:8) is of a different character than the commandments 
addressed to women (to learn in silence, not to teach or to have authority over men, 1 Timothy 
2:11-12). Although gender exclusive, 1 Timothy 2:8 does not imply gendered restrictions on 
specific acts but offers a prescription of how an act (of prayer) should be performed. Inger 
summarizes the text’s commandments for women as openly gendered restrictions on activity.  
The question of Paul’s authority versus Jesus’ authority is addressed again. Inger 
expresses relief about this text being a statement by Paul and not one by Jesus (Inger40) because 
Paul represents a possible object for criticism. It seems that, for Inger, this would have been a 
more difficult approach to take with respect to the sayings of Jesus (Inger40 and 42). Inger’s 
relation to the text thus seems to be framed by the view that Paul is behind the message of the 
text as a real person and that this notion helps her in making meaning of that text. Scholarly 
discussions about authors and editions of the New Testament text is beyond the scope of the 
discussion, and Inger needs to use knowledge that is accessible in order to make meaning. Inger 
continues her positioning as a subject toward the text from 1 Timothy. She now moves on to 
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make meaning of the text, even though she may not have found a satisfactory answer to her first 
question “Why read it?” The tool she uses in her interpretation is the value of gender equality, on 
the basis of which she criticizes the text, and evaluates Paul. She legitimizes her criticism of both 
the text and Paul through correlating a hermeneutical principle of interpreting the Bible from a 
center: the narrated messages of Jesus. She does not refer explicitly to a Lutheran hermeneutics: 
the two pillars of her interpretation are narratives about Jesus, and gender equality. Inger puts 
both the text and Paul in what she regards to be their place and herself in a place as the 
interpreter and evaluator, assuming an agency.  
 In Inger41, however, she indicates a problem: she does not know what Jesus said about 
the position of women. She knows, after reading the text from 1 Timothy, what she does not 
accept but not what Jesus, a much more authoritative figure for her, said about the position of 
women. She states that this is knowledge she needs to seek but does not have at that time. To 
recognize a need and admit a lack of knowledge about one’s own tradition can contribute to 
creating interaction with others. It may result in others bringing their own knowledge – or lack of 
knowledge – to the table or create a common search for knowledge. In addition, the admission of 
a need can create an example so that others are empowered to admit their possible needs in the 
conversation. 
 
Inger43:  And then they give the reasons for why women should be subordinate, and that is 
because they believe that Adam was created first, although there is nothing in 
biology that suggests this, as far as I know,  
Inger44:  But then that he did not let himself be tempted, it was this apple that … it was the 
woman who let herself be tempted.  
Inger45:  In a way, these are two things: One should behave properly, and the man was 
created first, and that is in a way the reason why the man is in a special position 
to be in charge over the woman.  
Inger46:  But then, there is something here that I find to be completely unchristian, in verse 
15 it says: “But she will be saved through childbearing, provided they continue in 
faith and love and holiness, with modesty.” 
Inger47:  Jesus never said anything about being saved through one’s childbearing.  
Inger48:  It is … but perhaps it is the thought that you have to go through suffering to be 
set free, but this is not Christian, the way I see it, the way it is written in this text. 
 
Inger engages in a critical examination of the validity of the arguments about why women 
should be subordinate to men. The text’s argument that Adam (as a representative of men) was 
created before Eve (as a representative of women) should legitimize female subordination is 
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dismissed by Inger with reference to biology. Inger’s use of biology in making meaning may 
seem surprising, but she is using references from Norwegian “common knowledge,” which 
includes biology. Perhaps Inger’s view of the New Testament text is that it should be interpreted 
like any other text, which would entail that it be consistent with other knowledge systems. 
The second argument in the text for women’s subordination, i.e. that the gendered 
hierarchy is a consequence of the Fall of Humankind, where 1 Timothy 2:13-14 interprets the 
narrative taken from in the Old Testament book of Genesis, is not commented upon. Inger moves 
on to what she categorizes as a “completely unchristian” statement (Inger46). Now Inger is back 
in reasoning hermeneutics within Christian theology, and leaves the common knowledge, 
biological argument aside. The claim that a statement in a text from the New Testament is 
“unchristian” is based on a perception that the fact that the text is included in the New Testament 
in the Christian canon is not enough in itself to guarantee its content as “Christian” for Inger. Her 
reasoning at this point is analogous to Lutheran hermeneutics, where the content of the scriptures 
has to be critically evaluated from the perspective of the hermeneutical center. 
Inger’s argument for the dismissal of any causal link between women’s salvation and 
childbearing and the reason for categorizing it as “unchristian,” comes in Inger47. She does not 
display any knowledge about what Jesus said concerning women’s salvation in the New 
Testament, or at least about what Jesus did not say. Again, the distinction between the authority 
of Paul’s sayings and that of Jesus’ is made in line with the hermeneutics of center and 
periphery.  
Inger48 shows, however, that Inger still makes an attempt to understand the text on 
“women’s salvation through childbirth” in a way that might make meaning in the Christian 
tradition. The move she makes is to address salvation through suffering as a general concept that 
includes both women and men and thus includes painful experiences other than just giving birth. 
Inger evaluates even this more general concept of salvation through suffering, however, as “not 
Christian.”  
Her making meaning of the text from 1 Timothy thus makes Inger dispute the connection 
between suffering and divine salvation in the Christian tradition – in a broader perspective that is 
gender inclusive. The New Testament narratives of the suffering, crucifixion, and resurrection of 
Jesus Christ constitute a pillar in traditional Christian confessions of faith. Inger’s view could 
challenge parts of the Christian tradition where identification with Jesus’ sufferings is seen to be 
essential for the pious Christian believer (Bowker 1995: 94-95). Inger has not addressed the case 
of Jesus’ sufferings, but her comments might be rephrased into these questions to elaborate the 
question of the connection between suffering and salvation: Is the alleged suffering required for 
divine salvation limited to the sufferings of Jesus, or does it include all Christian believers? And 
if it does include all, is this suffering gender distributed, so that there is one kind of suffering for 
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men and another for women? Or, is suffering an exclusive requirement for women, limited to 
giving birth?  
Inger’s view of the concept of divine salvation is not presented, but salvation would 
imply something positive, however she views it – and she claims that the access to it should not 
be gendered and that human suffering should not be required to obtain it. 
 
Eva94:   I must say that I agree with what you have said, generally speaking.  
Eva95:    And we must take Paul for what he was; he was not Christ. 
Eva96:  He … he did not even know Christ. But, of course, he is an apostle, and he has 
said a lot of nice things, some of the nicest in the Bible … for instance, in 1 
Corinthians 13:1, about love.                                              
Eva97:  But here, it seems as if he was having a bad day. 
 (Laughter among the participants) 
 
Aira104: Well said. That is possible to understand. 
 
Eva98: But then, this is not consistent with what else is said about Paul, that he had 
female co-workers, who traveled around talking to congregations, like Priscilla, 
for instance.  
Eva99: So this is not consistent with what we know was practiced, and that makes me 
think that this was contextual, what he said here.  
Eva100: It could have been some particular women he wanted to put in their place, I 
believe. 
 
Eva continues the critical line toward Paul, as the assumed source of the messages in 1 
Timothy 2:8-15. She follows up with a further argument to weaken Paul’s authority, probably 
aiming at weakening the authority of this text. Eva follows the line of Inger’s argument, 
introducing a hermeneutical distinction between the authority of Jesus’ sayings versus Paul’s 
sayings (Eva95). The new argument introduced by Eva to weaken Paul’s authority is that Paul 
“did not even know Christ” (Eva96). Eva thus points to a difference between the authority of the 
apostle Paul and the other apostles who, according to the Christian tradition, gained authority 
through their personal interaction with Jesus Christ according to the New Testament texts.154  
                                                 
154 The argument that Paul was not himself an eyewitness of Jesus’ words and deeds was activated in the so-called 
“Jesus-Paul debate” referred to earlier (Patterson 1991: 23).  
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Eva does not, however, deprive Paul of the status as an apostle, and she starts to defend 
him with reference to other alleged Pauline writings in the New Testament that she evaluates 
positively. These other texts are viewed as more central. A hermeneutical principle in the 
Lutheran tradition is that the Bible is its own interpreter (Ulstein 2006: 100). This may remind 
one of the Islamic concept of naskh.155 In Eva98-99 Eva argues that the message about the 
subjugation of women and the prohibition of female teachers contradicted Paul’s own practice, 
as described elsewhere in the Pauline writings in the New Testament. Eva thus gives an 
interpretation of 1 Timothy 2:8-15 as a text that is not representative of Paul’s teaching on 
women’s roles. Suggesting that this text may be Paul’s response to a specific situation and to 
specifically located women (Eva100), Eva makes this text particular and disclaims any universal 
message that may be derived from the text.  
 The connection Eva makes between the authority of the text and the authority of the 
(assumed) author of the text is that the text’s authority rests on the authority of the (assumed) 
author. This way of making meaning of texts, i.e. that the author bears the meaning as well as the 
authority of the text, may be called an author-focused hermeneutics. This implies that the readers 
need to understand the author in order to understand the text.156  
Eva’s statement about “Paul having a bad day” (Eva97) reminds us of Inger’s earlier 
statement (Inger8). The general amusement in response to this and Aira’s voiced approval of 
Eva’s comment (Aira104) indicates that no one seems to be offended by this way of speaking 
about Paul.  
Eva, however, seems to view the figure of Paul differently from Inger, even if she says 
that she agrees with what Inger says about this text. Eva’s argument is that this text has to be 
read as an exception within the writings credited to Paul in the New Testament. There is a 
different between taking take someone with “a pinch of salt” in general and excusing someone 
for “having a bad day.” Whereas Inger constructs an autonomous reader’s role for herself and 
evaluates the text on the basis of gender equality and gives Jesus higher authority than Paul, Eva 
looks for a different Paul from the one she sees in this text and finds him. 
 
Eva101: And he … these things about the men, that is fair enough, but then it is the things 
about women, that they should not dress up, that they should not have braided 
                                                 
155 The concept of naskh in koranic exegesis is a “Theoretical tool used to resolve contradictions in Quranic verses, 
hadith literature, tafsir [….] and usul al-fiqh [… ] whereby later verses (or reports or decisions) abrogate earlier 
ones. Based on Quranic verse (2:106) according to which God occasionally replaces older verses with better ones.” 
(Esposito 2003: 230) 
156 Reading and making meaning of koranic texts do not have to deal with the question of the author in the same 
way, as I discussed in Chapter 2. 
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hair or gold jewelry, no pearls and expensive clothes, and so on, that is 
understandable. 
Eva102:  Because one should share, right, the first Christians, if they possessed expensive 
jewelry, they were to sell that jewelry and share with everyone in the 
congregation. I think that’s perfectly fine. Their pride should be good deeds, as 
“proper for women who profess reverence to God.” That’s all fine. 
Eva103: But: “A woman should be silent” – that is not fine. That she should submit – that 
is not fine at all. 
Eva104:  But Paul was supposed to make the message of Jesus work in the Roman empire, 
wasn’t he? It could not make too much fuss and trouble, and these male women 
who had entered into … who had been granted the status of a person and 
whatever, they might have become a bit unmanageable. 
Eva105: Then he says: “I permit no woman to teach.” Well, that must be put to his 
account. Not “to have authority over man, she is to keep silent.” Well, this is not 
consistent with what Paul says in other places.  
Eva106: Then he says something that is quite absurd, actually. That Adam was created 
before Eve. But this is … there are two narratives of creation in the Bible, and 
they are very different. I like the first one, the first narrative of creation. 
Eva107: The next one, where Eve is created from Adam’s rib, it’s a wonderful legend, but 
it is … rather unfortunate. So I use the first one.  
Eva108:  “And Adam was not deceived, but the woman was deceived and became a 
transgressor.” Yes, there it is, we can discuss with Paul on this matter. Because 
he, too, gladly ate of the apple, this Adam guy. It’s just that he had someone to 
blame for the whole thing. 
Eva109: So, I think Adam was really being cowardly;  he could have said something that 
should happen to Adam because he was such a coward. 
Eva110: And then, that she will be saved through childbirth, as you say, it is very weird 
that it says this, and besides Paul recommends staying unmarried. Very strange. 
It is completely strange.  
Eva111:  “Provided they continue in faith and love and holiness, with modesty.” I guess 
we can say that what is really meant here is that women should behave properly, 
in order to prevent trouble around them, that if they dress up and start preaching 
to congregations and start governing the men and things like that, that might 
arouse trouble in the congregations. Perhaps that is what he wanted to prevent. 
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Eva112: But I don’t think that this text has anything to say to us today. It is a kind of text 
that … what did Luther say… “Do not make this my stumbling block.” Get on 
with it, and step over that rock. 
 
 
 Eva, as Inger did earlier, is evaluating the content based on how it fits into an ideal of 
gender equality, which would imply equal commandments and requirements for men and 
women. But, unlike Inger, she includes, in the act of making meaning, situating the text within 
its historical context and her tool is to use her knowledge from her studies of Christian theology. 
Eva’s includes a reflection on the commandment about modest dress among women (1 
Timothy 2:9), and she draws a link to the message of another New Testament text, where the 
issue of shared wealth among the Christians is addressed (Eva102).157 Eva transforms the 
question of how women should dress in 1 Timothy 2 into an ethical question of the distribution 
of goods. 
Then, Eva turns critically to the text’s content. She characterizes the argument of creation 
used to legitimize female subjugation as “quite absurd” (Eva106). Eva calls the second story of 
the creation of Eve from Adam’s rib, to which 1 Timothy 2 refers, “a wonderful [but 
unfortunate] legend.” She accepts the narrative as such but not for this use. 
The most substantial criticism is directed, however, toward the other premise for female 
subjugation in the text, namely the role of Eve in the narrative of the Fall of Humankind in 
Genesis. Eva suggests that Adam and Eve sharing the blame would be fair158 but accuses Adam 
further of acting cowardly because he puts the blame on his female partner when confronted by 
God in the narrative. Eva suggests a “discussion with Paul” on the interpretation of blame on the 
basis of this narrative. Thus, she articulates a quest for critical interaction with the Pauline text, 
since Paul as a person is obviously out of reach. Eva, just as Inger did earlier, is now positioning 
herself as an interpreting subject toward Paul or, rather, the Pauline text. But Inger constructs 
herself as an interpreter who evaluates Paul and the Pauline text by placing the text in the 
category “old” and by saying that Paul had “to be taken with a pinch of salt,” thus establishing 
herself as the interpretative authority in the relationship situated in the “now.” Eva, however, 
seems to be interested in a different kind of interaction with the text: she uses her knowledge of 
Christian theology and tradition to situate the text in its historical, particular context. This does 
not imply that she is a less critical reader. 
                                                 
157
The text to which she is referring is probably Acts 2:44-45 and 4:34 in the New Testament. 
158 This is the general view in the Islamic version and interpretation of the narrative of the Fall. Moreover, the 
classical Christian interpretation that the woman was the main transgressor is used by some Muslim feminists to 
claim that Christianity is more oppressive toward women than Islam is (Hassan 1987).  
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Eva105 and Eva110 are addressing concretely what Eva perceives to be an inconsistency 
between the statements in 1 Timothy and other Pauline writings, following up the hermeneutical 
principle of interpreting New Testament Pauline texts by juxtaposing them. She points out that 
women are told to be silent in this particular text, whereas Pauline writings elsewhere in the New 
Testament do allow women to speak. And whereas women are told here that they will be saved 
only through childbirth, in other texts Paul explicitly advises men and women not to marry. To 
imagine that Pauline texts would encourage women to have children without being married 
seems unlikely to Eva.159 
Eva104 and Eva112 represent the two different strategies for how Eva makes meaning of 
the text: One is the strategy of situated explanation and one that of evaluation. In Eva104 she 
continues to provide explanations of the text, and her explanation here is that the text was 
supposed to function as a guide for the Christian community (and the women in particular) on 
how to behave without offending other people in their broader social context. Eva’s expression 
“male women” (Eva104) suggests a mix of gender roles by women in this particular community 
as a possible destabilizing factor in their social context. According to Eva, this behavior could 
have been motivated by their new dignity as humans when becoming part of the Christian 
community.  
No matter how eager her attempt to defend the Pauline texts through twisting a positive 
meaning out of 1 Timothy 2:8-15, and despite her hermeneutical work in constructing a broader 
perspective of the Pauline texts and marginalizing this particular text in the general frame 
Eva112 does, however, entirely dismiss the possibility that this text could represent any value 
“today.” And not only does Eva find 1 Timothy 2:8-15 to be of no value, she also claims that this 
text has a negative value and warns that it could cause problems as a “stumbling block.” She 
refers to herself as someone who would simply “step over it.” Eva’s theological education seems 
to have provided her with the tools to make a qualified critical interpretation of 1 Timothy. This 
does not, however, prevent her from dismissing the message of the text, just like Inger does. The 
difference between their respective reasoning leading to the dismissal of the text is that Eva 
situates the text historically, and she is not ready to dismiss the Pauline texts altogether on the 
basis of the text from 1 Timothy alone.  
 
Aira105:  We can proceed to the other one. 
                                                 
159 Precisely this point has been made by New Testament scholars to argue that Paul is not the author of the text in 1 
Timothy. Possible motivations behind still claiming Paul to be the author were discussed in a paper at the SBL 
(Society of Biblical Literature) Annual Meeting of 2007 (Kartzow and Solevåg 2007), Kartzow and Solevåg suggest 
that this is done to strengthen the authority of 1 Timothy and that a certain conservative agenda may be behind this, 
since mainstream (and feminist) New Testament researchers dismiss Paul’s authorship (Kartzow and Solevåg 2007: 
4).  
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Inger49: Yes. The text from the Koran is not any better. 
 (Laughter among the participants) 
 
Inger evaluates both texts negatively. This is approved by shared laughter, which could 
indicate approval or surprise over Inger’s statement about the koranic text, or it may be an 
expression of distance or resistance to both. The text from the New Testament has now been 
evaluated critically and rejected as a text of authority by the two Christian participants present, 
and this exercise of self-criticism on behalf of their canonical scriptures may have influenced all. 
The next text on which they both will comment is Sura 4:34, and perhaps the laughter contains a 
certain anxiety as well, felt by the Muslim participants in the group: What will happen when Eva 
and Inger start commenting on the Koran?  
 
Inger50: I must say … I think it is a bit difficult to understand too. 
Inger51:  I cannot see that any reason is given why the man should be put in this position 
of authority over the woman. It’s just like … it’s like, this is just the way it is. 
You just assert it, kind of.  
Inger52:  It only says that “Men are in charge of the women, because Allah hath made the 
one of them to excel the other” by the fact that God has given one more than the 
other. So something was not given to all, just to some of them? And “because 
they spend of their property for the support of women.” Well, I then think about 
expenses, that they have the responsibility of maintaining a family, the fact that 
they have this responsibility gives them this authority. 
Inger53: But what … I don’t understand, it would have been interesting if any of you had 
any thoughts about what men could … what kind of qualities men have that they 
are given this position. 
Inger54: And then it comes again: “good women are the obedient” and “guarding in secret 
what Allah hath guarded.” What kind of secret is it? What is it that is a secret for 
us that men don’t know about? I put a question mark here. 
 
Inger starts by showing a questioning attitude. Her questions are posed to the text, but she 
articulates them in a way that invites her fellow participants to answer or to co-reflect. This 
provides an opening for a conversational space around Sura 4:34. This text belongs to the other 
tradition for Inger, and this seems to shape her attitude in a more questioning direction. When 
she commented on the New Testament text, her way of expressing herself was more confident 
and openly critical. The role she constructs for herself as a reader of the text of the other seems 
  
243 
different – not perhaps in how she constructs her own role as an autonomous subject toward the 
text but in how she involves the Muslim participants in her own making of meaning as co-
readers and interpreters through questions. 
Inger asks why it seems “natural” to put men in authority over women. She evaluates this 
text from a perspective of gender equality, just as she did the New Testament text. Inger argues 
that she does not find the argument in the koranic text for saying that men should be in charge of 
women convincing. This makes her ask for further explanation from the other participants, 
instead of dismissing the text right away.  
 
Inger55: And then there is this section that I find … If I understand it correctly, I think it is 
terrible. It says: “As for those from whom ye fear rebellion, admonish them and 
banish them to beds apart, and scourge them.” Scourge them, that means that you 
beat them or whip them. 
Inger56: And here, the women haven’t even been disobedient, it is only something one 
fears; you fear that it will happen. 
Inger57:  And then they should be put to bed, and then beaten, if I read this correctly. I 
don’t know any other way to do this. I am reading this literally now. 
Inger58:  But then, if it turns out that they become obedient after a while in bed, then one 
should “not seek a way against them.” 
Inger59: I don’t understand these points that I have mentioned: what kind of qualities the 
man has that gives him the right to rule over the woman, what kind of secrets 
women should keep for themselves, I wonder what that is, and this point that you 
don’t only have the right to punish if one is disobedient, I interpret that word as 
resisting, the opposite of being obedient, if one is disobedient. To fear that 
someone is going to be disobedient is enough to take measures against the 
women.  
Inger60:  So, reading this text makes me sad. I would rather … if anyone can read it in a 
different way, it would be really good. 
 
What Inger finds most problematic to relate to in the Koranic text are the words about a 
husband’s right to scourge the wife. Inger questions the arrangement of a gendered hierarchy 
within a marriage in which the man rules over the woman, just as she questioned the gender 
hierarchy in social settings in the New Testament text. Her moral evaluations are similar in both 
cases. 
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But even if Inger is strong in her criticism of the koranic text, she hedges her critique by 
questions using verbal signals: she does not know if she is reading it “correctly” (Inger55) and 
expresses a wish for someone to read the text in a “different way” (Inger60).  
Inger did not search a great deal for ways to “rescue” the New Testament text but used it 
as a way to establish her own authority to interpret and evaluate it and later dismiss it. She 
obviously has a different stance toward the text from 1 Timothy than she does toward the text 
from Sura 4:34 – perhaps not as a reader but with respect to the authority she claims in relation 
to the text. The New Testament text is a part of her own tradition; most probably she felt she 
could criticize it with more authority. The koranic text, on the other hand, is part of someone 
else’s religious tradition. This “someone” is present in the room – and has not yet commented on 
the texts.  
Inger’s shift between interpretative stances may be motivated either by the wish to show 
respect to a tradition that she does not know as well as her own, of the desire to pay respect to the 
other as present in person, or because of insecurity about which position to take – or all three at 
the same time. If one does not know the position of the others toward the text of their tradition, 
criticism of their text may also influence further mutual communication. 
Inger states that both texts make her “angry” (Inger29), but Sura 4:34 from the Koran 
also makes her “sad” (Inger60).  
 
Eva113: This is one of the most notorious suras, isn’t it? 
 
Shirin78: What? 
 
Eva114: The most notorious, the one Christians react to most strongly. 
 
Shirin79:  Yes. Muslims too. 
 
 Eva reveals a certain pre-knowledge of the existence of Sura 4:34, stated in the way one 
would report hearing a bad rumor. To call a sura in the Koran “notorious” is a strong judgmental 
act, but she poses it as a question, rather than as a statement about the text, and thus invites the 
others into a discussion. Eva generalizes her view to include “Christians” (Eva114). She used 
this way of argumentation earlier in the project, making general claims on behalf of all Christian 
believers (Eva3, p. 123; Eva20, p. 125). Shirin, in particular, reacted to this, and expressed a 
wish to avoid such general claims on behalf of traditions, advising everyone to limit herself to 
speaking for herself as an individual (Shirin5-7, p. 127). In this section, however, Shirin does not 
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stop Eva from making a general claim on behalf of Christians. Instead, Shirin expresses her 
unconditional agreement with Eva – on behalf of all Muslims. 
The dynamics between Eva and Shirin on the first critical evaluation of Sura 4:34 shows 
a different kind of interaction than previously. From a more apologetic mode of communication 
in earlier discussions, they now seem to agree on categorizing this sura as “notorious.” This 
agreement could be caused by either a shift in their attitude toward each other’s stances in 
general or a spontaneous and shared response to Sura 4:34. The following discussion on Sura 
4:34 will make it possible to see if the interpretative community occurring here between Eva and 
Shirin will manifest itself in other ways as well.  
 
Eva115:  And it is … if you take the worst part here, that about beating, put them to bed 
and beat them,160 it is illegal. 
Eva116: It is against Norwegian law. It is completely prohibited in Norway.  
 
 Eva’s reference to Norwegian law introduces a possible conflict: What happens if a 
koranic text conflicts with Norwegian law? Eva’s underlying view seems to be that Norwegian 
law would automatically overrule the authority of the Koran if they conflict. Eva did not, 
however, refer to Norwegian law when she dealt with the text from the New Testament, even if 
the content of 1 Timothy 2:8-15 could be said to conflict with Norwegian law as well – the law 
on gender equality, for instance.  
Eva’s different ways of talking about the two texts with regard to Norwegian law might 
be caused by judging physical violence against women to be a worse violation of Norwegian law 
than having them keep silent in a congregation. But it may also be that Eva regards the New 
Testament text as peripheral to the Norwegian Christian tradition, allegedly stripped of its 
previous authority through many years of the adaptation of the Christian tradition (as represented 
in Norway) to the emerging value of gender equality as a dominating social norm. Possible 
conflicts between the Koran and Norwegian law, on the other hand, are extensively debated in 
the Norwegian public, mostly by critics of Islam but also by Muslims in Norway themselves.161 
This could be the contextual reason why Eva introduces Norwegian law in making meaning of 
the koranic text. Eva does not really explore the relation between Norwegian law and the koranic 
text hermeneutically and contextually; she simply states that if a man beats his wife in real life in 
Norway, he would be violating Norwegian law. She could have referred to human rights 
                                                 
160 Eva is paraphrasing the Norwegian version of Sura 4:34: “send dem til sengs, og gi dem stryk.” 
161 Cf. for instance the website islam.no on this issue: “The Koran or the Norwegian legislation?” by Basim 
Ghozlan, http://www.islam.no/page1101312882.aspx. [accessed 23 June 2010]. 
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discourses more generally, but her focus on Norwegian law might serve to underline that her 
perspective of the primary context of making meaning is Norwegian society. 
 
Eva117: That men have authority over women because God has given some more than 
others, and their expenses, then God has kind of equipped them with 
something162 … then I almost start thinking about genitals. And I think …. 
 
Inger61: It’s not all; it is just some of them, remember? 
 
Eva118: I was thinking in relation to humans in general; perhaps I was wrong, then. 
 
Inger62: I thought about men and differences between men. 
 
Aira106: No, not exactly. We can …. 
 
Eva119: I thought, I mean, as humans, some of you … those humans being men, that they 
…. 
 
Aira107: It’s about humans in general; it’s on humans in general. 
 
The reference to a physical gender distinction in Eva34, where Eva tries to figure out 
what the different “equipment” of the genders is in reference to Sura 4:34, is a way to talk about 
gender as body that has been almost absent from the discussions throughout the process. 
Previous discussions contain reflections on human situations where physical needs are addressed 
as crucial (Discussion 2 related to the Hagar/Hajar narratives), references to motherhood, and 
giving birth. But in general, talk about gender and gendered differences relates to gendered 
bodies only to a small extent.163 According to Aira, however, Sura 4:34 does not refer to physical 
gender differences (Aira106).  
 
                                                 
162 Eva is referring to the Norwegian version of the Koran (Berg 1980): “det Han har utstyrt noen av dere med 
fremfor andre”, which translated directly into English would be “what He has equipped some of you with before 
others.” 
163 The discussion in this sequence between Eva, Inger, and Aira is based on how Sura 4:34 is phrased in the 
Norwegian version of the Koran that was read at the meetings. 
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Eva120: I think … I think that men have authority over women because of what they have 
been equipped with,164 then I believe that is about men in general. 
Eva121:  It is a mystery and really strange, isn’t it? And because of their expenses … this 
is not the case anymore because women in Norway bear as much of the expense 
as men do. 
Eva122: So, we can say that this belongs to a different time; this is not … it is not of any 
use in Norway, it is not … it cannot work in our world. 
Eva123:  Because we would rather tell women this … many women make more money 
than men, lots of women support their families financially, and would this mean 
that we should say that it was the women that have authority over men? Because 
of the expenses they have? 
Eva124: But we don’t want that, we don’t want women to rule over others. Nobody 
should be ruled over; every adult human being has to, has to follow his or her 
own free will. 
Eva125: And that is why … yes. So the good women should be obedient and guard what 
is secretive. Yes. I am starting to think about sexuality again. Well, I don’t know. 
“Because God wants the secrets to be kept.”165  
Eva126: If you fear disobedience you should admonish them …. Well. A man should 
admonish a woman …. We react negatively to that attitude. You can admonish 
children but not another adult.  
Eva127: And, put them to bed? That is, what can I say, foolish parents can send their 
children to bed as a punishment, but … yes. 
Eva128: “If they obey you, seek not a way against them”… Oh, really! They should not 
pursue the case if they obey! 
Eva129: “Allah is ever high exalted, great.” Yes. No. Yes, this is bad. 
 
 
Eva does not respond further to Aira’s remarks that the divine “equipping” in Sura 4:34 is 
not physical gender (Aira107). She continues to base her reflection on the divine equipment of 
men over women so as to grant males authority (Eva120). Eva strongly denies that a gendered 
pattern of expenses that she infers from the koranic text is consistent with how covering a 
                                                 
164 In the Norwegian version of the Koran which was read in the group (Berg 1980) the phrase “equipped with” 
(“utstyrt med”) is used for “given to” in the English version printed in the dissertation (Thomas Cleary 2004). 
165 This paraphrases the Norwegian version (Berg 1980), where it says: “ Derfor skal rettskafne kvinner være lydige 
og bevare det som er hemmelig, fordi Gud ønsker det bevart.” In English translation: “This is why righteous women 
should be obedient and protect what is secretive, because God wants it to be protected.” 
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family’s expenses in today’s Norway is organized (Eva123). The argumentation in Eva123-124 
tests the logical reasoning in the text, and perhaps considers Aira’s suggestion: If authority is 
linked to earning money and having expenses, will the wife have the authority in the marriage if 
she is the breadwinner? Is authority a matter of money and one’s role as provider, and not 
gender? Eva poses this as a question without trying to answer it. In Eva124, however, she 
addresses the entire concept of authority in marriage. Eva suggests equal authority between men 
and women in marriage as the ideal, based on the premise of individual autonomy among adults. 
According to her, it would not be any improvement at all if women were to rule over men in a 
family. In Eva126-127 Eva suggests an analogy between how Sura 4:34 views adult women and 
her own perception of the difference in authority between adults and children. On this basis she 
claims that the text makes an attempt to infantilize women.  
Eva suggests that the term “secretiveness” in the koranic text refers to sexuality. Here, 
too, Eva raises this as a question, and not as a statement. In the meaning-making situation with 
the prescriptive texts, the need for knowledge when Eva and Inger seek to understand the koranic 
text is addressed more explicitly than is the case with the Hagar/Hajar narratives. Both Inger and 
Eva have raised questions about Sura 4:34 that may be interpreted both as questions of 
clarification and as substantial criticism of the text. Eva is articulating a thorough criticism of the 
text, without being more careful when commenting on a text from a religious tradition other than 
her own.  
When making meaning of 1 Timothy 2, Eva uses her knowledge to situate the text in a 
historical frame. With respect to the koranic text, Eva’s reference is mainly current Norwegian 
society. She does not make any attempt to situate the koranic text in the way she did the New 
Testament text. Eva uses temporal categories to create distance from Sura 4:34: she situates it in 
a “different time” (Eva122), and the implications for her are that this text is “not of any use in 
Norway” and “it cannot work in our world.” The reference to Norway is explicit, but the notion 
“our world” is more open. Eva does not exemplify other contextual perspectives than the 
Norwegian one even though she opens the way for it. But the “our” does refer to a “we,” and is 
thus more inclusive. This means that Eva uses temporal metaphors to situate the text and to 
stamp it as irrelevant but uses spatial references to situate herself and the “we.” “Then” is 
opposed to “here”, not to “now.” Temporal and spatial interpretations interact to situate the text, 
the reader, and the context. 
 
Shirin80: Yes, it is. Can I say …. 
 
Aira108: Yes, if you have any questions or explanations. 
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Shirin81:  No, I only want to say what I found out. The first verse, you can interpret it. But 
like she said, in general one can … one has to realize what historical time, what 
kind of society, what kind of societal structures one has in mind.  
Shirin82: This is not the time to say, but at that time … 
Shirin83: I read a book by Fatima Mernissi; she’s a Moroccan writer, and exactly these 
verses that you say are notorious, it is … it is really difficult to understand.  
Shirin84: The matter of hijab as well. When she starts to do historical research, we can see 
how situational it was … I’ll say something general about it.  
Shirin85: Because the prophet was so kind, and what is it … tender to the women, other 
followers came and asked him why he treated his wives in that way. Because 
they lived in the mosque, and their family life was part public and part private, in 
a mix. And they said to him that the way you treat your women will make our 
women rebel against us .… 
Shirin86: I do not intend to say … I am just referring to what the researcher was thinking.  
 
Shirin refers to the researcher Fatima Mernissi and her work on the history and tradition 
of the prophet Muhammad and his social context.166 She makes an explicit reference to the term 
“interpret” (Shirin81) and uses Mernissi’s findings as a possible aid in explaining and 
interpreting Sura 4:34. Thus, one premise in Shirin’s interpretation is how a certain 
understanding of the historical context (“then”) influences interpreting and making meaning of 
the text in the present (“now”). The hijab is mentioned as an example of a symbol that has to be 
contextualized and situated, in order to be correctly interpreted. Shirin situates the text 
historically, just as Eva did earlier with 1 Timothy 2:8-15 (Shirin81). While using historical 
knowledge to interpret the text and referring to scholars, she also refers to Eva’s statement about 
the sura as “notorious.” For her part, she states that she finds the text “really difficult to 
understand.” This indicates that she has not given up on her own struggles with the text. Her 
referring to Eva’s statement might show that she recognizes Eva’s reaction but prefers to 
articulate her own view of the text in a more moderate way.  
In Shirin85 the example of Muhammad is used to make meaning of Sura 4:34. In the 
Islamic tradition the example of Muhammad is a resource for koranic interpretation through the 
use of the sunna and analogical reasoning, qiyas (Waines 2003: 68-69). What Shirin narrates 
offers both an explanation of why Muhammad transmitted a message like Sura 4:34 – and a 
                                                 
166 Fatima Mernissi, a Moroccan sociologist and feminist, has written extensively on gender, feminism, and Islamic 
societies since the mid-1970s. Her book Beyond the Veil (1975) has become a classic and may be the book to which 
Shirin is referring. Mernissi’s later publications include Beyond the Veil: Male-Female Dynamics in Modern Muslim 
Society (Mernissi 1987) and  Scheherazade goes West (2001).  
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reference to the way the prophet himself practiced his own authority in his marriages. Shirin 
keeps emphasizing that she is referring to Mernissi and how Mernissi uses the example of 
Muhammad. The reference to Mernissi’s historical research functions primarily as a preparation 
for Shirin’s own interpretation. Shirin86 may express a certain hesitation in revealing her own 
view, at least at this point in her reasoning. 
 
Shirin87: When it was said that women should put on more clothing, it was because it was 
very hot in Mecca. The clothes were transparent; in a way, the Prophet was 
forced in the matter of hijab… the matter of clothing, how to distinguish the free 
women from the slave women, so they would not be raped by those people in 
Mecca.  
Shirin88: So how the society was at that time, that one should … perhaps you should …. I 
just want to say that it was such that sexuality was totally free and shameless, and 
if a woman had many lovers, nobody cared.  
Shirin89:  When a child was born, it was a kind of task: one had to come and see and judge 
the looks of the baby, the men who had slept with her, and say who the father 
was. And then they called the child the son of one of them. This was their culture 
in those times.  
Shirin90: But then they started to organize the society differently. The researcher I 
mentioned said that in a way he was forced to state exactly how women should 
dress in order to distinguish them from the slave women.  
Shirin91:  But when you read the whole of the Koran, it does not fit in. Because in the 
Koran, it is not like anyone should be any better than others. 
Shirin92:  Many, many verses say that what distinguishes people are their deeds, their good 
deeds. 
Shirin93:  But now I remember. My husband knows Arabic, so I got some help from him in 
understanding what it is. And it is a little bit difficult to explain, but I will do my 
best.  
Shirin94:  In the verse, it is a word in Arabic that does not mean authority [in Norwegian: 
bestyrelsesautoritet]. The word means some kind of support. 
 
When discussing the issue of women’s dress in the Islamic tradition, Shirin keeps 
referring to Mernissi’s explanations about the historical context of the first Muslims and 
Muhammad. The issue of dress is not explicitly addressed in Sura 4:34, so one may ask why 
Shirin includes it as a theme, as she did in the preceding section when she mentioned the hijab. 
The text from 1 Timothy 2, however, does address women’s dress and appearance. Could the 
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content of the New Testament text be flowing over into the meaning-making process of the 
koranic text, like a textual osmosis, where the texts merge in the reader to some extent? Another 
probable answer, which does not exclude textual osmosis, may be that she finds the theme of 
women’s dress in Islam connected to the question of a gendered hierarchy in marriage. In 
contemporary Norwegian discourses on Islamic women, the issue of authority over wives (or 
presumably a lack of authority) in a marriage and the issue of wearing a hijab or “Islamic” 
clothing for women are often interrelated. 
In any case, an underlying narrative in her reasoning is that Islam improved the position 
of women in Mecca when it was established as a religious and legal practice. Shirin suggests that 
this is important to keep in mind when engaging with the text. In a mainstream Islamic 
interpretation of history, the pre-Islamic period in Mecca is often construed as the negative 
background for the positive shift the new religion brought about, with the improvement of 
women’s conditions through Islam being an important part of this interpretation of history.167 An 
analogy is found in the Christian tradition among some Christian feminist theologians who claim 
that Jesus practiced gender equality, improving respect for women before the Christian tradition 
was again co-opted by patriarchy.168 The interest in emphasizing that both Muhammad and Jesus 
worked to improve women’s social rights coincides with a growing Christian and Islamic 
feminism that wants to look at history in a different way, to reconstruct certain constructions of 
the past, to obtain new perspectives on the present and fuel from deep within the traditions to 
fight for change in the future.  
In Shirin91, however, Shirin questions her own use of the historical reasoning she has 
taken from Mernissi. She challenges the dominant narrative of general improvement through 
Islam when she asks: How does the frame narrative of Islam as a tradition provide social 
improvement for women, consistent with the egalitarian ideals found in the Koran that are 
extended to all humans – when the alleged improvement does not seem to include slave women? 
This criticism is based on how she finds koranic texts treat the issue of slavery, an issue Shirin 
addressed before, as a blind spot in the early Islamic tradition that ought to be criticized 
(Shirin47-50, p. 181-182). 
In Shirin93 and 94 Shirin is finally ready to address Sura 4:34 with her own textual 
reflections. Her husband is introduced as her discussion partner. Her preparation for the 
discussion and her meaning-making process is thus part of her private life, within her own 
marriage. She refers to him as a person who knows Arabic, and he helped her with the linguistic 
interpretation of the word qiwama, which she identifies as a central concept in the text. Qiwama 
                                                 
167 The Muslim feminist scholar Leila Ahmed challenges this view and argues that Islamic early practices 
concerning women is closely related to surrounding, non-Islamic customs and practices (Ahmed 1992: 5). 
168 This view is represented among what Roald (based on Osiek) wold call reformists, see p. 74. 
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is translated as “in charge” in the English version of the Koran (cited on p. 229-230) and 
translated by the word bestyrelsesautoritet (“executive authority”) in the Norwegian version of 
the Koran read at the meetings. 
To examine central linguistic and semantic notions in a canonical text is a classical 
exegetical tool in both the Christian and Islamic traditions. The motivation for doing linguistic 
exegetical work, particularly as a layperson that is not expected to have such intimate knowledge 
of the texts in their original languages, is based on the presupposition that the text has something 
to offer and that the effort is rewarded. It may also rest on the view that it is an option for finding 
the original meaning of the text and that it is necessary to search for this meaning in order to 
relate to it properly as a reader.  
Working linguistically and etymologically with a concept from a canonical text often (but 
not always) has a contextual aspect. The meaning of words change, and exegetical work may 
provide the reader with the necessary knowledge for distinguishing between how words are 
perceived today and the changes that could have happened in the perception of a notion, a 
concept, or a term over time.  
The first attempt to explain the meaning of the Arabic word qiwama is given by Shirin in 
Shirin94. She states the meaning of qiwama is closer to the notion of “support” than it is to the 
word “authority.” This immediately evokes curious comments from Eva and Inger, and the 
intense questioning, where at a certain point I myself forget that I am to be withdrawn and 
engage in the questioning, comes from a sudden atmosphere of expectation brought about by 
Shirin’s comment in Shirin94: 
 
Eva130: Support? 
 
Shirin95: Support. The woman shall … stay with him, I kind of … what is it …. 
 
Inger63: Take responsibility for? 
 
Shirin96:  Yes, how shall I … the woman should be supported …. 
 
AHG:  Protected? 
 
Shirin97: Protected … more than that. The word is ….  
 
Aira109:  The word is …. 
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Shirin98: The word is like something that can hold …. 
 
Eva131: A pillar? A kind of stone? 
 
Shirin99:  Yes, to keep up in some way. 
 
Eva132:  But then this turns into something quite nice …. if the man should be a support 
for the woman. 
 
Shirin100:  Well, it is not exactly that, the word does not say that. 
 
Eva133:  The word does not say support? 
 
Shirin101: Well, it is a kind of pillar that keeps it up.  
 
Trying to understand the notion of qiwama in the koranic text becomes a shared 
communicative task where the two Christian Norwegian participants question Shirin further, 
suggesting different words to express qiwama in their common language, Norwegian. Referring 
to her husband, Shirin states that qiwama means something that holds another person up, like a 
human pillar. Eva132 states that if the word in the Norwegian version of the Koran “executive 
authority”169 could be transformed into the meaning “support of” rather than “authority over” by 
going back to the original Arabic term, it would change the text’s meaning for her from “bad” 
(Eva129) to nice (Eva132). The – to her - new insights provided by Shirin have a direct impact 
on her evaluation of the text.  
This particular section is interesting in several ways: The participants struggle together to 
find the meaning of qiwama, and they all seem to share the supposition that defining the content 
of this term is crucial for understanding Sura 4:34. Shirin provides the basic analysis for 
suggesting this and the knowledge for reframing the meaning. Eva and Inger not only listen to 
Shirin’s premises and knowledge; they also accept her contributions as premises for the 
conversation and become engaged. Inger’s earlier wish that someone interpret Sura 4:34 
differently from what she did seems to come true. The interpretation and knowledge of the other 
proves to be required to understand the other’s text in a way different from the immediate 
encounter of a reader who is an outsider.  
                                                 
169 Eva uses the Norwegian word bestyrelsesautoritet found in the Norwegian translation of the Koran (Berg 1980) 
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Shirin’s insights, however, are not something she simply possesses automatically as a 
Muslim believer, since she has shared how she obtained her knowledge. Shirin’s quest for 
knowledge to interpret Sura 4:34 may well have started with the same question that Inger posed, 
caused by a resistance to the text in its immediate interpretation – a resistance forcing the reader 
to become engaged. 
 
Shirin102: But the other part is a bit general. It says something about human beings in 
general. About both women and men. What God has equipped some of you with 
… but as you say, that I can understand, even today.  
Shirin103: Think about the present, that today Norwegian society has a kind of arrangement 
for those in need of social security. They are told that “we will support you 
economically if you start to make a plan on how you can become self-supportive 
and take on responsibility for yourself.” That part of the verse is possible to 
understand, for both men and women. 
Shirin104: If you have the strength, you can take care of yourself, and nobody can decide 
over your life. This is the reality, not that somebody owns your person. If you are 
dependent in any way, economically or … if you cannot take care of yourself, the 
other is stronger than you. 
Shirin105: It’s like … think about the USA today. Think about the power of other nations … 
but they have the power to do so. But they have the power to do it. It’s not justice 
in this mindset, I don’t know if you understand …. 
 
 The conceptualizing of the meaning of qiwama into a broader context than just marriage 
and family, into a general concept of ethical obligation for the stronger party to support the 
weaker from a social and political perspective, opens the way for Sura 4:34 to provide an ethical 
tool for a general criticism of power. Not only does Shirin argue that the text in her 
understanding might limit the power of a husband, it can even be used to argue against the 
influence of the USA in the world. Defining strength as the ability to be self-reliant and 
autonomous, and weakness as being dependent on the strong (Shirin104), Shirin avoids her 
elaboration on support from being turned into a question of charity rather than power. When she 
connects the question of qiwama to both the private sphere of a marriage and the global political 
arena, she simultaneously connects a gender-based criticism of power that seems to approximate 
feminist analysis and a criticism of political power that seems close to postcolonial analysis. 
 
Eva134: I see what you mean. Don’t you? 
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Inger64:  Yes, that … but this is a different meaning, if you … instead of the man 
automatically have the authority …. 
 
Aira110: No, that’s not the case …. 
 
Inger65: … he has a function, that he should support something … be something that the 
woman can lean on. 
 
The implication of the new proposed understanding of qiwama is discussed a bit further. 
Inger elaborates that the concept of support is linked to a function, rather than a given position 
(Inger65). She links the function of support only to the man, however. Aira finally gets a chance 
to say something in this discussion after having tried to enter it without succeeding (see 
Aira109), denying that men are supposed to have an “automatic authority” over the wife in an 
Islamic marriage (Aira110).  
 
Shirin106: At the beginning of the verse, you say … yes, that word in Arabic says that if one 
is something like that …. Think about it, many women are stronger than their 
husbands. And then the man should have … what is it … should decide over that 
woman who is stronger than him, that is not legal, not in those times and not 
today.  
Shirin107: Then I think about what resources one has. If one is strong enough, regarding 
yourself and your own interests, or if one needs someone to help. Then one loses 
some authority. 
Shirin108: I don’t know how to explain it. I believe that today it’s like that. If you are strong 
intellectually and economically, you can’t … no one can,… If your husband is 
like that, then the woman can’t violate his rights. That might happen only if one 
of them is the weaker, intellectually or economically, I think. I can understand 
that. 
Shirin109:  But the one bearing the expenses… let me give an example. If for instance the 
social security office is going to help someone, they will make some demands. 
So if the man has the economic power of decision that will mean a lot. It is only 
his income that will count.  
 
Shirin106 dissolves entirely a given connection between being the supportive party in a 
marriage and maleness. She retains, however, the nexus between a supportive function in 
marriage and authority and a connection between economic strength and the supportive role 
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(Shirin109). But these statements come across as descriptive rather than normative. Shirin does, 
however, include other elements in defining a supportive role, such as intellectual capacity and 
the capacity to fight for one’s own interests. She emphasizes that a woman in a marriage may be 
stronger than a man (Shirin106), but she does not use this to argue for a supportive role for wives 
but to argue against male authority, calling it illegal. 
 
Inger66:  But then you have in a way a completely different sentence from the first one, in 
fact. It is a very beautiful …. 
 
Shirin110:  Yes, it is. I am totally sure that this is the way it is. 
 
Inger67:  Because then it means, if I understand you right, that there is no difference 
between men and women. 
 
Shirin111: No. 
 
Inger68: It all depends on who has the capacity to support the other. 
 
Shirin112: Yes, that is completely right. 
 
Inger69:  So, if the man is the stronger part, he should support the woman. And if the 
woman is stronger, she should support the man. And if one makes money, then 
one can make decisions on how the money is spent. That seems fine. 
 
Eva135: Yes, it does. 
 
Shirin113: But … the others. 
 
Inger70: Is this the way you interpret this too? 
 
Aira111: I will make my comments in a moment. 
 
Inger checks with Shirin if she has understood her interpretation of qiwama correctly, and 
Shirin confirms Inger’s interpretations of her explanations. The importance of avoiding 
misunderstandings is reflected in this way of testing the interpretation process and indicates a 
commitment. The engagement Eva and Inger show in the last sections indicate that making 
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meaning of the koranic text has become an important issue for them. Both express a positive 
approval of how the message of Sura 4:34 is transformed for them through Shirin’s interpretative 
move. The text’s message shifts from being a text about securing male authority in a marriage to 
a text calling for mutual support between the parties and a resource for the criticism of power. 
Why are they so heavily engaged in a way that seems quite different from the discussions on the 
Hagar/Hajar narratives?  
One explanation could be the group process itself. The mutual trust may have increased, 
creating more engagement with the text of the other tradition. But there are other possible 
interpretations that do not exclude the first: The prescriptive texts from 1 Timothy and Sura 4 
challenge them seriously in their making of meaning because of the discrepancy between their 
own ideals of gender equality and their immediate interpretation of the texts. The Christian 
participants had the hermeneutical tools, knowledge, and ability to criticize and situate the New 
Testament text, but in the encounter with the koranic text they have to rely on their Muslim co-
participants. Shirin’s interpretative work with the notion of qiwama changes their attitude toward 
Sura 4:34. But what difference does the new interpretation of qiwama make for Eva and Inger as 
Norwegian Christians? 
The new interpretation of qiwama makes the content of the koranic text much more 
consistent with Inger’s and Eva’s own ideals of gender equality. Are their positive reactions 
based on enjoying the Islamic text presumably to share their own ideals or based on an 
expression of solidarity with Muslims who relate to the Koran as a normative scripture? It may 
well be that both the confirmation of one’s values and the identification with what this 
interpretation means for Muslims plays a role in their excitement. Shirin is sharing her acquired 
knowledge, and by that also indicating her own position. The possibility of sharing an agency 
emerges more clearly, since so far they all seem to agree on the aim of improving women’s 
positions and possibilities – with or without the texts. Inger now ask for Aira’s views (Inger70). 
First, however, Shirin completes her contribution: 
 
Shirin114: But, in addition, one of you asked about the secretive part. What is the secret? It 
has something to do with private matters. For instance, everyone had something 
private, and one has … this has to do with respect. It should be kept here, 
between these four walls, and not go beyond them. The discussions, everything 
that happens in private, should be kept private.  
Shirin115: This was – what is it? – this was … one can perhaps say that women are more … 
are more talkative than men. I don’t totally agree with that, I think some men are 
like that too. They sit and talk … when they get together. 
Shirin116:  But perhaps women need it more, because we need … we need to talk a lot. 
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Shirin117: But in order to keep respect, it was said that “you shouldn’t gossip about your 
husband in public,” to strangers who don’t know what happens. That was what I 
found out about the secretive. I found, in the hadith, that it had to be interpreted 
like that. 
Shirin118: They say like this, “from whom you fear disobedience, admonish them.” That 
alone I cannot justify. It was like that in those times – that is the only way I can 
understand it. 
Shirin119: Today, for instance, concerning whipping. If you have an extramarital affair, how 
can you think … this happens today. Because the punishment is supposed to 
prevent it from happening again. 
Shirin120: But humans have developed so that some people … they get insulted. And there 
are lots of discussions on how to treat criminals and how to overcome crime. 
 
The hadith is introduced as another of the sources Shirin has consulted to interpret the 
text.170 The introduction to the theme of secretiveness, however, is also based on Shirin’s own 
experiences. Shirin115-116 suggests a gender divisive behavior when it comes to talking: 
women talk more than men. Nevertheless, Shirin wonders if her own image of women as more 
talkative than men is correct, according to her own experience. This confuses any suggestion by 
her of a natural difference between the genders in this respect. However, she does suggest that 
women need to talk more than men, but not necessarily that they actually do so. The reasons 
behind this need are not explored. Shirin adds that in the text secretiveness has to do with the 
relationship between public and private, and the Koranic text aims at keeping what is defined as 
private in the private sphere. Her findings from the hadith suggest that a restriction on gossiping 
about one’s husband in public is the real issue in the text.  
A short reflection on public, physical punishment for extramarital affairs is included, but 
Shirin’s conclusive remarks on this is just that “there are lots of discussions” on the theme of 
“crime.” Public punishment is, according to Shirin, generally motivated by an attempt to prevent 
crime. Does this mean that Shirin regards extramarital sexual relations as a crime or is she 
referring to countries that do so? Her statements fuse the descriptive and normative at some 
points. In Shirin118 she nonetheless distances herself from the appeal in Sura 4:34 to admonish 
wives on the suspicion of disobedience, by placing the text in the past (“then”).  
 
                                                 
170 She has already mentioned Mernissi’s research, conversations with her husband, the example of the Muhammad 
(the sunnah), and the use of other koranic texts as resources in making meaning of Sura 4: 34. 
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Shirin121:  What is happening in practice is that the Prophet never did it, or what is said in 
the hadith, even there, I do disagree … if one beats with a …. 
 
Eva136: Twig? 
 
Shirin122: Yes. But I told my husband, it is not what causes pain to the body, it’s one’s soul 
…. That is the worst part of being beaten: to be humiliated and subjugated. 
Shirin123:  But if you think about the time one is talking about … if you go through history 
and take a look at what happens to human beings, in those days it was not like the 
Prophet and the others close to the Prophet had it in this way. They were people 
with a good reputation. 
Shirin124:  Jesus Christ, for instance … that is a well-known incident in history, and perhaps 
you have heard about Ashura …. there was a battle, and the grandson of the 
Prophet and then his relative died. Both men and women, and the one who took 
power to show that they were innocent when they were accused of infidelity, that 
is why they were killed at the battle of Kerbala.171 It was the granddaughter of the 
Prophet who took the lead and started to talk to the people and made them 
understand why they were killed. And there were other men in the family, but 
they did not assume power.  
Shirin125:  And women were well esteemed. The obedience is impossible to understand, 
because one was negotiating all the time. If two people are intelligent, they will 
negotiate.  
 
Her reference to the hadith and to the example of Muhammad in Shirin121 may suggest 
that she feels that there is an interpreted inconsistency between the two. Shirin’s presentation of 
the example of Muhammad is that he never hit women or his wives, but in referring to the 
hadith, Shirin states that she disagrees with the content. What Shirin is referring to are the 
practical elaborations found in some texts, containing prescriptions about how such a beating 
should happen.172 
                                                 
171 After reading through the final transcriptions, Shirin pointed out that she wanted to give examples of people who 
sacrified their lives to save others and to bring about justice, like Jesus and the human sacrifices at the battle of 
Karbala (680) (Waines 2003: 160). Shirin emphasized that the act of sacrificing one’s own life is only meant for 
prominent religious leaders and should be viewed as an attempt to ground still young  and unsettled religious 
traditions, and not an example ordinary people should follow. Ashura is the name of the ten days of mourning in the 
Shira calendar of martyrs when the Shia Muslims commemorate this battle (Waines 2003: 160). 
172 Roald provides the textual sources in her book Women in Islam: A Western Experience. She mentions early 
koranic commentaries and later elaborations by the Islamic ulama as the sources for these prescriptions, and not the 
hadith directly (Roald 2001: 167-171). 
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Eva’s suggestion about a twig as a prescribed tool to use in a physical action directed at a 
wife shows that she most likely has some knowledge about the Islamic interpretative discourse 
on this particular text. One of the understandings in the Islamic tradition is that the husband’s 
physical action should be limited to slapping her on the cheek with a small twig with a softened 
end, something used as a toothbrush in some cultural contexts (Roald 2001: 169-170).  
Shirin addresses the mental aspect of being physically abused, however. She regards the 
humiliation and the subjugation implied in the act to be the worst part in an experience of being 
hit by one’s husband (Shirin122). From this perspective, the lack of bodily pain or harm in the 
allegedly symbolic act of striking the cheek with the soft end of a twig does not make it 
acceptable.  
Shirin’s reference to the Shia tradition, to Jesus Christ, and to the time of Muhammad 
refers to the past as a place where negotiation was more highly esteemed than violence, and she 
thus rejects or at least nuances a notion of the past and the historical context of Sura 4:34 as a 
time when subjugation and violence toward women/wives were commonly accepted. The 
inclusion of Jesus Christ is not explicitly motivated, but it may be done as an inclusive gesture 
toward the Christian tradition – including Jesus in the company of people with a good reputation 
(mentioned in Shirin124).  
Now, Aira makes her contribution: 
 
Aira112: Yes. first, I want to say that I agree with all of you ….  
Aira113: But I find that these texts are very much misused and misinterpreted and 
interpreted in many ways. 
 
Aira was challenged to state her position some moments ago and now joins the others in 
their criticism of and comments on the texts. Aira113 shows concern about the “misuse and 
misinterpretations” of the texts, addressing the interpretations of the texts rather than the texts 
themselves. She talks about the texts in plural, includes both of them in her comments, and 
comments not only on “misinterpretation” but also on “interpretation.” Aira does not yet address 
the distinction she makes between interpretation and misinterpretation or suggest what her 
interpretation of the texts would be. Nor does she identify where the interpretative power should 
be situated among all the different interpreters producing the various interpretations. The way 
she articulates herself may, however, signal that she believes that a right way of interpretation 
does exist, just as misinterpretation exists, or at least that some interpretations are to be preferred 
to others. She might be signaling a pluralistic attitude to indicate that she believes that there is 
more than one correct interpretation. But Aira’s mention of “misinterpretation” as a possibility 
also indicates that there are some interpretations that are not correct or unacceptable to her. 
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Aira114:  There is one way to interpret, and like she said, the word qiwama means to stand 
or support. It is one word, if you say we have qayam when you say the verb, this 
means to stand firm for someone.  
Aira115: And it means support or trust, and many Muslims take the meanings expressed 
here literally – that they should decide everything. 
Aira116: Actually, it means that men should protect women and be responsible, and then 
they should support them in all situations. 
Aira117: Women can earn their own money, but in many situations it is difficult for 
women to be … to take full responsibility for everything in life.… 
Aira118:  In that way it is a situation that requires … if they do earn money and support the 
family, then they should take part … in negotiations on how to use money in a 
sensible way and do things properly.  
 
 Aira turns to the word qiwama in Sura 4:34, just as Shirin did earlier, and seems to join 
in her identification of the word qiwama as the crucial point from which to crack the nut of this 
ayat. The common identification by both Shirin and Aira of qiwama as such a central notion in in 
Sura 4:34 has a comprehensive reference in current literature on this text within what may be 
categorized as Islamic reformist literature addressing women’s rights in Islam. Two examples are 
Asma Barlas (Barlas 2002: 186-187) and Amina Wadud (Wadud 1999: 70-74). 
Aira’s discussion on interpretation in Aira115-118 shows her awareness of the possibility 
that a Muslim reader of Sura 4:34 “takes the meanings expressed here literally.” What does she 
mean by the term “literally”?173 In Aira115 this kind of reading is said to read a hierarchy of 
authority into the concept qiwama. She does not explicitly categorize this hierarchy as gendered 
at this point. The Muslims addressed by Aira as the ones reading the text literally could be both 
men and women. She distinguishes between authority and responsibility and seems more 
reluctant than Shirin to reduce the prescribed responsibility of husbands, apparently to avoid 
placing too heavy a workload on women. Aira brings in practical considerations (Aira117) and 
concentrates on the issue of one’s financial contribution to the family. She suggests negotiations 
between wife and husband as a way of sharing authority over the financial resources (Aira118). 
Aira’s first step in making meaning is to contrast her own view with what she calls 
“literal interpretation.” This kind of interpretation would, according to her, lead to a situation 
                                                 
173 A literal understanding of a text may entail excluding linguistic, semantic, and historical knowledge relevant to 
grasping the meaning of a text. It might also include the reader’s ignorance of the dynamics between textual 
interpretation and context. This way of explaining a literal understanding of Sura 4:34 would match Aira’s analysis 
of the interpretative situation of Sura 4:34 among many Muslims, as will be shown later in her contributions. 
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where “they decide everything” (Aira115). “They” may refer to Muslim men, perhaps men with 
a religious authority to interpret the Koran who use this authority to read the text as a 
legitimization of men’s rule over women. But Aira’s comments do not address either men or 
women in particular. The division she makes is between literal interpretation and a more skilled 
interpretation of the text. 
 
Aira119: Concerning the other part, that what God has equipped some of you with before 
others, that is meant generally; it is not just men who are better equipped. I can 
give you an example. 
Aira120: People are born into different families. Some are very well off and some are 
barely capable of supporting themselves. Being born into a royal family will give 
you many advantages and privileges that make you better equipped than a poor 
person. 
Aira121: Then there are some personal qualities, perhaps some are strong, some are more 
emotional, some can protect, some are weak, some have ADHD, some are weak 
in mental situations – this is very general. It is not only that men were given 
genitals and that becomes something that make them stand above women.  
Aira122: So, there are some things that are given by birth, and some bad things given by 
birth, so I can’t… complain about the royal family or complain about that. 
 
What is Aira’s description of qualifications for allowing one to be regarded as the strong 
party in a relationship? The qualifications or advantages she lists are all gender neutral in the 
sense that they fit both men and women. Instead, Aira introduces a distinction other than gender, 
i.e. that between innate advantages and acquired advantages – exemplifying them as a fortunate 
personality, mental health, and a high social/economic status. There seems to be a certain 
element of fatalism in Aira’s view of the distribution of these advantages, but no fatalism can be 
detected in her interpretation of what it means to be born as a girl or a boy. In fact, it seems to be 
important for Aira to show that most important advantages are not linked to gender in the first 
place. She rejects male gender as being the only decisive factor for qualifying anyone as the 
strong party in a relationship (Aira120). Through this way of reasoning she seems to reject any 
idea of male authority over women as a general rule.  
 
Aira123: Generally, we say that men are responsible for the maintenance of their family. 
Aira124: But this is not what things are like. In the whole world lots of women are earning 
money, and there are men taking their money, and they maintain the family, but 
they don’t have the same rights or status.  
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Aira125: And the men who abuse power also abuse women and control them by saying 
they should be obedient and keep secrets in all cases.  
Aira126:  This means two things. Women should be obedient – to what? These are two 
different matters. 
Aira127: About secrets, it is like you said, we have private businesses, we don’t want to go 
out and discuss in public … things that are very important to keep in the home.  
Aira128: So one should be … one should be loyal to the family and faithful to one’s 
husband. And the husband should be faithful to his wife. So this refers to the 
many personal matters in the family. 
Aira129: But then, this depends on many things. It has to do with the private space one has 
at home.  
 
The statement in Aira123 is presented as the common view in the Islamic tradition about 
a husband’s role: the economic support of the family. Yet, in Aira124 Aira claims that this is not 
consistent with reality for many Muslim families “in the whole world.” It is not only men who 
provide for their families, lots of women do too. Aira states that when women are the 
breadwinners, the authority that would adhere to a male breadwinner is not given to them 
because they are women. Aira does not suggest any solution or formulate a concrete challenge. 
She simply states this as a fact that contradicts her understanding of Sura 4:34.  
Aira points to men directly as responsible for abuse of power (Aira125). She suggests 
that it is the personal intention of the (male) reader to make a significant difference between 
interpretation and what she characterizes as misinterpretation. The latter is connected to the 
abuse of power, but, as she describes it, the intention of control and abuse of power is present in 
the reader before he or she encounters Sura 4:34 rather than the other way around. 
The commandment to keep the secretiveness is separated from the prescription about 
obedience. Thus, Aira breaks up the potentially powerful and authoritarian link between being 
told to obey and being restricted to keeping silent. For Aira, just as Shirin explained earlier, it 
seems like the meaning of secretiveness in the text is connected to what is considered to be 
private. Aira suggests sexual intimacy or private financial issues as examples of such private 
matters. She proposes that the aim behind guarding the secretiveness is the protection of the 
family’s reputation.  
Who or what should women in a marriage obey? Aira asks the question but does not 
really answer it. In the discussion on obedience in connection with the Hagar/Hajar narratives, 
Aira limits human obedience to God alone (Aira92, p. 208; Aira97, p. 221). If this includes 
obedience to the Koran as the word of God and the Koran is interpreted as claiming a gendered 
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hierarchy in a marriage, there may nevertheless be a claim on a wife to obey her husband, as part 
of her obedience to God. Aira, however, has not drawn this conclusion.  
Aira128 shows that Aira want to put the same requirement of faithfulness on both 
husband and wife. It is somewhat unclear if she views loyalty in the same way, but it seems 
likely that she means this to apply to both genders as well. Aira seem to follow up on Inger’s 
earlier eagerness to implement gender inclusive commandments in a moral enrichment of the 
texts. 
 
Shirin126: Excuse me. Most of it has to do with respect, that one should not lose respect for 
one’s family and go out in public and say something. 
Shirin127: And I tell my husband: What about the problems that need public assistance to be 
solved, those cannot be kept secret. 
Shirin128: There are private matters that are not about hurting anyone…. For instance, my 
husband is like this and that … that is not of anyone’s business. This is the issue 
here, not things that have to do with laws and regulations, the way one talks 
today. Right? 
Shirin129: That if you are beaten, you have to go out and report it. 
Shirin130: And if the rights of the children are… that must be reported. These are laws and 
regulations that have to be kept. 
Shirin131: But what is private, what kind of … sex, that is between ourselves.  
Shirin132: If it’s … OK, you can go to professionals to solve it, that is OK, but you can’t 
just go out and talk about it. I do agree that it may harm oneself and others if one 
talks about those things, because ordinary people can’t solve it if it is only talk. 
One should turn to professionals to get help.  
 
Shirin’s interruption is motivated by a concern: What if something considered to be a 
private matter in a marriage includes incidents where one of the parties is harmed? Should this be 
kept a secret or even be defined as a private matter in the first place? Shirin denounces that, for 
instance, cases of domestic violence should be kept secret (Shirin129). Nor should violation of 
children’s rights be kept secret. Shirin argues that these issues cannot be regarded as private 
matters because domestic violence and the mistreatment of children are acts transgressing “laws 
and regulations” (Shirin128-120). Shirin seems thus to link up with Eva’s use of Norwegian law 
to evaluate Sura 4:34 (Eva115-116), presenting a contextual interpretation of what the text says 
about secrecy by bringing Norwegian law into her making of meaning. Shirin55 includes another 
aspect of the Norwegian context, the welfare system, as an argument for seeking help when 
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needed for family matters. Shirin tells all of this to the group as a reflection of what she has 
discussed with her husband.  
 
Aira130: As far as “if you fear disobedience, you should admonish …” is concerned, I 
have talked to several people about this issue, and they say it refers to being 
unfaithful in the married relationship. Marriage – that should be a faithful 
relationship. They should be loyal to each other. If one fears extramarital 
relationships, that hurts the family. 
Aira131: If a woman has an affair, for instance, and gets pregnant by a man other than her 
husband, this abuses the husband’s status because his property should not be 
inherited by someone who is not his daughter, for instance. 
Aira132: One should be loyal and faithful and not abuse the marriage to meet needs one 
might have. 
Aira133: And if one should be devastated because the women … or one of them has [an 
affair with] another man or woman … then the marriage is abused. 
 
Like Shirin, Aira has discussed this text with others (Aira130). Aira refers to her 
discussion partners without naming them. In this section she restricts the meaning of obedience 
to sexual fidelity for both husband and wife. She addresses the right of a husband to know the 
fatherhood of the wife’s children, based on an argument regarding the protection of property and 
inheritance, which is to proceed in an orderly way (Aira131-132). Aira addresses the emotional 
side of extramarital relationships as well (Aira130, 133). Control over woman’s reproductive 
capacity is a central point in this section, but the infidelity in itself is also addressed, extended to 
both genders. 
 
Aira134: And it says that one should talk; to admonish is a word that can be interpreted in 
different ways, the Arabic word. Then it is that you discuss, you tell, you just say 
don’t do this and that, and you should keep to the boundaries and not be 
unfaithful to your husband.  
Aira135: And if this works out, then you shouldn’t pursue the case. If they are obedient, if 
they understand the importance of the matter …. 
Aira136: If the woman thinks that the situation will be OK, they should not pursue the 
case. But if it gets difficult, and they say … there are a lot of interpretations of 
this verse. 
Aira137: And if there is a mental condition where the wife is afraid of being beaten by the 
husband, they should be separated in a proper way. 
  
266 
Aira138: But if you do it, you should not hurt them.174 
 
Aira134 turns back to the issue of translating the Arabic text, and questions the word 
“admonish” as a comprehensive translation. She suggests that the translation may just as well be 
“discuss.” Aira137 and 138 refer to the part in the koranic text about scourging. She highlights 
the mental part of being physically threatened. In Aira136 she emphasizes once again that there 
is a plurality of different interpretations of this particular koranic text. She does not specify them 
further.  
Aira138 does not dismiss the “scourging” described in the Koranic text entirely, although 
Aira disclaims any right to hurt someone if in doing it. This means that she does not understand 
the koranic text to be prescribing “scourging” for disobedient female spouses (referring to sexual 
infidelity, in her interpretation) and that a possibility to do so that may be inferred from the text 
should not result in any harm. 
Her statement in Aira138 may, however, be taken as a statement of negotiation with 
certain interpretations of the text that she knows about, rather than representing her own 
interpretation of the text. It may be that Aira does not want to reject any part of the koranic text 
directly, so that she has to find ways other than open rejection in order to come to terms with the 
meaning. If the opening for “scourging” in the text needs to stand as authoritative, according to 
Aira’s view, this does not prevent her from bringing up her own interpretations and addressing 
possible practical implications of the text. What she has made clear, however, is that she finds it 
wrong to use Sura 4:34 to legitimize abuse of power and harmful actions against women/wives.  
Aira’s meaning-making activity with Sura 4:34 at this point may express an act of 
balancing: maintaining the required respect for the Koran while still upholding her view that it is 
wrong to hurt anyone. Aira has displayed a view of marriage as a place where the strong should 
support the weak, where children should be properly taken care of, and where nobody should get 
hurt. These views are, however, also based on her interpretation of the Koran and the Islamic 
tradition. The act of balancing that Aira possibly exercises, then, is a balancing between different 
parts of the Koran and the Islamic tradition and between different interpretations of Sura 4:34. 
 
Aira140: We read elsewhere in the Koran that, when there is a conflict between a woman 
and a man, then one has to talk about it in the family, both in the woman’s family 
                                                 
174 In a comment on the final transcription Aira has the following comment on her own statement: “In the cases 
where physical punishment becomes an option, it should be in a way that is not harmful and should be very slight. 
Having said this, the Prophet (pbuh) always emphasized that ‘the best among you is the one who is best to his wife’ 
and never recommended or practiced physical punishment.” 
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and in the man’s family. And if they understand another, if they reconcile, then 
you can put things right. 
Aira141: But if you can’t, they can leave each other, you can get a divorce.  
Aira142: So, it is no solution to … this is not a general advice to beat women. 
Aira143: As far as I understand it, we interpret it like this here, but many interpret it quite 
differently, and as you have seen in these texts, they have provided room for the 
abuse of women and for the subjugation of women. 
 
Aira140-141 suggests ways of dealing with a marital conflict based on talk and 
discussion and on the involvement of the extended family. She mentions divorce as a possibility 
if all attempts to resolve a conflict fail. The basis for these suggestions is found in the Koran and 
the fiqh. Aira142 may suggest that these means, including divorce, are to be preferred before 
acceptance or use of physical violence.  
Aira repeats that there is a multitude of different interpretations of this text, and some of 
them are described as versions that “have provided room for the abuse of women and for the 
subjugation of women” (Aira143). Aira’s critique of the interpretations she finds that represent 
the abuse of power surfaces through employment of the notions “abuse” and “subjugation.” The 
use of these strongly negative terms shows Aira’s engagement in the matter. She addresses both 
texts here for the first time, and thus includes 1 Timothy 2:8-15 in her concern: we agree about 
how these texts should be understood, but what about those who interpret them to legitimize their 
power and abuse of women?  
 
Aira144: And it is easy for men to say the Koran says so. So, they don’t want to go into 
depth and really see what it means to do what they are supposed to, no.  
Aira145: They just want to take the word “executive authority” and I know many who will 
use the verse in this way. 
Aira146: But really, it means what she said: Support. And it is the word qiwama itself that 
says so.  
Aira147: There are many who … perhaps not that many, but quite a number of people who 
interpret it like it says. Then it creates difficulties. 
Aira148: This misunderstanding could occur in this verse, and I feel that it is important 
that you can compare it to the broader message of the Koran, that you should 
behave properly and decent, and that goes for men as well. And there is another 
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verse in the Koran that says that both of them are told to behave decently when 
they meet.175  
 
Aira144-145 launches into a severe criticism of Muslim men for neglecting what Aira 
claims to be their duty regarding interpretational work on the Koran. According to Aira, the 
reader of Sura 4:34 is obligated to see “what the text really means” and not only “what it says.” 
Aira finds that reading and interpreting the Koran might not be enough if it is done without 
“going into depth” (Aira144). She raises the issue of the reader’s obligation, and the present role 
of many readers is criticized morally. According to Aira’s analysis, the problems to which Sura 
4:34 may give rise emerge because of male readers who do not assume the responsibility they 
ought to bear. She thus presupposes that the interpreter has a large and important task before 
him/herself. Actually, she expresses herself in a way that shows that she finds the whole 
responsibility of the impact of this aya to rest upon the readers.176 
What is Aira asking for when she requests Muslim male readers to assume a more 
thorough interpretative responsibility in connection with Sura 4:34? She may be suggesting that 
contextual needs should be taken more seriously and/or that they should be more aware of the 
possibilities to misuse this text. Both issues are addressed in her contributions. But it seems that 
what she is really asking for is a deeper understanding of the term qiwama. Again, the focus is on 
the understanding of the notion of qiwama (Aira146-147). Aira turns back to the formerly 
explored meaning of the word, as presented by Shirin and herself, as an argument against both 
the Norwegian translation of the term (“executive authority”/bestyrelsesautoritet) and perhaps 
against related ways of framing the meaning of the Arabic term as well. Aira is using other parts 
of the Koran to shed light on the general prescriptions for the relationship between men and 
women (Aira148). On the basis of this larger view she finds support for her position that 
demands are made of both genders, and she explicitly mentioned that a koranic requirement to 
behave “properly and decent” applies to men as well as to women. 
The interpretative situation Aira describes concerning Sura 4:34 is that (Muslim) women 
are left to do all the work with coming to terms with this text, whereas the men “don’t want to go 
into depth”. According to Aira’s analysis, the attitude toward the text and its contextual 
implications and the motivation for taking the trouble to explore this text to a sufficient degree is 
gender-divided in practice. This is a situation she wants to change. 
If Aira seems reluctant to criticize the text from the Koran as a text, she does not at all 
hesitate in criticizing Muslim men and what she claims to be their lack of adequate interpretative 
                                                 
175 Aira is probably referring to Sura 24:30-31. 
176 Cf. the phrase “moral enrichment of the text” and Khaled Abou El Fadl (Abou El Fadl, Cohen, and Lague 2002: 
15), discussed in Chapter 2, p. 49. 
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work. It may seem that a proper interpretative task for Aira would mean reaching conclusions 
about Sura 4:34 that are close to her own. What she obviously states, however, is that any 
interpretation of this text that gives carte blanche to subjugate and abuse women is simply a 
shallow and problematic piece of interpretation. 
Aira then addresses the text from 1 Timothy 2:8-15: 
 
Aira149: So, their jewelry and beauty should be good deeds, and that goes for both men 
and women. 
Aira150: But there is a lot of … I feel that this is personal, too, that it could be a general 
admonishment that women listen to the teaching of the men, perhaps it was only 
in church that women were busy with children or something, and perhaps started 
to talk a little, and the sermon and other things were disturbed. Perhaps it was a 
way to say that only about then and there, and then it became a part of this text.  
Aira151: Otherwise, we do not view this differently. I very much see this together, that it 
can be compared to the message of the Koran, which states how a man should act 
and how a woman should act. 
Aira152: And, for instance, that “he should lift his hands without anger and argument.” 
When we do hajj, it is said that after you pick up those clothes, you should not 
involve yourself in a conflict and you should control your anger.  
Aira153: But I believe that it is not only for a certain time that you should control your 
anger, I think one should control anger all the time and behave properly.  
Aira154: And concerning that part of the text that women will be saved through childbirth, 
we don’t have references to that in the Koran …. Women, we have the same …. 
 
Commenting on 1 Timothy 2:8-15, Aira relates her interpretation to the Koran and 
Islamic religious practice, exemplified through hajj. Aira says that she generally finds the gender 
roles prescribed in the New Testament text consistent with the Koran. To prescribe specific roles 
to men and women in the first place is presented as familiar to her because of her knowledge of 
koranic texts. The example of hajj to which she turns, however, is a practice involving both men 
and women, and Aira underlines that anger control should not be a gender-specific requirement, 
nor should it be a requirement limited to the performance of hajj.  
Aira’s way of relating to the New Testament text is to evaluate its content on the basis of 
her own tradition, more specifically by relating it to her own interpretation of the koranic 
tradition and texts. Probably inspired by Eva, she suggests situating parts of the New Testament 
text in a specific context. Aira states that there is only one point in the New Testament text that is 
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clearly strange for her: the statement on women’s salvation through childbirth in 1 Timothy 2:15 
(Aira154).  
 
Aira155: [I]t wasn’t Eve who transgressed the commandment, both of them did. So it was 
not the woman, it was both. 
 
Inger71: Does the Koran say that? 
 
Aira156:  Yes, it does. So it wasn’t the woman, it was both. So, I don’t know. Otherwise I 
fully agree with you, that these two texts are very … they open up the way for 
abuse and subjugation, and a lot of this has actually happened. 
 
Inger72: Now, I think that both of you should become imams and give this understanding 
of the text …. 
 
On the basis of the reference in 1 Timothy 2 to one of the narratives of the Fall of 
Humankind recorded in Genesis, Aira explains the difference she finds between the two 
traditions’ narratives. The narrative of the Fall exists in both, but in the Christian version, as 
rephrased in 1 Timothy 2:8-15, the gendered roles are played out in a specific way. Eve is 
presented as the first transgressor of the divine commandment against eating the fruit of the Tree 
of Knowledge of Good and Evil. She is put in a double role as both tempted (by the snake) and 
temptress (of Adam). In 1 Timothy she is held mainly responsible, and the consequences are 
severe. She is made a representative of all women in this text, and thus all women have to endure 
the same consequences. In the Islamic tradition both Adam and Hawwa (Eve) bear equal blame, 
and the consequences of the Fall are less grave.  
Aira155 does not reflect on the differences between the two traditions’ narratives of the 
Fall of humankind as differences. Aira presents the Islamic version of the narrative, and makes 
correcting comments on the version represented in 1 Timothy, based on the Islamic version. The 
two narratives seem to merge into one for Aira, the version from 1 Timothy assimilating into the 
Islamic version. In Aira’s (merged) narrative, both man and woman were transgressors, and 
subsequently were equally to blame.177 Aira’s comments on the New Testament text’s reference 
                                                 
177 Some Islamic feminists, like Riffat Hassan, claim that the representation of these diverging narratives of the Fall 
of Humankind makes the Christian tradition appear more systematically oppressive toward women than the Islamic 
tradition. Hassan finds that the Judeo-Christian tradition has had a negative impact on the Islamic tradition through 
the transmission of patriarchal structures, originally Judeo-Christian, with its roots in, for instance, the narrative of 
the Fall of Humankind as it is presented in the Old Testament (Hassan 1987). Kari Børresen, in her exploration of 
Christian and Islamic gender models and gender roles, explores Augustine’s construction of female subordination, 
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to the Fall (and thus the implication for women as forced to bear the consequences described in 
this text) declare its content to be incorrect, according to the Koran.  
That the traditions and narratives within the Christian and Islamic traditions appear to be 
related but not the same raises an issue in a Christian-Muslim encounter. There are different 
ways to relate to this, and some of these were displayed in the discussions about the Hagar/Hajar 
narratives. Aira chooses the narrative from her own tradition as the authoritative reference for 
making meaning, as she did in the discussions about Hagar/Hajar (see p. 186). 
Inger becomes engaged and shows this through her request to get confirmation of what 
Aira just said (Inger71). Aira confirms the difference between the koranic and biblical versions 
of the narrative of the Fall without blaming the Christian tradition or the New Testament text as 
such for being oppressive to women (Aira156). Instead, she focuses on what she finds the 
narratives have in common: Both illustrate human disobedience toward God. The common 
problem connected to the texts of Sura 4:34 and 1 Timothy 2:8-15, as she sees it, is not the texts 
themselves but the fact that both of them may “open up the way for [the] abuse and subjugation” 
of women (Aira156). To Aira, this is not a hypothetical but a real problem: “a lot of this has 
actually happened” (Aira156).  
Aira chooses to focus on shared challenges in real life in both the Islamic and Christian 
traditions. She comments on the differences she finds between the texts but does not actually pay 
them much attention. It is the way in which the texts function in the lives of people that really 
matters for Aira, and this makes the interpretative task crucial for her. It is not her strategy of 
change to criticize the texts. She aims instead at criticizing the interpreters of the texts for not 
doing a thorough enough job. 
The appreciation Inger expresses for the contributions by Shirin and Aira also shares a 
concern for how Sura 4:34 may be understood by other Muslims. Her concern is shown through 
her wish that Aira’s and Shirin’s interpretations of this text might be widely shared by others 
(Inger72). For Inger, an imam seems to represent the necessary authority for interpreting and 
reinterpreting koranic texts in an influential way. Subsequently, she wants Shirin and Aira to 
become imams. Neither Shirin nor Aira made any immediate response to Inger’s wish for them; 
the discussion just continues. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
which is based on his interpretation of the narrative of the Fall of Humankind in Genesis and its implications for 
imago Dei. A gendered hierarchy is thus connected to the relation between humans and God, according to Børresen, 
who claims that the Islamic tradition’s gendered hierarchy limits itself to organized relations among humans 
(Børresen 2004: 8). 
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A Turning Point in the Group’s Meaning-Making Process? 
In many ways this discussion represents a different mode of communication and shows, in 
comparison with the discussions on the Hagar/Hajar narratives, other strategies in making 
meaning of the texts. In the discussions on the narratives most of the Christian participants often 
concentrated on identifying differences between Islam and Christianity. The Muslim participants 
often engaged in defensive arguments of the Hagar/Hajar narratives, particularly the narrative 
from the hadith, but they did so for the narrative from the Old Testament as well. The Muslim 
participants generally focused on similarities rather than differences between the two religions.  
Now communication has changed into a mode where mutual understandings and attempts 
to understand one another’s thinking has become more dominant. This development is exactly 
the opposite of what I had expected beforehand, since I thought the Hagar/Hajar narratives 
would be more likely to contribute to be more of a shared interpretative communication than the 
prescriptive texts. This was why I had decided to start with the Hagar/Hajar narratives in the first 
place. I regarded Sura 4:34 and 1 Timothy 2:8-15 to be more “difficult” texts that would possibly 
also generate conflicts. This discussion proved me wrong. It seems that, for the participants, the 
prescriptive texts generated a change in the interpretative situation where their respective 
objectives seemed much more concordant. The texts seem to create a greater consensus rather 
than discord. But what does the consensus consist of? Is it connected to the texts, the strategies 
of making meaning, the group process, or reflections on the context(s)? 
What the participants seem to agree on most of all is that both texts have caused 
sufferings and injustices for women, in the past as well as in the present. These effects are not 
accurately located geographically, but the locations in which they are claimed to occur are 
situated so as to transcend the family sphere, and for some of the participants seemingly covering 
the entire areas of Christian and Muslim religious and cultural influence. The agreement is based 
on a common understanding of context(s) and of contextual challenges in the past and present, 
and the interpreters of the texts are themselves part of this/these context(s). There seems to be a 
difference between the Christian and the Muslim participants, however, regarding how to situate 
the time of oppression. Inger and Eva relate more to the problem of female subjugation as being 
part of the past, whereas the Muslim participants do not distinguish clearly between the past and 
the present in this respect. The question of analyzing the issue of female subjugation and 
situating it in time and place will be developed further in the following discussions. 
The subjugation of women is addressed as a problem not only because it causes human 
suffering. When such subjugation is done in the name of Islam or Christianity, it is also seen as a 
misrepresentation of the Christian and Islamic traditions. The Muslim participants see it as a 
misrepresentation of the koranic text. For them, the text itself is not the most urgent problem 
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(even if it poses some challenges, for instance, for Shirin with respect to the interpretation of 
“scourging”). It is rather the interpretations that pose the challenges. The Christian participants, 
however, consider the text in 1 Timothy to be a substantial part of the problem, but only 
historically speaking. The conversation related to Sura 4:34 is given more space than 1 Timothy 
2:8-15. Aira and Shirin present the contextual challenges of this text extensively and also engage 
in detailed discussions about their interpretation of Sura 4:34. The impression is that this koranic 
text represents a contemporary challenge for the Muslim participants. The text from 1 Timothy is 
presented differently and mostly as belonging to the past, without any significant contemporary 
influence and thus not connected to a contemporary contextual challenge for Eva and Inger. 
The question of how the texts have caused the subjugation of women is related mainly to 
how male Christians and Muslims with interpretative authority have interpreted the texts and 
how they have propagated a common understanding and practice of female subjugation within 
the traditions. The interpretations and the interpreters are thus the targets of the participants’ 
critique – that by the Muslim participants in particular but also that by the Christians. 
Among the Christian participants is also a thorough critique of Paul as the alleged author 
of the text from 1 Timothy. He may be regarded as a prominent male interpreter of Jesus’ 
message within the Christian tradition, even though he is not explicitly placed in this role in the 
discussion. He is criticized as author and only indirectly as an interpreter of Jesus, since both 
Inger and Eva prefer to move beyond this text and search for what they consider to be the 
message of Jesus, not trusting Paul’s interpretation.  
 Does this discussion represent a turning point in the process of making meaning in the 
group? The conversations are marked by a high degree of consensus: common definition of 
contextual challenges, critique of the interpretation of canonical texts or the canonical texts 
themselves, and a shared engagement in preventing the texts from contributing to female 
subjugation. All of these represent a new form of interaction where the participants seem to 
define themselves as players on the same team. One significant change in the communication 
mode is present throughout the discussion but became particularly visible among the Christian 
participants after Shirin began with her interpretation of the concept of qiwama: There are more 
questions and fewer expressions shaped as statements than in the previous discussions on the 
Hagar/Hajar narratives. The questions seem to express a more open way of relating, whereas 
posing questions to the participants of the other religion has replaced the earlier occasions of 
framing the other, a way that is taken for granted or defining her without further investigation. 
Questions are open for answers, making knowledge accessible. But it also represents a new turn 
by allowing the participants to define themselves and their knowledge in the conversation, and 
by acknowledging a need for more knowledge. Since the text from Sura 4:34 becomes the main 
focus, it is the Christian participants who ask most of the questions. The knowledge the Muslim 
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participants have in their activity of making meaning of this text is accessible to the Christian 
participants only through the Muslim participants’ sharing of knowledge and reflection. This 
may result in a turning point where the Muslim participants are more clearly approached as a 
resource for the others, rather than primarily as representations of something different. 
 
Resources in the Activity of Making Meaning 
One of the obvious resources in the activity of making meaning throughout this discussion is 
what is suggested by the term “internal library” (Ford 2006: 4).178 The “internal library” of each 
participant, i.e. their respective knowledge, experience, reflection, and narratives, becomes 
apparent. The impact of the “internal libraries” becomes obvious in the encounter with a 
canonical text with which the reader has to struggle in order to make meaning of it. This 
becomes particularly obvious when the texts in their immediate interpretation represent ethical 
values different from those of the reader. In this respect Sura 4:34 and 1 Timothy 2:8-15 are texts 
that require extensive use of these readers “internal libraries,” and the interdependence of the 
respective resources and knowledge of all participants is made visible.  
One element of the “internal library” is contextual knowledge. This kind of knowledge is 
less available than literal knowledge for anyone outside a tradition, but it appears to be essential 
for understanding a canonical text as situated. The Muslim participants are clearly the most 
important resource for the Christian participants in making meaning of Sura 4:34, because of the 
combination of their contextual and more formal knowledge. It seems that the Christian 
participants are a resource for Aira and Shirin, too. But Aira at least seems to have read the New 
Testament text primarily by evaluating its content on the basis of the Koran and Islamic religious 
practices such as the hajj. 
 The Christian participants struggle to make meaning of 1 Timothy 2:8-15. Using 
hermeneutical tools that first and foremost make them able to argue for relativizing or 
abandoning the text, they construct an interpretative position for themselves where this act is 
plausible. Inger professes a hermeneutics where the Jesus narratives constitute the hermeneutical 
key and dismisses both text and author on that basis. Eva uses her Christian theological 
knowledge to situate the text historically, claiming that it does not carry a universal message and 
is not representative of the Pauline texts in the New Testament. Both include a use of their own 
responses to the text as a resource in their making of meaning, and their positioning of 
                                                 
178 The expression “internal library” was used, according to Ford, by Aref Ali Nayed in a panel discussion at a 
Scriptural Reasoning conference at Cambridge in 2003.  Ford explains this as “all they [the participants in SR] have 
learnt not only through tradition-specific activity in study, prayer, worship and experience but also what they have 
learnt through whatever academic disciplines they have studied – and also, of course, elements from a range of 
cultures, arts, economic, cultural and social contexts” (Ford 2006: 4-5). 
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themselves as autonomous readers opens up the way to do this without necessarily creating a 
dilemma in relation to the text itself.  
Their reasoning links up well with that of Anne-Louise Eriksson who claims that, in 
order to apply the biblical text as an authority, particular texts should be tested as to whether 
their interpretation contributes to liberation or not (Eriksson 1999: 96). 1 Timothy 2:8-15 does 
not pass this test for Eva and Inger, and the result is a denial of the text’s authority. Their testing 
of the text, however, concentrates more on the value of gender equality in particular than it does 
on a broader concept of liberation, as Eriksson suggests. 
 The Muslim participants turn to traditional and contextual resources in their interpretation 
of Sura 4:34, represented by the hadith and the sunna, the example of Muhammad, koranic 
exegesis, and contemporary scholars. Conversations with other Muslims are listed among the 
resources as well. To abandon the koranic text is not posed as an option for Aira and Shirin. 
They concentrate on testing the interpretations against the perceived broader message of human 
equality in the Koran. 
 Both the Christian and the Muslim representatives, then, engage with resources within 
their own traditions in their interpretation. Only the Muslims state explicitly that they discussed 
their text with others. This is another indication that Sura 4:34 is seen as a more relevant text for 
Muslims in Norway than 1 Timothy 2: 8-15 is for Norwegian Christians. The difference, 
however, is that the Christian participants put the text from the Christian canon on trial, whereas 
the Muslim participants dispute other interpretations of Sura 4:34. Based on the former 
discussions on the status of the Koran versus the Bible in the group, one may well have imagined 
that the different approaches to the two scriptures from the Christian and Muslim participants 
respectively could have merged into a discussion here too on the authority and status of the texts. 
Instead, there is a common attempt to discuss the two texts on different premises. One of the 
Christian and one of the Muslim participants discuss Sura 4:34 in relation to Norwegian law. 
This shows an awareness of the Norwegian context as a juridical context. Norwegian law is not 
consulted in the interpretation of 1 Timothy 2:8-15. The move to include Norwegian law in the 
discussions of Sura 4:34, however, indicates that solving contextual problems of female 
oppression related to the texts seems to overrule a potential conflict between different views of 
the participants’ canonical scriptures. The contextual problems the participants are addressing are 
primarily situated among Muslims and possible challenges in Christian contexts are not 
discussed.  
  
Why Read These Texts? Time, Space, and Reading Positions  
The texts as representing a past and contexts and readers as representing the present is a recurrent 
feature of the discussion. One position is that a temporal evaluation dismisses the relevance of 
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the texts in the present. Another is the need to situate the texts historically in order to interpret 
the text’s message, which relates to Mieke Bal’s criterion of using a historical text in an 
informed way, having knowledge both about the past and the present (Bal 2008: 48). The 
concept of qiwama, playing a central role in the discussion on Sura 4:34, is used in a way that 
may qualify for Bal’s request to be a temporal metaphor (Bal 2008: 48), when a notion is 
explored both in its historical and present use. The dispute on the interpretation of qiwama is 
located in the present, however, and the aim is to delve behind the interpretative development in 
the Islamic tradition from recent decades in order to reconstruct an original meaning that comes 
closer to the reformist Muslim agency of empowering Muslim women. 
 Inger’s question “Why read?” is motivated by a position in which the texts are hopelessly 
lost in an irrelevant past and perhaps a wish that this is for the best of all concerned. The present 
challenges that are presented mainly by the Muslim participants but embraced by all as a 
common task, however, pull the participants into a position where they need to relate at least to 
Sura 4:34 as part of the present. One of the questions in analyzing the following discussions 
would be to see if this return to the present will gradually include making meaning of 1 Timothy 
2:8-15 as well. 
 
 
Discussion 2 Related to Sura 4:34 and 1 Timothy 2:8-15.  
Aira: “The old understandings of old things that perhaps used to be 
sufficient but is not today” 
The discussion on the interpretation of Sura 4:34 and 1 Timothy 2:8-15 continues. Inger 
comments:  
 
Inger73: I am just thinking about how we … in what different ways we read the texts. I 
have read them very critically and kind of letter by letter, but you have worked 
very hard to interpret … to reinterpret the text. 
Inger74: I see it as … what I experience is that you found out about the expression ”in 
charge of,” and found that it means support, and in a way you’ve worked very 
actively to understand and interpret the text. It has a completely different 
meaning in this way. 
Inger75: So, I am curious … if what you say about the text is the same interpretation you 
meet when you … when you talk to other Muslims or if you are kind of pioneers 
who …. 
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Inger does not use the term “interpretation” about her own making of meaning. Her 
comments on the Muslim participants’ activity of making meaning include references to “hard 
work,” “interpretation,” and “reinterpretation” (Inger73-74). She characterizes her own way of 
reading, however, as “reading critically and kind of letter by letter.” This may describe a way of 
reading as critical without having any other information beyond the text itself and what her own 
individual interpretative framework of knowledge and experience gives her. She had not used 
linguistic or semantic strategies to work with the original Greek of the New Testament text, 
compared to the preparations of the Muslim participants on the Arabic notion of qiwama, giving 
Sura 4:34 a new meaning. 
But Inger asks: To what extent is their interpretation representative of Muslims in general 
(Inger75)? Even if both Shirin and Aira did refer to others in their explanation of qiwama 
(Fatima Mernissi, Shirin’s husband, “other people”) and made use of an extensive Islamic 
hermeneutical reasoning (other koranic texts, the hadith, and the sunna), Inger is curious about 
the place of their interpretation among other Muslims. Inger’s way of asking shows perhaps that 
she herself is surprised by the new meaning that their interpretative work has given to Sura4:34. 
Thus, Inger may have worries that their interpretation, which she judges to be very constructive, 
is hidden from “other Muslims” (Inger75). What she asks for is their contextual and social 
knowledge of the interpretative situation and their own positioning in this. 
 
Aira157: No, it is … you can find a number of people of the same … who are able to 
interpret the text in the same direction that we have talked about here. It is not 
taken out of the blue. 
Aira158: There are a number of people of the same opinion, particularly in Europe, in 
England. 
Aira159: It is the word qiwama that she mentioned, and I view it … that means to stand, to 
support, I heard that interpretation in England for the first time. It was in a 
course, together with others from Norway. It was at a center that many Muslims 
attend and are given religious education and are kind of prepared to be a minister, 
to be an imam. Or to become a leader who knows the art of interpretation and 
who can work with the texts in the future. 
Aira160: So, there are people thinking in the same way. And it … you find it in Pakistan 
too. Not only a few.  
Aira161: But there are many people who take these words literally. They think that the 
man has some “executive power.” There is a need to educate these people with 
scholarly knowledge. Contextual information and knowledge about the Prophet’s 
traditions are essential to understanding these ayas.  
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Aira162: So, woman and man are like parts … just like two pairs of wheels on a car. One 
can … a car needs all of them to move. They have to stay together; then there is 
support, right? 
Aira163: And if you don’t get support, you could think: Was it only men who supported 
the family? 
Aira164: In the time of the Prophet many women had small shops and trade caravans …. it 
was common for women to have businesses or do some work. 
Aira165: The way of interpreting we have talked about today is actually shared by several 
leading scholars and imams today, but it may not be so common among people 
with little knowledge. 
 
That the interpretation given by Shirin and Aira is not geographically and culturally 
limited to Europe or “taken out of the blue” (Aira157) is clarified. Aira does, however, admit that 
the interpretation she has presented may be seen as valid mostly among educated Muslims 
(Aira161 and 165). Inger’s hunch that Aira and Shirin represent a rather small group of Muslims 
is thus partly confirmed.  
Aira shares her personal narrative about her process of making meaning of Sura 4:34, as 
well as contextual knowledge. Then she returns to comment directly on the koranic text, first by 
using an image to illustrate the ideal relationship between man and woman in marriage – they are 
like wheels on a car. Aira’s earlier argument, based on a complementary gender model, does not 
seem to apply here. Wheels on a car serve the same function, rather than different ones. Aira then 
includes references to her experience (Aira163) and finally she draws on the example of the 
prophet Muhammad (Aira164). 
Now Aira makes an attempt to explain the status of the interpretation of Sura 4:34 she 
follows: 
 
Aira166:  But really, why is it like that? Then one has to know about the political 
conditions in the different countries, the high rate of illiteracy. If one is illiterate, 
the message is … you can’t read for yourself, you don’t understand the words, 
the context, or the conditions of the sayings, so one cannot judge. You have to 
believe what is orally stated by someone in the mosque. He might be a good 
imam, well educated, but it is possible that he does not have enough knowledge 
to share it with others. 
Aira167: And he can have the usual tendency or the usual understanding that does not have 
anything to do with the present. Then it is the old understanding of old things that 
perhaps used to be sufficient but is not today. 
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Aira168: For instance, today, when both have jobs, if both husband and wife spend money 
at home, it doesn’t mean that one should share just the way it is prescribed in the 
Koran. If the husband dies, and the wife gets one fourth of the share, that would 
be unfair. Because they have both contributed. Then it should be exactly the 
same however much he has contributed and however much she has contributed. 
Aira169: So, one can think that this would lead to new interpretations.179 But then, it 
depends on the political situation in the countries. You find dictatorships, unrest, 
nobody has the time or the resources to educate themselves or see one’s own 
opinions or understand different interpretations, and then you can understand it 
quite easy. 
Aira170: And then you’re stuck. So there are many factors; it is not one thing that creates 
the problems; there are many things. 
 
The explanations Aira gives for other interpretations of Sura 4:34 (Aira166 and 169) are 
all linked to contextual factors: Political and educational circumstances, lack of opportunity and 
time to prioritize knowledge about the text among people in Muslim communities. Hence she 
does not see other interpretations as a result of different methodological or theological 
interpretations of the Koran and the Islamic tradition as such.  
Aira’s emphasis on education and literacy as tools to implement a more constructive 
interpretation of Sura 4:34 in a way that does not create problems comes to mind. She highlights 
the importance of Muslims having enough skills to read and understand the Koran and the sunna 
for themselves (Aira166). Apart from the educational point, this argument leads to the question 
of authority to interpret. Aira seems to place this authority with the individual Muslim as well as 
with the institutional authorities within Islam. But rather than discussing a religious 
institutionalized hierarchy of interpreters, Aira concentrates on the importance of interpretational 
skills among all. The crucial point for Aira is that the interpretation needs to be grounded in 
education and knowledge, it has to be adequately related to the contemporary context of 
contemporary times and not represent “old understandings of old things” (Aira167). 
Furthermore, ordinary Muslims need to have access to it. The notion “old” seems to be used 
negatively in connection with “understanding,” referring to irrelevant and problematic 
interpretations. The “old things,” however, may refer to the Islamic tradition and text, and here 
“old” may not have negative connotations at all but simply frame a chronology. But the “old 
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 After reading through the final transcriptions, Aira underlines that, according to Islam, a woman can earn her 
own money and is not obliged to spend it on the family, since this is the responsibility of the man. 
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understanding” happening now is a problem. What Aira probably wants, if she is talking about 
her earlier making of meaning, is new understandings of “old things.” 
Aira pictures a situation of being “stuck” if one does not have access to education or 
political and social space to exercise relevant interpretational work on the Koran and the sunna 
(Aira169-170). To be “stuck” implies a situation where one is unable to move. Aira places 
countries with a low level of education and political instability in this “stuck” situation. In other 
words, one does not need to be stuck in this way in Europe or in Norway.  
Aira gives an example in Aira168 of a new interpretation in another field: the Norwegian 
context influences her view of what is fair in a gendered practice of inheritance distribution. A 
new interpretation is needed in order not to be stuck in what she evaluates as an unfair outcome 
in her own situation, although the Islamic traditional ruling would say otherwise. 
 
Eva137: But it is like this in the Christian world as well. Before … you say that the imams 
have power and people in general do not know what is written. The priests and 
ministers have interpreted, haven’t they, as it suited them? 
Eva138: Concerning the subjugation of women, for instance, and other kinds of 
subjugation, as it fit into the social structures of society.  
Eva139: So, the societal conditions and the interpretations have, kind of, been two sides 
that have completed each other. So we know this quite well …. 
 
Eva makes a comparison with the “Christian world” (Eva137), based on Aira’s shared 
analysis of the current interpretative situation in some Muslim majority countries. She compares 
imams incapable of presenting relevant interpretations of the Koran and sunna, drawing on 
Aira’s example, to Christian ministers who, according to Eva, interpreted the Bible in a way that 
only benefited themselves. Eva’s “Christian world” is not clearly situated in time and space, but 
Eva1 could suggest that Eva is talking about “then,” as opposed to “now.” Eva is comparing the 
Christian “here and then” to the Muslim “there and now.” But there is an element of 
identification in her comparison with what Aira just shared. Eva has moved from emphasizing 
differences, as she did earlier in the process, to comparing possible similarities between the 
Christian and Islamic traditions. 
Aira’s explanation of what she viewed as a poor interpretative situation was lack of 
education and knowledge and political circumstances. Eva states that she believes that the 
Christian clergy’s motivation was ethical, or rather a lack of ethical reflection. This may 
illustrate the fact that she suspects the Christian clergy of interpreting against better knowledge, 
deliberately hiding other ways of interpretation from Christian believers because of their own 
interests. If this is the case, Eva’s mistrust is of a different kind than Aira’s view of the challenge 
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facing many Muslims: better knowledge and education would improve the situation for Muslims, 
according to Aira. Eva suggests that this is an ethical or moral question, which turns the question 
of interpretative authority into a question of power and intention. But it seems that Eva is talking 
mainly about a Christian past, rather than a present challenge in her own context. 
Eva believes that Christian ministers interpreted biblical texts according to the contextual 
social norms of society (meaning female subjugation in past society) for their own benefit. But 
when the conventional norms in society shifted from “bad” to “good” in her ethical evaluation, 
that is, when the social structures of society turned from a normative message of subjugation of 
women to a normative message of gender equality in the Norwegian context, does Eva find it 
right to adapt to social conventions when interpreting the Bible?  
Eva has explained earlier that she believes that contemporary Norwegian society has 
moved closer to Christian ideals during recent decades (Eva81, p. 191). The Christian ideals she 
found to be better implemented in the present are the ideals of human equality. She described 
how she believed that a more accurate interpretation of the message of Jesus has contributed to 
this development. In this section, however, she is concerned with a past negative social influence 
on biblical interpretation and with clergy who, according to her, had an interest in securing their 
own privileges. Eva’s concern does not seem to be that the church and biblical interpretation 
should be kept away from discourses in society at large or away from contemporary political 
movements. Rather, Eva has an ethical measuring stick, an axiomatic value which functions as 
her reference when she evaluates Biblical interpretation both in the past and in the present. Her 
criterion for an adequate interpretation of biblical texts is human equality, or inclusive gender 
equality. She connects this value both to the message of Jesus and to the human struggle (Eva81-
84 p.190).  
 
Inger76: And the language is … Arabic, which no one understands, we had Latin that no 
one understood.  
Inger77: It was part of the liberation, I think it means you get the texts in your own 
language and are allowed to read for yourself and to interpret and ask questions 
because, if you do not, you are dependent on authorities in a way that is not 
liberating. 
 
Shirin133: Those interpretations or, for instance, the fact that they are translated into Farsi or 
Urdu … but those people who have a particular interpretation that they perhaps 
claim is literal, those verses create problems, you see.  
Shirin133: They don’t want to. 
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Shirin134: In the West it is kind of taboo to talk about religion. I don’t know how you think, 
but ... I think this is something that needs to be worked on, so that it doesn’t 
become a taboo. In Muslim countries, it is taboo to talk about non-religious stuff. 
Democracy … the kind of governing system that they have, some of them have 
… that is a kind of taboo when you only live with the word democracy. And I 
believe that for some in the West democracy is … it needs to be worked on, I 
think, so that they can see that no one will threaten their religion, their …. 
Shirin135: I think that in the West … religion is like … if it is not supposed to be taken 
seriously, fine. But if it is supposed to be regarded as at the same level as other 
sciences, then … I believe that religious studies is like … it is parallel to other 
sciences and studies, it is a reason for that.  
Inger78: But, I think …. 
 
Shirin136: Superficial, yes, but not … sorry. 
 
Inger79: I was the one interrupting this time. But I do believe that there is something in 
what you say, that religion is in many ways a kind of taboo in the West.  
Inger80: But this might have been necessary, because some generations ago, everyone had 
to baptize their children, everyone had to be confirmed, everyone had to get 
married in the church, and when I got married … thirty-something years ago, 
there was a large movement in Norway on the right to choose marriage or just to 
live together without marriage. One wanted to be liberated from the forces of 
religion, as well as from the forces of society and the bourgeoisie. One should be 
allowed to make free choices.  
Inger81: So, but I think there is a change now, as well, religion is a new topic, but now 
you choose religion. It is not only part of a tradition; it is something you actually 
choose.  
Inger82: And I believe that is great: young people can choose to become baptized when 
they are fourteen years old. They choose it. 
Inger83: At the same time, some things are disappearing, so I believe that it is right what 
you are saying. And some get embarrassed if you bring up the topic. 
 
Inger compares current challenges in the Islamic tradition to challenges she views as 
belonging to the past in the Christian tradition. The example she uses is that of the languages of 
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Arabic and Latin as languages that alienate believers who do not know them.180 Inger’s point is 
that this alienation makes the believers more dependent on religious authorities for understanding 
and interpreting the texts (Inger77). The “liberation” Inger mentions in Inger77 is the freedom to 
read and interpret for oneself because the text is translated into one’s own language. It seems as 
if she is referring to a historical event, perhaps the Reformation and the Lutheran emphasis on 
access to the Bible for everyone. 
The main problem addressed in this sequence, by Inger and later by Shirin, is the impact 
that individual access to the canonical scriptures may have on the possibility for believers to be 
their own interpretative authorities or at least be equipped to engage in discussions and 
evaluations of the texts and their interpretations. To be dependent on, for instance, religious 
authorities limit the autonomy of the individual believer. Shirin comments that translation of the 
Koran may not be a solution for improving the interpretative situation among non-Arabic 
speaking Muslims. She states that Muslims who consider themselves traditional or conservative 
and interpret texts such as Sura 4:34 “literally” would not accept a translated version of the 
Koran anyway.181 
The discussion between Inger and Shirin about challenges in the interpretative situation is 
extended to include the position and attitude to religion in the West. They agree that religion is a 
somewhat taboo topic in the West, and Shirin compares this to an alleged taboo against talking 
about democracy in some Muslim majority societies. Inger80-82 emphasizes how religion has 
ceased to have a firm grip on “everyone’s” life, referring to changes in the Norwegian society. 
She views this as a positive development: religious participation now is a matter of free choice 
by the individual rather than a social duty. This change, from religious participation as social 
obligation to a matter of free individual choice, is located in the Norwegian, and perhaps 
Western, context. 
Shirin argues that religion is a study and research discipline in the West along with other 
disciplines, and that this is, after all, a sign that religion is taken seriously. For Shirin the issue of 
democracy in Muslim majority societies is a matter of explaining or interpreting democracy in a 
way that it is not perceived to “threaten their religion” (Shirin134). That Shirin uses “their” may 
be a consequence of her viewing this as an outsider, perhaps situating herself in this position to 
construct a distance between herself and “them” in a multitude of different representations of 
                                                 
180 There is a difference between Latin and Arabic as religious languages. Latin was mainly the language of the 
educated and of the Church. Arabic in its various dialects, on the other hand, is the mother tongue of millions of 
people and has a different status as the language of the Koran and which the Islamic tradition considers to be a 
language revealed by God. 
181 In the Islamic tradition, the Koran in its original language has the status of revelation, whereas translations 
cannot fully represent the original Koran and are preferably called versions and not translations. 
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Islam that exist. It may also express a diasporic imagination, in which she is negotiating between 
different cultures and representations of Islam.182 
Shirin and Inger share a perception that people’s understanding of both religion and 
democracy can distinctively shape the environment and context for interpretations of religious 
canonical scriptures. What they do not address is what might happen with the skill of interpreting 
if religion is regarded as taboo in the public sphere and if the political idea of democracy is seen 
as a topic for religious interpretation. Aira addressed the question of the political and educational 
context as crucial to obtaining interpretative skills, as well as room to work with texts, as a 
practical and political matter. Shirin and Inger discuss biblical and koranic interpretation with 
regard to larger cultural, religious, and political discourses.  
 
Shirin137: I think it is at the same level as other sciences, and the way I see it, in modern 
times, there are lots of very positive things. Think about the revolution bringing 
all that information to the internet. Ok, somebody may misuse it, but think about 
all the good and free information researchers have the opportunity to provide, 
they can do research and then share it with humanity, lots of good things. But ok, 
someone does misuse them. But one can’t …. 
Shirin138: With religion, it’s like this. People need it. Even if someone misuses it, you have 
to talk about that and solve the problems and move on.  
 
Eva140: No, I think that religion is something completely different from research. I mean, 
you cannot do research to have religious faith. 
 
Shirin139: Not faith, but religion … I usually say: What is Islam? Is it a construction of 
thought, finished once and for all? Or something dynamic? I take a look at it, I do 
research on it, I think about it, I experience it. Which is it? 
 
There are two parallel discussions in this section, and they do not really meet. Shirin 
argues that religion needs to be open to the public (“on the internet,” Shirin137) for discussions 
on what religion is. Using the example of Islam, she asks: Is it fixed or negotiable (Shirin139)? 
Shirin states that the Islamic tradition is a “construction of thought.” This reveals her view of 
Islam as a dynamic tradition. Constructions can be reconstructed, as opposed to viewing 
something that is fixed. Shirin uses the notion “misuse” twice in the sequence (in Shirin137-
                                                 
182 See Chapter 2, p. 47, for an elaboration of the term “diasporic imagination” in this study in connection with 
Kwok Pui-Lan’s work on the term (Kwok 2005: 47). 
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138): about information in general and about religion. The misuse is not only mentioned as a 
possibility but also as deliberately acted out by “someone.” Shirin’s proposed way of dealing 
with the “misuse” is not to abandon religion; rather, openness and discussions are required to 
investigate the meaning and impact of religion. 
Eva’s concern is to establish a distinction between “religion and research” (Eva140). Her 
argument is that religious faith is not possible as a result of research. Shirin suggests a distinction 
between religion and faith and continues to highlight the importance on research on religion. Eva 
comments: 
 
Eva141: Well, but you are supposed to interpret Islam in your present, just like we need to 
interpret the Bible based on the present. We must do that, right? But that’s an 
interpretation, it’s not a science. 
 
Shirin140: It will be, as far as I can see. Not for us, but for the theologians. When you are 
supposed to think in different ways. Something is written, different elements 
enter into the picture, and it becomes science. Not the faith itself but how I 
experience the faith. 
 
Eva142: We think about this differently because you think that there are people who 
should interpret for you, in a way, these imams should interpret for you, research 
and so on.  
Eva143: But I look at this in the way that I read the Bible, and I read the gospels, and then 
I interpret them myself, based on who I am and the times I live in. Nobody stands 
between me and my interpretation. 
 
Shirin141: But this is for those who are able to do so. Think about most Christians. Perhaps 
they need someone to make them understand. You see? 
Shirin142: OK, in our religion, there is still a great need for that. 
Shirin143: Perhaps for you this has already happened. There are a lot of good books about 
those who were theologians, Christian theologians who do research in 
pedagogical institutions. And you call it science, theology. Perhaps you don’t 
need it, but we need it. 
Shirin144: And this hasn’t happened to us like that. What we have, is, excuse me, there was 
interpretation at the time of the Prophet Muhammad. But after that, it was fixed. 
Think about that. Some have worked on it but not enough … and lots of people 
stick to the interpretation that happened at that time. 
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Eva144: But this isn’t possible. 
 
Shirin145: This is our challenge. 
 
Eva145: But it isn’t possible. One cannot say “our interpretation is fixed.” Because we 
live in a different time, the words mean something different for us; it is a 
development. 
 
Shirin146: Yes, but for us …. 
 
Eva146:  That’s why it is a bluff to state that an interpretation is fixed, right? 
 
Shirin147: Yes, this is a challenge for us. We need to renew the interpretation .… we have to 
start now to work with sharia .… That is what we need to start working on. 
 
 
Shirin and Eva agree on the importance of reinterpreting the canonical scriptures in their 
respective traditions but disagree on how to reach a situation where this can take place. Their 
disagreement seems to emerge from their different analysis of the status quo and the role of 
scholarly skills in renewing interpretation. In addition, Eva claims that the role of the individual 
interpreter is generally limited in the Islamic tradition (Eva142). 
Eva states that the challenge for Christians and Muslims are the same, suggesting a 
common “we” (Eva141). The expression “your present” (Eva141), however, might suggest that 
Eva does not automatically see that Christians and Muslims share a common “present.” Splitting 
up the temporal notion “the present” like she does indicates a spatial division within the temporal 
framing of a “now.” The split may suggest that there are different challenges in different 
contexts: for instance, between the “now” in a Norwegian context and the “now” in a Pakistani 
or Iranian context. Or, the split could refer to Christian and Muslim contexts respectively within 
the Norwegian context. If her attempt is to create a general division of one “now” for Christians 
and another for Muslims, it may still represent a spatial division but in a more metaphorical way, 
as an establishment of two separate universes. I believe Eva is simply stating that she believes 
Christians and Muslims face different challenges in the “now,” not that they live in different 
“now’s.” 
Eva and Shirin agree on what Shirin has described as a “dynamic” way of looking at 
Islam (Shirin139), which Eva applies to the Christian tradition as well. They disagree, however, 
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on the role of academic knowledge in textual interpretation. Eva states: “Interpretation is not 
science” (Eva141), whereas Shirin claims that textual interpretation is part of science because it 
needs research, and she calls for this work to be done by “the theologians” (Shirin140). Keeping 
the distinction between faith and how faith is experienced, as she suggested earlier, she can 
exclude the dimension of “faith” from the sphere of research. If Shirin views faith as an 
individual, subjective experience, this distinction could imply that in theological research on a 
text she looks for community-oriented interpretations closely connected to knowledge 
represented by the tradition, contextualized in a skilled way. Shirin seems to be arguing for a 
view of religious knowledge and science as integrated into the Islamic knowledge system. That 
she belongs to Shia Islam, a branch of Islam where different religious scholars (like ayatollahs 
and marja’ al-taqlids, interpreters to be followed) form schools of followers and occupy an 
important position in the interpretation of tradition, may explain her statement on the need for 
religious leaders in the interpretation process (Waines 2003: 168-169). Whereas Aira focused 
earlier on the need for education for all in order to evaluate the textual interpretation done by 
Islamic leaders and the necessity to be able to read the Koran for oneself, Shirin addresses the 
need for access to religious knowledge through theologians (Shirin140), and asks Eva if 
Christian readers of the Bible do not need someone to provide knowledge for them as well 
(Shirin141).  
Eva’s suggestion that Shirin’s view is motivated by a need to lean on the interpretations 
and knowledge of others, seems like an indirect criticism of a lack of autonomy. Eva approaches 
the question of involving research and religious scholars in textual interpretation as a power 
struggle over the interpretative authority, Shirin emphasizes theologians and researchers as 
sources of knowledge to help the individual believer understand better.  
Eva’s own uncompromising autonomy in making meaning of biblical texts surfaces once 
again in the discussion (Eva143). She seems to view biblical interpretation as primarily an 
individual act and indicates a skeptical or even dismissive attitude toward “professional” 
interference in the freedom of the individual believer in this respect. She explains her own way 
of interpretation to be shaped by “who I am and the times I live in” (Eva143). This implies an 
individual approach to interpreting the texts, but since society and a broader context are part of 
both the construction of the interpreting “I” and the contextual reference “the times,” which 
probably has a spatial dimension as well, Eva’s interpretation is still related to a community. It is 
probably not that she wants to interpret the texts without relating to other people, society, or the 
church community. What Eva is insisting on is the right to claim her own interpretative 
authority. Eva used her theological skills when reflecting on 1 Timothy 2:8-15, skills she learned 
from someone else, based on research and scholarly work. In this discussion, however, she 
attributes no explicit value to her own achievement of historical and exegetical knowledge about 
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the Bible. What is at stake for Eva is not access to knowledge but confirmation of interpretative 
autonomy. 
Shirin’s comments suggest that she views the current interpretative situation for Muslims 
and Christians differently. Her reference to something that may have “happened” in the Christian 
tradition that “hasn’t happened to us like that” (Shirin143-144) remains unexplained. It seems to 
have something to do with Christian theology and interpretative turns in Bible studies such as the 
use of the historical-critical method (Henriksen 2006: 146-147), and other hermeneutical 
developments taking place in recent decades. Shirin describes an interpretative situation among 
Muslims where many stick to an interpretation of the tradition that emerged during the time of 
Muhammad (Shirin144). The reference is probably to the interpretation of the Koran, but it may 
include the interpretation of the entire sunna. According to Shirin, there is a need for 
knowledgeable people who can help people interpret the Koran and the tradition in line with the 
present situation (Shirin142 and 147). On this issue she agrees with Aira: knowledge of the 
tradition is not enough; skills to interpret it in ways compatible with current needs and 
contemporary contexts, and knowledge of how to bridge the gap between the “then” and the 
“now” are crucial.  
Shirin’s description of the different situations in the Christian tradition over against the 
Islamic interpretative tradition emerges as a general view of the historical development of 
religions in accordance with certain historical stages, and that Islam as a younger religion has not 
yet reached the same level of hermeneutical skills. This indicates that Shirin uses a kind of 
evolutionary theory of history to interpret the development of the religions. It would, however, 
be speculative to interpret her in this way, since she is eager to emphasize the fluidity and 
dynamic aspect of Islam. Shirin obviously finds it hard to believe, too, that most Christians do 
not need more knowledge about their own texts and how to make meaning of them. What Shirin 
does not address is the question of interpretative power connected to the position of being the 
knower, which is Eva’s concern.  
Eva objects to the way Shirin analyzes the Muslim interpretative situation and claims it is 
impossible to hold to results that are 1300 years old. This is based on how Eva understands the 
concept of interpretation. She rejects the possibility of any fixed interpretations, since the 
meaning of the words is different for people at different times (Eva145). The same texts have 
different readers who understand the words differently. Shirin does not, however, address the 
question of interpretation as a philosophical question at this time. Rather, she confronts the 
interpretational attitude of an alleged fixed interpretation. They speak from two different 
perspectives: Eva is speaking on the basis of her philosophical and theological view on 
interpretation and Shirin is speaking from a more praxis-oriented point of view.  
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Shirin states that the most urgent object of reinterpretation is the sharia.183 Why sharia 
and not the Koran? In Islam sharia and the Koran cannot necessarily be said to be two different 
entities. Sharia in the broad sense, as Shirin most probably uses the term, refers to the entire 
divine law, including all divine guidance for humans to live a good life according to God’s will 
(Waines 2003: 63). Shirin formulates the necessary work of finding new ways of interpretation 
in Islam as a challenge it is possible to meet. She articulates the need, and assumes an agency: In 
Shirin147 she includes herself in the “we” that has to assume the task of renewing the 
interpretation of Islamic tradition. 
 
Aira171: Yes. Yes, excuse me. Well, in reality it is not full stop in the interpretation. 
Because … if we look at Islam, there are many sects. All the sects have different 
interpretations. Shia interprets in one way; it differs from how Sunni Muslims 
interpret the same verse.  
Aira172: So, that is why we are here. … and within the same group or tradition, there are a 
lot of different interpretations, as well …. So it never stops. 
Aira173:  It hasn’t happened only once but in several places, and there are different 
interpretations. 
 
Shirin148: Do you mean Sunni and Shia Islam? 
 
Aira174: Yes, it is …. 
 
Shirin149:  Was that a kind of dynamic interpretation? My research does not show that it is. 
 
Aira175: What I mean is that interpretation is not finished. There are different 
interpretations. Why do we have different sects? 
 
Shirin150: That’s the way it’s always been. 
 
This is a rare occasion within the group discussions where the difference between Sunni 
and Shia Islam is explicitly stated. The main focus, however, is the total interpretative situation 
in the Islamic tradition. Aira states that the interpretative situation among Muslims is marked by 
pluralism (Aira171-173), not only because of the existence of Sunni and Shia Islam, but also 
                                                 
183 See my section on Ziba Mir-Husseini’s thinking on this in Chapter 2, where she emphasizes fiqh as the important 
locus for reinterpretation in the Islamic tradition, p. 75. 
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among Sunni Muslims.184 Shirin questions whether the mere existence of plurality is enough to 
grant a dynamic interpretation. Aira states that her point is that the activity of interpretation in 
Islam is not fixed but fluid, pluralistic, and ongoing (Aira172). There is no evaluation of this as 
positive or negative. Aira puts her statement in a descriptive way, simply stating it as a fact. Aira 
spoke earlier of the concept of ijtihad as dynamic interpretation required for responding 
adequately to the current need for reinterpretation (Aira22-23, p.136). Although she does not 
mention ijtihad in this section, when she did so earlier she articulated that independent thinking 
in the interpretation of sharia and fiqh (ijtihad) is necessary as an ongoing activity (p. 136).  
 
Aira176:  I think we are finished with the current cases. Is there anything else we should 
discuss? 
Aira177:  This has been very interesting to listen to, and these interpretations are the ones 
we use to subjugate women or to give them a respectable space to live a dignified 
life. It is our interpretations deciding this. 
Aira178: And I hope we can use our reason in the future, when we sit and listen to each 
other, and perhaps enrich each other’s mindsets.  
Aira179: This has been great, and I believe that we might not need another meeting for the 
same things if we cannot come up with new thoughts. 
 
Aira, in her concluding remarks as moderator, evaluates the making of the meaning of the 
texts as contextually relevant and acknowledges that the participants’ interpretations are 
significant. This might be interpreted as if she is saying that the group possesses interpretative 
authority; she is at least stating that the interpretations are decisive (Aira177) – even if the “we” 
in Aira177 may include the totality of both the Christian and the Muslim community worldwide. 
Interpretation is thus presented as a collective and possibly transreligious matter. It is not 
obvious however, that Aira is emphasizing the need for an interrelated, Christian-Muslim 
interpretation of the texts. Her main focus throughout this discussion was on how Muslims could 
be equipped to interpret and reinterpret their own tradition. 
Aira presents a choice to the “we” of the group, and possibly to a greater “we” as well: 
since the interpretation of the texts influences the life of women (Christian and Muslim, 
Aira177), the interpreting “we” decides whether this influence is constructive or destructive. This 
gives the texts – but first of all the interpreters – a crucial role in shaping the lives of women. 
Aira seems to refer to women in general, without emphasizing particular religious, cultural, or 
                                                 
184 An example of different interpretative traditions originating from the same geographical area within Sunni Islam 
is the barelwis and the deobandis. Both groups exist in Norway as well as in Pakistan (Vogt 2000: 23-27). 
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geographical locations. But obviously the importance of the textual interpretation is correlated to 
how influential the texts are in their respective contexts. It seems that, to Aira, the importance of 
the texts is more or less given. 
Aira179 may suggest that Aira was content with the meeting to such a degree that she 
doubted if another meeting about the same texts was required. Through this she both takes a 
position of authority, since another meeting was already scheduled, and shows perhaps an 
eagerness to be efficient in the sense that the meetings should have a clear aim. If the aim has 
been fulfilled, then it is time to move on. This remark, together with her expressed satisfaction 
with how the communication went when discussing the text (Aira179) indicates that Aira’s 
expectations for the discussion were met and her own most important points had been 
communicated. She suggests that the future meetings should be marked by listening and mutual 
enrichment in a similar way. An acknowledgement of a common “we,” and a possible shared 
agency, may be suggested by Aira in her concluding remarks.  
 
The Interpretative Situations in Present Contexts 
Both discussions in this meeting spend much more time on Sura 4:34 than on 1 Timothy 2:8-15. 
It is suggested by one of the Christian participants that present-day Muslims face the same 
challenges of interpretation as Christians have done in the past. Based on this view, all 
participants might share the feeling that a discussion of Sura 4:34 is much more urgent. 
 The interpretative situation among Muslims to which the Muslim participants related 
reaches beyond the Norwegian context. Their spatial dimension of textual interpretation includes 
contexts in Muslim majority countries as well as other European countries. A connection is 
drawn between social and political conditions having an impact on the possibility for the 
interpretation and reinterpretation of Islamic canonical texts and sharia. For Aira and Shirin, the 
necessary reinterpretation requires political stability and freedom as well as access to knowledge 
and skilled religious authorities. In this discussion, it seems that Norway – as a stable democracy 
– might be evaluated as a good place for reinterpretation and new making of meaning regarding 
the Islamic canonical scriptures. The vulnerable element in the Norwegian context, however, is 
probably the lack of access to knowledge about the Islamic tradition. 
Aira establishes the aim that all Muslims should have enough knowledge and skills to be 
their own interpretative authority. However ambitious this goal may seem, this is what both Aira 
and Shirin are displaying in these two discussions. They are able to relate to the text from Sura 
4:34 in a way they want all Muslims to be able to do. 
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What Kind of Knowledge is Needed? 
Knowledge is highlighted in discussion 2 as a necessary requirement for improving the skills of 
interpretation among Muslims. But there are other requirements for knowledge too, and there are 
some discussions about knowledge and religion. The discussion between Eva and Shirin 
addresses the role of knowledge in the interpretation of canonical scriptures. Whereas Shirin has 
confidence that more knowledge is important to the believers, Eva seems to doubt the value of 
knowledge and establishes a more existential interpretation of the texts as a practice of faith 
without particular knowledge. Knowledge is constructed by Eva as a possibly unwanted element 
in her making meaning of the biblical texts, potentially overruling her own experience and 
analysis of her context. The Muslim participants do not immediately share Eva’s hermeneutics of 
suspicion toward scholarly knowledge. However, they too, evaluate what kind of knowledge 
they believe is for their and other Muslims’ good. It should not fix the tradition but provide room 
for differences and for dynamics within the tradition. The knowledge requested by all, however, 
is required to relate to contextual needs. Beyond that, they may differ in what emphasis scholarly 
knowledge and theological research should have. Shirin’s question (Shirin141) does, however, 
ask the Christian participants in turn a question about representativeness after Inger asks Aira 
and Shirin about their representativeness. Perhaps they do not need that scholarly knowledge, but 
what about the needs of other Christians? Is it really only the individual making of meaning that 
matters in the Christian tradition, free from influence by scholars? 
 A tension regarding the role of textual interpreters and their religious identity between the 
participants may surface at this point. The Muslims’ need to interpret a canonical text and stay 
within the frames of the tradition appears to be different from that of the Christian participants. 
 The search for knowledge that again becomes visible in discussion 2 is displayed in the 
discussion itself. This is the Christian participants’ need to have access to the contextual 
knowledge of Aira and Shirin. While the Muslim participants primarily seek knowledge about 
how to establish a different interpretative situation for Sura 4:34, the Christian participants seek 
knowledge about Islam and Muslims. 
 
Toward a Shared Interpretative “We”? 
The participants all agree about the importance of being able to evaluate and interpret the Koran 
and the Bible respectively as individual believers and to have authority as readers, although for 
the Christian participants this authority seems to include autonomy whereas the Muslim 
participants engage more closely with their religious tradition. But is the meaning-making work 
done separately by Christians and Muslims in the group, or is the group starting to become an 
interpretative “we”?  
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Aira addresses a “we” in the group in her last comment, and she claims that this “we” 
could improve the living conditions for Christian and Muslim women if the attempts at making 
meaning in the group could be made available to others. She thus situates the “we” in a powerful 
interpretative position with a significant responsibility. Her horizon is contexts outside the group, 
and the common “we” she suggests seems to be constructed on a shared ethical analysis of the 
texts’ effects on their contexts: these texts should not be used to oppress women. This is Aira’s 
call for a shared agency. 
 
 
Discussion 3 Related to Sura 4:34 and 1 Timothy 2:8-15.  
Inger: “But women as wise as us ... need to get something said!” 
Two participants were present in the fifth meeting who did not take part in the first meeting on 
Sura 4:34 and 1 Timothy 2:8-15: Susanne and Maria, both Christians. Eva did not attend. Aira 
had suggested at the end of the former meeting that the process of making meaning of these texts 
was exhausted, asking if there was anything new to be added to what was already said. She did 
not get much response to her suggestion at the end of the fourth meeting. The fifth meeting, the 
second to discuss Sura 4:34 and 1 Timothy 2:8-15, was held as scheduled.185 The fifth meeting 
was the last meeting to discuss the canonical texts in the project. Inger functioned as morderator 
for the fifth meeting.  
Sura 4:34 and 1 Timothy 2:8-15 were read aloud to lead in to the discussion to be based 
on this text. This time Aira read the New Testament text, and Maria later read the text from the 
Koran. Thus, the practice so far in the group – that a Muslim read the text from the Islamic 
tradition, and a Christian read the text from the Christian tradition – was changed this final time. 
Inger suggested this and no one objected. 
At the previous fourth meeting, the comments were structured by the participants’ 
religious affinity: the Christian participants commenting on both texts first, followed by the 
Muslim participants doing the same. At this meeting, however, Inger suggested that the 
comments should be structured by the texts: All comments on one of the texts should be 
presented before the group moved on to the next. In this way, 1 Timothy 2:8-15 was more 
thoroughly discussed than at the former meeting. Both texts are, however, present throughout the 
discussion through references and cross-comments by the participants. 
 
Aira180: When I read it, a lot of it reminds me of similar rules or messages in the Koran. 
                                                 
185 See the chapter on method for the account on the participation and absence of the participants and how this 
might have influenced the process. 
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Aira181: Concerning the purity of the men before prayer, this is exactly like our ritual 
ablution. We wash our hands, our mouth, our face and feet before we pray five 
times a day. 
Aira182: So, it is almost the same – one is supposed to be totally clean before one can 
come before God. 
Aira183: And without anger and rage … that is a message in the Koran too that one should 
forgive others, and not lose one’s temper. 
Aira184: Concerning the women’s appearance, this is the same, too, that they should have 
… not be too provocative, and the message about wearing a hijab or decent 
clothes is something we regard as a koranic message.  
Aira185: And gold jewelry and pearls … that too is mentioned in the Koran, that we 
should not expose our adornments to people who are not very closely related to 
us.186 
Aira186: So, I view it very much this way that this is a message that is intended to create 
good relations, and distinguish women and men from their attraction for each 
other which may create problems in the long run. This goes for both women and 
men. 
Aira187: When it comes to “Let a woman learn in silence with full submission” and “I 
permit no woman to teach,” I feel that these verses are related to a specific 
situation .… it is possibly not a general message that women should keep silent 
…. 
Aira188: But when it comes to the restriction that women should not be teachers, I don’t 
understand it, for this is not consistent with the message of the Koran. 
Aira189: The Koran says that both men and women are obliged to learn how to teach. 
They should study the Koran themselves, and then lecture, share their insights 
with others. So this is a bit different from the message of the Koran.  
Aira190:  And the next thing here … many who translate the message so that men have 
“executive authority” would translate or interpret that verse as “she should have 
authority over the man.” As if it is the men who have complete authority.  
Aira191: So there are many similarities here, but they can also be a bit different.  
 
Aira states that she uses her knowledge and perception of koranic texts as her main 
reference for reflecting on and evaluating the New Testament text. This corresponds with her 
                                                 
186 Cf. Sura 24:31f. 
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way of commenting on this text in the former discussions. This time, however, she is more 
thorough. Being the one who read the text aloud might increase her engagement with the text.  
Her comments are structured mainly along similar patterns: First, she refers to the New 
Testament text, and then adds a comment that includes a reference and a comparison with what 
she views as a related message from the Koran. Verse 8 and 9 in 1 Timothy 2:8-15 take on 
meaning for Aira when she relates their immediate content to Islamic practice as expressed in the 
prescription to dress modestly and ritual ablution before prayers (wudu), (Aira181-186). Her 
conclusion is that the textual intention of introducing these regulations is to safeguard decency in 
male-female relations.  
Aira’s comments on the prohibition against women teaching are, however, far more 
critical in this second round of commenting than in former discussions. The denouncement of 
women teachers in 1 Timothy 2 is a prescription that, according to Aira, is not only different 
from the message of the Koran but directly opposes it, since, in her view, the Koran presents the 
task of religious education as compulsory for both men and women (Aira189). Aira distinguishes 
between what she perceives as general and specific messages in the textual meaning of 1 
Timothy 2 and suggests (as she did in the former discussion) that the prescription that women 
should be silent is a specific message to address a local problem. In this way she gives an 
interpretation similar to that given by Eva earlier, perhaps relating to Eva (Eva100, p. 237).  
In Aira190 Aira states that interpreters who prefer to understand the term qiwama in Sura 
4:34 as bestyrelsesautoritet or “executive authority,” and thus use the text to legitimize men’s 
authority over women in the Islamic tradition, would be of the same kind as those who interpret 
1 Timothy 2:8-15 as legitimizing men’s general authority over women in the Christian tradition. 
Aira thus establishes a direct connection between the two texts by what she perceives to be 
Christian and Muslim interpreters motivated by the same aim: to establish a gendered hierarchy 
of power with men in charge of women. Aira seems to suggest that the two texts carry the same 
interpretative challenges and indirectly suggests a hermeneutics of suspicion – not toward the 
text, but toward other interpreters and interpretations.  
Her statement in Aira190, i.e. “as if it is the men who have complete authority,” is a 
warning against the misuse of both texts. Whereas an obvious result of the misuse may be the 
subjugation and oppression of women, what Aira addresses here may be male interpreters aiming 
at possessing an authority that belongs to God only. Her way of putting it – “as if” the men had 
the “complete authority” – indicates that she regards men’s possession of authority to be limited 
because Aira regards God as the only instance having full authority. 
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Aira192: And concerning the part that “Adam was created first and then Eve, and he was 
not deceived, but the woman was deceived,” this message is different from the 
Koran too.  
Aira193: Because the Koran states clearly that they both lost the way of God because of 
Satan’s … what can you say…. 
 
Inger84: Temptation? 
 
Aira194: Temptation. Temptations, it says in the Koran, and that word means that they 
both were, what did you say … tempted by that Satan, and it wasn’t only that Eve 
did this and that she had … so that is different. 
Aira195: So that is not included, that it is only the child that saves her,187 it is really faith in 
God, love for God. 
Aira196: We have … there are two main things that we must have. 
Aira197:  That is, our obligations toward God, and our obligations toward fellow human 
beings. 
Aira198: If we have love for God, we must believe in him, and then we show love to 
humans too, and when we submit to God’s will, we are saved, and this has 
nothing to do with childbirth. 
 
The two different narratives of the Fall of Humankind in the group’s discussions, the 
koranic version and the version from Genesis to which 1 Timothy 2:8-15 refers, are addressed 
through pointing out the differences. The two differences Aira finds are, first, how the narrative 
of the Fall in 1 Timothy 2 is used to explain and legitimize the subjugation of women because of 
the women’s role in the Fall. In the corresponding narrative in the koranic tradition, both the man 
and the woman are equally responsible for what happened (Sura 7:19-25). The second difference 
concerns the statement in 1 Timothy 2:15 about women being saved through childbirth. Aira 
states that, in the Koran, what saves both men and women is faith in God, love for God and 
fellow humans, and submission to God. Aira made the same points in the former meeting, but 
she elaborates on them further in this section. 
Aira does not, however, evaluate the differences she identifies, nor does she criticize the 
biblical text. Rather than comparing or evaluating the challenges of the texts, she compares the 
challenges represented by some of the interpreters. She constructs a common “they” of Christian 
                                                 
187 Aira is most likely referring to childbirth, as in 1 Timothy 2:15. 
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and Muslim interpreters alike who interpret the texts in their respective tradition with the 
intention to legitimize, implement, and uphold the subjugation of women. 
 
Inger85:  Yes, it is Paul who says these things, not Jesus. And Paul was restricted by his 
time, place and history, Jesus wasn’t.  
Inger86: And the image of women and men sketched in this text is very traditional. 
Inger87: If you read the introduction, it is the man who is kind of behind it here, and the 
premise is that the man is active and aggressive, he must abandon his anger and 
stop fighting. 
Inger88: While the woman is passive and kind of … she is supposed to become even more 
passive according to how this text is formulated. 
Inger89: So I believe this is a text written two thousand years ago, when they still hadn’t 
grasped the resources, capacity, and possibilities of women. But as you say, it’s 
situational. 
Inger90: Yes. So it is provocative for a Norwegian woman of today. I don’t know if it is 
possible to find something uplifting here. 
Inger91: I could very well … I like to be guided in how to live simply and not vainly. But 
not in this context. It only makes me want to dress up! 
 (Laughter among the participants) 
 
Inger repeats some of the interpretative patterns from her contribution in the previous 
discussion on 1 Timothy 2:8-15: The distinction in authority between Jesus and Paul, and the 
historical, contextual view of women as formative for this text, which makes its message 
irrelevant in contemporary times. Inger remarks that 1 Timothy 2:8-15 both confirms and 
possibly strengthens what she views as traditional gender roles: men as active and aggressive, 
women as passive (Inger87-88). But in Inger’s portrayal of the gender roles, women are passive 
because they are forced to behave that way. Her portrayal of the gender roles thus includes an 
analysis of power and a critique of those power relations that would be the consequence of these 
roles. Inger suggests that a lack of knowledge about women’s capacities have shaped the 
traditional view of gender reflected in the text, a knowledge that is available in the present and 
thus should imply a new interpretation based on new knowledge. 
Inger emphasizes – again – her own feeling of being provoked by the text (Inger90-91). 
Even if this is a negative feeling, the provocation indicates engagement with the text, projecting 
meaning into it, subversive though it may be. Inger discusses intensively with the text, criticizing 
or morally enriching it. The text is activated as a text to which she relates differently from her 
first response (in the previous meeting) when she questioned the reason for reading the text at all. 
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From one perspective one may ask: Is this good or bad? In other words, is the project forcing 
Inger to relate to a text she believes should simply be put aside and forgotten about? 
 
Inger92: And I don’t mind the message here about [not being obsessed by your own 
appearance].188 But as I said, in this context it is a way of pushing women down 
and away, and keeping them quiet.  
Inger93: It is … one thing to gab, but … women as wise as us, we need to be able to get 
something said! 
Inger94: And then, in addition to … the man as active and aggressive, the woman as 
passive, then the woman is blamed for everything, through the fall of man. And 
this story is in the Koran, as well, the story of creation? 
 
Aira199: Yes, as I said, it is both similar and different, the woman is not blamed. It was 
Satan who tempted both, at the same time.  
 
Inger95: They played the same role.  
 
Aira200:  It was simultaneous, so one can’t blame the woman, implying that she was the 
trespasser and the man had only listened to her. So this is different from the 
Koran.  
 
Inger96: Then I prefer the Koran on this issue. And then, there is this getting saved 
through childbirth; that means, in pain you shall give birth to your children, this 
is a … we react to that. It can’t be right. Paul must have misunderstood. Faith, 
love, holiness – to live in decency, that’s all fine. But here it is linked to her 
behavior and not to the grace that will set us free. I think I’ll stop here. 
 
Inger interprets the prescription for women to dress modestly in 1 Timothy 2:9-10 by 
taking into account the other messages she finds in the text and claims that the prescriptions in 
question may be part of an aim to construct a system of female subjugation. In Inger’s eyes, to be 
made to dress in a particular way, in order to make one less visible emphasizes women’s role as 
silent, passive, and subjugated. 
 A distinction between different kinds of talking is introduced in this section (Inger93). 
Gabbing and the speech of “wise women” are distinguished as being two completely different 
                                                 
188 I have edited the discussion at this point to make it more concentrated, merging two of Inger’s statements. 
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modes of communication that could both be framed as “talking.” Inger does not express any 
support whatsoever for a general silencing of gabbing but rather states that “wise women like us” 
need to “get something said” (Inger93). Her self-identification on behalf of the group, including 
herself, in the category of “wise women,” shows both Inger’s self-confidence and her confidence 
in the other participants. She does not identify the presumed listeners to the talk of “wise 
women,” other than what is implied in identifying the agents as “wise,” which by itself may 
imply an expected audience as an act of sharing wisdom. A speech act is not fulfilled without 
listeners who perform the act of listening. The women in the group share their wisdom with one 
another, as both listeners and talkers. Inger claims that the roles of both listener and talker should 
be available to wise women generally, as a necessary resource. This perspective includes both 
fighting for access to speak at the same level as men, but her statement implies more than mere 
justice. Wisdom is always needed, thus the contributions of the specific women present in the 
group should be requested because of the quality of their insights and knowledge. 
This section shows that both Aira and Inger view the koranic version of the narrative of 
the Fall as more gender equal than the version in 1 Timothy. Aira insists that there are both 
similarities and differences between the two narratives (Aira199), whereas Inger addresses only 
the difference she finds to be most decisive and adds that she “prefers the Koran regarding this 
issue” (Inger96). How is this statement to be interpreted? What happens to an interaction 
between people from different religious traditions when they read and interpret interrelated 
stories and someone finds the “version” of the other tradition more attractive than the one in 
one’s own tradition? The traditional view would be that the contents of the canonical scriptures 
are enclosed within the specific tradition that has canonized the same scripture. When texts from 
different traditions are read in a multireligious context, however, the texts may merge in the 
minds of the readers. This happened occasionally in the discussions on the Hagar/Hajar 
narratives (cf. Discussion 2 Related to the Hagar/Hajar Narratives, p.162-178). So, what happens 
when the reader wants to edit the texts by mixing their contents and deleting what does not 
measure up in the reader’s comparative evaluation? Is it plausible to pick and choose? If a reader 
claims sovereign autonomy with respect to a text, the answer must be yes. The question would 
then be how to view the question of legitimization when doing this with respect to both one’s 
own religious community and the community that is the “owner” of the text. The question of 
whether canonical scriptures belong exclusively to the religious tradition from which they 
originate is touched upon here. As we can see from the above conversation, the texts cannot be 
controlled once they are accessible to all who want to read. 
 In any event, Inger finds inspiration through the Islamic version of the narrative of the 
Fall. Inger’s own criticism of 1 Timothy 2:8-15 regarding the text’s use of the story of the Fall of 
Humankind concurs with Islamic feminist criticism of the Christian tradition, as noted earlier 
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(Hassan 1987). Aira, however, does not bring up this particular criticism. Even if Inger is not 
able to “pick and choose” to the extent that she deliberately mixes the two traditions, she seems 
to experience the Islamic tradition as providing her with a way to deal with an element she 
perceives as unjust in her own canonical scripture. The crucial point may be how Inger regards 
the Islamic tradition in general: Is the Islamic tradition a legitimate source of support for her in 
the activity of making meaning of Christian canonical texts? Even if she does not fully include 
the Islamic narrative in making her own meaning, the knowledge that other versions of the 
narrative exist, even in another religious tradition, may provide a window giving a new view of 
one’s own text and open it up for critique. The Koran represents a resource in this respect, at 
least in this particular situation. 
 
Susanne42: Is it my turn? I thought about what you said about situational. Now, it’s really 
been a long time since I graduated from the program in Christian studies, but I 
think I remember that the congregation this text is addressed to experienced some 
problems. Isn’t that right, Anne Hege? That there was a problem with so called 
provocative women, or am I totally wrong? That it is written in a specific 
situation, not a general text. 
Susanne43: I at least heard this theory, that it was a problem because the message did not 
come across, and conflicts arose, and that the focus in this congregation was 
somewhere else than where it was supposed to be. And I believe that this is 
important background. 
Susanne44: And another thing… Paul isn’t really known to be very women-friendly, is he? 
Susanne45: I agree with you in that specification that it is Paul who is saying this, and that’s 
why I think one can interpret it differently. 
Susanne46: It is a text that has created an incredible amount of oppression; I am actually 
totally provoked by the whole text. 
Susanne47: It was interesting to listen to you, Aira, going through the text in that way and 
saying what is similar to and different from the content of the Koran. And to see 
how you read it, for instance, when you read that part about men who are 
supposed to lift clean hands …. 
Susanne48: I did not think about washing, ritual washing, I was thinking more of purity of 
the soul …. 
 
Aira201: Yes, I understand that, but in a way that is mental preparation. If you visit me and 
I wash myself, you don’t come to pray, but I wash my hands to prepare myself 
for the encounter.  
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Susanne49: I know. 
 
Aira202: It’s just like mental preparation, to be clean physically and mentally, and it 
doesn’t matter if one only washes one’s hands and forgets about the mental and 
spiritual aspect. To be at ease in your mind, and the head should be empty of bad 
deeds, that is an important part of it. But to wash your hands, or to clean oneself 
is an important preparation for presenting oneself to …. 
 
Susanne50: I know this is important in Islam, and that’s what I mean. It was interesting that 
you read that into it, because I didn’t read the same at all. I read “clean hands” in 
a more metaphorical way. 
 
Aira203: I see. 
 
Susanne51: It’s not only that you shouldn’t have killed someone, or … you should be clean in 
the sense of free from guilt, or …. 
 
Shirin151: You have that in our tradition as well; that’s what I thought about in the same 
way as you did, clean hands mean that when you are going to face God you 
should be careful about what you do. The washing itself … your actions …. 
 
Aira204: Not to kill anyone, not to harm anyone …. 
 
Shirin152: Clean hands are part of a symbolic language that… 
 
Susanne states that the text from 1 Timothy has caused oppression (Susanne5). This 
statement marks the text as significant and blames the text for being responsible for oppression. 
Clearly, when talking about the effects of a text, such as oppression, the readers and interpreters 
of the text are involved. Susanne’s focus, however, is only indirectly on them. She does not 
address the interpretative contexts, which are extratextual sources for legitimizing the 
subjugation of women. The reason may be that Susanne relates to an interpretation of the text as 
a message to a specific addressee, rather than a text with a universal message.  
She asks me for confirmation of the historical circumstances of the text. I just mention 
that I believe some researchers claim that this is the case, without going further into the issue. 
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Susanne seeks shared knowledge in making meaning, and the question posed directly to me 
reminds me that I am not in any way invisible in the discussion, even if I do not speak.189  
Susanne’s comments on Aira’s earlier contribution show a difference between them 
regarding their respective interpretation of cleanliness and purity. Whereas Aira immediately 
associates purity with actual washing, as in the Islamic ritual of wudu, Susanne interprets purity 
in a more abstract way, as purity of the mind, with no practical or ritual performance connected 
to it (Susanne48). Aira clarifies that the ritual ablution also means mental preparation (Aira202), 
and Shirin calls clean hands “part of a symbolic language” (Shirin152). In many ways this 
discussion is related to the discussion after Fouzia’s narratives when the group discussed their 
general views on the Bible and the Koran (Chapter 4). Susanne’s background as a Lutheran 
Christian may have equipped her with a framework of interpretation where the symbolic is the 
first preferred meaning, at least regarding religious rituals. The Protestant Lutheran spirituality in 
Norway has traditionally, particularly when influenced by pietism, focused on the individual’s 
inner life rather than on outward rituals and practices. We should recall how Eva evaluated 
rituals in that first discussion as “almost magic” and as representing religious behavior against 
which she warned Christians at that time (Eva3, p. 123).  
 
Susanne52: Another thing. It could well be that this interpretation was infused into the text 
when it was written. I don’t know anything about that. But at least as a reader 
today, I don’t read that into it. But besides that, I am just provoked, like you.  
Susanne53: And I agree with you, Inger, that it’s OK not to be provocative, but what does 
that mean? It’s something about the context. I get provoked if nice clothes and 
pearls are prohibited … but that one should be subordinate is also a point that is 
incredibly provoking to me.  
Susanne54: But if, of course, if one … if I am to understand it with a maximum of goodwill, I 
believe that it could mean that one should not rank oneself higher than another 
person on purpose, that one should submit in a way in the sense of adapting 
oneself so that everything runs smoothly for all parties but not to submit in a way 
that implies that one is not allowed to stand up for one’s own opinions or cannot 
fully be oneself. 
                                                 
189 To keep almost completely silent, as I did throughout the process, when the participants knew that I had both 
knowledge and opinions I could have made accessible to them may be regarded as a position of power bordering on 
the abuse of power. Still, it remains necessary for me to be sparing in my contributions. The way I had organized the 
establishment of the empirical material meant that the focus would be on their making meaning, not mixed up with 
mine. See Chapter 3 p. 110-112 for discussions of these issues.  
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Susanne55: Then I think about human relations. A human relation where one should always 
give oneself up … but …. 
 
What is Susanne’s reason for starting a second interpretative round with the text and 
introducing “the maximum of goodwill” (Susanne54)? She does not state any explicit purpose, 
but she might be aiming at harmonizing the text’s interpreted message with a set of values with 
which she can identify, i.e. values that are more consistent with her own perception of the 
Christian tradition. Susanne’s hermeneutical positioning to read “with a maximum of goodwill” 
consists of transforming the message of female subjugation, which generates a gendered 
hierarchy into a message of mutual submission in human relations regardless of gender, as an 
exercise of piety for both men and women (Susanne54). Susanne55 offers an existential ethical 
argument for this mutuality, in addition to the more practical argument in Susanne54 that mutual 
submission would minimize frictions in human relations. The limit of mutual subjugation for 
Susanne is when “one is not allowed to stand for one’s own opinions or cannot fully be oneself.” 
Susanne sees a tension between “being oneself” and being subjugated to another person, even if 
such “subjugation” is mutual and disconnected from gender.  
In Susanne’s reasoning, there may be traces of the earlier discussions on qiwama in 
connection with Sura 4:34 as a concept of mutual support between men and women where the 
stronger party has the greater responsibility. Susanne is, however, more concerned with the 
individual’s space for executing her/his autonomy and authenticity.  
 
Inger97: Then this should be advice for both men and women. But here it is a distribution 
of roles. Because here it is only the woman, and it’s the woman who becomes the 
great sinner, both originally and further on.  
Inger98: It’s the responsibility of women to take care of the decency. Because if the 
woman doesn’t, the man can’t be decent either. And this is kind of provocative to 
me. And the part that women will be saved through childbirth … that has created 
a lot of suffering throughout history. 
Inger99: This makes me think about … when you hear about rape cases in the media, it’s 
often like they say that the woman wanted it to happen or she was part of it or 
tempted the man somehow, so this is a classic way of placing the responsibility 
even for the abuse on her. She gets the responsibility and the blame, almost like 
she invited it to happen. This text invites us in a way to that kind of thinking. 
 
Still interpreting with gender equality as her hermeneutical moral axiom, Inger concludes 
that the advice of subjugation should be addressed to both men and women – as Susanne 
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suggested when reading the text with a “maximum of goodwill” (Inger97). Returning to 1 
Timothy 2:8-15 without Susanne’s goodwill, however, Inger states that this is not the case. Inger 
accuses the text of making the woman the “great sinner” through the construction of the past in 
the text (the textual interpretation of the biblical narrative of the Fall, the second version) and 
that the construction of the present in the text is a continuation of this construction of the past 
(Inger97).  
Inger notes that the text makes women responsible for the decency of both men and 
women. Inger thus claims that 1 Timothy 2:8-15 provides the possibility of constructing a 
position for abused women as doubly victimized: first as a victim and then as the one to blame 
for her own victimization. 
 
Susanne56: And about what you said that you did not understand it … the part “I permit no 
woman to teach,” I read that into the context of educating the congregation. 
 
Aira205: OK.  
 
Susanne57: Not necessarily to her children, or… but that she should not be like …. 
 
Aira206: Like an imam perhaps? 
 
Susanne58: Like an imam. That is what I read into the sentence. 
 
Aira207: OK. 
 
Could the restriction on women teaching in 1 Timothy be compared to the restriction of 
women not being permitted to become imams in the Islamic tradition? Susanne suggests this 
comparison in an attempt to explain to Aira the possible meaning of prohibition in 1 Timothy 
against women as teachers. Earlier, Aira stated that teaching was compulsory for all adults in 
Islam (Aira189). Susanne does not understand 1 Timothy 2:12 against prohibiting women from 
teaching children, suggesting that the position of a teacher in a religious community may thus be 
open to women in this text, whereas a position as a religious authority, “as an imam,” is not 
accessible. Susanne probably knows that Islamic theologians in general do not allow female 
imams to lead prayers for both men and women.190 Susanne may be attempting to close a 
perceived gap between the message in the New Testament text as it has come across so far and 
                                                 
190 According to Islamic tradition, women may lead prayers (function like an imam) for other women. 
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Islamic religious practice on the issue of accessible roles for women. She does so by using an 
example from the Islamic tradition to explain the New Testament text. The interaction between 
Susanne and Aira in this sequence is marked by confidence and a joint attempt to find out what 
the meaning of this text might be. Susanne may have an additional motivation for trying to make 
the Christian canonical scripture not stand out in too negative a way compared to the 
representation of the Islamic tradition in the group and in relation to her own axiomatic value of 
gender equality.  
 
Shirin153: What they say, how one should behave, was probably consistent with those 
times. That the woman did not have the possibility of developing the way we see 
today. 
Shirin154: This is what I think. We know that the men … in all societies we know of 
throughout history, we had … interpreted how society worked. And our religious 
customs could not be outside of what people could understand and relate to. 
Shirin155: But today, to us it is a totally foreign approach when we … some women … how 
far we have come. 
Shirin156: But I will say something that you will perhaps dislike. I think that for instance, 
women, if they are going to work, should not get all the attention. 
Shirin157: I don’t believe that one has to wear a hijab in Norway … I mean, the Muslims. 
But to wear something that make others focus on something else than her 
substance and what she is thinking, for instance, her hair, I personally don’t like 
that. 
Shirin158:  I believe that I come to my work to do a job, and the attention should be for the 
work one is doing, not one’s appearance.  
Shirin159: I am not saying that one should not be nice and clean or that one should not look 
good; everyone likes to look good.  
Shirin160: Every society has its limits. But I do criticize the West, personally, because I 
believe they have gone very far in their demand that everyone should be very 
beautiful and look very good all the time.  
Shirin161: I don’t like that. I believe it is very tiring and very demanding, and diverting. 
And when you think about what kind of mental problems this kind of mindset 
creates … I don’t like that. 
Shirin162: Then I think it’s good that one shouldn’t be vain, or tempting, when you are 
about to work for society. 
Shirin163: But in private, yes. At parties and other private places, it’s OK.  
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Here Shirin does something no one has done so far in the discussions: She uses the text 
from 1 Timothy 2: 8-15 constructively, to establish a criticism of what she perceives to be an 
enormous, destructive pressure on people’s appearance in the West. She claims that both men 
and women are under pressure to look good on all occasions, and that this pressure is so great 
that it creates mental problems. Even if she does not believe that Muslim women ought to wear 
the hijab, she finds that wearing the hijab may be a way of focusing on other things than one’s 
appearance. She introduces a distinction between public and private space for dressing up: it is 
acceptable to dress up in a private space (Shirin163). A dichotomy of the public versus the 
private sphere has not been addressed much in the discussions so far, unless in the one on 
secretiveness at the former meeting where the distinction between public and private was seen as 
problematic when the question was one of keeping problems and abuse in the family private. In 
this section Shirin suggests one practice in private for women’s dress, and another in public. She 
uses the text from 1 Timothy 2 to argue that wearing the hijab may have some advantages, and to 
criticize the contemporary focus on appearances – the latter located in the West. She shares her 
reasoning that 1 Timothy 2: 8-15 may be interpreted in a way to support wearing a hijab. Shirin 
thus moves to a reading position of the New Testament text that implies a closer interaction 
through using it in making meaning of an intra-Islamic reasoning on the use of hijab. Hedging 
her remarks, she seems aware that some may react to this way of using the text (Shirin156). 
However, Shirin also seems to be inspired by the interpretations of 1 Timothy offered by Inger 
and Susanne when she takes modesty to include both men and women, thus implementing 
gender equality in her moral enrichment of the New Testament text. The question of ownership 
of the text and the right to interpret the text here appears from a different angle: Whereas the 
Christian participants react to gender-divisive restrictions on dress in 1 Timothy 2:8-15 and 
claim that it may be motivated by making women invisible, Shirin uses it as a useful correction 
of excessive focus on appearance. 
 
Shirin164: One should be like you, like Inger. Not dress up too much .... 
Shirin165: If one can interpret it like this, I agree, but the other verses about women not 
being allowed to teach, or submit to the man, that depends on …. Today this is 
unthinkable. 
Shirin166: Some places, for instance in my country, perhaps in her country, it is like this, 
but everyone knows this is wrong, and it has to change. It is a negative culture, 
we all know that today. 
Shirin167: And the other things you interpreted, I agree. 
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Shirin presents her Christian co-participant Inger as an example for others through her 
appearance (Shirin164). The acknowledgement of Inger crosses cultural and religious lines, and 
this may be a point for Shirin, showing that she does not discriminate when applying her own 
evaluation of proper appearance.  
Shirin then talks about “my country” (Shirin166), and it is quite obvious that she is 
referring to Iran and not to Norway. She uses Iran as a negative example of a society where 
women are forced to depend on their husbands and male relatives (Shirin166). The situation she 
knows in Iran is thus used as an example of an implementation of the gendered hierarchy 
represented by an immediate reading of 1 Timothy 2:8-15 in a social setting. Through this 
meaning-making move, Shirin introduces a spatial dimension to oppressive situations for 
women, but she criticizes it using a temporal distinction: “Today this is unthinkable”. 
(Shirin165). The expression “unthinkable” is not spatially situated. It is unlikely that she is 
referring to Iran, however, due to the way she just described her country of origin. It may 
however, be a description of Norway or the West.  
In Shirin166 she claims that the subjugation of women is something “everyone knows … 
is wrong.” It seems that she fuses time and space in this statement: everyone, everywhere, knows 
that this is wrong. If “everyone knows this is wrong,” why is it still going on? Shirin does not say 
anything about why, apart from it being caused by a negative culture. The culture, not religion, is 
viewed as supplying the negative causes. Shirin does not suggest any action or way out at this 
point nor does she construct a space for her own agency. However, she does claim: everyone 
knows this must change.  
 
Maria36: I think this is a difficult text. I don’t really know what we should think. Because 
when I read it, I didn’t understand all of it. Perhaps there was some meaning 
behind …. 
Maria37: But what I think is that this does not fit in with today’s society. 
Maria38: There are many kinds of women’s wisdom, but it has nothing to do with the way 
they are dressed; it has to do with personality and what is on the inside. That’s 
what’s important. 
Maria39: Of course, there are many things to talk about, but now I have become old, so …. 
(Laughter among the participants) 
 
Maria’s first reaction to 1 Timothy 2:8-15 is that it is “difficult” (Maria36), and this 
makes her try to find “some meaning behind” it. The text thus seems to provide her with 
subversive stimuli, making her try harder to wrench a meaning from the text. The first difficult 
encounter with the text does not make her turn away – rather, it initiates a further interpretative 
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effort. Maria includes a “we” in her reflections on what to think about the text in 1 Timothy, 
possibly including the entire group or perhaps only the Christian participants. It could also be 
meant to be an inviting “we,” open to any of the participants who want to include themselves.  
Maria’s evaluation of the text in Maria37 suggests that the text does not “fit in” with 
“today’s society,” without elaborating on which society she is thinking of. Most likely she is 
thinking of present Norwegian or “Western” society and not the context of her East African 
origin on which she had reflected earlier when making meaning of the Hagar/Hajar stories and 
claimed that the situation for women today was not far removed from the reality presented in the 
Hagar/Hajar narratives. She may well find the text of 1 Timothy unfit in any society, if her 
statement is taken as normative rather than descriptive.  
Maria38 addresses the relation, or rather the lack of it, she finds between women’s 
appearance and wisdom. Emphasizing the plurality of women’s wisdom, she is possibly linking 
up with Inger’s earlier statement when identifying the group as “wise women.” Maria insists that 
personality and looks are separate matters and that only the first is of real significance. Maria 
seems to join the others who have already stated that the text from 1 Timothy is to be regarded as 
outdated and misplaced in the here and now. She tacitly opposes, however, Shirin’s arguments 
on modest appearance, and claims this to be irrelevant (without openly criticizing Shirin). 
Maria’s reaction to 1 Timothy 2:8-15 as being outdated and out of place is as assertive as 
her earlier claim that the Hagar/Hajar stories could have been written “today.” Why this change 
of interpretative position? It is possible that it is connected to a difference between a narrative 
text compared to a prescriptive text. A narrative text is not necessarily interpreted as normative 
and can be received as a story with which one can identify or listen to. It does not make claims 
on the reader’s way of life directly but could provide space to co-reflect and co-narrate. A 
prescriptive text may force the reader to take a stance regarding its content and perhaps invite the 
reader to share primarily confessions rather than narratives.191  
 
Shirin168: You’re not old.  
 
Maria40: I don’t like to judge people based on what I see immediately. I need to get to 
know that person in order to say something. 
Maria41: Because if you see people dressed in this or that way, you label them, and 
perhaps he or she turned out to be a completely different person than what you 
first thought.  
                                                 
191 See Chapter 2 for elaborations on the interpretation of narratives versus making meaning of prescriptive texts, p. 
48-50. 
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Maria42: And I believe that in societies where … in Africa, for instance, to take that as an 
example, women dress almost completely the same way. We all use the same 
kind of material, so they look very similar in their dress. But they are still very 
different from each other. 
Maria43: And some are good people, some are bad people, even if they are all fully 
dressed and they hardly wear perfume or makeup or anything. That is not what 
makes them good or bad. 
 
Maria elaborates on her earlier point of dissolving any connection between a woman’s 
appearance and her qualities as a person. Using her experience from Africa as a reference, she 
explains that even if women usually dress in very similar ways, this does not mean that they are 
similar in other ways. Even if a woman dresses in a pious way, it says nothing about her other 
qualities, or if she is pious in other ways too. Maria highlights the existence of plurality and 
individuality in spite of an alleged similar appearance among African women. The meaning of 
dress as an identity marker is thus questioned altogether.  
 
Maria44: So, I think this is a typical Old Testament … where women should stay in their 
place and the men in theirs, and women should be subjugated to men. 
Maria45: But I am not … I think everyone should participate in an equal way. Of course, 
everyone has their own task, but it doesn’t matter to me if men do it better, or if 
women do it better than men, or the other way around. 
 
Maria’s placing of the text from 1 Timothy in the Old Testament in Maria44 indicates 
that Maria finds the gender models and roles of this New Testament text (and perhaps its content 
in general) to be typical for that part of the Bible. What is behind this if one reads it as a 
hermeneutical statement? Does it represent an interpretative move for understanding the text or 
is it a way of dismissing the text and relocating it in a scriptural hierarchy in the Christian 
tradition, as less significant than a text from the New Testament? Later on it becomes clear that 
Maria believes that the text from 1 Timothy is actually an Old Testament text (Maria59, p. 333). 
Still, her “mistake” provides an interesting hermeneutical observation: It opens the way for 
questioning the distinction between the Old and the New Testament as a hermeneutical tool. The 
Christian participants have used this distinction as a hermeneutical tool in their meaning making. 
The question is if the terms “Old Testament” and “New Testament” function primarily as 
markers for what is seen to be acceptable and/or unacceptable textual messages, not necessarily 
referring to a textual location in the Bible. In the discussions about the Hagar/Hajar narratives, 
Maria stated that the temporal gap was not significant, quite the contrary (Maria8, p. 154). This 
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supports the view that distinguishing between the Old and New Testaments is not a matter of 
temporality or chronology but of content. What is judged to be out of place in contemporary 
society, mostly with open or tacit spatial reference to Norway or the West, may be stamped “Old 
Testament” and left behind. In the Christian tradition, the Christ event is the hermeneutical 
center, and thus the New Testament generally has greater authority than the Old Testament. But 
what if the texts from the New Testament represent a challenge to the participants in how they 
view consistency in the Christian tradition when they state that human equality (including gender 
equality) is part of Jesus’ message?  
Maria’s statement in Maria44 clearly shows that the distinction between the Old and New 
Testaments as a hermeneutical approach does not solve every problem. Inger and Eva suggest a 
distinction between the alleged sayings of Jesus and narratives about Jesus on the one hand, and 
Pauline texts on the other. But contextual challenges and contemporary discourses on gender 
equality and feminism seem to form the ethical basis of evaluation, providing a strong frame of 
reference for their hermeneutics, as well as criteria for evaluation of the texts.  
In Maria45 Maria reveals how she evaluates a gendered role structure: the roles in 
question should be occupied by those most skilled, regardless of gender. This fits well with 
Maria’s earlier focus on personality and “inner” qualities rather than people’s appearance and 
dress. Perhaps Maria regards gender as a category close to her view of different ways of 
dressing: The differences marked by appearance, including dress, and gender are not significant, 
when evaluating people’s qualities and skills.  
 
Inger100: This text would be very different if it was addressing … if both women and men 
were addressed at the same time.  
Inger101: And then, today, young men dress up with gold jewelry and have their hair 
standing straight up … and they are just as vain as women. 
Inger102: But I think what you say is interesting and important, this pressure on 
appearance, and. actually, behind that is sexuality and how we express that. 
Inger103: And it is natural to express it and natural to communicate it, in a way, not locking 
it completely up, but this is taking off totally in the West. I agree with that. 
Inger104: Kids sit and watch TV-programs about, what’s it called … total makeover …. 
 
Shirin169: It is tiresome. 
 
Inger105: Yes. 
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Shirin170: Think about it, this is not creating equality.… These verses from both the Bible 
and the Koran are very oppressive; they are used to oppress women. 
Shirin171: It is men who interpret them, again and again, and then they don’t realize it when 
they read them … that decent behavior is for both for men and women.  
Shirin172: So, if we don’t take this up, and, generally speaking, both texts from the Bible 
and the Koran have been used to oppress women, then it is really dangerous. 
Shirin173: And I am sure of this, just think about the fact that they beat women because of 
this koranic text that says … what does it say? That … if the woman doesn’t 
obey the man she will be scourged. 
 
Inger repeats her claim for gender equality in the text, stating that if the behavioral 
prescriptions were addressed to both genders, it would have changed her view of the text. Her 
problem with 1 Timothy 2:8-15 is the gendered distribution of advice, commandments – and, as 
she has stated elsewhere, that the blame and responsibility as explained in the text is laid on 
women alone. She comments that “men are just as vain as women,” as an argument that men 
need to be admonished about dress just as much as women. Inger is the one who introduces the 
appearance of contemporary men into the text.  
Shirin provides a type of conclusion about how to relate to both Sura 4:34 and 1 Timothy 
2:8-15. The texts must be confronted and interpreted, because they represent a potential danger 
to women (Shirin170, 172). Shirin is going beyond the mere supposition of danger when she 
states that, to her knowledge, some men beat women because of Sura 4:34 (Shirin173). 
Shirin converts the danger she claims the texts represent into a responsibility for the 
interpreters. She states that the real problem is that the male interpreters do not really see the 
texts or realize their true content. Shirin openly holds these men responsible when the texts are 
used to oppress women.  
What is it that Shirin claims that the interpreting men do not see? The question is if the 
alleged blindness concerns the texts themselves, the influence of the texts on women’s situations 
in various contexts, or not seeing their own role as interpreters as a collective lack of self-
reflexivity. What Shirin mentions, is that they do not see that the texts makes demands on men as 
well as on women (Shirin171). Shirin seems to address both Christian and Muslim men in 
general, claiming that they have failed to meet their responsibility. This is the same accusation 
Aira brought up earlier concerning interpreting men who had not done their job properly, by not 
going into depth in their interpretation of Sura 4:34.  
Shirin suggests that “we” – meaning the “we” of the participants, the “we” of women, or 
the “we” of people with a similar view of interpretation – are obliged to assume the task of 
reinterpreting these texts in order to avert a dangerous situation. The specific task is to work 
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against a use of the texts that promotes the oppression of women. Shirin thus formulates an 
agenda and constructs a collective agency in which she includes herself. People who see should 
interpret the texts.  
Shirin’s explanation of the capacity to see seems to be the ability recognize obligations in 
the text addressed to both gender, and to be aware of the destructive use of the texts to legitimize 
oppression and violence against women. It may be that the skills and intention to see the texts 
and the context matters more to Shirin than the gender of the interpreter. 
 
 
Muslim-Christian Hermeneutics in the Making? 
In this discussion, the participants engage more directly with the text from the other tradition 
than their own. Different positions emerge where the text of “the other” moves from the position 
of being part of the other’s context to becoming a text to which the participants relates jointly as 
“the other.” Shirin, for instance, finds that 1 Timothy 2:8-15 provides an ethical reasoning for 
counteracting what she believes is an extreme pressure on appearance in the West. Inger declares 
that she prefers the koranic version of the Fall of Humankind, as presented by Aira, to the 
version presented in 1 Timothy 2:8-15. Aira keeps evaluating 1 Timothy on the basis of koranic 
texts and Islamic religious practices and compares the prescription of ritual ablution in 1 
Timothy to the practice of wudu.  
 All these examples illustrate that the participants are now starting to include the canonical 
scriptures of the other tradition into their own meaning making of texts and contexts. What 
remain relatively stable are the positions as reading subjects that the participants have already 
established for themselves. These positions influence the way they relate to the text of the other, 
however. Aira’s position as a reader of 1 Timothy is marked both by her own positioning as a 
reader and her inclusion of the Bible as a text she respects highly, but she does this in accordance 
with Islamic interpretative tradition on biblical material, she relates to the Bible as a scripture 
that should be corrected by Islam.  
 The participants relate more actively to the texts from the other tradition than earlier in 
the process. But what does this imply? Does it mean that the text of the other is regarded as a 
religiously authoritative text in the participant’s meaning making? Or does it reflect a broadening 
of the participants’ meaning-making horizon, the texts representing a resource through 
addressing relevant questions, providing alternative perspectives on parts of one’s own tradition? 
There are no signs that the Koran has become an authoritative text in any way for the Christian 
participants, but, on the other hand, most of them have claimed that the biblical texts are not 
necessarily authoritative for them, either. The Bible is most probably situated in the same 
position for the Muslim participants as before. I suggest that the new attitude appearing in the 
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group toward the texts of the other follows the earlier shift of how the Christian participants 
seemed to change their view of their Muslim co-participants. The texts of the other have shifted 
from representing difference to providing resources. This move accommodates a new encounter 
where the texts may be allowed to meet and merge as problematic and resourceful texts in the 
readers’ minds. 
 
Reading with a Maximum of Goodwill 
Susanne uses this expression, introducing a hermeneutics of goodwill toward the text in 1 
Timothy 2:8-15. The attempt to rescue the biblical texts is represented in parts of Christian 
feminist theology, particularly in its first decades (Stenström 2009: 137). Susanne is the first 
Christian participant who applies an alternative interpretation of this text, morally enriched by 
her own ethical perspective. Mutual subordination between man and woman is what she suggests 
may be the message of the text in the present. But even this reading is problematic for her: 
submitting one’s self could threaten the autonomy of the self. This interpretation has, however, 
brought a new element into the process of making meaning. Susanne is also the first of the 
Christian participants to claim that 1 Timothy 2:8-15 represents a challenge in the present. This 
may be related to her efforts at finding an alternative interpretation. 
  
Gender and Gendered Hermeneutics 
The Christian participants hold on to their ethical principle of gender equality as a cornerstone in 
making meaning of 1 Timothy and use this principle to assess the text – in many ways similar to 
how Aira uses the koranic base to evaluate the same text. The Christian participants’ reasoning is 
based partly on a view of the message of Jesus as promoting human equality and partly on 
gender equality as a social norm in Norwegian society. In this way, the comparison between 
Aira’s use of the Koran and the Christian participants’ use of Jesus makes it clear that these are 
the fundamentals for how they, respectively, make meaning. 
 The views of gender roles represented in the group become more articulated in discussion 
3. To some extent, this emerges from the discussions on how the text of 1 Timothy represents the 
narrative of the Fall of Humankind in Genesis, which blames women in general for the Fall. 
Together with what Inger feels to be prescribed gender roles in 1 Timothy, passive and invisible 
for women and aggressive and dominant for men, she criticizes the New Testament text for 
reflecting an unacceptable, provocative, and completely outdated view of gender. The 
constructive view of gender roles emerges from this background: men and women should have 
space to speak their wisdom, without being judged by their appearance, and being able to 
participate equally. The point about equal participation is restricted only in the question of 
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female imams (for gender-mixed audiences). Otherwise, it seems that the participants share a 
concern about sharing both power and possibilities equally between women and men.  
 The reflections concerning the different versions of the narrative of the Fall of 
Humankind has other implications for making meaning than those mentioned above. To put the 
blame on the woman when she is victimized by rape is recognized as something that happens in 
the present, and Inger states that this is an act of injustice toward women that some 
interpretations of 1 Timothy 2:8-15 may legitimize. The critique Inger constructs toward the use 
of the Genesis narrative in 1 Timothy is equivalent to a criticism Muslim feminists have raised 
about the Christian tradition: that the interpretation of this narrative in the Christian tradition 
represents a legitimization of female oppression that does not exist in Islam in the same way 
because the version of the narrative of the Fall is different (Sura 7:19-25). Aira may know about 
this criticism, but she does not articulate it. She only points to the differences between the 
narratives. 
 Aira’s critique of men who believe that they have authority may be interpreted as 
accusing these men of acquiring an authority that does not belong to them. This may be a 
statement that follows up her elaboration of qiwama. But if she is saying that these men try to 
obtain an authority that only belongs to God, this comes close to Amina Wadud’s statement 
about patriarchy as shirk (Wadud 2009: 102). 
 Shirin articulates a possible gendered hermeneutics, ending in a call for a shared agency, 
as Aira did in the former discussion. For Shirin, the crucial point is that the act of interpreting is 
to see. Accusing men who have the authority to interpret the texts of blindness, more precisely 
addressed to men who do not interpret Sura 4:34 as making demands on both men and women, 
she declares: “If we don’t take this up, and generally speaking both texts from the Bible and the 
Koran have been used to oppress women, then it is really dangerous.” 
 
 
Discussion 4 Related to Sura 4:34 and 1 Timothy 2:8-15.  
Shirin: “But think about it. This is much better than what happens in 
real life”  
Getting close to the end of their conversations about the texts of Sura 4:34 and 1 Timothy 2:8-15, 
the participants mostly repeat or elaborate on their earlier reflections and interpretations of texts, 
contexts, and agency. Some of the elaborations on earlier points include very concrete 
suggestions or descriptions, so it is significant to include them in the material, although they do 
not bring in new interpretative aspects of text, context, and agency as such. The hermeneutical 
circle has now changed into a spiral, where the same turns are taken, but at a different level of 
understanding, which in this group moves in the direction of the concrete.  
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Maria46: I think this text, too, is very difficult. I did not understand everything, but I think 
they say almost the same thing, that a wife should obey her husband.  
Maria47: But there is something in it … when it says that women should obey, and guard 
the secret …. What could that mean? What is that? I thought that it could be 
something about the woman taking care of what is … to bring about … then it 
was a small positive sign, wasn’t it, that we should protect … and that God wants 
it protected …. 
Maria48: But this is only my interpretation, because I want to find something positive, and 
I found it so negative.  
 (Laughter among the participants) 
   
When comparing Sura 4:34 and 1 Timothy 2:8-15, Maria’s immediate reaction is that the 
texts are difficult to understand – and that they prescribe female subordination in marriage. 
Maria’s difficulty with the text is not explicated further. Does she mean that the texts are difficult 
to understand as texts? Or does Maria find the message she perceives from the texts, although 
clear concerning their content, difficult to understand as biblical and koranic messages consistent 
with the Christian and Islamic traditions? Both aspects of difficulty could be represented in her 
statement.  
Maria makes an interpretative turn not unlike that of Susanne earlier when she chose a 
temporal hermeneutical stance, understanding with “the maximum of goodwill” (Susanne54, p. 
302). Maria wants to look for something “positive” in the text from Sura 4:34. The reason she 
gives is that she found the text “so negative” in the first place (Maria48). So, rather than 
elaborating on what she finds negative, she attempts to search for positive signs, perhaps to be 
able to make meaning of the text, despite what she finds to be difficult. She does not really 
explain her motivation for this hermeneutical strategy, nor what she defines as positive. Perhaps 
she wants to make an attempt to rescue women through rescuing the texts, if she is able to 
interpret the texts as supportive of women in some way or another. Or she may wish to make an 
attempt at saving her own relationship with the text as part of the canonical scripture in the 
Islamic tradition.  
When Maria states that she wants to look for something positive in the texts, everyone 
laughs. The laugher seems to follow the earlier pattern: the collective laughter seems to be 
usually following a saying when the texts are being criticized or commented upon in an 
unpredictable manner. Is it the remark about searching for the positive in the text that causes the 
laughter because the statement is unexpected? 
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Maria ends up identifying one element in the text which she claims may be positive, 
namely the passage about secretiveness. Her suggestion is that the prescribed restriction implies 
that whatever is meant to be kept secretive, is something valuable, something in need of 
protection. The notion of “protection” gives her associations that something valuable could 
allegedly be trusted to women’s protection. This would imply an acknowledgement of women. 
Maria did not attend the former meeting when the same texts were discussed, so she missed the 
earlier elaboration of the term secretiveness in Sura 4:34 by Shirin and Aira. Shirin comments 
further on secretiveness in Sura 4: 34: 
 
Shirin174: About the secretive: I checked it out a little bit, and I found that, if there is a need 
for professional help, what then? Then one should seek professional help.  
Shirin175: But to go out and talk about private things … to respect …. 
Shirin176: But personally, I am unable to keep my mouth shut. 
 (Laughter among the participants) 
Shirin177: This is how my heart works. But I don’t think it’s like that in Western culture; 
one has become used to it. But in our culture, one is looked down upon, 
unfortunately. One should not talk about private things.  
Shirin178: For instance, if one comes and says: “My husband is like this,” or “my daughter 
does this and that,” it’s like “why does she talk like that about her children or 
about her husband?” This is our culture, that one shouldn’t do that.  
Shirin179: But one does so just to find encouragement, sometimes one has this on one’s 
mind.  
Shirin180: But I think that what one should not do is speak badly of one’s family or others. 
 
Shirin suggests a distinction between different intentions behind divulging a “private 
secret.” Her reasoning appears to be a continuation of the reflections she shared at the former 
meeting on the same theme (Shirin114-117, p. 257-258). The question she raised last time was 
how to deal with potentially destructive family matters in light of this text. The crucial point for 
Shirin is to decide what kind of issues should be regarded as internal family matters. Last time, 
she suggested that domestic violence and the mistreatment of children were not private but 
public matters, because they represent violations of Norwegian law. Here, she broadens the 
category of the (alleged) private sphere by stating that if professional help is needed to solve 
private matters, any secret could be revealed to the professional helper (Shirin174).  
Gossiping about other family members is suggested to be a non-valid reason for 
divulging private secrets for Shirin. In Shirin4, however, she refers to “our culture,” not the text 
or the Islamic tradition, in order to explain this restriction. Shirin also shares a private opinion: 
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she personally regrets this cultural restriction because she views the need to articulate feelings 
about one’s own family to others as legitimate. She does however draw a line for what she 
believes to share acceptable to share in Shirin7. A comparison is made between what she states 
to be her own culture and Western culture expressing appreciation for the openness to talk about 
private matters outside the family that she claims to find in the West.  
Shirin’s self-confession about having problems “keeping my mouth shut” is met by 
laughter from the rest of the group. The laughter may express both acceptance and identification: 
after all, have they not all just heard that women can both gab and talk wisdom, and should not 
remain silent? 
Shirin181: I have a question. What does “rebellion” [oppsetsighet]192 mean?  
 
Aira208: It is to go against your husband, and it is related to fidelity, that you are not 
faithful to your husband. That one has an affair. 
 
Shirin182: That the woman has an affair? 
 
Aira209: Yes …. 
 
Shirin183: Sexual affair, you mean? 
 
Aira210: Yes. 
 
Shirin184: But there is something interesting here. If you look at how it works today, if you 
find out that the woman is unfaithful, the woman might be killed. 
Shirin185: But in the text it says, talk to her, and after that, beat her, and then, divorce her. 
There is nothing about killing. 
 
Inger106: But, if it is as you say, it should have been written as “unfaithful” and not 
“disobedient” [oppsetsig]. Because the Norwegian word simply implies that you 
protest, that you have a different opinion, that you speak out against someone. 
 
Aira211: It is not correct. 
 
                                                 
192 This is a linguistic question about the Norwegian word oppsetsighet, which means “disobedience” or 
“insubordination” in English. The word oppsetsighet is used in the Norwegian version of the Koran (Berg 1980). In 
Pickthall’s  English version (Pickthall 1996) it is translated as “rebellion.” 
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Inger107: Is it not correctly translated? 
 
Aira212: It is a wrong translation. Because I have read in a commentary on the Koran that 
it is an interpretation, that this is the only reason for being a little hard on women, 
but then he should not strike so hard that he …. 
 
Shirin186: It is unacceptable; one cannot think like that. But now I think … what if a man 
thinks, and doesn’t really see that… 
Shirin187: Not to kill, but if the man goes out and has an affair, that’s not a problem, but if 
he just imagines that the woman has another relationship, and he kills her or hits 
her …. 
 
Aira213: I will continue with that verse. What is said is that if the conflict becomes so 
difficult that you cannot be reconciled, then someone should mediate, through a 
person from her family and one from his family, persons they themselves trust.193 
This should not be imposed on them, but if …. 
 
Shirin188: Divorce. First, try to work it out, and if not …. 
 
Aira214: If it doesn’t work out, then just divorce. It is not as if one should stay in a 
relationship where the woman is beaten. 
 
Shirin189: But think about it: this is much better than what happens in real life. 
 
 Aira, Inger, Shirin, and Maria all take part in this co-reflection, starting with Shirin’s 
question about the meaning of the rather archaic word for rebellion used in the Norwegian 
version of Sura 4:34 (oppsetsighet). Aira claims that the meaning of the Arabic term (nushuz) is 
sexual infidelity (Aira208). This answer is connected to koranic exegesis, and not to Norwegian 
etymology, which shows that Aira is concerned about the meaning of the Arabic text of the 
Koran. Inger’s exploration of the Norwegian word oppsetsighet (“rebellion”) suggests that this 
word has a far broader meaning than just sexual infidelity. Its connotations are closer to general 
disobedience. Through the previous discussions Inger has become familiar with how Aira and 
Shirin work with koranic texts, knowing that translation is a complicated matter in their act of 
interpretation. Now Inger asks about the accuracy of the translation from Arabic concerning 
                                                 
193 This may be a reference to Sura 4:35. 
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“rebellion” (oppsetsighet). Aira claims that the translation is inaccurate and states that, according 
to her understanding, Sura 4:34 was never meant as a general prohibition against wives opposing 
their husbands but as a prescription regarding sexual fidelity (Aira212). Shirin points out that this 
should obtain for the husband as well, not only the wife (Shirin187). Nobody comments on this, 
but the apprehension of gender equality is once again applied as a moral enrichment of the text 
and as a hermeneutical compass – this time by Shirin. 
But it is the further discussion that appears to be the central event in this section. The 
discussion on the permission to punish a wife physically in Sura 4:34 turns around. From 
discussing how to prevent this verse from being interpreted as a legitimization of the abuse of 
male power, Aira and Shirin state that the ayat may actually function as a prescribed limitation 
of male violence in a marriage.  
Both Shirin and Aira emphasize, for instance, that there is no opening in the text 
whatsoever for legitimizing the killing of wives, whether or not they are unfaithful. Aira212 
states that if the text is interpreted as the limited right of a man to strike his wife, it could be only 
because of sexual infidelity, and not because of disobedience in general. Further, the physical 
effect should be limited and not harmful. Shirin, on the other hand, opposes any legitimization of 
physical violation. Both Shirin and Aira, however, refer to “real life” in their discussion about 
the possible use of Sura 4:34 to limit domestic violence. Shirin in a direct manner (Shirin189), by 
claiming that the circumstances and physical transgression described in Sura 4:34, even though 
she finds them inappropriate and does not agree, is much preferable to what Shirin claims 
actually happens “in real life.”   
Aira is careful to situate the above statements in a larger perspective by emphasizing that, 
for the woman, divorce is much preferable to remaining in a violent marriage. In Aira214 she 
includes both marital partners in her reasoning, possibly implying that men could be victims of 
marital violence too, or that it would be in the best interests of both the victim and the victimizer 
to get out of a destructive marriage.  
External guidance and involvement if there are problems in a marriage is suggested as a 
means for resolving marital problems in general (Aira213). Here, Aira seems to relate to the 
following ayat, Sura 4:35, which prescribes the involvement of the extended family in a marital 
conflict. She states that marital problems should be the concern not only of the married couple 
but of their larger network as well. Social responsibility of this kind could include intervention in 
a marriage if one suspects violence or abuse, although Aira does not mention this explicitly. 
Aira and Shirin’s reflections on the use and impact of Sura 4:34 seem to be based on their 
contextual knowledge, not on any ideal reality. Shirin and Aira have interpreted Sura 4:34 by 
means of knowledge about the text that allows them to relate to the text in ways that challenge 
instead of confirm male authority over the female in a marriage, as their interpretative work on 
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the concept of qiwama has shown. Now they show their contextual knowledge about the existing 
use and interpretations of Sura 4:34, and this makes them reflect on a potentially life-saving 
function the text might have by not allowing serious violence or killing in any possible 
interpretation of the text. This is a shift from a liberative to a survivalist strategy of 
interpretation, to follow Delores Williams (Williams 1993: 194-197).194  
Neither Shirin nor Aira disclose the location of the context(s) to which they are referring. 
Are they speaking of contexts in Norway, Pakistan, Iran, or are they referring to a multitude of 
contexts? Are they talking about Muslims in general? Whatever context to which they may be 
referring, they point out that Sura 4:34 could actually provide a strategy for survival.  
 
Maria49: But I think this puts a lot of responsibility on the woman.  
Maria50: What I want to say is that things haven’t changed much since that time, even if 
the text does represent views different from today’s. 
Maria51: When you see the current attitude on women and sexuality, we are still like that 
today, that women are expected to control the situation, not the man. 
Maria52: You can say that the girl has been raped … and (they) ask: Why were you raped?  
Maria53: They always make the woman explain what happened, don’t they? 
Maria54: This is the case with raising children as well, even if there is both a mother and a 
father in the house, if things go wrong with the child, it is always the mother who 
gets a little … who gets the blame .… 
Maria55: So, we haven’t changed our mindset very much in some areas. 
 
Shirin188: I believe that there has been a change. In the West. 
 
Maria56: Yes, there are changes, but …. 
 
(…) 
 
Maria57: What has changed perhaps, at least a little, is that it has become easier for 
women. Not easier as such, but it is easier today for a woman to leave a bad 
marriage. 
 
Aira215: Yes. 
 
                                                 
194 See Chapter 2, p. 77-78. 
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Maria58: Today we have laws so that women don’t have to stay in a violent marriage. 
 
It is not obvious at first what Maria is referring to in Maria50: What or who is placing too 
much responsibility on women? Is it the texts or the participants through their statements? The 
following transcription shows that she is referring to social and cultural contexts, represented by 
certain attitudes that are not specified further. Addressing the distribution of responsibility means 
moving into an analysis that is more oriented toward gendered power structures. The underlying 
question seems to be: What about the responsibility of men regarding keeping decency and in 
situations of abuse?  
Maria uses the temporal categories of “now” and “then” when navigating in her making 
of meaning. She claims that the burden of responsibility put on women by the context(s) is 
disproportionate. She states further that this disproportionate distribution of responsibility has 
remained unchanged between the “then” and the “now.” She places the texts in a distant “then” 
but claims nevertheless that peoples’ mindset has not really changed. Does this mean that Maria 
finds the situation for women in general similar to the immediate prescriptions of women’s 
behavior and position in Sura 4:34 and 1 Timothy 2:8-15? 
Shirin challenges Maria’s analysis of the situation “now” and states that a change has 
taken place. Shirin does not define what the change consists of, but she locates the change 
spatially, referring to the West. Maria does agree that a legal change at least has taken place 
concerning the possibility for women to leave a “bad marriage,” (Maria57-58). But Maria does 
not locate her example of legal change.  
It seems as if Shirin and Maria are negotiating which context should be more significant 
as a frame of reference. Both of them include more than one geographical context in their 
references to real life: Maria refers to Africa, and Shirin to Iran. But in Maria’s limited 
willingness to state that changes in attitude toward women’s responsibility and blame have taken 
place, she seems to refer to the Norwegian context as well as to a place where there still is a 
culturally bound disproportion between men’s and women’s responsibilities. She does agree, 
however, that, legally speaking, women are better off in the Norwegian, Western “now.” 
 
Gendered Hermeneutics: Strategies of Emancipation or Survival? 
Most of this discussion is marked by the suggestion that they look at Sura 4:34 from a quite 
different angle. So far, the focus in the group’s discussions on this text has been on the 
interpretation of qiwama and how to prevent the text from being used to legitimize male 
authority in marriage. The Muslim participants’ making meaning of the text has been marked by 
an attempt to support gender equality as a strategy of women’s emancipation within the 
framework of the Islamic tradition where the tradition displays patriarchal structures. 
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 In this discussion, however, it is suggested that the text provides a strategy for survival. 
The text’s opening a way for a husband to beat his wife physically has been avoided or regretted 
in the discussions. But here Shirin and Aira focus attention on the limits of the physical abuse 
they find presented in the text. Killing or hurting is not allowed, and divorce is to be preferred to 
staying in a violent marriage.  
 The dilemma Shirin and Aira might be facing is that, on the one hand, they apparently 
need the authority of Sura 4:34 to restrict violence while at the same time being personally 
disgusted by the use of violence that the text may be allowing in a marriage. Their contextual 
knowledge, however, seems to make them aware of the possibility that Sura 4:34 could provide 
resources for limiting domestic violence. But in order to provide this resource for Sura 4: 34, the 
authority of the text must be maintained. 
 The feminist dilemma of liberation or survival has been addressed in many contexts (cf. 
Delores Williams) and this time it is Shirin and Aira who indicate that they are ready to use both 
strategies, depending on the needs they identify in their present context. Their context is defined 
as the “now,” but it is located spatially beyond the immediate “here.” 
 
 
Concluding Discussion on Sura 4:34 and 1 Timothy 2:8-15: 
Strategies of Making Meaning and Ethical Implications for the Readers 
For the first time in the process, in the last minutes of the time scheduled to discuss Sura 4:34 
and 1 Timothy 2:8-15, I intervened in the meaning-making process by asking a question.195 My 
question was: How does one relate to texts of this kind? Some of the participants had addressed 
this explicitly earlier, so the question did not in itself open up any new perspectives. The same 
question had already been presented – and answered – by many of them. My intention in asking 
was to challenge the group to sum up their reflections on strategies regarding how they included  
– or excluded – the texts of Sura 4:34 and 1 Timothy 2:8-15 in making meaning.  
   
AHG: I have a question I would like to ask the whole group. I don’t know if the right 
time is now because I think that … this has been really interesting to listen to. 
                                                 
195 As discussed in Chapter 3, I had made the choice not to take part in the discussions on the text, nor to 
try to control the conversations, that is, how the participants chose to discuss the texts. My intervention here, despite 
these decisions, was motivated by the fact that time was running out, and I wanted to open up the space for some 
general, concluding remarks on how to deal with the texts. There were two reasons for doing this: first, to 
investigate if the comments already made by the participants were repeated on a more general level and, second, to 
signal a wish for further general reflections to be added to the empirical material. 
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My question is: How does one relate to texts of this kind? How? That is my 
question. 
…  
 
Shirin189: I think this has to do with text, and it has to do with women’s situation. The text 
talks about those times, and one has to see how things are now. 
 
Susanne59: … I almost said something about this a while ago, but I didn’t say it then, I will 
say it now instead. That is … I think at least for the New Testament text, I am 
very close to abandoning it totally. 
Susanne60: As a historical text … it is interesting as a historical text, but it has nothing to say 
to me, and it is not interesting in any way other than describing this historical 
situation, perhaps the historical situation in general. There is nothing to gain from 
it for our time. 
Susanne61: I can’t say the same about the koranic text, because I am not a Muslim. 
Susanne62: But I … with the risk of provoking you all, I am willing to abandon that one too. 
But that is from my perspective. I think it is a more difficult text, less explicit.… 
The text is very vaguely formulated, and I find it difficult to interpret. I have 
heard interpretations. But just as I read it, what does it mean? … The last part of 
it is easier to understand, I think. But the first part is incomprehensible to me. 
 
Shirin190: Not to me … to Muslims. It must be interpreted.  
 
Susanne63: In that way, I am … the New Testament text is more specific, such as the details 
about not wearing pearls and so on …. I think it’s difficult to relate to it. But how 
does one use them or relate to them, I am kind of in a place where I think these 
are texts that do not relate to … which I can … which I can abandon totally as … 
thinking about what you said, or what we have been talking about: violence 
toward women, rape, vanity, and the current obsession with body and 
appearance. 
Susanne64: But I believe that these themes are interesting to discuss in relation to the texts, 
but the texts are not crucial to starting a discussion about these topics.  
Susanne65: So, for my part, they could be erased. Except as historical documents. 
 
Inger107: Yes, I agree with that. And I feel that as a Christian, I have the right to abandon 
parts of the Bible. I don’t have to find an interpretation or a meaning in every 
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single paragraph. So this belongs to the past. What was the question again, Anne 
Hege? 
 
AHG:  How does one relate to the texts? 
 
Inger108: Then I will cross this one out. But there is another question I think is really 
important, too, and that is how we as Christian and Muslim women comprehend 
our role as women, based on our understanding of God.  
Inger109: If we were to describe this, based on our own understanding, and not only based 
on these pieces of text … do we have equal status? Or, are we equal to men in 
everything? Or do we have different roles in some areas of life? Now I have 
introduced a new question, so perhaps we should take the other question first. 
 
Aira216: Yes, when I look at the koranic text, I cannot just say that we should abandon 
parts of the Koran or something like that, but I … rather on the contrary, I would 
say that what is needed is better insight into what they really stand for. 
Aira217: Why should we always leave it to the men to interpret these verses, when some 
misuse them for their own purposes? 
Aira218: We have to inform ourselves better about the understanding of the Koran. We 
need better knowledge, so that we can interpret by ourselves and stand up for it. 
Aira219: For instance, when it is said that men should rule over women…. The man 
should stand beside the woman in all matters and support her under all 
conditions. 
Aira220: And this is not just some opinion coming from me; there are lots of people who 
believe that this has nothing to do with the authority of men over women; it is 
rather about their support and backing. 
 
Shirin191: But they do it like that everywhere …. 
 
Aira221: But it is misinterpreted! It is a misinterpretation. 
 
Shirin192: Unconsciously, you see men with education like ourselves – not bad, but nice – 
they have this attitude.  
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Aira222: Yes, there is a need for better attitudes, and to stand up and say it’s like this, if 
you look in dictionaries, and examine the words and the origin of the word, and 
what meaning it had historically.  
Aira223: And if one is strong in one’s faith and rational, the day will come when women 
have more understanding to view things in a totally new way. 
Aira224: But it will take quite some time before others understand what it means …. A 
lecturer in England sees it the same way, it [qiwama] means support. 
 The profiling of the participants’ hermeneutical standpoint is drawn more sharply. Their 
statements become more conclusive, probably as a response to the question I formulated. The 
discussion covers the question of relating to the texts in a comprehensive way, including context 
and their own agency/position in the meaning-making process. In the foreground are descriptions 
of the contexts in which women live, how the texts might influence these, and the actual agency 
of interpretation. Inger develops her answer into a new question, asking about the Christian and 
Islamic traditions’ perspectives on gender roles and gender models in general beyond these 
particular texts. The participants contextualize the texts and their own understandings, not only 
of the texts but also of issues of women’s situation in general. Placing themselves and the texts in 
time and space is part of the contextualization of their own making of meaning. 
 Two different hermeneutical standpoints occur, divided according to religious lines. The 
Christian participants claim their right to abandon the text in 1 Timothy 2:8-15 in terms of its 
having any religious authority. The argument they use is that the text is outdated, belongs to a 
different time, and is irrelevant to what they define as “our time” or “now.” They argued earlier 
that its content is not consistent with Jesus’ teaching, which is the center from which they 
interpret Christian canonical scripture. But in this section it is only their hermeneutical 
evaluation that the text does not fit the present that leads them to abandon the New Testament 
text.  
The Muslim participant Aira states that her way of relating to Sura 4:34 is through 
knowledge and interpretation and not through abandonment of the text, which is not presented as 
an option (Aira216). The crucial interpretation for Aira is the word qiwama (Aira224): if 
interpreted as support, not authority, the aya could be seen to be a constructive work to 
strengthen women’s role and position. Shirin and Aira appear to differ in their degree of 
optimism about possible changes in the general interpretation of this text. Shirin does not, 
however, suggest abandoning or marginalizing Sura 4:34. Rather, she argues that to change the 
way it is interpreted is an overwhelming task, and that she cannot really see how this can happen. 
Aira adds one significant argument for not abandoning Sura 4:34: if she, and others who interpret 
the text in the same way she does, turns away from it – more of the interpretative power will, in 
her view, be left to male interpreters who argue that the text legitimizes the maintenance of a 
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patriarchal structure. The responsibility she identifies for herself as being a part of the Islamic 
tradition is to stay with the texts from the Koran and struggle with destructive interpretations 
through obtaining more knowledge and through taking on the task of transforming the general 
interpretation of Sura 4:34.  
The details in the participants’ answers reveal greater nuances than the broad picture I 
painted above. Shirin starts by suggesting that the texts and the context are decisive factors for 
making meaning (Shirin189). She indicates a division between the two based on chronology: The 
texts are in the “then,” and the contexts (and readers) are in the “now.” She may be suggesting 
that the hermeneutical task is to “bridge the gap.” She declares that the text needs to be 
“interpreted” (Shirin190), which indicates that she believes Sura 4:34 needs exegetical and 
perhaps contextual reflection; it is not enough to read it and only use the information from the 
text itself or to rely on any given interpretation.  
Susanne’s stance is to abandon the New Testament text as an authoritative religious text 
and states that, to her, it represents nothing else than a “historical document” (Susanne60). She 
discusses her own inability to see the koranic text in the same way, since she is not a Muslim, 
and ends up by regarding it in the same way – as a “historical text” (Susanne65). Susanne, then, 
ends up with the same attitude toward both texts. Her hermeneutical position toward the koranic 
text, the text of “the other,” is similar to her position toward the text from her own tradition. 
What she does, is to place both texts as parts of the historical contexts of the Christian and the 
Islamic tradition – thus dismissing the texts as bearing any significant meaning for the present to 
which she could relate as a reader.  
Articulating this position toward the text from the Islamic canon, Susanne shows that she 
might consider relating to other Islamic canonical texts, expecting to seek meaning from them, 
which is different from viewing the text as part of a context. If she had not regarded the Islamic 
canonical text as a possible source for the exploration of meaning, it would be meaningless to 
say that she would abandon a text from a tradition other than her own. Susanne thus presents 
herself as a reader who may be more concerned with the actual content of the canonical texts 
than their religious status as Christian or Muslim. 
Susanne states that the themes addressed in Sura 4:34 and 1 Timothy 2:8-15 are 
contextual matters, independent of the texts. This could mean that she even finds subversive or 
alternative attempts at interpretation to be valueless. The texts are not even needed as sources for 
raising important feminist issues. Taking a close look at the social contexts would be enough to 
suggest the significance of the same issues, she states. Susanne turns away from the texts, both as 
canonical texts and as texts for which it would not make any sense to spend the effort to relate to 
them. 
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Inger states that she feels free, on the basis of her Christian faith, to “abandon parts of the 
Bible.” (Inger107). Thus she claims that she does not need to struggle to find meaning in “every 
single paragraph.” (Inger107). She declares that 1 Timothy 2:8-15 is a text she would abandon. 
Inger, then, uses her hermeneutical stance grounded in her perspective of herself as an acting 
subject in the reading process provided by the Christian tradition to place this text outside her 
own frame of reference. This hermeneutical stance implies that the text is regarded as a lost case 
and it should be left alone; there is thus no need to struggle to interpret the text. The roles of text 
and reader are approached as separate in the meaning-making process, and the autonomy of the 
reader is established as a premise. Inger does not comment on Sura 4:34. 
Aira, ruling ou t the possibility of her abandoning texts from the Koran, constructs a 
strategy representing the opposite move. She claims that texts like Sura 4:34 need even more 
attention, knowledge, and work. The premise for Aira’s stance is that a close dynamics between 
reader, the koranic text, and available relevant knowledge, including knowledge of the text’s 
contextual use, is required to make responsible and consistent meaning of Sura 4:34.  
Even though these stances of abandonment and close interaction seem contradictory as 
interpretative positions, they still share a view of the position of the reader as a subject. The 
process of gaining resources of knowledge and evaluating what knowledge to use requires a 
subject outside of the text. Aira’s subject position of the reader does not, however, grant the 
reader autonomy to the extent that she could abandon the text. The text’s position is constant, 
although there is be a dynamics of negotiation between text, reader, and tradition in the 
production of meaning. It is the position of the text, with its implications for the autonomy of the 
reader that makes the two strategies different, not the view of the reader as such.  
Aira, however, shows that there is another difference, too: response and responsibility in 
relation to a context. The hermeneutical strategy of abandonment versus the strategy of initiating 
a critical dynamics between reader, text, tradition, and context, is discussed when Aira addresses 
what she identifies as a contextual need. A strategy of abandoning Sura 4:34, or even a 
reluctance to relate to this text, would imply leaving the interpretation to men, whereof “some 
misuse them for their own purposes” (Aira217). The way Aira sees it, the strategy of 
abandonment is not an option – not only because of the status of the Koran in the Islamic 
tradition but also because this strategy would prevent any change from happening in the 
traditional making of meaning of this text. If Aira and those like her do not involve themselves in 
interpretational efforts, Sura 4:34 would still produce legitimization of male dominance. 
 
Shirin193: It makes us Muslims careless about whether society is governed in a just way. 
Think about that. Everywhere in Muslim countries a few possess a lot of 
resources, while others have nothing. 
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Aira225: Yes. 
 
Shirin194: And with the claim that God has provided some above others. Don’t forget that. 
You see? They don’t move on to the next verse about giving and redistribution in 
society. You never hear this because that means you have to give. But this verse 
you can hear everywhere. 
 
AHG:   Can I ask something? Is this text used to legitimize political systems? 
 
Shirin195: Yes. 
 
Aira226: That’s a misinterpretation.… 
 
Shirin196: There are misinterpretations everywhere.  
 
Shirin brings up a new interpretative perspective for Sura 4:34. So far, the interpretation 
of the text has concentrated on family and marital issues, as well as gender roles in the Islamic 
tradition more generally. Now the application of the concept of qiwama includes a new area: the 
general distribution of wealth and power in “Muslim countries” (Shirin193-194). The political 
implication this text may, according to Shirin, suggest a lack of interest in general in making 
attempts at changing social and political injustice because the text’s use of qiwama is interpreted 
as if a different distribution of wealth and power is God-given. I was not aware of this use of 
Sura 4:34 before Shirin’s critical elaboration, which motivates me to ask a follow-up question. In 
Shirin194 she refers to a “next verse,” which may be the ayat of Sura 4:36, where the 
responsibility of “being good” to the orphans and the poor is prescribed. 
Both Shirin and Aira state that they regard this use of the text as “misinterpretation.” By 
calling an understanding of a text “misinterpretation,” they confirm their own authority to judge 
which textual interpretations are correct. This self-confidence is necessary in order to construct 
an agency. 
 
Shirin197: For instance, we have many, many verses saying that whatever religion you have, 
if you believe in astrology or if you are a Jew, everyone is equal. But some places 
in the Koran … particularly because there are two … one in Mecca and one in 
Medina that came to the prophet, two different …. 
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Inger110: Versions? 
 
Shirin198: Versions, OK. It is contextual, everything. There was a war, and one had to kill: 
this was about those Jews who were involved in the war. Then they use it. Look, 
misinterpretations are everywhere. The main message is that everyone is equal. 
Shirin199: There is only one God, no matter if you are a Christian, a Jew, or you believe in 
the stars, as long as you have your good deeds and interpret it as you should in 
keeping rules and regulations, then it’s OK.  
Shirin200: But they come and interpret it that way. Then it is misinterpreted. 
 
Bringing in koranic textual support to claim the equality of all people takes Shirin back to 
one of her main viewpoints that were articulated throughout the project. Although she does not 
refer to specific texts, she claims that the koranic message is about human equality regardless of 
one’s religious identity.196 This comment is probably meant to represent a correction from the 
Islamic canon itself of the misinterpretation mentioned above: Islam is not about maintaining 
inequality – it is about the implementation of equality. The equality Shirin emphasizes is 
between people of different faiths, which seem to be a hermeneutical axiomatic stance for her in 
the same way as gender equality is to Inger, for instance. 
Shirin197 brings in a traditional Islamic tool for interpreting the Koran, namely to 
interpret koranic texts in accordance with the context in which they were revealed, and 
particularly to separate between revelations given to the prophet Muhammad in Mecca and the 
later revelations in Medina. What Shirin addresses indirectly is that there are some textual parts 
revealed in a war situation in Medina that are allegedly shaped by the tense situation where the 
Jews were no longer considered allies of the prophet Muhammad (Leirvik 2006: 42) These texts 
refer to Jews as enemies who should be defeated. Shirin argues that these verses must be 
interpreted as part of a war context in Medina at the time of the revelation and not taken as the 
general stance on Jews in the Koran. Again, knowledge and historical placing of the text is 
suggested as crucial for a relevant making of meaning of canonical texts. 
 
Aira227:  … concerning obedience … if one is a man one should adhere to the limits set by 
God. If he doesn’t … honor women, we are not obliged to obey a person who 
violates the limits. 
Aira228: And keeping what is a secret, just as you said, it can be private matters. 
                                                 
196 The examples she gives of different religions include Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. The addition of  
astrology/believing in the stars may refer to Zoroastrianism, a religion originating from ancient Iran and whose 
adherents are mentioned in the Koran as belonging to the “peoples of the Book” (Roald 2007: 286).  
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Aira229: It could be that a woman who is pregnant and might want an abortion for various 
reasons, perhaps because of her health, there is no reason for this to be public. 
Though God does not allow abortion, if she decides to do so, this is a matter 
between that woman and God. 
 
The meaning-making process regarding Sura 4:34 is not yet exhausted. Aira returns to the 
interpretation of Sura 4:34 in a marital context. Her statement in Aira227 on obedience in 
marriage is somewhat ambiguous: On the one hand, Aira seems to establish the premise that 
obedience to a husband is regarded as a duty for the wife in the Islamic tradition, when she 
moves on to qualify the premises for the husband’s authority. The necessary qualification of 
obedience to the husband is that he “honors women” and “adheres to the limits set by God” 
(Aira227). Otherwise, in Aira’s view, there can be no claim for obedience to the man from the 
wife with support in the Islamic tradition. This suggests that obedience for both husband and 
wife is ultimately an obligation they have to God, since a wife is not obliged to regard a husband 
who transgresses the boundaries set by God as an authority. When the question of obedience 
came up during the discussions on the Hagar/Hajar texts, Aira very clearly stated that human 
obedience was to God exclusively. Is Aira presenting an interpretation to limit male authority 
through confirming it with a qualification no Muslim could object – that obedience to God 
overrules male authority in any case and emphasizing that the female has an independent relation 
with God? Her aim may be rooted in contextual knowledge, just as when it is suggested that the 
text be used as a limitation of violence (Shirin189, p. 318).  
Aira229 introduces a new possible use of the prescription of secretiveness in the text, as 
an allowance and an option for an individual private space in a marriage. Using the example of 
having an abortion – but hedging her statement by stating that she does not believe that abortion 
is what God would want197 – Aira interprets the text to give both permission and an option to 
keep an early pregnancy a secret between the pregnant woman/wife and God. Aira regards this as 
a positive protection of a private space of reflection and self-determination for a married woman.  
  
Aira230: It is my opinion that these texts provide immense room for oppression of women 
because they are usually misused and misinterpreted.  
                                                 
197 Leila Ahmed in her book Women and Gender in Islam (Ahmed 1992) remarks that, according to her sources, 
medieval Islamic jurisdiction on contraception and termination of pregnancy is “remarkably liberal” regarding the 
permission of women to decide about their reproduction (Ahmed 1992: 92). There is a distinction within the Islamic 
sources between terminating a pregnancy before and after the fetus is 120 days old, i.e. when the fetus becomes a 
person, according to Islamic tradition (Rogers 1999: 123).  
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Aira231: So, there is a great need …. I will not only say that they are historical texts and 
should be left behind, we have to study them carefully, we have to work more 
thoroughly with them, and then stand up and perhaps form groups among 
Muslims and non-Muslims and work together to improve this situation. 
 
Aira230 is a quite clear analysis of how “these texts” are used today in contexts that are 
not specified further. In her view they do not just happen to be “misused and misinterpreted;” the 
misuse is systematic, and more the rule than the exception. But exactly what texts is she referring 
to when using the plural form? Is it Sura 4:34 and 1 Timothy 2:8-15 or she is referring to more 
than one text from the Islamic tradition? So far, Aira has not presented contextual knowledge 
about the interpretative situation for 1 Timothy 2:8-15, and the Christian participants have 
mostly regretted the contextual subjugation this text has caused in the past. The use of 1 Timothy 
is still somewhat in the shadow, since its contextual use is not exemplified by reference to 
experience, as is the case for Sura 4:34. But Aira may have a more general perspective: both 
texts represent a problem, and all canonical texts of similar type cause oppression of women 
through misuse and misinterpretation.  
But Aira’s main statement in this section is Aira231, where she again rejects any 
possibility for herself of taking the same stance toward the texts as Inger and Susanne have 
stated, namely to relate to the texts solely as historical, non-authoritative texts or to abandon 
them. Aira prescribes – again – the opposite move for herself. What is new in Aira231 is that she 
suggests a concrete plan of action: to create groups for sharing interpretative knowledge and 
interpreting the texts together, both “among Muslims and non-Muslims” with the aim of 
“improving this situation” (Aira231). She does not say “Muslims and Christians,” and it is not 
clear if the groups should be divided along religious lines or if people should be together in the 
groups. The improvement she refers to would be to spread the message that the texts should not 
be used as a means of oppression, claiming this on the basis of knowledge and her own 
interpretative skills in order to obtain a different understanding and interpretation of the texts. 
She assumes agency: to study, to stand up, and to share knowledge in the community, and she is 
not only referring to the Muslim communities.  
Aira’s argument in this section for not abandoning the difficult texts and not weakening 
their authoritative status does not seem to be mainly doctrinal. Her argument is rather of a moral 
kind, based on what she perceives is a great need for a counteractive interpretation of the text(s) 
because of the “misuse” and “misinterpretation.” So far, none of the Christian participants has 
reflected in the same way about the text from 1 Timothy 2:8-15, nor have any of them suggested 
a plan for action. 
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Shirin201: Regarding the creation of the Koran, there are two different schools. One says 
that it is created, and those who say this think it should be interpreted literally. 
But many scholars say no. It was … it came gradually, depending on the context 
.… 
Shirin202: I am among those who say that it was not created at once. It has come gradually.  
Shirin203: This is why I think that it was the message, what its spirit was. 
Shirin204: If I understand it literally … personally, I don’t interpret it in that way. Not that 
one should walk away; one needs to relate to something but not literally. 
 
Inger111: Do I understand you correctly if I say that you think that it is originally a 
message from God, from Allah, in this text, so what matters is to … and that this 
is valid for all Koranic texts; it’s important to get to the root and find the original 
message, since several layers of misunderstandings have been added? 
 
Aira232: Yes. 
 
Inger112: So, originally, the whole Koran is an expression of God’s will? 
 
Aira233: Yes. It is. For me it is, and for the believers. I cannot say that it is historical. 
 
Shirin205: You think it is dependent on time and space? 
 
Aira234: Yes, but then it is reinterpretation, then you can draw new conclusions from old 
stuff … it’s not that one should be stuck, that this is the only thing that is there. 
We should interpret and draw conclusions suitable for the situation today. 
 
Shirin206: Then it is history. What you say is the same as she says. 
 
Aira235: No. 
 
How is a Muslim to relate to the Koran – as a Muslim? This is the fundamental question 
emerging between Shirin and Aira. Even if they express themselves differently, they may not 
represent significantly different views. Starting with the discussion if the Koran is created or 
uncreated, Shirin pulls the view of the origins of the Koran into the discussion (Shirin201). She 
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connects the view of the Koran as uncreated to a literal interpretation of the text.198 If the Koran 
is regarded as created, however, this means that the text includes contextual references and needs 
to be interpreted as a text “dependent on time and space” (Shirin205). Shirin links up to an early 
debate among Muslim philosophers about the same issue, and she positions herself in support of 
the Koran as created. She does, however, state that this does not indicate any possibility for her 
to abandon the text. It is a different perspective on the text, not a dismissal of it.  
Aira does not position herself in this discussion on the created and uncreated Koran. She 
claims instead that she and Muslim believers cannot regard the Koran as a historical document 
only. On the other hand, she claims the need for a contextual interpretation, “to draw conclusions 
suitable for the situation today.” (Aira234) 
Inger checks to see if she had understood Aira’s and Shirin’s perspectives on the Koran 
and interpretation correctly. Her question also seems to function as providing a basis for Aira and 
Shirin to clarify their views further, not only to Inger and the other Christian participants present 
but among themselves as well. 
Shirin and Aira seem to disagree on whether they share the same view or not. Aira claims 
that there is a difference, without elaborating on the matter. The way Inger and Susanne used the 
concept “historical” earlier in reference to the texts, was clearly a way to deprive the texts of 
current authoritative status. Aira’s view as presented in Aira233-234 respects the authoritative 
status of the (koranic) texts, but at the same time she claims that a continuous reinterpretation in 
the present is needed. This could be motivated by Aira’s standpoint about the text’s authority: the 
significance of the koranic texts requires the readers to study continually in order to ensure that 
the receivers of the textual messages are not getting “stuck” but provided with interpretations in 
line with their experiences and contextual challenges.  
 
Maria59: How should we relate to the text? As a Christian, I see very much …. This is the 
Old Testament, isn’t it? Is it the New? 
 
Inger113: It should have been, but …. 
 (Laughter among the participants) 
Inger114: It’s Paul. 
 
Maria60: OK. That’s all right, but I read it as… because I couldn’t believe that it …. 
 
                                                 
198  David Waines summarizes the early debate on this issue in his introductory book on Islam (Waines 2003: 70-
71). 
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This rather humorous intermezzo between Maria and Inger reveals that Maria thought 
until now that the text from 1 Timothy 2:8-15 was from the Old Testament. Now she asks the 
group if she is right, perhaps reading something from their faces that makes her doubt her first 
idea. Inger’s ambivalent answer (Inger113) shows her discomfort with this text as part of the 
New Testament, but it seems that placing the text among the Pauline scriptures explains 
something for both Inger and Maria without further elaboration: It is in the New Testament, but 
it is placed among the Pauline writings.  
The intermezzo reveals in brief the formerly mentioned hierarchical-hermeneutical 
structure the Christian participants apply to the biblical texts: Dividing sharply between the Old 
and the New Testament and distinguishing between texts in the New Testament that are 
narratives about Jesus and sayings of Jesus and other texts, including the Pauline texts. The 
former division functions as a strategy to construct different textual universes, where the New 
Testament takes preference above the Old Testament, and the narratives about Jesus above the 
Pauline texts. This hermeneutics implies a center and a periphery in the Bible, the center being 
the New Testament Gospels containing the Jesus narratives, and all other texts are interpreted 
from the perspective of this hermeneutical center. This pattern of making meaning of biblical 
texts is very similar to a Lutheran view of the Bible. One of the differences, however, is the 
position of the reader, where the Christian participants in the group claim an individually 
oriented, autonomous position for themselves as readers, without the interpretative control of a 
community that is required in the Lutheran tradition as well if one claims to have authority to 
interpret the texts for others, and not only for oneself.199 
As Maria’s “misunderstanding” in this section exemplifies, the categorization may not 
coincide with locating the text in either the Old or the New Testament. In this case, it functions 
as a hierarchical classification of texts, regardless of their actual location within the Bible. This 
“flaw” makes it possible to follow a hermeneutics based on the participants’ expectations toward 
the text from the Old versus the New Testament.  
 
Maria61: OK, but what I wanted to say about … perhaps about both texts is that they have 
been used to oppress women, I would say. It’s been done in many countries. 
Maria62: Of course people can sit and think this isn’t right. But they have been used, and 
are still used, to oppress women. 
Maria63: Now I’m going to say how I’ll relate to the text …. I kind of agree with you that 
it’s sad; I don’t think one should learn from them, I don’t find anything positive 
that I can contribute.  
                                                 
199 See Chapter 2, p. 41. 
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Maria64: I think it’s, it’s taking us back to the message about Adam as the first one to be 
created, and what does that mean? It could have been Eve who was created first, 
right, so this is “who came first” and I don’t think …. 
Maria65: And then I think OK, perhaps we who are sitting here, we can think and interpret 
it as we like, but what is unfortunate, perhaps for the Koran in particular, is that 
they don’t interpret, they practice it as it is. 
 
Aira236: Many do that. 
 
Maria66: Yes. And that makes it a bit difficult and dangerous. 
 
Maria dismisses the texts from 1 Timothy 2:8-15 and Sura 4:34 as resources for 
knowledge (Maria63). In her spatial reference to the effects of the texts, described as oppressive 
for women (Maria61), she does not refer to specific cultures or religions but suggests a 
geographical reference to “many countries.” She finds “nothing positive” in the texts that she 
wants to pass on to others (Maria63). The argument in 1 Timothy about Adam being created 
which was used to legitimize male authority over women is characterized as a childish quarrel. 
To Maria, the chronology of creation is random and thus cannot be used as a serious argument 
for a permanent hierarchy between the sexes. 
First, Maria does not indicate any wish to engage in interpretation of the texts at all and 
seems to join Susanne and Inger’s strategy of abandonment. Later in the section, however, she 
states that it is necessary to interpret the texts. In Maria65 she argues that the situation may be 
more unfortunate for Muslims in this respect. Following Aira and Shirin’s earlier descriptions, 
she suggests that many Muslims supposedly practice the text from Sura 4:34 “as it is,” implying 
that this may lead to oppression of women. She explains this kind of textual use as non-
interpretation, which may indicate a situation where the text is not reflected upon; since there is 
allegedly no distance between text and reader to make room for interpretation. There is probably 
a connection here to the notion presented earlier by Shirin and Aira of “literal” interpretation that 
contrasts with the interpretation they request. Regarding the interpretative situation in the 
Christian tradition, Maria does not explicitly exempt Christians from a situation of non-
interpretation of texts. She does not take up the question of the use of 1 Timothy in Christian 
contexts. Does this perhaps illustrate a lack of contextual knowledge among the Christian 
participants? Or is this text invisible in the relevant contexts of the Christian communities the 
participants know?  
 Referring to people who passively “sit and think this isn’t right” (Maria62), and later 
applying the position of sitting and thinking to the group, including herself, Maria seems to 
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construct an opposition between a privileged, safe position that allows people to sit and reflect on 
the texts and an unprivileged, unsafe position without the possibility of “sitting and thinking.” 
An underlying challenge may be how the sitting and thinking “we” relates to the needs in outside 
contexts and people (women) in unsafe positions. But Maria’s statement (Maria65) may also be 
understood as a positive evaluation of the interpretative situation in the group, regarding it as a 
place where it is possible to communicate whatever is on one’s mind, grounded in and creating 
confidence. The aspect of challenge, however, rather than of confirmation, seems to be strongest 
for Maria. It is as if Maria is just about to formulate a shared challenge to the group of doing 
something together with the interpretative situation of these texts, but she does not actually 
express a common agency. 
Aira responds in a confirming and still modifying way (Aira236) that many Muslims 
practice the text “as it is” and “don’t interpret” – but not all. Maria views this lack of 
interpretation as creating a situation that is “a bit difficult and dangerous” (Maria8). The last 
comment includes both a possible theoretical, doctrinal perspective (difficult) and a practical, 
existential and physical perspective (dangerous), where both the “difficult” and the “dangerous” 
may refer to religious teaching and to religious/cultural practices.  
 
Susanne66: Then I think it’s important what you say: to go in and read what is actually … 
what the words actually mean, and what they could have meant.  
Susanne67: And really, even if I said it in a flippant way that I could abandon the text 
completely, it is important even with the New Testament text … because it is 
used in certain places to oppress women. 
Susanne68: It isn’t … I mean, in sects or in more extreme groups, texts like this are used to 
oppress women, so it’s important not to just say “I don’t care about it” but to see 
what it could have meant, in what context it was written, and what the context 
means, and then you can say it’s not relevant. 
Susanne69: And this is a freedom I believe one has in regard to biblical texts and doesn’t 
have regarding the koranic texts.  
Susanne70: You said, too, that you can’t just abandon them, you rather have to interpret them 
and find the original meaning of the words, what they meant, and how to 
interpret them today. 
Susanne71: While I can read this Pauline text and I can perhaps read it in its original 
language, also taking a look at the context, and then I can say: I don’t need to 
interpret it more than this because it has nothing more to say. It is not relevant, 
and I can overlook it. But I think we have a possibility as Christians that I don’t 
believe Muslims have in relation to their text. 
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Susanne presents a self-reflexive comment on her earlier proclamation of abandoning the 
two texts (Susanne67). She expresses a different perspective relating to the contextual, pragmatic 
challenges presented by Aira and Shirin, and finally, by Maria. Agreeing that it is necessary for 
contextual reasons to work on the interpretation and reinterpretation of the texts, she modifies 
her earlier position of abandonment. As the first participant, she explicitly addresses the text of 1 
Timothy 2:8-15, in the context of the practiced Christian tradition as being in need of 
interpretation. The addressed contexts are, however, restricted by Susanne to being “sects and 
extreme groups” (Susanne68). It seems as if the participants, including Susanne, do not regard 
the text in 1 Timothy 2:8-15 as being used extensively to legitimize male superiority and cause 
oppression of women – in comparison with how the participants view Sura 4:34 and the situation 
in Muslim contexts. 
Susanne also initiates a doctrinal reasoning about the texts, stating that she finds a 
significant difference between the Christian and the Islamic traditions in this respect. The 
difference is focused on the autonomy of the reader: she suggests that the freedom for a reader of 
biblical texts in the Christian tradition includes the freedom to abandon the text, whereas Muslim 
interpreters simply do not have the possibility of depriving the koranic text of authority or 
abandoning it altogether. While acknowledging that a certain freedom in the interpretative 
process is also granted to the Muslim interpreter of the Koran (Susanne70), this freedom is still 
limited, according to Susanne.  
For quite a long period in the discussions, differences between the two traditions were not 
addressed. The focus was on common challenges and similarities and suggestions of constructing 
a common agency. Does this shift from a focus on similarities to one on differences have 
implications for the emergence of a possible shared agency? 
 
Inger115: I actually think that you interpret the Koran in a quite open way, like how I relate 
to the Bible. 
 
Shirin207: Yes, lots of people in the Muslim world are following this process. It has started, 
luckily.  
 
Susanne72: My main impression, however, is that the majority of Muslims follow your line, 
right, that it should not be interpreted literally, that is, be used to oppress, but …. 
 
 Inger disputes Susanne’s suggestions about framing a different Christian and Islamic 
position of the reader by comparing her own way of interpretation to that of Shirin and Aira, 
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finding that they all interpret in a way she calls “open” (Inger115). Inger’s statement relates to 
her experience in the group, where she does not categorize her own strategies of making meaning 
of the biblical text as very different from the Muslim participants’ making meaning of the Koran. 
Shirin recognizes Inger’s suggestion of a shared, open hermeneutical position and refers to what 
she sees as an ongoing interpretative process among Muslims in Muslim majority societies, more 
or less along the same lines. Thus, they both underline the similarities, and Susanne joins in 
agreeing that the majority of Muslims do not interpret the Koran literally – stating that literal 
interpretation to her indicates oppressive use of the text. But this was probably not exactly what 
she tried to address in the former section. What about hermeneutical differences between the two 
traditions? 
 
Aira237: Create more knowledge, so that one can stand up and say: No, to use literal … 
that’s wrong. So, if one can be that strong ….  
Aira238: It is very important that we read it. Some things are historically and contextually 
dependent texts that have nothing to do with today, but we should recognize that 
they exist, and reinterpret. 
Aira239: And this is not against the message of the Koran. God says all the time: Why 
shouldn’t you think? Why don’t you think and reflect on the Koran. 
Aira240: And if we don’t reflect and if we don’t think and ponder deeply …. that means 
that we actually oppose the message of the Koran. 
 
Aira’s repeats her confidence in knowledge: If the readers (she is most likely referring to 
Muslim readers of the Koran at this point, but she might include Christian readers of the Bible as 
well) acquire sufficient knowledge, they will not only be able to do the necessary interpretative 
work to prevent the texts from being misinterpreted: having knowledge will also provide the 
necessary self-confidence and a position from which to articulate one’s views (Aira237). 
Knowledge thus has at least a double function for Aira.  
Claiming that reflection and knowledge is not only needed but required in Islam by the 
Koran itself, Aira states that reinterpretation of the texts is an Islamic duty prescribed by the 
Koran. The authoritative status of the Koran that Aira holds on to is thus her strongest argument 
for legitimizing the reinterpretation of koranic texts. 
 
Susanne73: I believe, from my point of view, that this principle is dependent on which text 
one is talking about. This is a text that doesn’t yield any meaning for me to 
interpret in the present.  
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Susanne74: This is a bit … it is so specific, and it has a little to do with it being … it holds 
values that I can’t … I can’t cater to them, and I can’t see how they can be 
interpreted differently. 
… 
Maria67: There is one thing we must remember, and that is that a lot of people need to 
have this read to them, because they don’t know how to read themselves. So they 
are very dependent on those who do read and who interpret what’s being read 
and interpreted. 
Maria68: If we as readers want to give a different interpretation, they – what those people 
do, they say that this is the way it is: the women should be subordinate to the 
man.  
Maria69: This is what the Bible says, and this is what the Koran says. Sects and religious 
groups use exactly this Pauline text: that women should stay in their place, they 
should dress in a specific way, and they should be like this and that. 
 
Susanne repeats an earlier criticism of the text from 1 Timothy – it is too specific and is 
an outdated text for which Susanne can’t find any room in her interpretative frame of reference 
(Susanne73-74). Susanne does not see any alternative interpretations (Susanne75), and confirms 
her former wish to distance herself from the text altogether, because of the huge discrepancy she 
experiences between her own ethical values and the values she sees in the text in 1 Timothy. The 
challenge to relate to a canonical text from one’s own tradition representing ethical values 
contrary to those of the reader may confront the interpreter morally because of her ethical 
position. If the reader takes an autonomous position, and the text is evaluated as being marginal 
within the canon, it may be difficult to find the motivation to struggle with it. The source of 
motivation may still be found in the contextual situation, as Maria does (Maria67-68). 
What are the causes for the differences between Susanne and Aira’s approach to the 
readers’ position, if one should attempt to summarize them? Susanne regards it as possible to 
abandon the text and still stay within the boundaries of her own tradition, and a contextual need 
for a reinterpretation is less urgent for Susanne than for Aira. The different approaches to the 
Bible and the Koran in the two traditions do influence Susanne and Aira’s reasoning, and is best 
illustrated by the different views on the possibility of abandoning the text and the obligation to 
reinterpret the text, both argued for from within the Christian and Islamic traditions respectively. 
In addition, their different stances are contextually motivated. These motivations, however, also 
interact. The authority – or lack of authority – of the texts does not only influence how the 
participants in this project relate to the texts but also influences the larger communities of 
Christian and Muslim believers, too, in their different contexts. This makes the question of the 
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texts’ authoritative status part of the context. The more authority a text possesses the more 
significant the impact on the believers is, making the interpretation more urgent.  
Maria67 and 68 touch on a contextual problem that had not been addressed earlier, except 
indirectly by Aira in her earlier call for the improvement of common education (Aira166, p. 
278): What about those who do not know how to read? As an illiterate person, one is dependent 
on others to know and explain a written text such as the Bible and the Koran.  
Maria, still including a wider contextual reference than the other Christian participants 
present, now claims that 1 Timothy is still used to legitimize female subjugation. But Maria, too, 
in Maria69, seems to limit the practice of female subjugation based on 1 Timothy to “sects and 
religious groups.” Like Susanne did earlier, Maria, finds that the broad Christian mainstream 
distances itself from the use of 1 Timothy 2:8-15 to promote female subjugation.  
 
Inger116: Can I ask … do any imams in Norway interpret this text the same way as you do? 
 
Aira241: I have only heard one, in England, and he is dead now, he died a short while ago. 
 
Inger117: Then you have an important task. 
 
Aira242: Yes. And perhaps there is this one in Sweden …. Anne Sofie200… and perhaps 
Lena Larsen201, but I haven’t heard her on this.… I have heard Anne Sofie. 
 
 
Inger asks specifically about the interpretive stances among Islamic religious leaders in 
Norway, requesting Aira to share her contextual knowledge. Aira does not refer to any 
Norwegian imams or other Islamic religious leaders but to an imam in England and to a 
Swedish/Norwegian Muslim researcher on Islam, Anne Sofie Roald. In the background of Aira’s 
shared contextual knowledge, Inger emphasizes the importance of the contributions by Aira and 
supposedly Shirin also. 
Aira and Inger express themselves (without dramatizing) about a situation that may easily 
be regarded as dramatic. Based on Aira’s earlier sayings on the contextual needs and how they 
should be met, it becomes apparent that she acknowledges the importance her own contribution 
                                                 
200 Anne Sofie Roald (1954- ), a Muslim convert of Norwegian origin, has been doing research on Islam and 
Muslims in Scandinavia and the West as well as in the Middle East since the mid 1990s. In her book Women in 
Islam: The Western Experience, she discusses the interpretation of Sura 4:34 (Roald 2001).  
201 Lena Larsen (1960-) is also a Muslim convert of Norwegian origin. She was the first female leader of the Islamic 
Council in Norway (2000-2003) and is presently (2010) a Ph.D.-student at the University of Oslo. 
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and own agency may have in the Norwegian context to reduce the discrepancy between her own 
ethical engagement and her interpretation of Sura 4:34 on the one hand and the reality in the 
Norwegian Muslim context as she knows it on the other.  
Aira elaborates on the interpretative situation among Muslims in Norway only when she 
is questioned directly. But when she is asked about this, she communicates her own view without 
trying to be apologetic on behalf of the Muslim communities in Norway. Instead, she stresses a 
need to improve the interpretative situation, and she is assuming a position as an agent for 
change in this situation. Aira’s willingness to share her analysis may indicate that she does not 
view this as an internal Muslim matter only, or at least she is communicating the challenges she 
identifies in an open manner. But this may also be motivated by a commitment from Aira’s side 
to protect the koranic text from what she finds to be the contextual abuse of the text. 
 
Susanne75: I think this is very interesting, because they are two completely different ways of 
relating to the text, aren’t they: to fight the effect of the text, because the effect is 
the same, namely that women are oppressed, exposed to violence, to …. 
 
Shirin208: Oppressed? 
 
Susanne76: Yes, when I read these texts, I believe that the effect is oppression, strong or 
weak, with and without violence .… For me, is the most natural thing is to 
abandon the entire text, because it is not crucial to the biblical message.  
Susanne77: To me, this is a text related to the Law; there is no Gospel in this, nothing 
pointing to the Gospel of the New Testament, so I can’t really …. 
Susanne78: So, with Luther, I can say that this text isn’t relevant for me, because it’s not part 
of the Gospel, it’s part of the Law. But you have a different interpretation as your 
premise. 
Susanne79: But I can’t avoid reading it, and I have to try to understand it in the light of my 
own context. 
 
Susanne still struggles to identify the meaning-making strategies represented in the 
conversations on Sura 4:34 and 1 Timothy 2:8-15, perhaps as a continuation of her former 
attempt to sort out the differences between a Christian and an Islamic way of interpretation. The 
two ways of interpreting she mentioned the last time concentrated on a freedom to abandon the 
text (in the Christian tradition) versus an obligation to relate to the text (in the Islamic tradition). 
The development of her own position has led her to a stance of fighting the practical effects of a 
text that she abandons in theory. Thus, her reason to relate to the text is contextually but not 
  
342 
textually motivated. Does this mean that she has changed her mind about the relevance of 
relating to the text? It seems as if she may feel forced to relate to the text after all, grounded in 
the moral obligation to fight a possible oppression of others, even if it is said to be at a certain 
distance from her own situation  
Unlike Aira, however, who stated that a widespread legitimization of oppression of 
women based on Sura 4:34 required increased knowledge, reinterpretation, and common action, 
Susanne seems to dismiss the possibility of any reinterpretation of 1 Timothy 2:8-15. She instead 
uses a hermeneutical perspective to marginalize the text from 1 Timothy 2 further: the Lutheran 
hermeneutical distinction between Law and Gospel in the biblical texts (Ulstein 2006: 107-110). 
Eva used the same hermeneutical tool in the general discussion about the participants’ general 
view of the Koran and the Bible (Eva9-20, p. 124-125). Based on this hermeneutical concept, 
Susanne evaluates the text from 1 Timothy as peripheral in the biblical canon, as representing the 
Law, and thus in the margin.  
 
Aira243:  It’s important to create more knowledge, and it’s important that we, women and 
men, create some groups where we can take a look at …. I think something like 
this has started, but it is moving ahead very slowly. 
Aira244: And actually, it’s a difficult job to do because of most people who understand 
this literally are also dominating women and oppressing them. That’s the easiest 
for all. 
Aira245: And women are oppressed, yes, because they don’t have the knowledge that … 
the insights they really need to prove it, look here, what is the Koran saying? 
Aira246: Not many women can say “No, I will not listen to you if you ….” I never say that 
I am obedient; I can listen to my husband, but if he chooses to do something 
against the message of God, there is no reason why I should follow him. 
 
Shirin209: You know that God’s message really is that … what is really the message of 
God? 
 
Aira reflects on factors she finds prevent the change she calls for among Muslims and 
mentions three: continuing dominating and oppressing women turns out to be “the easiest for all” 
(Aira244), women don’t have the knowledge needed about the Koran (Aira245), and they do not 
have the courage to stand up for themselves in marriages where their husband violates God’s 
message (Aira246). She repeats her call for groups to assume agency for change, and emphasizes 
that men should be involved in the work for change, alongside women. Aira246 repeats that, to 
Aira, God is the final authority, and the only authority a Muslim, male or female, has to obey.  
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So, Shirin asks, what is really the message of God? Returning to a fundamental question 
brings the conversation on the specific texts to a more general level. It is difficult to say if the 
question is meant to be rhetorical, but it nevertheless functions as an invitation to conversation. 
Is Shirin thinking solely about finding the message of God in the Islamic tradition or does she 
include the Christian tradition as well? The intention behind this question may be addressed 
across religious borders, reflecting Shirin’s statements of similarities and equality between the 
religions and her quest for a common ground (Shirin18, p. 130).  
 
Aira247: It is, for instance, that one should be equal, and …. 
Aira248: There are two things in the message of Islam: obligations toward God, and 
obligations toward other people. If we don’t fulfill those obligations …. 
 
Shirin210: What are those obligations? 
 
Aira249: If you are after me all the time, if you abuse me all the time, if you hit me all the 
time and are violent against me, then you don’t live up to your obligations. Then 
I don’t want to be maintained or obey him. It is as easy as that. 
 
Aira answers Shirin’s question twice: first without reference to a specific religion and 
then with reference to the Islamic tradition. Aira’s second answer (Aira248) on the double 
obligation of the human being in Islam introduces this principle to clarify the meaning of the 
specific text of Sura 4:34. This is done by stating that the obligations toward others are limited – 
so as to avoid legitimizing the abuse of power in the name of Islam. Aira moves between the 
general and the specific and shows once more that a broader perspective from the Islamic 
tradition is necessary to interpret this specific text. If the narrative of Jesus Christ in the New 
Testament is the hermeneutical center for the Christian participants, equality between humans 
together with obedience to God may be the hermeneutical center for Aira. 
 
Maria70: I just wanted to say that when I read the two … the koranic text is quite short, but 
in a way I think … when trying to explain it, I do find a little bit of a positive 
message in the way the Koran puts it. Because it elaborates on how women are 
equipped, whether or not we mean bodily, I don’t know, but if we mean that 
women are equipped for childbearing, that one should take care of them and 
things like that, it is actually somewhat positive. 
Maria71: The Christian text, I think it’s very…. It’s very concerned about women’s 
appearance and makes women responsible for not dressing in a way that attracts 
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attention. It talks about not dressing up, not taking care of your hair and 
hairstyling. Everything about gold jewelry and that … to me this has nothing to 
do with the heart or the personality of the person inside. 
Maria72: I believe that is a very old … what should I say, old-fashioned way of thinking 
here, to say that women are only good enough when they don’t look pretty. And I 
think that’s weird. 
 
Inger118: Boring. 
 
Maria does not seem to have given up her search for positive elements in the koranic text 
and finds a possible positive sign in reading childbearing as a positive quality of women into the 
text (Maria70). She does not, however, say anything about looking for positive elements in the 
New Testament text and instead repeats her earlier criticism. 1 Timothy 2:8-15 is indirectly 
placed in the past again, conveying an old-fashioned view that appears strange and foreign. 
 
Susanne80: But I think … even if this text is used concretely as the reason behind the 
oppression of women in certain groups, parts of this text are also used within 
broader groups. In the entire Catholic Church and with certain ministers in the 
Lutheran church, it is used as an argument against female ministers. 
Susanne81: The… “a woman should receive the teaching in silence … I don’t permit a 
woman to act as a teacher,”202 these verses are used to argue against female 
ministers. And that is … most of the Christian world uses this text to do exactly 
that. So even if we can abandon this text for historical reasons, much of it is still 
used …. 
 
Inger119: Today. 
 
Susanne82: As a very central text today. And I find that problematic. 
 
It seems here that the context where 1 Timothy 2:8-15 represents the legitimization of 
female subjugation is gradually being extended. The place of the literal implementation of this 
text was suggested to be “sects and extreme groups” (Susanne68). Susanne relates the text from 
                                                 
202 This quote is from the Norwegian translation of the Bible used in the group (Bibelselskapet 1978), where the text 
in Norwegian is: “En kvinne skal motta læren i taushet. Jeg tillater ikke en kvinne å opptre som lærer.” 
  
345 
1 Timothy to a theological resistance to female priests in the Roman Catholic church, and 
declares it to be “a very central text today” (Susanne82).  
Why does Susanne change her perspective on the extent of the text’s influence? The 
Roman Catholic Church was hardly meant to be included in her earlier reference to “sects and 
extreme groups.” Perhaps she has been reminded of a larger context throughout the discussion 
and, while including a global and not only a national context, she realizes it is necessary to 
extend her own perspective. The challenges have been moved from the past and the periphery to 
the now and to church communities situated in the Norwegian context, which implies that the 
location is now getting very close to the “here.” 
 
Inger120: But what are our opinions, then … is there any reason why we should have a 
specific message for women, for me as a woman, different from a man? I don’t 
really think so. 
Inger121: There are certain things linked to childbirth, but it is a very small part, it is 1.8 
children per Norwegian woman, and it is a very limited period of life.  
Inger122: This might be relevant for you now, but, generally speaking, in our society, 
where everyone is educated, and things are organized for us to have children, we 
are equal. 
Inger123: So why should there be any specific regulations for women at all? 
Inger124: And the way I read the New Testament, how Jesus met women, exalted them, 
and gave them status and attention, I can’t see that there should be any 
restrictions on what we can do. 
Inger125: We too can preach the word of God, we have been empowered, equal; this is my 
understanding, my interpretation.  
Inger126: I don’t know about more … do we have any thoughts on this, now at the end? 
Are there specific messages to women in the Koran, different from the message 
for men? 
 
Inger portrays a division of gender roles displayed as commandments directed only to 
women in the biblical material, with 1 Timothy as one example, as absurd. Her argumentation is 
based on a comparison with contemporary social norms and structures in Norway, Jesus’ 
narrated teachings and actions, and women’s actual abilities. To establish a set of norms for 
women different from those for men does not make any sense for Inger, and she positions herself 
very clearly in this respect. Her contribution is, however, framed by questions so as to include 
her Muslim co-participants in a shared reflection on gender roles and gender models in the two 
traditions.  
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Shirin211: The way I read the Bible and the Koran as a whole, no. It is equality, and there is 
this beautiful verse that I remember: that they complement each other. This 
means that they live together, and become a whole.  
Shirin212: Not that they are not whole, but … I don’t understand this as oppressive. 
… 
Shirin213: Some say that it is created, and you can’t do anything about it. It is created like 
that. It is supposed to be like that. Some fundamentalists who do terrible things, 
interpret it in this way. 
Shirin214: But others say, no, it has come gradually, depending on the situation of the 
Prophet. Then you look at what it was, what the intention was, what happened. 
Shirin215: This is why I say that I am of no less worth, according to what I have understood 
from the Koran as a whole. 
 
Shirin’s claim that human equality is the core message of both the Bible and the Koran is 
an inclusive statement, but it also opens up the question of how Shirin actually views the 
relationship between these scriptures. Does she view the Bible as part of the basis for the Koran, 
only using the Koran as the interpretative key to understanding the Bible? Or does she compare 
them as separate expressions of their respective traditions?  
Shirin’s concept of equality (Shirin211), applied to gender relations, suggests a 
complementary view of the roles of men and women, that only together can they represent a 
whole (Shirin211). She adds that she does not find this oppressive (Shirin212). However, she 
hedges her statement by claiming that this does not imply that women and men are “not-whole” 
in themselves. Shirin’s view of gender equality could thus be marked more by a complementary 
gender model than the view some of the Christian participants seem to hold, i.e. that men and 
women are equal concerning both status and roles and cannot be placed in fixed categories. Inger 
and Maria in particular have been explicit about this. Eva argued, however, earlier for the 
existence of universal experiences of women to which men do not have access (cf. p. 165) and 
used this standpoint to disqualify the text as a trustworthy narrative about a woman and child 
because of an alleged male author. But this way of portraying differences between men and 
women is not identical with a complementary model, which implies that women and men are 
supposed to fulfill different tasks but nevertheless claims that they have the same status. 
Defenders of this gender model often replace gender equality with gender equity.203 Eva’s view 
                                                 
203 An example of this in the Islamic tradition is the Islamic scholar Jamal Badawi (Egypt/Canada) and his book 
Gender Equity in Islam: Basic Principles (Badawi 1995).  
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is closer to suggesting a gendered dichotomy. And while Shirin’s complementary model is 
viewed as harmonious, Eva’s approach is shaped by a power analytical feminist view of gender 
differences. Both approaches, however, confirm and legitimize universal differences between 
men and women in different ways. 
 
Maria73: … With those texts … because I am a child of God in the same way as a man and 
can practice my faith in the way I understand it, and want to do it … so 
personally, this does not affect me, I don’t want it to affect me. I don’t want that. 
Maria74: I think they are … I don’t want that. But I can’t only think about myself. I have 
to show solidarity to others who are oppressed by this.  
Maria75: And that is why it becomes important and interesting for me how it is used to 
oppress other women. I am actually lucky, I can make a choice, while many 
others can’t do that, or they have been brainwashed through religious sects, 
through Islam, through Christianity, and all that. 
 
Maria declares that she shares the strategy of the abandonment of the text(s) for her own 
part. She legitimizes this choice, and the fact that she has a choice, through claiming religious 
autonomy and identifying herself as a religious believer on the same footing as men (Maria73). 
Maria applies a contextual understanding of the texts requiring her to relate to them or, rather, to 
relate to oppressive interpretations of them (Maria74-75). She chooses to engage with other 
women who do not have this choice, viewing this as a moral obligation. This solidarity seems to 
be presented as an obligation crossing religious boundaries, since Maria can be understood to 
include in her solidarity Muslim women who suffer because of the koranic text, as well as 
Christian women who suffer because of the biblical text. 
 
Shirin216:  Just this verse, from the first day I read it: it made me very angry. And I felt … 
no, no, with a small twig, do it like that. But what about the mental problems it 
creates?  
Shirin217: Then you see that OK, at that time, it was perhaps understandable. But to me, it is 
not understandable.… And look at what men do to their women, just because of 
this verse.  
Shirin218: And many, many verses say that you should do good deeds, you should create a 
society without poverty … nobody … 
 
Aira250: … cares about that. 
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Why does the koranic text in Sura 4:34 have such great influence among Muslims, 
whereas other texts in the Koran are overlooked? Both Shirin and Aira seem to agree that this is 
the case, which they find it difficult to accept. Why is a text that creates suffering for women 
highlighted in the tradition when texts about abolishing poverty do not seem to have much 
influence on social practices, cf. Sura 4:36? Shirin’s reflections raise an important question 
concerning power of interpretation: Who decides which texts should be highlighted? In 
mainstream Islamic religious practice there is no escape from relating to the entire Koran. Is a 
text used extensively to legitimize male superiority in marriage, more important than texts 
prescribing abolishment of poverty?  
 
Inger127: I just wanted to add that … I think we should move on, and I believe that 
nowadays, not many Christians … now the church is … people change, and then 
the texts change too. 
Inger128: I think that today, the church is more concerned about its view of women, for 
women have, at least in the West, come very far. But I believe that the church 
today is even more concerned about other issues like homosexuality and things 
like that, which have become more urgent than the problem between women and 
men. 
 
The expression “People change, and then texts change too” (Inger127) emphasizes the 
reader/interpreter as the decisive subject in the hermeneutical process. Inger has established 
herself throughout the process as an autonomous reader of the text, and this statement fits well 
with this position. The process of change is thus located by the transformation of the reader. It 
happens before the interpretation as such but influences the interpretative situation. There is a 
temporal aspect in Inger’s statement, with a certain optimism reflected in the current situation 
located among Western Christian women. Inger suggests that the interpretative challenge for the 
Western churches in the interpretation of biblical texts has moved from gender issues and the 
view of women to the issue of homosexuality.204  
Inger reflects on change in the interpretation of canonical scriptures as an unavoidable 
process, not unlike Eva’s earlier statement on the difficulty of imagining any fixated 
interpretation (Eva144-146, p. 286). Inger, like Susanne, had dismissed the text from 1 Timothy 
                                                 
204 In the Church of Norway the debate on homosexuality and how to interpret relevant biblical texts has been the 
crucial issue for some time. However, the general view of the Bible and biblical interpretation may also be affected 
by this discussion. This is shown in the statement by the Church of Norway National Council represented by its 
Doctrinal Committee, which discusses the issue of homosexuality from the broad perspective of Christian Lutheran 
biblical hermeneutics in a document from 2006 (Kirkerådet 2006). 
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earlier without trying to reinterpret it. The cause may be that Inger experiences the situation of 
women to be satisfying within her own religious context, leaving 1 Timothy behind as a mere 
outdated text. Inger’s reflection on interpretation in Inger127, however, does not have any 
reservations, so she opens the way theoretically for a new interpretation of even 1 Timothy 2:8-
15. None of the Christian participants, however, made any attempt at interpretation in this 
direction throughout the conversations, except for Susanne’s attempt to read the text with “a 
maximum of goodwill”. Their activity of making meaning has mainly been to situate the text 
historically and to situate it on the margins of the Christian canonical tradition. 
 
Susanne83: Yes, I agree, but at the same time this issue about female ministers is an issue 
that … even if one can think that … this is still a difficult issue in many other 
churches.  
Susanne84: And a non-existent issue … or a very problematic issue. But otherwise, I think 
that … Eva’s presentation of herself in our first meetings “I am a feminist 
because I am a Christian,” kind of, I found very exciting, and yes, it was 
meaningful. 
Susanne85: Because the message is a liberating message that women are of equal worth and 
should have the same rights. 
Susanne86: But a different issue is that I think Christianity kind of gives a certain boldness, 
in the way I interpret it, to demand one’s rights as a woman, and … yes.  
Susanne87: But as far as I understand, that in Islam it is more … it’s not … oppressive 
toward women as a religion. Women have another function, I don’t know if I am 
right, but women have another …. 
 
Shirin219: To subjugate us, they say actually you have other functions. If you have the 
opportunity, you can test out every area, right? As long as you get support. Right, 
if one gets support, one can continue …. 
 
Susanne88: But I have heard both, that it is to keep women down and that it is to exalt 
women in a way to say that they are of equal value, only that you have different 
areas. 
 
Consistent with her own broadened perspective, Susanne argues that there are still issues 
concerning women that should be solved in “many other churches.” The challenge is 
contemporary, in the “now,” but in this section it is not located in the “here.” Neither Inger nor 
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Susanne seem to find any significant unequal treatment of women and men within their own 
church tradition, the Church of Norway.  
Why did they not spell out this contextual knowledge earlier in the discussion? It may be 
partly because they included the Church of Norway when they spoke about Norwegian society, 
which they have claimed is a gender equal society. They have not, however, been asked to share 
this knowledge by the Muslim participants either. This may be because the Muslim participants 
also view the Church of Norway and Norwegian society to be one and the same context. 
Susanne’s earlier statement about some male ministers opposing female ministers in the Church 
of Norway is now absent from the discussion. Contextual challenges from the Norwegian 
majority context, including the Church of Norway concerning gender equality, is generally not 
addressed as a contemporary issue by anyone in the group. Does this mean they regard such 
challenges as non-existent?  
Linking up with Eva’s self-presentation at the first meeting: “I am a feminist because I 
am a Christian” (Susanne84), Susanne presents the Christian Lutheran tradition as a valuable 
resource for feminism, both doctrinally and practically (Susanne85-86). This statement of the 
Christian Lutheran tradition as a “perfect” base for feminism, is however, contrasted with a 
statement on Islam as assigning different roles to men and women. Susanne is careful not to state 
that she finds “Islam as a religion” oppressive to women (Susanne87). She describes the view of 
gender relations in the Lutheran Christian tradition as more or less feminist constructivist, and 
the Islamic view on gender as complementary. Attention is turning back to the challenges 
connected to gender issues among Muslims, which has generally been given a great deal of focus 
in the discussions on Sura 4:34 and 1 Timothy 2:8-15. 
 Shirin’s reflections on her earlier presentation of a complementary gender model as not 
being oppressive is, in her response to Susanne’s comments, viewed as a model that could be 
used in an oppressive way (Shirin219). Susanne, for her part, acknowledges that a 
complementary gender model may have different representations and effects (Susanne88). 
 
Susanne89: Women are chiefly responsible for the home and the children, and that is a task 
of such importance that it should be lifted up, so that it becomes a positive rather 
than a negative value.  
Susanne90: But in my ears this turns into “women should stay at home.” So, for me, this 
becomes something negative, even if I understand from the discussions I have 
had with Muslim girls that they view it as something positive, and I can see the 
positive in it, but for me it’s kind of difficult to relate to an interpretation like 
that. 
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Aira251: But if one says that women’s only function is to be at home and bring up the 
children, that would be totally wrong. And it is wrongly understood as well. 
Aira252: Because if we look at it, the Prophet’s own wife was a businessman … woman.  
… 
Aira253: It depends on how we experience our everyday life. If we can make it … if my 
children suffer because I am out all the time and fixated on my career … and I 
forget and my husband forgets …. Both of them ought to organize this in a way 
that doesn’t make the children suffer.… 
Aira254: It can be a very demanding situation both being at home and still doing a lot of 
other things. I have worked very much outside the home myself and still had to 
take care of the kids, so it’s not an easy task. 
 
The discussion on the different representations of a complementary gender model 
between Susanne and Aira do not reveal any great disagreements. Rather, they seem to agree that 
this model should not be used to limit women’s possibility of having access to different areas of 
life, both private and public. Susanne from outside and Aira from within the Islamic tradition are 
aware of the challenges the complementary model may represent for Muslim women. Aira, 
however, has the knowledge to challenge the limitations the model may impose on women 
without stepping out of the model herself. She addresses another aspect: the limitations inherent 
in the complementary model may also be a limitation on the total amount of work that can 
sensibly be borne by women. Aira refers to her own experience of having a double task 
(Aira254) and emphasizes that children should not be sacrificed for a career. But she includes 
both the mother and the father in the responsibility for raising the children, and the warning not 
to put their careers above children is thus addressed to both.  
 
Shirin220: Do you know why? Because our men don’t take any responsibility for the 
situation. 
 
Aira255: No, it’s very important that we talk, and then …  
Aira256: … we should not blame Islam. The Prophet himself helped his women in the 
home. So, then it’s their own local traditions or their male chauvinism or 
dominant attitude toward women, and that is a completely different tradition. We 
can’t mix culture and Islam. 
 
Shirin221: These attitudes are everywhere. 
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Aira257: Yes, but then we have to talk about culture, and not about Islam. 
 
Shirin222:  Yes … everyone says that the women have come very far, but they do both jobs, 
at home and outside the home. You see? 
 
Aira258: And they are expected to contribute everywhere. This is what has to change. 
 
In Shirin’s accusation against “our men” in Shirin220, it is not entirely clear who is 
addressed. Is she referring to Muslim men or simply all men? Shirin221 and 222 may be 
consistent with both interpretations. Aira’s answers, however, are limited to Muslim men, and 
she suggests a more thorough distinction between Islamic and cultural influences as a possible 
solution. For Aira, culture and “male chauvinism” (Aira256) is the cause of unjust practices 
toward Muslim women, not Islam. She suggests that if the example of Muhammad is followed, 
the problems will be solved. Shirin’s statement “These attitudes are everywhere” seems less 
optimistic and perhaps also more reluctant with regard to the project of distinguishing between 
religious and cultural influences. What Shirin and Aira both address as the most acute problem 
for women, however, is not that they are obliged to stay at home, but rather that their 
responsibilities are endless: in the home and outside the home (Shirin222, Aira258). Shirin222 
may, in addition, be a criticism of the notion presented earlier that gender equality has already 
been achieved. Is the project of gender equality resulting in women working twice as much as 
men? This is the first time in the project anyone has asked critical questions about the status of 
gender equality in the Norwegian majority context. 
 
Inger129: This is a crucial point, if the men take responsibility at home or are willing to 
stay at home, perhaps for some months to take care of the children, only then 
have we have come so far that women do not bear a double burden. 
 
Shirin223: The function of the women outside the home is very … what is it, more 
important. If the women make more money, why don’t the men stay at home and 
take care of the children during the time they can choose to do so? And then the 
woman can work outside the home.  
Shirin224: Do you know what happens if a Muslim man stays at home? It is a complete 
disaster. 
 
Inger feels included in the description of women’s limitless responsibility and suggests 
that the only way to change this is to balance the gender roles and the accompanying duties in the 
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private sphere (Inger129). Inger views the gender equality situation in present-day Norway as not 
perfect after all. Shirin follows up, strongly arguing for women to be able to work outside the 
home, even if this requires a change of function between men and women within the family 
(Shirin222).  
Then the whole discussion ends with a rather discouraging statement about the ability of 
the “Muslim man” to fulfill domestic duties. All of the participants have portrayed women 
thoroughly as able to fulfill the role and functions of both women and men, traditionally 
speaking. The willingness and ability among men to fulfill the traditional role and function of 
women in the home is, however, questioned. Shirin seems to dismiss male ability completely in 
this regard. Her statement may be intended to be humorous, but nobody laughs.  
 
Negotiating Context: Identifying the Contexts of Significance 
Throughout the discussions on Sura 4:34 and 1 Timothy 2:8-15 there has been a gap between the 
Christian and the Muslim participants regarding their attention to these texts in context. The text 
from 1 Timothy is judged to be stripped of any authority in the religious contexts of the Christian 
participants who were present when the text was discussed. The Christian participants have 
gradually, however, come to see the text from 1 Timothy not only as a ghost from a grim past, 
legitimizing female subjugation, but also as a text still representing a challenge within the 
Christian tradition. It is only when this particular text moves from being read as a text from a 
distant past to being read into contexts beyond the Church of Norway that the negotiations on 
which context to relate to when describing challenges in the present start. Susanne and Maria 
connect the immediately interpreted message of 1 Timothy to practices of gender injustices in 
Christian contexts other than their own. They do not necessarily relate these practices directly to 
the influence of 1 Timothy but rather include 1 Timothy in a broader textual heritage from the 
Christian canon that may legitimize gendered hierarchies.  
 The Muslim participants generally relate to a context beyond Norway in making meaning 
throughout the project. This may have influenced the Christian participants. But it seems as if 
Maria’s globalized view has influenced them more. The expectation among the Norwegian 
Christians in the group that the Christian and Islamic traditions have different challenges 
regarding gender issues may have contributed to a situation where the challenges in contexts 
defined as “Muslim” are regarded as not comparable with contexts defined as “Christian.” The 
opening to other significant Christian contexts appears when “Christian” is no longer seen 
automatically as equivalent to “Norwegian Lutheran Christian.” But do the Muslims see it the 
same way, that is, do they expect that the challenges for the Christian and Muslim contexts 
respectively are incompatible? 
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 The Muslim participants distinguish more clearly between the West and places outside of 
the West, often their countries of origin such as Pakistan and Iran. These distinctions are not 
linked to religion but to geography, culture, and social and political circumstances. Since the 
Norwegian Christian participants scarcely address challenges that women face in Christian 
contexts and in Norway in general, this shapes the image that Christian Norway is a context of 
gender equality. The Muslim Norway, however, emerges as a context struggling with the 
reinterpretation of an Islamic tradition that has generally been associated with cultures of 
discrimination. 
 The question of framing contexts of significance thus seems to relate to a cultural rather 
than a religious background: the participants with a plural background include contexts beyond 
Norway when making meaning of the texts. This has two consequences for the negotiation on 
context: the Norwegian context becomes visible as a context of its own, not only a given space of 
automatic reference, and contexts outside Norway are integrated into the group’s perspective as 
contexts of significance. 
 
Then and Now, Here and There: Situating Texts, Readers, and Contexts 
Navigation through texts and interpretations of texts, contexts, and reading positions is often 
framed in temporal and spatial expressions. The texts as texts are generally placed in the past, 
although differently so: they could be contextually situated or not, taking the texts’ historical 
contexts into account in the meaning making. The past in which the texts are placed could 
represent something the participant wants to distance herself from – as a negative mirror of the 
present or just representing a different time. The evaluation of the “past” decides if the 
participant sees a need to bridge the gap between past and present, between the text representing 
the past and the reader representing the present, or if the gap should be maintained.  
 Then there is the matter of situating the texts in the present, which is related to the 
reader’s making meaning of the text as well as of other interpretations of the text. Both are 
connected to a context where the text appears to represent some kind of meaning. As mentioned 
above, negotiating contexts are part of the meaning-making process in the group. This means that 
the project is not only about reading texts but clearly about reading contexts as well. The readers 
situate themselves in a here and now, and all of the participants emphasize the need to keep 
focusing on the present. But what does this entail? And does this mean that they refer to the same 
present? 
 Generally speaking, the Christian participants speak more in terms of temporal framing 
(of the texts themselves and the contexts) and the Muslim participants more about spatial 
framing in their interpretation (the West, Iran, Pakistan, or other contexts). The Muslim 
participants too, however, do include temporal framing in their hermeneutics but seem to assess 
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the temporal gap between themselves and the koranic text as less problematic. The narratives 
from the times of Islam’s origin are used as corrections of contemporary interpretations of Sura 
4:34 that are regarded as oppressive. Thus, they do not place the origin of gendered injustice in 
the past or paint an image of the past as simply negative. The Christian participants, with Maria 
as the exception, usually make a distinction between past and present where the past – except 
that of the biblical narratives about Jesus’ actions and sayings – is viewed as negative and the 
present as positive. Maria, however, claims that the differences between past and present 
regarding the oppression of women are only established in certain contexts and, generally, she 
seems to view gender equality as fragile regardless of different contexts. 
 When the participants formulate challenges for themselves, it is mostly the Muslim 
participants and Maria who insist on breaking down an image of a perfect “here and now.” Their 
use of temporal and spatial tools of interpretation seems to blur the total separation between 
“here” and “there” as well as that between “then” and “now.” This way of situating texts, 
contexts, and readers in a complicated web of experience, contextual knowledge, and 
interpretative situations make them suggest concrete action in the imperfect context of the 
present. 
 
Hermeneutics and Interpretative Community = Dialogue? 
The utterances, reflections, and statements in this last discussion reflect a hermeneutical spiral 
movement in the communicative process, where much of the same reasoning is shared but is 
expressed more and more precisely. The reasoning often happens in verbal interaction, meaning 
that the articulation of a thought seems to coincide with the thinking process. At this stage, the 
participants have learned about the views of the others, and this may have created a 
communicative space where an interpretative community emerges more clearly, creating a 
shared “we.”  
 It seems that the participants are now aware of their different hermeneutical strategies 
toward Sura 4:34 and 1 Timothy 2:8-15. The strategies of the Norwegian Christians are marked 
by a Christocentric hermeneutics and define their religious and social context as generally 
satisfactory. The Muslims stay with their commitment to change the interpretation of Sura 4:34, 
as motivated by their analysis of the contextual needs. But both strategies imply a strong 
subjective position for themselves as readers and interpreters. In this way, both the abandonment 
of 1 Timothy and the close textual interaction with Sura 4:34 represent compatible views of their 
own position. An interpretative community caused by a mutual acknowledgement of the 
importance of textual interpretation is established. The reference to gender equality as an ethical 
value in the reading of texts and contexts is commonly agreed upon, although the exact definition 
of what gender and gendered roles imply differs between the Muslim and the Christian 
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participants. But everyone dismisses structures of male authority over women, based on gender 
only. 
 Susanne is the only one in this discussion who addresses differences between Christian 
and Islamic hermeneutics, stating that she may abandon the text from 1 Timothy on the basis of 
her own religious tradition, whereas the Muslims do not have the option of abandoning texts 
from the Koran. Aira recognizes her description of this hermeneutical difference.  
 It seems as if the intersubjective communication is encountering differences in meaning-
making strategies, thus including different views in what could be called a dialogical 
interpretative community where there is mutual awareness and the acknowledgement that 
hermeneutical difference constitutes no hindrance to mutual understanding and communication.  
 The most striking emergence, perhaps, of an interpretative community in this section, 
however, appears toward the end. This is where the immaculate image of gender equality in 
Norway starts to crack for the first time. After having discussed how women have access to all 
areas in Norwegian society, this is suddenly turned around to pose a challenge. Women have a 
double task struggling to fulfill all the roles they have access to in the society of gender equality. 
Shirin raises this as a critical question. Participants, regardless of religious and cultural 
background, seem to agree, and there is a common understanding of what needs to be changed. 
Men have to be willing to share the women’s workload in the home as well as in the religious 
interpretation of difficult canonical texts. Gender justice is not only about the rights of women – 
it is also about redefining the responsibilities of men. 
 
Moral Critique and Moral Enrichment of Sura 4:34 and 1 Timothy 2:8-15 
The basis of ethical critique and moral enrichment of canonical texts is that the reader is regarded 
as a moral subject, with a responsibility toward the context, the text, and her own integrity. When 
there is a discrepancy between moral messages as viewed in the text and the moral stances of the 
reader, the reader faces a dilemma. Moral critique and moral enrichment are two terms that 
basically express the same attitude of the reader toward the text, but they may entail different 
understandings of the authority of the texts. Moral critique indicates a greater distance from the 
text, whereas moral enrichment may indicate a closer bond between reader and text.205  
 The Christian participants engage in ethical critique of both the New Testament and the 
koranic text, based on an ethical principle of gender equality. The Muslim participants relate to 
Sura 4:34 with their own moral stances, which influence their making of meaning. The New 
Testament text does not become an object of ethical critique or moral enrichment for the Muslim 
participants.  
                                                 
205 See Chapter 2 for discussions on the terms moral enrichment and moral critique of the texts, p. 48-50. 
  
357 
What dominates communication in the group, however, is the moral critique of textual 
interpretations (misinterpretations, abuse of power, legitimization of male authority over 
women). This is based on contextual knowledge about the past and the present.  
 
The Will of God, the Will of the Readers: Taking on a Shared Agency? 
What really, Shirin asks, is the message of God? Aira answers that God’s will, as revealed in the 
Koran, is human equality. The Christian participants believe that gender equality is part of Jesus’ 
message: We have been empowered and are equal to men, Inger states. The Norwegian Christian 
participants usually refer to gender equality when addressing human equality, whereas the 
Muslim participants and Maria more often include the question of human equality in a broader 
perspective (encompassing religious belonging, social class, geographical location.) This 
intersectional approach to equality did not become a distinct topic in the group.  
 Among the participants, Aira and Maria are the ones who most clearly articulate 
suggestions for shared agency. Their approaches are inclusive across gender and religious 
belonging, and directed to working with people in their contexts. The task is to change 
oppressive interpretations of the texts and make room for supportive qiwama.  
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Part V: 
 
Concluding Remarks 
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Chapter 7: 
Conclusions 
 
It makes sense in this concluding chapter to organize the most important findings in the analysis 
around the three key terms in Chapter 2: hermeneutics, dialogue, and feminisms.    
 
What Kind of Hermeneutics? 
Situated hermeneutics, usually called “meaning making” throughout this dissertation, reveal 
different strategies and patterns of making meaning in the group. The discussions are marked by 
the Norwegian context through references and experiences shared by the participants. But they 
relate to other cultural, social, and geographical contexts as well. The hermeneutical situation is 
marked by the interpretation of the texts, the interpretation of other textual interpretations, and 
critical engagement with both. The interpreted encounter between readers and texts and between 
the readers is marked by the fact that the participants are Muslim and Christian believers, 
individuals with different cultural backgrounds, and women.  
 It is apparent that there are internal differences both among the Muslim and the Christian 
participants in their making meaning of the texts, dissolving any idea of the two religious 
traditions as fixed and stable entities. The destabilizing term transreligious hermeneutics thus 
emerges as an adequate description.  
The cultural background of the readers proved to be an influential variable in making 
meaning through destabilizing the representations of the religious traditions. The effect of this 
cultural diversity is made most visible by the Christian participants with an additional non-
Norwegian background, because they openly refer to African or Middle Eastern cultures 
respectively. The Christians with a Norwegian background identify with the majority Norwegian 
culture, but these references are often only made in implicit ways. The Muslim participants 
seem, generally, to refer more to their religious tradition in the interpretation of the texts and in 
analyzing contemporary contexts than to culture. They challenge the cultural and political 
references (Iran and Pakistan) repeatedly with their conception of Islam, contrasting the two.  
The distinction between culture and religion, however, is difficult to make on a general 
basis, and the participants themselves struggle with this distinction. There seems to be no clear 
answer in the empirical material to the question if the primary identification of the participants is 
cultural or religious. At times cultural identification proves important, but more often religious 
identification seems to be the primary reference. This may well be because of the pre-established 
structuring of this study. The participants were selected primarily because of their Christian or 
Muslim background, and the focus on canonical texts may have reinforced the highlighting of 
the religious traditions.  
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The various cultural backgrounds make it possible to investigate the relation between 
religion and culture in making meaning of the texts. This becomes particularly visible in some of 
the discussions on representations of Christian and Muslim traditions, where the variety 
regarding cultural backgrounds enable the participants to discuss how Christianity and Islam are 
intertwined and interact with cultures. Examples are Discussion 1 on the Hagar/Hajar narratives 
regarding the naming of women and Maria’s regular references to an African context, which is 
also marked by Christianity. The consciousness about cultural variations in the representation of 
the religious traditions entails that the understanding of the Christian tradition is extended 
beyond its representation in the Norwegian and Western contexts and that the Islamic tradition is 
not made equal to concepts of Middle Eastern or East Asian cultures. The cross variations 
regarding cultural background within the group make it possible to challenge stereotypical 
conceptions about Christianity and Islam among the participants. 
 That the participants are all women impacts the making of meaning not in one common 
way but in various ways. The experience of what it means to have a Christian or a Muslim faith 
and to be a woman and its further impact on the hermeneutical approach to the texts is expressed 
differently. Most of the participants state openly that they regard themselves as feminists, and 
nobody says she is not a feminist. How this is displayed in the making of meaning differs, and 
will be further commented upon in the section below on feminisms. For most of the participants, 
however, this implies that if the canonical scriptures of Christianity or Islam are interpreted in a 
way that they find to be women’s disadvantage – to control women, or to promote male 
superiority or dominance – this is seen as a misrepresentation of the tradition and the texts’ 
divine message. For the Muslim participants, this concerns the entire koranic text, which they 
claim must be interpreted with the necessary historical and contextual knowledge and skills, a 
hermeneutical approach they argue is derived from the Koran itself. For the Christian 
participants, the hermeneutical key is the story of Jesus, representing for them an ideal of 
practiced gender equality overruling other biblical texts that might suggest something different. 
Even if the participants’ ideals about how gender roles should be constructed in social and family 
life probably differs to some degree and their views on the Bible and the Koran as authoritative 
scripture differ as well, they nevertheless meet in a critical project to challenge interpretative 
practices in both traditions that favor men’s control over women. 
The participants’ making meaning of the text from the other tradition follows to a large 
extent the hermeneutical strategies the participants apply to their own texts. This means that the 
Christian participants are generally as critical of the texts from the Koran and hadith as they are 
in their interpretation and questioning of the biblical texts. The respect the Muslim participants, 
on the other hand, generally show to the biblical texts is similar to the respect they show the texts 
from the Koran and hadith. But at the same time they critically evaluate the biblical texts against 
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the content of the Koran, thus giving the Koran an epistemological preference. Establishing a 
shared hermeneutics toward the canonical texts (in the sense of common understandings of the 
texts as texts) does not happen, since the participants stay with their developed interpretative 
strategies in relation to their own canonical texts. 
It is in making meaning of texts in context, in negotiating contexts, and through 
analogical reasoning (including moral enrichment and moral critique of the texts), that a 
transcontextual space of making meaning emerges at times throughout the group’s interpretative 
process. The hermeneutics “on the ground” in this study, which may be called transreligious, 
thus relates to the contextual. The contextual perspectives appear when the situated 
interpretations of the texts as well as their impact on people’s lives are discussed. The role of the 
canonical texts in this will be addressed later. I will first discuss the positioning of the readers in 
the group process. 
 
Meaning-Making Positioning: Between Fluidity and Fixation 
The participants as readers all define themselves as interpreters, and through this they take on a 
responsibility in relation to the texts. This is most obvious among the Muslim participants, who 
express this responsibility in order to secure the status of the texts in general (and they include 
the biblical texts in this to some extent) and to work for what they perceive as a responsible 
interpretation of the Islamic texts within the Islamic communities. The latter includes 
pedagogical work to make the texts resources for fellow Muslims. The Muslim participants have 
a stable meaning-making position toward the Islamic texts, where the responsibility in the 
interpretative act is placed with the reader. The final authority, however, is located in the (divine) 
text of the Koran, thus limiting the subjective freedom of the interpreter. This places a great 
responsibility on the shoulders of the reader, who has to search for the divine meaning in the text 
(this is what the subjectivity consists of). Accessible knowledge from the tradition as well as 
contextual knowledge is seen as a requirement for interpretation and reinterpretation. This 
encourages the participants to seek knowledge about the tradition and to discuss textual 
interpretations with other Muslims as well as to be knowledgeable about society at large and to 
be aware of other peoples’ (Muslims’) experiences and needs.  
The Christian participants assume a responsibility related to the texts in a different way. 
Generally, they first need to discuss the authority of the text and to situate it in their 
understanding of the Christian tradition. The responsibility the Christian participants construct 
for themselves may include the option to dismiss the text, as in the case of 1 Timothy 2:8-15. 
They construct their interpretative position as stable regarding the readers’ subjectivity but, 
unlike their Muslim co-participants, also claim to have the final authority over the texts as 
readers – “in Jesus’ name,” so to say. The authoritative instance for them is the narratives of 
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Jesus, which they do not seem to relate to primarily as biblical texts but as narratives of faith 
shared in the church and individualized. For some, Luther’s interpretational tools of Law and 
Gospel also seem to guide their interpretations and support their positioning toward the texts. In 
their analogical reasoning they relate more to their own experiences and ideological views of 
gender relations than to other sources in the Christian tradition, including other biblical texts. It 
may be that some of the Christian participants come close to Chung Hyun Kyung’s suggestion 
“We are the text” – primarily placing the biblical text in its context, as historical or contemporary 
background material, whereas the interpreters’ own story (which includes religious experiences 
derived from the Bible, such as the narratives about Jesus) is the authoritative text. 
The instability in positioning that occurs in making meaning of the texts is not created 
through the mere presence of texts from a different religious tradition. This is the case for both 
the Muslim and the Christian participants, since they seem to interpret all texts with the same 
interpretative tools (texts from their own tradition, and texts from the tradition of the others). The 
instability – which is necessary to create a transcontextual space – emerges through the 
contributions of the participants that tend to criss-cross fixed or expected stable boundaries. 
When this happens, the existing (intrareligious) interpretative communities are expanded to 
include others.  
A cultural variable plays a significant role in many of these crossings. Rima’s 
clarification of the relation between Middle Eastern cultures and Islam and her ability to relate 
culturally to the Islamic texts means that she and temporarily becomes part of the formerly 
exclusive intra-Islamic interpretative community in the group, by virtue of her Christian Middle 
Eastern background. Maria’s perspective, which clarifies that Christianity is not identical with 
Norwegian culture (or the Norwegian representation of Christianity), also represents such a 
crossing. Different cultural and educational backgrounds of the Muslim participants may be 
reflected in how they communicate their contributions: through narratives, through argument, or 
both. The narrative presented several times (by Aira) about Muhammad telling his follower to 
use his common sense in order to find the right answers if they were not found in the Koran or in 
the Islamic law tradition seems to have communicated with everyone’s pre-knowledge. This 
suggests that religious resources, such as narratives with a general message, may also destabilize 
the religious boundaries and reveal an interpretative community, this time through a general 
recognition of the importance of human rationality. 
The general subjective positioning toward the texts generates interpretative strategies of 
analogical reasoning that seem to bring the most significant form of fluidity into the making of 
meaning. Analogical reasoning, implying the use of one’s own experiences and reflections to 
relate to the text, requires the reader to establish a sense of coevalness with the text where the 
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text is taken seriously enough to engage the reader in this way. This interpretative tool may also 
be used without an ethical motivation. 
Analogical reasoning may introduce a communicative mode marked by coevalness 
among co-readers of the text. It makes more sense to discuss moral and ethical challenges, as 
well as personal reflections and experiences, if they appear to be relevant in the “here” and 
“now.” When the participants engage in discussions on these matters, be it the question of why 
Hagar/Hajar leaves Ishmael in the desert or the possible problems in interpreting the prescriptive 
texts (Sura 4:34 and 1 Timothy 2:8-15), making meaning in the group becomes fluid in the sense 
that the meaning is not fixed beforehand, but the discussions themselves construct the meaning 
when the participants reflect as they speak and listen.  
Stable positions as readers and interpreters of canonical texts may thus create space for 
fluidity in making meaning if the stable positions are of a kind where the readers assume 
responsibility, grounded in the view that there is a distance between the interpreter and the text 
where subjectivity has space to unfold. Generally, the participants in this study argue for their 
right to take such a position on the basis of their conception of the Islamic or Christian tradition. 
The Christian participants argue with their understanding of Christian freedom; the Muslim 
participants with their trust in the Koran. Behind both is an understanding of themselves as 
believers called to be responsible and a freedom as well as an obligation to fulfill a subjective 
role in taking on agency as a maker of meaning. Taking on the responsibility as a meaning-maker 
entails taking on an agency. 
 
What Role do the Canonical Texts Play? 
What would have happened in this encountering process without the canonical texts? Chapter 4 
mentions only one discussion where the texts are not the starting point of the discussion. This 
particular discussion (about the participants’ general views on the Bible, the Koran, and the 
hadith) turns out to be rather polemic, but it is difficult to say if this is because of the absence of 
texts on which to focus. The conflict-oriented communication mode in this particular discussion 
could also be occurring because it is still early in the group process, and some participants may 
be concerned to position themselves and their beliefs in relation to the others.  
The canonical texts were given an important position in this process by the researcher, 
and the participants concentrated mostly on discussing the texts in the meetings. The rather 
consistent focus on the texts and topics derived from the texts was impressive: the participants 
went on and on through hours of discussions.  
 There may be answers to this consistency, beyond a possible loyalty to the researcher, 
which is likely to be found in the functions the texts were given by the participants by placing the 
texts in different positions. The canonical texts were given the functions of being a refuge, a 
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source of inspiration and encouragement in everyday life as well as in struggles for justice. They 
were, furthermore, given status as a sacred material object (the Koran for the Muslim 
participants), as important historical testimonies, and as the origin of important rituals (the Hajar 
narrative as the origin of sa’y for the Muslims). All these functions and representations can be 
regarded as positive. It is not surprising that it is the Muslim participants who usually give these 
functions to their canonical texts but to some extent they also include the Bible.  
However, for some Christian participants, the texts seem to represent annoyance and 
provocation or even a danger to the believers. This applies to the prescriptive texts from both the 
Bible and the Koran. The view of the Bible as a sacred object that has to be related to physically 
in a particular way is not represented among the Christian participants. Some state the contrary 
(referring to Christian freedom).  
The prescriptive texts represent dilemmas and challenges for both the Christian and 
Muslim participants. The Muslim participants do not, however, locate the dilemma in or 
challenge the koranic text itself but only possible interpretations of the text. Faced with 1 
Timothy 2:8-15 one of the Christian participants finds support for her criticism of this text in an 
Islamic tradition that one of the Muslim participants referred to in commenting on the same text 
(on the interpretation of the Fall and its consequences for men and women, p. 298-299).   
One decisive function the canonical texts have in the meaning-making process is to 
induce the participants to introduce time and temporality as a hermeneutical tool. As representing 
a different time, the texts challenge the participants on the meaning of time in interpretation. The 
participants’ placing of the texts – clearly in the past as “old” – may or may not further imply 
that the texts are irrelevant, as the time factor alone is not made decisive. Whenever a text is said 
to be irrelevant because it is “old,” other factors are added, such as moral critique of the text, 
sometimes on the evolutionary presuppositions that social and religious reasoning and moral 
knowledge are constantly improving throughout history. The Muslim participants never 
categorize an Islamic canonical text as irrelevant for either of these reasons, including temporal 
categorization, but interpretations of the texts are sometimes argued to be irrelevant because they 
are old and not helpful with regard to contemporary challenges. 
It is the participants’ contextual and analogical reasoning that introduces spatial tools of 
making meaning. But the texts are used as providing premises for including other places and 
contexts through the participants’ analogical reasoning: Mecca, the place of the performance of 
sa’y (Aira), the Middle East (Rima), contemporary contexts in Africa and Iran (Maria and 
Shirin), together with the Norwegian context that is either mentioned openly or implied.  
The differences between the Muslim and Christian participants’ view of the Bible, the 
Koran, and the hadith are not surprising but rather expected, due to the different statuses of the 
Bible and the Koran in the two traditions. Perhaps surprisingly, there is still so much to discuss 
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in making meaning across these differences. The use of analogical reasoning and the 
participants’ way of relating to contemporary issues is the most substantial ground for these 
discussions. 
The canonical texts can be said to have both a divisive and unitive function in the 
communication of the group: the texts are divisive when the participants constructively express 
their own religious faith and unitive when the texts are seen to represent a challenge (as texts, or 
through interpretative representations of the text), thus requiring a critical perspective from the 
participants. The discussions on the Hagar/Hajar narrative turned out to divide the Christian and 
the Muslim participants over against each other more than the discussions on Sura 4:34 and 1 
Timothy 2:8-15. The making of meaning of the Hagar/Hajar narratives became a constructive 
project for the Muslim participants (less so for the Christians), whereas the prescriptive texts 
represented a challenge and a dilemma for both, creating a unitive critical approach.  
 
 
Is the Group Process a Dialogue? 
I have refrained so far from naming the group process of making meaning a dialogue. Now the 
time has come to situate the process in dialogical terms, and I will start doing so by evaluating 
the function of difference in the group and comparing it to the function of difference in the two 
suggested models of transreligious dialogue given in Chapter 2 (“Difference as Constitutive” and 
“Difference as Challenge”). 
During the group process differences are regarded both as constitutive and as challenging 
(cf. the titles of the two models). In the discussions on the Hagar/Hajar narratives as well as in 
the first, more general discussions on the Bible and the Koran, religious differences were 
highlighted by some of the Christian participants. The Muslim participants showed that their 
view of the narratives was different from the Christian participants’ more critical approach to the 
figures of Abraham/Ibrahim and Hagar/Hajar – as well as to the narratives themselves. 
Differences were usually interpreted as constitutive: important to identify and significant to 
claim. Even some of the attempts to suggest a common ground for the two traditions (done 
primarily by the Muslim participants) were interpreted within the framework of difference: to 
minimize the importance of difference was articulated as an unwanted transgression for one of 
the Christian participants. 
The general approach to differences changed in the process of making meaning of the 
prescriptive texts. Confronted with these texts, the challenges perceived by the participants 
seemed to force them into viewing differences differently. It became obvious that contextual and 
historical knowledge about the texts was required for making meaning, and the participants (in 
particular the Christian participants) started to view the religious differences as a possible 
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resource for acquiring this knowledge. This comes closer to viewing difference as a (positive) 
challenge, as in the second model.  
In discussing the prescriptive texts, shared critical views on the subjugation of women in 
the Christian and Islamic traditions also shifted the focus of the group to be more concerned with 
contextual challenges. Common contextual challenges, identified through the discussions on the 
texts, overruled the religious differences. The differences were thus transposed from religious 
differences to contextual differences, and the discussion turned into trying to situate the contexts 
and negotiate what to view as significant contexts. Gradually, the geographical perspective of the 
group also became more inclusive through the references to contexts other than Norway, where 
women face greater difficulties because of the prescriptive texts. This process of enlarging the 
geographical scope started in the Hagar/Hajar discussions, but it did not become a shared subject 
at that stage. The enlarged perspective motivates the participants (in particular the Christian 
participants) to relate to the biblical texts anew because of the reception of the text in other 
contemporary contexts. This happens as an act of solidarity and is not motivated by the texts 
themselves.  
Both models of dialogue, with respect to how differences are viewed, are thus 
represented in the group’s process. The texts seem to cause the change from seeing differences as 
constitutive to seeing differences as a challenge, as a source for knowledge, a possibility to 
enlarge the scope of what should be the significant context. But this shift may also follow a 
process in the group, regardless of the texts. The numerical attendance of participants had 
dropped considerably when the shift took place, and a more intimate group (with the most 
devoted participants?) could perhaps provide different social frames encouraging such a process. 
According to both the models, then, the group process may well be called a transreligious 
dialogue. There are other elements in the communication too, suggesting that dialogical values 
are present during the meaning-making process. Comments about the communicative process 
itself show awareness and self-reflection. How to communicate in a respectful manner and still 
be able to speak one’s mind is one of the issues addressed in these meta-reflections. This is an 
important matter to consider in most dialogues so as to prevent a transreligious encounter from 
turning into either endless mutual confrontations without substantial communicative exchange or 
a conversation containing nothing but polite phrases – also without substantial communicative 
exchange. When a self-reflecting perspective is included in a dialogue, it may be possible to 
avoid both pitfalls. 
Self-reflection and even self-critique on behalf of one’s own religious or cultural tradition 
seems to fertilize the making of meaning of both texts and context. Critique may function in 
exactly the opposite way if criticism is directed only toward representatives of the other (religion 
or culture), since it usually encourages defense strategies. In the latter case, differences may 
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become borders, but in the first case, the religious or cultural tradition represented is destabilized 
through self-reflection and may thus become more open for interpretation, challenges, and 
interaction. 
Let us return to the two models of transreligious dialogue: the concept of diasporic 
imagination (Kwok) and Bal’s suggestion regarding the “bold use of anachronisms” introduced 
in Chapter 2 were suggested as hermeneutical tools used by the participants in the meaning-
making process. Both diasporic imagination and the “bold use of anachronisms” destabilize the 
borders between “here” and “there” (Kwok), and “then” and “now” (Bal). This destabilizing may 
influence the concept of religious traditions as well, suggesting that the interpretation of 
canonical scriptures is dynamic, rather than static, and that the cultural representation of a 
religious tradition is fluid rather than fixed. The question arises if these hermeneutical tools 
would be regarded as valid in the dialogue model where religious differences are seen as 
constitutive.  
The Muslim participants defend their belief and their view of the Koran as a resource for 
the believers, and at the same time underline the common values between different religious 
traditions (“the peoples of the book”). This might be interpreted as fitting well with a model of 
dialogue that comes close to the practice of Scriptural Reasoning (“Difference as Constitutive”). 
But the challenge the Muslim participants identify as threats to Muslim women’s right to self-
determination or to Islam as a religious tradition is not secularism. Rather, the Muslim 
participants identify the challenges either found within the Islamic tradition (lack of knowledge, 
both historical and contextual), or they identify the threats as political. The political challenge 
they address is related to a lack of social and political stability and democratic rights in some 
Muslim majority countries and to the lack of access to education for all. They state that these 
issues have a direct influence on Muslims’ possibilities of interpreting the Islamic tradition 
(including the Koran) in a way that secures women’s rights. But they also challenge, although 
less directly, the Western politicized discourses on Islam where this particular tradition is viewed 
as inferior (to the Western culture and the Christian tradition) by supporting the subjugation of 
women. This also poses a threat to the freedom of interpreting and reinterpreting the Koran and 
sharia because Muslims have to use their energy and focus simply to defend their right to be 
Muslims. 
The Christian participants, in particular those with a Norwegian background, defend what 
they conceive to be their Christian freedom and the concept of gender equality as interpreted in 
the Norwegian society. For the most part, they place the challenges to women’s rights in the 
Christian tradition in the past. Only late in the process do they reflect on challenges in the 
present – although outside their primary religious and cultural context. In their (perceived) lack 
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of present challenges regarding gender justice in Norwegian society, they focus instead on the 
challenges discussed by their Muslim co-participants.  
Whenever some of the participants try to frame the differences between the Christian and 
Islamic traditions (it is usually some of the Christian participants who try to do this), the 
discussions following these attempts show that to agree on what the differences between the two 
traditions are is a disputed issue itself (at least in this group). This suggests that framing and 
articulating religious differences between these two traditions and their implications is a 
complicated issue if one intends to describe the difference(s) in a way acknowledged by all 
parties involved. This may be useful to bear in mind when relating to differences in a 
transreligious dialogue: the power of definition regarding differences should ideally be shared (to 
fulfill the search for equality in a dialogue), and differences could be regarded differently from 
various positions. 
To answer the question in the title: there is no doubt that the meaning-making process of 
the group can be called a transreligious dialogue according to the two models suggested in 
Chapter 2 and because of the dialogical qualities appearing in the group’s process. The 
methodology of this study, however, where the researcher decides on which texts to discuss and 
who should participate, is not consistent with the idea of a dialogue as presented in Chapter 2. 
The answer is thus both yes and no. The participants make the encounter a dialogue (of different 
kinds), but the selected frame for this study’s empirical research violates the dialogical rule of 
mutuality in deciding topics, access to the conversation and the control over the encounter. 
 
Lack of Balance in Attention Regarding the Christian and Islamic Texts – A Problem? 
The texts from the Islamic tradition generally receive more attention than the biblical texts – 
from all of the participants. Equally, the contextual challenges identified by the Muslim 
participants are discussed more. What does this mean? Does it entail a lack of interest by the 
Muslim participants in the Christian tradition and (paradoxically) a lack of such interest by the 
Christian participants themselves? The Muslim participants may be better informed about the 
Norwegian majority discourses than the Christian participants (including the ones with a plural 
cultural background) are of Muslim discourses, which are minority discourses. But the majority 
discourse does not necessarily provide knowledge about the Christian tradition as such. The 
Christian participants, as part of the religious majority in Norway, may be expected by the 
Muslim participants to be well informed about the Christian tradition, and the Muslim 
participants themselves may regard the Christian tradition to be known through their knowledge 
of the Norwegian majority discourse. This could explain the lack of curiosity from the side of the 
Muslim participants in the Christian tradition (contrasted by the curiosity in the Islamic tradition 
expressed by the Christians). The Muslim participants are probably, due to the current political 
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climate in the West, used to having to explain about their faith and their tradition, which also 
makes them seek knowledge to equip themselves for this task. The Christian participants do not 
meet these requirements to the same degree. This, however, may not be the entire explanation. 
Another way to see it is that the current intrareligious debate in Islam is focusing a great deal 
precisely on matters of textual interpretation and women’s situation. In Norway, the intensity of 
the debate on biblical interpretation and women issues in the Lutheran church is, generally 
speaking, rather low at present. For the encounter between the Christian and the Muslim women 
in this project, this means they are probably influenced by the debates – or lack them – in their 
respective religious communities. Their stake in this project is thus different. 
 
What Is in It – and for Whom? 
What was revealed of the participants’ motivations in taking part in this study, and what kept 
them motivated throughout the process?  
The Muslim women generally wanted a broader understanding of Islam and work within 
the Muslim community on the reinterpretation of koranic texts and sharia. The Christian 
participants shifted from a critically questioning of the Islamic sources and Islam into a listening 
position where they recognized the contextual knowledge of the Muslim participants as 
necessary for their making meaning of Sura 4:34. The Muslim participants aimed at sharing 
knowledge and experiences. The Christian participants generally aimed at being able to question 
both traditions (including the texts), and then gradually at receiving knowledge. This is the 
general pattern, although there are several exceptions in the material. The interpretative efforts of 
the Muslim participants made some of the Christian participants ask for more knowledge about 
their own tradition and the biblical texts. In this respect, the encounter may represent an 
encouragement for them to study their own history of interpretation. 
 The Christian participants, however, were also eager to support the attempts of the 
Muslim participants at reinterpretation, even by suggesting ways to improve the practice of 
gender justice in Muslim communities.  
 Achieving agreement at a religious or cultural level was not presented as an aim for any 
of the participants. A moral agreement on aiming at improving the situation of women who were 
oppressed by religious or cultural traditions was present in the group from the beginning, but 
most openly articulated in Part IV. If this had not been the case, I believe that, for some of the 
participants, it would have been an aim to make the group agree on this as a moral issue. During 
the group process, it was explicitly expressed by some of the participants that religious and 
cultural differences were expected and accepted, and this seemed to be the case for the most part 
– although at times the differences were discussed intensely. To be able to engage in such a 
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discussion through participation in the project may have been a motivation in itself for some of 
the participants. 
 
 
A Dialogically Situated Feminist Hermeneutics 
The fact that the participants agreed on the moral issue of gender justice does not necessarily 
imply that they understand feminism in the same way. The participants share the belief that their 
respective religious traditions originally aimed at gender justice but have been corrupted by 
patriarchal cultural influences and/or by men given the interpretative authority and using it to 
subjugate women. This evaluation of the relation between their religion and patriarchy enables 
them to keep their religious beliefs and their feminist stance together. Some (Christian and 
Muslim) participants use their religious tradition directly to argue for feminism.  
 The participants were divided along cultural rather than religious lines in addressing the 
need for feminist-oriented change in the contexts to which they relate. The Norwegian Christian 
participants express open satisfaction about the status of women in their faith community (The 
Church of Norway) and in Norwegian society in general. They do not criticize their faith 
community or Norwegian society in this respect but hold them up as ideals. Some critical 
remarks about men’s lack of engagement in practical family life at the end of the study is the 
only crack in the Norwegian Christians’ portrayal of their immediate religious and cultural 
surroundings’ achievements regarding gender equality. Their feminist criticism is directed 
toward the canonical texts, toward the past, and toward other cultural and/or religious traditions.  
 The Muslim participants direct their feminist criticism primarily toward interpretations of 
the Koran and sharia in the Muslim communities globally, including Norway. The status of the 
Koran as above criticism is defended in the name of gender justice, because it is exactly this 
status that is needed to use the Koran as a tool strong enough for change within the Islamic 
community. To undermine the status of the Koran would mean undermining the most important 
tool in their struggle. 
 What the participants do agree about is the use of gender equality or gender justice as a 
moral measuring stick to evaluate either the texts themselves or interpretations of the texts. 
Using the texts to ensure male dominance in the private as well as the public realm is judged as 
unacceptable for all. One of the Muslim participants comes close to saying that this could be 
seen as men aiming for the authority and power that belongs to God alone (cf. Amina Wadud’s 
statement about patriarchy as shirk). A Christian participant calls the message in 1 Timothy 2:15 
on childbirth as the only way to salvation for women completely unchristian. Discrimination 
against women in the name of Christianity and Islam is regarded as a misrepresentation of 
traditions that ought to change. 
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The content and understanding of feminism, gender quality, and gender justice is 
differently constructed in the meaning making. A gendered hermeneutics based on viewing men 
and women as essentially different, based on an understanding of these differences as universal 
and influencing women and men’s textual and contextual interpretation, is represented. A view 
that gendered categories are less important than social and cultural background and individual 
experiences are, however, also present. Equally, the ideal for the social and structural positioning 
regarding gender varies from full equality at all levels to a complementary model where men and 
women have equal status but different roles. The latter view is indirectly (for the most part) 
present through some of the Muslim participants’ reasoning. Other statements by the Muslim 
participants suggest that they relate to a model of full equality.   
The different views presented are sometimes conflicting, particularly when the Christian 
participants directly criticize the texts. Usually, however, the different views of gender roles and 
gender models or criticism of male misuse of the religious traditions to obtain control over 
women do not create conflicts and disagreements. But the perception of the Islamic tradition as 
subjugating women per se, expressed by some of the Christian participants at the beginning of 
the project, does create tension. Some attempts by the Christian participants to describe 
differences between the two traditions according to the requirement of obedience (for women) 
are argued by the Muslim participants to be a narrowing of both traditions. 
The Muslim participants situate their feminist hermeneutics when they apply both an 
interpretational strategy of liberation and a strategy of survival to Sura 4:34. In doing so, their 
contextual knowledge and pragmatic considerations on the basis of this knowledge becomes 
visible. The Christian participants situate their feminist hermeneutics in the Norwegian context 
marked by an ideal of gender equality and their experience of this equality. The challenge of 
gender inequality is transposed to other religious traditions and contexts other than this 
Norwegian one. The struggle for women’s rights is placed mainly by the religious and cultural 
other, whom they are ready to support. In the encounter the Muslims may feel that their feminist 
stance as a valid feminism is questioned at times, whereas the Christians may feel that what is 
questioned is not their feminism but the quality of their religiosity. Keeping feminism and 
religious belief together may be more complicated when encountering a representative of another 
religion where the relation between the two may be constructed differently. 
 
Suggesting a Road to Change: A Search for the Involvement of Men 
The Muslim participants point to knowledge and ability to relate in a relevant way to 
contemporary challenges by religious leaders and Muslim believers in general as the primary 
tool for the improvement of women’s situation. The Christian participants are less optimistic 
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about knowledge as a tool, but they generally have fewer strategies for change because most of 
them evaluate their situation to be satisfactory. 
The participants seem to agree, however, on the need to have men assume responsibility 
in a struggle for gender justice in private and in public. Although confirming their own right to 
act and speak, and to encourage other women to do the same is viewed as important, the 
engagement of men is strongly demanded. But this should not be at the expense of women’s 
agency. Women and men should struggle together to fight the difficulties created by what the 
participants view as a patriarchal misuse of the traditions – sharing the burden and sharing the 
work.  
 The status of a transreligious (Muslim-Christian) attempt in this respect is not discussed 
broadly, although the Muslim participants do invite the Christian participants to collaboration. A 
shared agency is taken on with respect to making meaning of the texts within the frames of the 
group, but regarding a broader implementation of gender justice, a common organized agency is 
not clearly articulated. To make men responsible agents in a struggle for gender justice, and to 
struggle for re-interpretation of the Islamic texts in Muslim communities, are the most clearly 
articulated agencies in the group shared by all. 
 
 
Gender Justice: A Dream Only? 
Discussing the implications and content of gender equality and gender justice is not only about 
women and men as gendered beings. Women and men may also be religious believers – 
Christians and Muslims – and they are individuals connected to social, cultural, and political 
groups. Cultural and religious plurality challenges the interpretation of the concepts of equality 
and justice: Who has the authority to decide what equality and justice means? Transreligious 
dialogue on differences as a challenge and as a possible resource acknowledges that change and 
new perspectives requires instability. Plurality leading to instability is thus a possibility rather 
than a threat. The space created when different views (religious, cultural, political) encounter one 
another on unstable ground provides hope for change while continuously discussing what change 
means.  
 This study shows that Christian and Muslim women have great hope in their religious 
traditions, and that they are finding tools in the Christian and Islamic traditions respectively that 
prove to be useful in their meaning-making struggle for gender justice. The Muslim participants 
rely on the Koran and aim at improved knowledge among Muslims. The Christians rely on the 
example of Jesus, on Luther – and in addition, on Norwegian state feminism. When they meet, 
challenges other than gender equality appear: What about equality and justice between Christians 
and Muslims, and equality and justice between people from different social and cultural 
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backgrounds? This is the challenge of an intersectional analysis of power: always ask the other 
question. 
In most transreligious dialogues the challenge of equality is posed the other way around: 
acknowledging religious equality and obtaining politically just treatment of different religions in 
a society (to a lesser extent cultural and social equality) is often articulated as an explicit aim, 
whereas gender equality and gender justice is not addressed.  
In the form of a testimony, one of the Christian and one of the Muslim participants – both 
in their sixties with a long and winding road behind them – described the time and place for a 
strong personal experience of human equality. The Muslim participant described her experience 
of sa’y, where men and women from all over the world were struggling side by side during hajj 
in the footsteps of Hajar. The Christian participant described contemporary Norwegian society 
where she found that the message of Jesus about human equality was finally converted into 
social and political practice. I believe that the conversations shared as empirical material in this 
study are taking place in a fruitful tension between these two, shared images of the experienced 
implementation of human equality.  
The inclusion of some usually implies the exclusion of others, but the possibility of 
widening the spaces where human equality can be experienced across gender, religious, social, 
and cultural background emerges as a possible moral commitment to be assumed together – 
across the two poles of Norway and Mecca reflected in the above-mentioned testimonies. These 
spaces can be derived neither from the concept of Christian Norwegian-ness nor from the 
concept of Islam alone. At the same time both can contribute substantially to a web of making 
meaning that may help in producing places of human equality. 
My hope for this study is that it may prove to be useful for some when they look for 
resources and tools to include women’s issues – aiming at gender justice in Muslim-Christian 
dialogue and in studying Muslim-Christian relations. The responsibility toward both text and 
context and the acknowledged need to meet face to face in order to get knowledge about the 
other demonstrated in this study is hopefully encouraging others to embark on the challenging 
and necessary act of reading canonical scriptures together, as Muslims and Christians. The reader 
should not be afraid: the participants in this study show that it is possible to address the most 
challenging texts and issues concerning women in the two traditions – and still keep talking to 
each other.  
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